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Abstract
ABSTRACT OF JACK J. COE’s PhD THESIS
International Commercial Disputes are Distinctive and 
Often Exceedingly Intricate
The classic influences which make private international law 
and international business planning multifaceted render 
international business disputes challenging to dissect and 
resolve. Conflicts of regulation and putative mandatory laws 
coincide with multiple languages, cultures, currencies, and 
interests to generate disputes that pose special problems and 
implicate tremendous resources. Given these realities, arbitra­
tion has emerged as an important fixture in international 
business planning. States have an interest in being able to offer 
suitable mechanisms to promote the arbitral process.
The FAA Is Outmoded and Discourages Selection of 
the United States as A Neutral Situs
The main body of the work argues that the Federal Arbitration 
Act of 1925 should be replaced by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law for disputes characterized as “international.” The present 
statutory regime is fragmentary and complex; there are many 
arcane intersections between federal and state law and no 
centralizing, unifying framework. Anecdotal accounts suggest 
that these negative attributes discourage selection of the United 
States as a neutral venue for international arbitration.
The UNCITRAL Model Law is the Apt Replacement 
for the FAA as to International Disputes
The Model Law was drafted by experts, is balanced in its 
accommodation of the common law and civil law traditions, is
2
becoming increasingly well tested, provides a framework 
which is familiar to non-Americans and not greatly at odds 
with existing U.S. doctrine. The arguments against it are, on 
balance, not compelling, especially given that the basic Model 
can be augmented to account for certain matters dictated by the 
U.S. Constitution and by recent developments.
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AUTHOR’S FOREWORD
The year 2000 will mark—rather inconspicuously—the passage of 
roughly one decade since the question of reforming the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) by reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law 
generated learned debate within the American arbitration 
community.1 Ironically, the interim has been characterized by 
remarkable reform activity outside the United States and astonishing 
inertia within its borders; the debate continued abroad, leaving in 
the United States only apparent stalemate. The intervening years 
have only strengthened the author’s belief that reform, while not a 
matter of dire emergency, is inevitable.2 So too have they brought 
the recognition that the UNCITRAL Model Law is far more than 
a quick-fix for lesser-developed countries bereft o f modern statutes 
and of expertise sufficient to remedy their plight; dozens of 
states—of all stripes—have now embraced it,3 accounting for “more 
than one quarter of the world’s territory.”4 Other states, though not 
adopting the Model Law, have borrowed liberally from it.
This work explores modern characteristics of international 
commercial arbitration, time-honored and emerging issues 
associated therewith and the implications o f the foregoing for
1 The leading essayists were Kolkey, 1 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 491 
(1990)(favoring Model Law adoption) and Messrs. Rivkin and 
Kellner, id. at 535 (against adoption).
2 As Kolkey wrote in 1990:
The world has changed dramatically since 1925 when the FAA was 
first enacted. The surprise is that the law has lasted as long as it has, 
not that it is in need of reform today.
1 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. at 534.
3 Model Law states are listed at Chapter 8, § 8.6 (notes).
4 Correspondence with Professor James E. Byrne, Commercial Law 
Association, May 24, 1998 (on file with author).
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arbitral reform in the United States. It notes in particular the 
renewed promise of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a paradigm for 
modernizing the American regime applicable to international 
disputes.
Organizationally, this monograph proceeds from general to 
specific, endeavoring to create context and foreshadowing before 
engaging in detailed discussion. To achieve word economy, the 
abbreviations in the preceding table will be employed.5
5 Infrequently occurring authority, however, will be cited in full.
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Chapter 1
BUSINESS PLANNING-SELECTED THEMES 
IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Chapter Contents
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Interdependence and the Global Marketplace
1.3 The Transnational Planning Milieu
1.4 Moderating Influences
1.5 Traditional Mechanisms and Cyber-Commerce
1.6 Transnational Business Disputes—Implications of the 
Foregoing
1.1 Introduction
International business disputes originate and complete their 
course among forces that make them distinctive and often 
exceedingly complex. This chapter selectively introduces 
features of the international business environment that bear 
upon dispute settlement. Though merely an impressionistic 
outline, it provides a backdrop for the chapters that follow.
1.2 Interdependence and the Global Marketplace
1.2 .1  In  Ge n er a l
Business perspectives and strategies have become transna­
tional1 to an unprecedented degree in response to the develop­
ment of international markets and the infrastructures that serve
1 The literature sometimes distinguishes among “global,” “interna­
tional” and “transnational.” Unless otherwise indicated, however, 
those terms will be used interchangeably in this work.
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them. Even small investors are now regularly advised to 
consider their options in global terms,2 as has long been done 
by their institutional counterparts.3 Stock exchanges are now 
widely dispersed4 and companies, large and small, plan their 
fund-raising accordingly.5 Computerization and advances in 
telecommunications,6 in turn, allow myriad transactions to 
occur on a 24-hour basis7 and with unprecedented speed.8 
Concurrently, the world’s financial and equity markets demon­
2 See M. Sesit, Why I t’s Time for Investors to Think Globally, Wall 
St. J., Apr. 23, 1993, at C l, C14.
3 See generally B. Longstreth, A Look at the SEC’s Adaptation to 
Global Market Pressures, 33 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 319 (1995).
4 See Scott & P. Wellons (3d ed.) 32-52 (excerpting Report of the 
Staff of the SEC on the Internationalization of Securities Markets
(1987)).
5 See D. Braverman, U.S. Legal Considerations Affecting Global 
Offerings of Shares in Foreign Companies, in Norton & Auerback, 
at 14.
6 E.g., J. Keller and M. Carnevale, Clear Message: MCI-BT Tie Is 
Seen Setting Off a Battle In Communications, Wall St. J., June 3, 
1993, at A1 (international alliances among long distance carriers 
intended to “globalize” corporate communications); see also W. 
Sechrest, Six Global Business and Financial Trends: A Lesson about 
Interconnectedness, in Norton & Auerback at 20 (discussing the 
impact of a “global network of instantaneous information”).
7 See generally S. Hunter, The Status and Evolution of Twenty-Four 
Hour Trading: A Trader’s View of International Transactions, 
Clearance, and Settlement, 4 B.U. Int’l L.J. 15 (1986).
8 Cf. J. Norton and C. Olive, Globalization o f Financial Risks and 
International Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons 
from the Barings Debacle, 30 Int’l Law. 301 (1996).
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strate both remarkable interdependence9 and persistent 
innovativeness.10
Transnational approaches to market development and direct 
investment are now prevalent. Prompted by various factors and 
encouraged by receding trade barriers,11 businesses large and 
small increasingly look beyond familiar territory and traditional 
arrangements; in the process, new forms of international 
collaboration and foreign presence have emerged as have new
9 See, e.g., One World, One Market, U.S.News & World Rep., Nov. 
10, 1997, at 40 (“Three markets, three time zones, same con­
cerns... ”).
10 See Scott & Wellons (3d ed.) at 32-41.
11 Multilateral and regional processes have been underway for decades. 
Of paramount importance is the process induced by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 55 U.N.T.S.187 
(effective Jan. 1, 1948) through which have occurred substantial 
reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers, understandings affecting 
non-tariff barriers and commitments on services, trade-related, 
aspects of intellectual property and numerous other subjects bearing 
on market entry. The above undertakings embrace 50-plus separate 
texts linked together by a single integrating document—The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Charter. See Jackson et al., at 316-17.
The fifteen-member European Union (EU) is the most sophisticat­
ed of the regional arrangements now functioning. It exists to 
enhance within the Union the flow of goods, services, capital, and 
persons. Its quasi-federal evolution has pursued legal and economic 
integration that is both geographically and politically “wide” and 
systemically “deep. ” Its potential for expanded membership (perhaps 
to include many Eastern European states) and tightening affiliation 
with the remaining European Free Trade Association (EFTA) coun­
tries portend a process that will carry well into the next century. 
Standard references include: T. Hartley, T h e  F o u n d a t io n s  o f  
E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n ity  L a w  (3d ed. 1994); D. Lasok, L a w  a n d  
I n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n itie s  (6th ed. 1994).
30
Chapter 1: Global Context
terms to describe them.12 Nation states too are being coun­
seled to “align their policies with the forces of globalization by 
embracing reforms [and] liberalizing markets. . . .”13
For its part, the multi-national corporation (MNC)—a fabled 
and variously defined player—continues to be a principal 
steward of wealth and technology, a potent force in currency 
markets,14 and a cardinal vehicle for global development.15
Given the foregoing, it was to be expected that lawyers and 
law firms would become “globalized;” and so they have. To 
cultivate new clients and serve existing ones in their operations 
abroad, many firms have established branch offices, formed 
alliances with distant firms and pursued similar initiatives.16
12 “Strategic alliance,” and “outsourcing” are now part of standard 
business jargon. See generally M. Yoshino & U. Rangan, S t r a t e ­
g ic  A l l i a n c e s  (1995).
13 IMF Annual Report: 199724 (discussing improved global prosperity 
linked to “rapid integration of national economies worldwide 
through trade, financial flows, technology spillovers, information 
networks and cross-cultural currents”).
14 Multinationals as Mini-banks: Major Players in Their Own Right 
(Survey), Fin. Times, May 27, 1986, at VII.
15 Recognizing these realities, developing states typically welcome 
affiliations with such enterprises. For some countries, this has 
required a repudiation of the anti-MNC rhetoric and disquieting 
policies of not long ago. Cf. Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign 
Direct Investment, 1 ICSID Foreign Inv. L.J. 295, 297 (1992) and 
Report to the Development Committee, id. at 315-16 (World Bank 
project to educate host governments).
16 See, e.g., S. Goldberg, The British Go Global, A.B.A. J., Apr. 
1993, at 51.
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1.2.2 Cyber-Trade—The  Emerging Phenomenon
The advent of the internet and its immediate appeal among 
traders and consumers alike has spawned a phenomenon that 
has permanently altered the landscape of international trade.17 
“Bom global”, electronic commerce takes many forms, direct 
and indirect,18 and is remarkably dynamic. It is “now rapidly 
expanding into a complex web of commercial activities 
transacted on a global scale between an ever increasing number 
of participants, corporate and individual, known and unknown, 
on global open networks. . . .”19 
The modalities of product promotion and delivery are 
integrally part of the sea change now underway. Fluidity, 
innovation and hybridization are the principal characteristics of 
the emerging mechanisms, which remain built largely but not 
exclusively upon the Internet.20
17 See generally Adams; EC Commission, A European Initiative in 
Electronic Commerce, Communication of April 16, 1997 (hereinaf­
ter European Initiative).
18 In “direct” electronic commerce intangible goods and services are 
delivered on-line. “Indirect,” e-commerce by contrast, entails 
transactions in tangible goods and services, delivered. European 
Initiative at 4.
19 Id. at para. 6. Thus there has already developed “a wide array of 
innovative virtual businesses, markets and trading communities.” Id. 
at paras. 8-9. In many industries, outsourcing over the internet has 
become commonplace. Id.
20 Promotion of electronic commerce includes activities and media 
other than the Internet which is “rapidly federating other forms of 
electronic commerce” and is generating new forms “by combining, 
for example, digital television infomercials with Internet response 
mechanisms (for immediate ordering), CD-ROM extensions (for 
memory intensive multimedia demonstrations).” Id. at para. 8.
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Predictions vary, but one forecast envisions web-generated 
sales alone to account for US $300 billion in annual global 
revenues by the year 2000.21 Others place the number consid­
erably higher.22 The obstacles that remain to exponential 
growth in on-line commercial relations are more technical than 
legal. In particular, the privacy and security that consumers 
and commercial entities desire will require greater accessibility 
to existing technologies—such as digital certification23—and 
greater harmonization among existing protocols.24
Not surprisingly, cyber-trade poses fundamental questions 
of trade policy.25 Should it be free of all but public health and 
safety regulation? Should it be brought formally within the 
WTO (GATT) process? How is it to be reconciled among 
competing national tax systems? And, how can increasingly 
sophisticated encoding technologies best be subjugated to 
national and international security imperatives?26
21 Chasia at 2.
22 One research firm predicts in the business-to-business market alone 
(excluding consumer sales) revenues of over $700 billion will be 
generated from “web commerce.” Adams at 44.
23 Digital certificates are software applications designed to prove one’s 
identity in cyber-space so as to qualify for a particular transaction. 
Adams at 42.
24 Digital certificates are issued by certificate authorities (CAs). There 
is at present no international standard for such certificates. One CA 
may not verify another CA’s certificate; so, the vouching process 
may break down. Id.
25 See generally A Framework for Global Commerce (White House: 
July 1, 1997) (arguing for a minimalist approach to regulation).
26 See, e.g., O. Ullman, The FBI vs Silicon Valley, Bus. Week, Sept. 
29, 1997, at 47 (exports of encryption technology problematic).
33
Chapter 1: Global Context
1.3 The Transnational Planning Milieu
1.3 .1  Th e  Reg u la to r y  E n v ir o n m e n t
No single source dispenses “global” commercial law, either 
regulatory or judicial. Rather, national legal systems individ­
ually develop substantive rules aimed at such conduct as each 
deems to be within its prescriptive jurisdiction.27 This lack of 
centralization means that, despite certain influences tending to 
unify national law, rights and duties may change as activities 
cross state boundaries. In addition, because jurisdictions such 
as the United States purport to give extraterritorial effect to 
certain laws affecting business,28 regulatory overlap and 
conflict sometimes occur.29 Thus, one commentator predicts:
[t]he future conflicts of laws will not so much be a problem of 
choice between contractually agreed rules and imperative rules
27 Concerning prescriptive (or “legislative”) jurisdiction. See Born, 
L i t ig a t io n  at 493-544.
28 Under the often discussed “effects” doctrine, activities occurring 
outside the U.S. territory can be subject to U.S. regulation if they 
affect U.S. interstate or foreign commerce. See United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(the seminal case; Sherman Act applied to conduct intentionally 
affecting U.S. commerce). EU authorities have also embraced the 
doctrine in administering EU Competition law, as have certain 
national authorities. See R. Weintraub, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L i t ig a t io n  
a n d  A r b i t r a t i o n  P r a c t i c e  a n d  P la n n in g  354 (1997).
29 See § 1.4.2 infra and notes thereto, discussing Hartford Ins. (1993) 
(holding extraterritorial application of antitrust law permissible; no 
restraint imposed by comity).
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having binding character, but a problem of choice between two 
sets of rules both of which have a loi de police character.30
U.S. antitrust and securities laws are but part of a distinctive 
regulatory patchwork addressing the morals of the international 
marketplace. Other well-known components are the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),31 certain antiboycott laws,32 
the Export Administration Act and the highly controversial 
Helms Burton Act.33
In Western Europe, the basic regulatory pattern constructed 
along national lines is augmented, and sometimes preempted, 
by European Union law,34 which affects most aspects of com­
mercial endeavor within the Member States. Competition Law, 
once a primary focus, is now but one source of concern; of
30 S. Jarvin, Arbitration of Antitrust and Competition Issues—An 
Overview of the Situation in Some Major Western Jurisdictions, 
(1994) Y.B. Arb. Inst. Stockholm Ch. Comm. 55, at 86; cf. J. 
Baselow, Conflicts of Economic Regulation, 42 Amer. J. Compar. 
L. 423 (1994) (discussing need for refinements in conflicts doctrine 
given coexistence of national laws addressing international transac­
tions).
31 The FCPA prohibits bribes and certain other payments to foreign 
officials. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78m, 78ff (1977) 
(amended 1988). See generally J. Impert, A Program for Compli­
ance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Foreign Law 
Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 Int’l Law. 1009 (1990).
32 The Internal Revenue Code (§ 999) and the Export Administration 
Act provide penalties for those who cooperate in boycotts against Is­
rael. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2407, 2410 (1991) and 15 
C.F.R. § 769.2(a) (1993) (Prohibitions against refusals to do 
business and against furnishing various types of information). See 
also T. Burton, Caught in the Act, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1993, at 
A1 ($6.6 million in fines against U.S. company).
33 See, e.g., M. Wilkey and C. Giesze, Helms-Burton: Two Viewpoints 
26(2) ABA Int’l L. News (Spring 1997) at 1, 5.
34 See generally Jackson et al. at 185-214.
35
Chapter 1: Global Context
equal importance are EU environmental35 and consumer 
protection measures36 and numerous other areas treated in 
regulatory detail. The increasingly intricate labyrinth37 re­
quires full-time monitoring and specialist assistance.38 Other 
regions, of course, present their own challenges.
1.3.2 Traps for the U nw ary
A move from domestic to international operations exposes an 
enterprise to various new forms of regulatory, commercial and 
political risk. In anticipating these, domestic analogues take the 
business planner only so far. There are, for example, the 
special protections given by law to one class of participants vis 
a vis another; in a generic sense both the dealer protection 
laws known in Western Europe39 and the partial immunity
35 See, e.g., Council Regulation 1734/88, 1988, O.J. (L155) (on 
export and import of certain dangerous chemicals); Council Regula­
tion 3322/88, 1988, O.J. (L297) (on certain chlorofluorocarbons and 
halogens that affect the ozone layer).
36 For example, Member States’ laws now contain provisions making 
product suppliers liable without proof of fault for personal injury 
resulting from defective products. See Council Directive 85/374, 
1985 O.J. (L374).
37 Several forms of EU legislation are used in the process. The 
principal modalities are Council Directives and Regulations. See 
Hartley, supra note 11, at 107-10.
38 Cf. A Guide: Solicitors of England and Wales 9 (1994) (“to advise 
clients on European Union matters, about 40 English solicitors’ 
firms have set up offices in Brussels while others have formed 
associations with lawyers in Belgium and other Member States”).
39 See A. Saltoun and B. Spudis, International Distribution and Sales 
Agency Agreements: Practical Guidelines for U.S. Exporters, 38 
Bus. Law. 883, 914-916 (1983) (Table of Protective Legislation).
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given to sovereigns40 fit under this heading. The standard list 
of potentially surprising elements also includes low the levels 
of protection still given to intellectual property in some 
jurisdictions,41 the loss of profit that may accompany a 
currency’s fluctuation in value42 and numerous regulatory 
interventions such as exchange controls43 and export prohibi­
tions.44
40 See generally Restatement (Third) § 451 et seq.
41 In states where protection is available, treaties have facilitated access 
to it. The Paris Convention for the Protection o f Industrial Property, 
March 20, 1883, revised Stockholm, Jul. 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 1629, 1631, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, is arche­
typical. It requires nondiscriminatory (or “national”) treatment {id. , 
art. 2.) and establishes a priority rule, under which those who have 
duly filed an application {e.g., for a patent) in one member country 
enjoy a period of priority during which to file in other Union coun­
tries {id., art. 4). The TRIPs accord reached during the Uruguay 
Round of GATT built upon these first principles, improving the 
general level of protection on a global basis. In some countries, 
however, protection, remains weak. See J. Woo, New Trademark 
Laws in Asia Are Less Effective Than Firms Hoped, Wall St. J., 
Feb. 16, 1994, at B8.
42 See generally R. Weisweiller, I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  F o r e ig n  E x ­
c h a n g e  ch. 12 (1983). For the unprotected, a bargain once 
propitious may become onerous, making the temptation to breach 
nearly irresistible.
43 See International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Ex­
change Restrictions, IMF A n n u a l  R e p o r t  (1991) (listing over 120 
countries which utilize some form of exchange control). To lessen 
investor apprehension, modern foreign investment codes and 
bilateral investment treaties often contain provisions guaranteeing 
liberal conversion and repatriation of initial investment and earnings. 
See, e .g ., the U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty of Novem­
ber 14, 1991, Article V, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 124, 132 (1992).
44 Business planners combine general risk assessment techniques with 
anticipatory contract drafting and insurance to hedge against the 
foreseeable. See W. Hannay, Drafting Arbitration, Choice of Law, 
Force Majeure and Termination Clauses in International Transac­
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1.3.3 Cross-Cultural a n d  Linguistic Elements
The lore of international business bristles with anecdotal ac­
counts attesting to the impact of cultural dynamics on interna­
tional business relations. Added to the above-mentioned 
regulatory elements are others that both prompt disputes and 
make them more difficult to resolve. Particularly prevalent are 
linguistic issues. In verbal modes, complexity and potential for 
dispute enlarge when parties do not share the same mother 
tongue, since the collaborative processes that form, administer 
and adjust an understanding are highly dependent on relative 
parity.45 The written word may fair no better; nuanced but 
significant impediments such as false cognates, inaccurate 
translations, and disputes over the priority of texts may plague 
the relationship from the outset.46
Non-linguistic cross-cultural influences can also be influen­
tial. Such elements are manifold.47 Different conceptions of 
business ethics, negotiation style, gender roles, eye contact, 
gestures, personal space, the elderly, lawyers, alcohol, reli­
tions, in Battram & Goldsweig at 131. R. Allison, P r o t e c t i n g  
A g a in s t  t h e  E x p r o p r ia t io n  R isk  in  I n v e s t in g  A b r o a d  ch. 3
(1988).
45 See generally Salacuse at 28-33. At a minimum, disparities in lin­
guistic abilities will slow negotiations. Poor enunciation and limited 
vocabulary impede discussion and can result in serious misunder­
standings. Id. at 29. The use of interpreters may retard the process 
further, while changing significantly the dynamics of the negotiation. 
Id. at 28-30.
46 For examples, see Fox at 129-30.
47 See Foster {passim); The Economist, Business Bribes, in E s s e n ­
t i a l s  o f  B u s in e s s  E th ic s  390 (P. Madsen & J. Shafritz eds.,
1990); T. Griffin & W. Daggatt, T h e  G l o b a l  N e g o t i a t o r  171 
(1990); Salacuse {passim).
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gion, personal hygiene, truth-telling, privacy, gift-giving, 
punctuality and profit often promote differing habits and sensi­
bilities, enforced in some cases through government interven­
tion.48 Naturally, such diverse perspectives can lead to friction 
when potential partners try to forge and maintain a business 
relationship.49
Legal cultures may also diverge when lawyers from varied 
backgrounds interact, producing both conflicts in style50 and 
serious misunderstandings. The latter often result from 
oversimplification51 and faux amis.52
48 Please Don't Show Your Lingerie in Iran, Even If It's For Sale, 
Wall St. J., June 21, 1995, at 1.
49 Often, it is the mundaneness of a given practice that ushers in 
controversy. The existence of different calendars or the way in 
which dates are communicated, for example, may prompt serious 
misunderstandings. Consider, for example, the international fax that 
states that the goods being requested must be delivered no later than 
1-2-96. Does it refer to January 2 or February 1? Europeans will 
generally differ with Americans as to the answer.
50 Contract drafting styles provide a well-known illustration. Foster at 
292 (contrasting the “tomes” written by American attorneys with the 
brief “memorandums of understanding” issued by Chinese drafters). 
Matters of form may of course mask fundamental differences in 
methodology. In some legal systems a brief contract reflects the civil 
law conception that the relevant code’s standard provisions augment 
the writing, thus obviating excessive detail.
51 The notion of “a sale,” or due diligence, for example, may mean 
vastly different things to lawyers trained in different legal systems. 
W. Chu, Cross-BorderM & A, Bus. L. Today, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 
8, 9 (due diligence outside of the United States may be relatively 
abbreviated).
52 An American lawyer may assume (quite wrongly) that the civil 
law’s notary is essentially a notary public. See S. Baker and T. 
Barassi, The International Notarial Practitioner, 24(4) ABA Int’l L. 
News (1995); K. Zweigert & H . Kotz, A n  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  
C o m p a r a t iv e  L a w  (2d ed., T. Weir, trans., 1992).
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1.4 Moderating Influences
1.4.1 In  General
Although the transnational legal environment lacks perfect 
integration, making for an unsystematic patchwork of national 
legal regimes in occasional overlap and conflict with each 
other, several forces ameliorate what might otherwise be an 
international legal environment ruled predominantly by national 
idiosyncracies. First, systems sharing the same ancestry have 
a common core of substantive and procedural approaches that 
influence both statutory and nonstatutory sources of law.53 
Additionally, even among systems with different traditions, a 
measure of cross-pollination has produced some similarity.54
1.4.2 Judicial Tempering
Decades of diplomatic interchange and the influence of 
scholars have gradually led some American courts to develop 
thoughtful approaches to potentially exorbitant regulation, par­
ticularly in considering its application to the activities abroad
53 A common ‘tradition,’ however, does not imply, necessarily, 
predictable uniformity in rules and procedures; rather the similarity 
is most apparent in the study of attitudes and methods. See J. 
Merryman, T h e  C iv i l  L a w  T r a d i t i o n  1-5 (2d ed. 1985).
54 See R. Schlesinger, C o m p a r a t iv e  L aw : C a s e s - T e x t - M a t e r i a l s  
9-25 (4th ed. 1979). The author is informed that the team of 
comparative law specialists drafting Kazakstan’s Commercial Code 
is being greatly influenced by the Commercial law of Louisiana! 
Conversation with Professor Christopher Osakwe, American team 
member, September 1997.
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of non-American entities. In construing legislation, for 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed the pre­
sumption that, absent a clear indication to the contrary, statutes 
are intended not to be applied extraterritorially.55 Among 
federal courts, a second method of subduing potential conflict 
has also been evident—the weighing of foreign and domestic 
interests. Especially in relation to antitrust law, the presence 
of foreign elements and the interests of other states have been 
judicially assessed in delimiting legislative reach.56
Perhaps the tempering analysis that has received the most 
attention is the Ninth Circuit’s Timberlane57 formula. That 
three-step “jurisdictional rule of reason” requires a district 
court to consider not only the aims and magnitude of the 
conduct in question but also seven factors bearing upon 
comity.58 At present, however, the extent to which such a 
comity analysis is available to federal courts is subject to
55 EEOC, 499 U.S. at 247.
56 See generally Hawk at 118-57.
57 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 
1976) (:Timberlane I); 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (Timberlane 
III). For criticism, see Hawk at 122, 133-35.
58 These are:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality 
or allegiance of the parties and the locations of principal places of 
business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by 
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative 
significance of effects on the United States as compared with 
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to 
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such ef­
fect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of 
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.
Timberlane /, 549 F.2d at 614 (footnote omitted); Timberlane III, 
749 F.2d at 1384-86.
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question in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hartford 
Insurance decision, which held that a district court may not 
decline to exercise jurisdiction on comity grounds where the 
acts of the foreign defendants were not compelled by foreign 
law; it mattered not that the activities in question were lawful 
in the state in which they took place.59
A third maxim promoting self-restraint has been endorsed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in refining the law of in personam 
jurisdiction over foreign entities; it has instructed lower courts 
to assess the reasonableness of jurisdiction by balancing several 
factors—including the burdens on the defendant in defending 
in a distant foreign legal system and the “interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies.”60 The Court quoted with approval the lan­
guage of Justice Harlan written two decades earlier: “Great
59 Hartford Ins., 509 U.S. at 798. It was not denied by the defendants 
that their joint policies on the provision of reinsurance would have 
substantial effects in the United States. Their conduct, however, was 
lawful in England where it took place. The four dissenting justices 
argued that a court construing the Sherman Act’s reach should 
consider the regulatory interests of foreign states. The opinions 
when compared illustrate the sharp divisions and conceptual thicket 
associated with extraterritorial jurisdiction. See A. Lowenfeld, 
Conflict, Balancing of Interests and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to 
Prescribe, 89 Amer. J. Int’l L. 42 (1995). Hartfordhas been relied 
upon by the First Circuit in condoning a criminal prosecution arising 
from acts “committed by foreign nationals [entirely] outside U.S. 
territory.” J. Gibeaut, Sherman Goes Abroad, A.B.A. J., July 1997, 
at 42 (noting U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
1997).
60 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting Worldwide Volkswagen v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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care and reserve should be exercised when extending our 
notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.”61
1.4.3 U n if ic a t io n  a n d  Rapprochement T^uro vg h  T r e a t ie s
The interstate compact is another vehicle for minimizing 
conflict, both among regulatory authorities62 and in private 
international law generally. In the latter context, treaties have 
unified substantive rules and methods for their selection by 
following one of two basic approaches: the first constructs 
agreed-upon choice of law principles to be followed in pre­
scribed situations so that a given set of facts will produce in all 
participating fora the same choice of law outcome;63 the 
second method unifies the substantive rules themselves so that 
where applicable, the treaty supplies the rule of decision
61 Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). One can legitimately 
question whether the Court’s pronouncement in Asahi, a personal 
jurisdiction case, is consistent with its unwillingness in Hartford to 
incorporate comity into prescriptive jurisdiction analysis.
62 Information sharing and similar forms of cooperation among states 
have emerged. See M. Mann et al. , International Agreements and 
Understandings for the Production of Information and Other Mutual 
Assistance, 29 Int’l Law. 780 (1995); see also Competitions Laws 
Co-operation Agreement 1991 (EEC-USA) (EEC-USA) (Sept. 23,
1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991).
63 The 1980 Rome Convention is a leading example of this approach. 
For helpful essays, see C o n t r a c t  C o n f l i c t s —T h e  EEC C o n ­
v e n t i o n  o n  t h e  L a w  A p p l ic a b le  t o  C o n t r a c t u a l  O b l ig a ­
t io n s :  A C o m p a r a t iv e  S tu d y  (P. North ed., 1982); see generally 
North & Fawcett at 459-521; Hague Applicable Law Convention 
and A. von Mehren, Explanatory Report, Hague Conference on Pri­
vate International Law, Proceedings of the Extraordinary Session, 
October 1985 (1987).
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common to the participating fora.64 Under each approach, to 
the extent wide adherence is achieved, forum shopping loses 
much of its utility. As importantly, throughout the life of the 
commercial agreement the parties can assess their rights and 
duties by reference, directly or indirectly, to a common set of 
principles.
1 .4 .4  A -N a tio n a l  U sa g es  a n d  Principles
A final unifying influence warrants mention—the adoption of 
common usages. According to some observers, the internation­
al business community has elevated many habitual practices 
and understandings to a species of contemporary lex mercato- 
ria.65 Modem usages taking on this character operate in 
certain international financing arrangements such as letters of 
credit and are seen in the customary understandings conveyed 
by particular trade terms such as “FOB” and “CIF.”66 Pri­
64 The 1980 Sales Convention, which the United States and approxi­
mately 50 other states have ratified, is an example of this technique. 
For literature, see P. Windship, The U.N. Sales Convention: A 
Bibliography of English-Language Publications, 21 Int’l Law. 585 
(1987).
65 As Professor Goode explains, the original law merchant:
subsisted as a distinct source of law, administered by its own 
mercantile courts, before ultimately becoming absorbed in the 
common law itself. The maritime courts, the courts of Fairs and 
Boroughs and the Staple courts, in company with other commer­
cial courts of the Middle Ages, determined disputes not by English 
domestic law but according to ‘general law of nations’ based on 
mercantile codes and customs. . . .
R. Goode, C o m m e rc ia l  L a w  31-32 (1986) (footnote omitted). The 
doctrine is more fully discussed in Chapter 4.
66 See generally H. Bermann, The Law of International Commercial 
Transactions, 2 Emory J. Int’l Disp. Resol. 235, 246-65 (1988).
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vately sponsored publications have captured and reinforced 
some of the more well established expectations. The text 
known as INCOTERMS, for instance, catalogs and fixes 
accepted meanings for frequently used trade terms.67 Parties 
who wish to adopt an international standard and to clarify 
certain details while avoiding needless prolixity can simply 
employ the appropriate INCOTERM.. When doing so, they 
agree in short-hand fashion upon a series of standard rights and 
duties.68
Another formulation, though rather new, is proving to have 
a substantive impact on international commercial arbitration: 
Principles o f International Commercial Contracts, a text spon­
sored by UNIDROIT for application, inter alia, when the 
contracting parties specifically so designate, or, optionally, 
when they stipulate the lex mercatoria or other a-national 
source to govern their rights and duties.69 The UNIDROIT 
Principles are revisited in Chapters 4 (§4.9.4) and 11 
(§ 11.2).
1.5 Traditional Mechanisms and Cyber-Commerce
The modem influence of technology upon commerce is 
pervasive and growing; traditional policy and legal paradigms
67 INCOTERMS are published by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). ICC Publication No. 460 (1990).
68 See Schmitthoff at 66-67. An analogous publication sets forth stan­
dard rules governing letter of credit operations. ICC Publication No. 
500 (1993).
69 UNIDROIT published the final text in 1994. It is reproduced with 
learned commentary in Bonell.
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are under constant pressure to adapt.70 As noted earlier,71 the 
time-honored international sales model under which tangible 
goods are bargained for and received through exchanges of 
paper documents is being eclipsed by electronic practices. 
These raise a host of questions. Can the parties form a fully 
enforceable contract on the internet? What record of the 
transaction is required to preserve the rights and duties of the 
parties? The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
of 1996 bears testimony to the importance of these issues.72 
In the same vein, the ICC has formulated “E-terms,” a text 
analogous to its highly successful INCOTERMS project, for 
use in electronic commerce.73 These and related develop­
70 Cf. J. Wilke and B. Gruley, Is Antitrust Relevant in This Digital 
Age? Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1997, at 1 (noting challenges facing anti­
trust enforcers in a digital age).
71 Section 1.2.2.
72 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) reprinted 
at 35 I.L.M. 202 (1997) (hereinafter UNMLEC); see also H. 
Burman, Introductory Note, id. at 197. Its seventeen articles treat a 
variety of matters including elements of offer and acceptance, (Art. 
11) the method by which signature and writing requirements can be 
met by “data messages” (Arts. 6 and 7) and the admissibility and 
weight as evidence of such messages (Art. 9). In principle, the law 
is designed to apply “to any kind of information in the form of a 
data message used in the context of commercial activities” (Art. 1). 
Data message is defined as: “information generated, sent, received 
or stored by electronic, optical or similar means including, but not 
limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, 
telegram, telex on telecopy” (Art. 2(a)). An EDI “means the 
electronic transfer computer to computer of information using an 
agreed standard to structure the information” (Art. 2(b)). The 
official notes recommend that “commercial” be given a broad 
interpretation “so as to cover all relationships of a commercial 
nature whether contractual or not. ”
73 Burman, supra note 72, at 199.
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ments74 deserve monographs of their own. Nonetheless, little 
imagination is required to appreciate how a digital, increas- 
ingly-paperless commercial environment will dictate the types 
of disputes that arise and the persons and methods called upon 
to resolve them. Aspects of these questions are discussed in 
Chapter 6.
1.6 Transnational Business Disputes—Implications of the 
Foregoing
Almost by definition, international commercial disputes present 
manifold intricacies not found in domestic business quarrels, 
a distinctness often reflected in the mechanisms called upon to 
settle them. As will be seen, however, generally these mecha­
nisms are not fundamentally different from those serving 
domestic commerce; rather, they have merely been tailored to 
the international milieu sketched above. These themes are more 
fully discussed in the next chapter.
74 The race to legally structure the digitized world is further evidenced 
by the UCC’s new draft Article, 2B. It will govern “licenses” i.e., 
agreements granting access to information. See ALI, Discussion 
Draft on UCC Article 2B, April 14, 1997, § 2B-102. The draft 
(which contains nearly 100 sections) assumes that transactions 
involving the right to use intangibles, such digital information, are 
substantively and commercially distinct from those effecting a sale 
or lease of goods. Id. at 4. In particular, traditional notions of title 
and delivery are inapposite. Article 2B’s proposed coverage extends 
beyond rights to computer programs to include various informational 
content transactions in “digital,” “coded,” “electronic” and print 
information. Id. at 43.
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PROCESSING BUSINESS DISPUTES
Chapter Contents
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Dispute Resolution Methods in Broad Concept
2.3 International Litigation—Forum Shopping and 
Related Matters
2.4 Mitigating Forces and Techniques
2.5 International Litigation Revisited—Relative 
Deficiencies Cataloged and Compared
2.6 Potential Benefits of Litigation
2.7 An Interim Synthesis and Prospectus
2.1 Introduction
As the preceding chapter endeavored to suggest, the challenge 
facing international business planners is considerable. Several 
legal, commercial and cross-cultural factors affect the calculus. 
Only some of these can be fully anticipated. The legal 
framework alone is daunting: national and supranational 
regulation creates potential overlap and conflict while substan­
tive commercial laws—despite the helpful influence of certain 
treaties—remain diverse. Consequently, even the most diligent 
specialist may entertain legitimate doubts about the applicable 
law and its content; the resulting confusion about rights and 
duties both complicates public law compliance and fuels private 
disputes.
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With the many other concerns facing planners, commercial 
disputes are often not thought of as a business risk and given 
the pre-dispute attention they warrant.1 Nonetheless, a 
business disagreement over which the parties have lost control 
can be as detrimental to a business plan as an uninsured 
expropriation, a large regulatory fine, or an ill-conceived 
marketing campaign. Even in an apparently modest contro­
versy, significant amounts of time, money and other resources 
may be expended in reacting to the dispute; during the interim 
the commercial objective underlying the disagreement comes 
no closer to realization. Experienced planners, therefore, 
anticipate disputes, just as they would any other foreseeable 
risk, by establishing mechanisms designed to process the 
contingency in predictable ways.2 This chapter will survey
1 Multijurisdictional business plans are sometimes formulated and 
implemented without the help of lawyers. The non-involvement of 
legal counsel may have no negative effect, for the project may enjoy 
a charmed life. If no regulatory problems arise, disputes may later 
be resolved informally as business matters. Indeed, an attorney is 
not an essential feature of most dispute settlement processes. 
Ordinarily, however, commercial entities enlist the help of legal 
advisers in planning their transnational activities because of the 
surfeit of regulations typically involved and the due care with which 
management is required to proceed.
2 In a transaction of even modest complexity, the formative stages 
often entail a collaboration among corporate general counsel and one 
or more specialists familiar with the legal considerations that pertain 
to selected aspects of the business plan. See generally Gans and 
Stryker. Typically, during this preliminary stage, no dispute over 
rights and duties has arisen. It is thus an optimal time to agree upon 
dispute resolution, especially for the party who wants to ensure that 
arbitration will replace litigation. To the frustration of many 
business lawyers, however, it is also the juncture at which 
participants are often most unable to visualize disputes; jubilant and 
trusting, they eschew efforts to fix the means of resolving
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aspects of transnational litigation, will introduce mediation (the 
primary non-arbitral ADR3 technique) and will account for 
some of the considerations that influence choice of method.
2.2 Dispute Resolution Methods—The Options In Broad 
Concept
In general, the various commercial dispute resolution methods 
can be classified as adjudicative or collaborative. Adjudicative 
techniques are typified by litigation and arbitration, in which 
the parties submit the dispute to a neutral authority with the 
power to impose a binding result; typically, adjudication 
produces a winner and a corresponding loser. By contrast, the 
collaborative methods such as negotiation and mediation give 
the parties control of the process and the outcome.4 When
controversy.
3 The author includes arbitration within the term ADR.
4 Conciliation and mediation are distinguishable according to some 
writers, but as terms will be used interchangeably in this survey in 
which “mediation” will be more frequently used. As used in this 
work, both terms mean a process in which an independent person 
agreed upon by the parties promotes a settlement by employing 
various techniques designed to elicit essential facts, to ascertain the 
respective positions and concerns of the disputants and to fashion a 
mutually beneficial modus vivendi. The method’s central feature is 
the non-partisan, go-between role played by the mediator, whose 
detachment, expertise and familiarity with the parties’ concerns 
allows him or her to sponsor terms of settlement acceptable to both 
sides. The mediator therefore aims to reduce obstacles to 
communication, to define the issues and to explore alternatives. In 
many ways, the theory of mediation is not different from that of 
simple negotiation, except that a third party is interposed.
Several institutions including the AAA, the ICC and UNCITRAL, 
have promulgated mediation rules for commercial use. Several 
American states and other legal systems have devoted separate
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resolution occurs, neither party is defeated; the solution 
reached is one which the parties have imposed upon 
themselves. When successful, mediation is both cost-effective 
and promotes the underlying relationship; corporations, 
therefore, often prefer it as a method of first resort (at least in 
domestic commercial disputes), and many have integrated this 
preference into formal corporate policy.5 Studies suggest, 
however, that the choice of ADR method,6 and the method’s 
preferability vis-a-vis litigation, often depend ultimately on the 
type of dispute involved.7
ADR in general, and arbitration in particular, is a response 
to a traditional court-centered model which by no means is 
defunct in the commercial world. To further develop this 
point, the following two sections survey selected features of 
the international litigation model, with an emphasis upon its 
relative strengths and weaknesses.
legislation to international commercial conciliation.
5 Cf. Gans and Stryker at 42-44 (outlining Siemens’ pledge to ADR 
and corresponding instructions to company and retained lawyers).
6 Cf. Gans and Stryker at 40, 46 (consensual methods most often 
preferable “in terms of preservation of resources, good will 
and...business relationships”).
7 Lipsky and Seeber (passim). It is not perfectly clear to what extent 
preference for non-arbitral ADR (among American entities or 
generally) declines when the dispute is international. Buhring-Uhle’s 
survey of experts led him to conclude that while mediation was 
“gaining momentum” in the international sector, its significance 
remained “rather limited.” Buhring-Uhle at335 (reproducing results 
of a poll of specialists). Lipsley and Seeker report, in apparent 
contrast, that American corporations use mediation for commercial 
disputes perhaps as often as they use arbitration. The survey did not 
distinguish international disputes from other commercial matters and 
thus may be consistent with Buhring-Uhle’s findings.
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2.3 The Litigation Response—Forum Shopping and 
Related Notions
When disputes arise from multi-jurisdictional endeavor, parties 
often resort to national courts. Sometimes the choice of 
litigation is purposeful and strategic; other times it is purely a 
default procedure, necessitated by the lack of mutual will to 
process the dispute in another way.
Subject to notable exceptions,8 the rules of jurisdiction 
prevailing among states have not been ordered according to a 
supranational scheme or other common plan. A dispute will 
generally not be beyond the jurisdiction of a particular national 
court simply because it involves significant foreign elements; 
as a result, a plaintiff typically has a choice of venues. Indeed, 
often a plaintiff can file suits in multiple locations. The 
defendant in response may initiate actions in yet further courts. 
A single dispute may thus be characterized by parallel proceed­
ings, and the competing fora may be largely unrestrained by a 
treaty or other regime allocating the courts’ work in a rational, 
nonduplicative way.9
8 The Lugano Convention of 1988 sets forth rules of jurisdiction 
applicable in EC and ratifying EFT A States, in respect to com­
mercial and civil matters. It extends to ratifying EFTA States the 
principles of the Brussels Convention of 1968 (as amended by acces­
sion conventions) which established direct rules of jurisdiction 
among the then 12 Member States of the EC. The two instruments 
establish inter alia bases of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction 
applicable when the defendant in question is domiciled in a contract­
ing state. See generally North & Fawcett, chs. 10, 14 .
9 See, e.g., China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 
F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987) (parallel proceedings in U.S. and Republic 
of Korea courts); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World 
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (antisuit injunction sought
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While certain doctrines are available to courts to mitigate the 
potential for inconsistent judgments and duplication,10 they do 
not operate automatically or predictably. In addition, some of 
the unilateral tools available to centralize litigation are 
employed at the expense of comity.11
For would-be plaintiffs, the relative advantages of certain 
fora are all too apparent.12 Expansive notions of personal 
jurisdiction combined with pro-plaintiff rules of battle contrib­
ute to congestion in some systems. The general attractiveness 
of a particular venue, however, is only one element affecting 
selection; the location of the defendant’s assets is also
to prevent defendants from requesting antisuit injunction from an 
English court); Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 
531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982) (parallel actions, U.S. court 
enjoined party from prosecuting English action).
10 Lis alibi pendens and forum non conveniens for example, are discre­
tionary doctrines recognized in common law systems. See infra 
notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
11 See generally A. Vollmer, U.S. Federal Court Use of the Antisuit 
Injunction to Control International Forum Selection, in Goldsmith 
237 (“The rules developed by U.S. federal courts . . . [regarding] 
antisuit injunctions... permit U.S. interference with foreign 
proceedings too frequently”); T. Hartley, Comity And The Use Of 
Antisuit Injunctions In International Litigation, 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 
487, 506-511 (1987). Furthermore, despite unification efforts in 
certain regions, choice of law outcomes may vary among the courts 
of different states, further inducing result-oriented forum shopping.
12 Thus, “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the 
United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands 
to win a fortune; at no cost to himself, and at no risk of having to 
pay anything to the other side. The lawyers there will conduct the 
case ‘on spec’ as we say, or on a ‘contingency fee’ as they say.” 
Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Block, [1983] 2 All ER 72, 74 
(Denning, J.). See generally R. Weintraub, The United States as a 
Magnet Forum and What, If Anything to do About It, in Goldsmith 
at 213.
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influential.13 Without having considered this factor, the victo­
rious plaintiff presented with a resistant judgment debtor may 
face a prolonged delay. In the absence of a treaty requiring a 
different result,14 judgments may enjoy little preclusive effect 
when transported to the place where the defendant’s holdings 
can be found; courts taking a restrictive approach to foreign 
judgments may undertake a substantial review of the “foreign” 
court’s work product—starting with its jurisdictional 
findings—before awarding relief.15 If the defendant is a 
sovereign, an additional gauntlet may confront the judgment 
creditor.16
13 Cf. Bom & Westin at 129, 231 n.47 (the availability of prejudgment 
attachment of assets outside the situs depends upon the law of the 
state where the assets are located). See generally O. Sandrock, Pre­
judgment Attachments; Securing International Loans or Other Claims 
for Money, 21 Int’l Law. 1 (1987).
14 E.g., the Lugano Convention.
15 A decade ago, Professor Juenger’s survey of systems found that in 
some countries foreign judgments had no preclusive effect in the 
absence of a treaty requiring recognition. Juenger at 26-28. Though 
case law had softened some of these provisions, in Finland a 
complete retrial of the underlying dispute remained likely unless the 
original action was based upon a forum selection clause. Id. at 28. 
Even in less restrictive jurisdictions, several grounds for 
nonrecognition may exist. Lack of reciprocity, improper choice of 
law, and inconsistency with local protective legislation are among 
impediments to recognition found by Juenger. Id. at 31-36. See 
generally E n f o r c e m e n t  o f  F o r e ig n  J u d g m e n ts  W o r ld w id e  (C . 
Platto ed., 1989) (a survey of 32 jurisdictions).
16 In many legal systems, state assets enjoy, prima facie, immunity 
from execution. To prevail, the foreign or domestic judgment 
creditor must demonstrate a waiver of immunity by the sovereign or 
the fulfillment of some other exception. Cf. H. Smit, Foreign Sover­
eign Immunity—American Style, in I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n t r a c t s  
245, 260-65, 268-69 (H. Smit et a l ,  eds., 1981) (noting the 
differing rules on suit and execution).
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Absent the influence of some especial allure, however, the 
plaintiffs instinctive preference for familiar surroundings often 
proves compelling. After all, as defendants often discover in 
even greater measure, litigation abroad may be expensive and 
clouded in vagaries.17 In addition to the expenses of main­
taining key persons on site, fees for one or more local counsel 
will be incurred. In-house counsel, unless possessing compara­
tive law background, will in turn be at a disadvantage in 
assisting local counsel. In a foreign forum, one’s perception of 
the development, progression, and outcome of a trial may be 
inaccurate: the scope of pretrial discovery may be far different 
than imagined; the civil jury may be conspicuous by its 
presence or absence; the judge may be decidedly more active 
or passive than assumed; and costs may exceed expectations. 
Similarly, uncertainty as to the tasks available to counsel 
licensed only abroad may inhibit effective divisions of labor 
between local and foreign counsel.18
2.4 Mitigating Forces and Techniques
2 .4 .1  Pa r ty  A u t o n o m y
To varying degrees, the legal systems recognize that parties to 
a contract are permitted to shape their agreement to a con­
siderable degree by setting forth in detail the specific rights 
and duties of each. An extension of this precept is that they
17 See Born & Westin at 221-22, 346-51; Fox at 24-33, 225-31.
18 Additionally, away from one’s familiar environment, various 
otherwise collateral matters may loom large. For example, high 
quality translations, skillful interpreters, capable stenographers and 
suitable expert witnesses may be difficult to procure.
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may designate the substantive law that is to govern their agree­
ment.19 Courts in many developed legal systems honor choice 
of law clauses. The party autonomy principle which is en­
shrined in many choice of law conventions,20 is also codified 
in the UCC, which has been adopted to some extent in all fifty 
of the United States. It is a risk containment vehicle honored 
both in litigation and arbitration and makes the election to 
proceed in either manner far less improvident than would 
otherwise be true.21 In arbitration, however, the latitude given 
the parties is especially great, a fact more fully explored in 
Chapter 4.
19 See generally North & Fawcett at 476-87; North, General Course 
152-84; S. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
1988, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 457, 478-80 (1989).
20 See, e.g., Rome Convention, art. 3; and the Hague Applicable Law 
Convention, art. 7.
21 The parties’ power to designate the applicable law is not unbridled, 
at least under the formulae to which courts may be required to refer. 
For example, a nexus between the law chosen and die transaction 
may be essential. Under UCC §1-105, for instance, the parties are 
required to choose a law with which the transaction has a 
“reasonable relation”; see also Restatement (Second) § 187 (law 
chosen must have a “substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction” or be supported by some other “reasonable basis”). The 
Rome Convention, consonant with English law, does not require that 
the chosen law have a nexus with the parties or the transaction. See 
North & Fawcett at 481-82. Yet, traditional English law and the 
Rome Convention require that the law chosen be that of an existing 
legal system, thus apparently precluding the parties’ choice of, e.g., 
the lex mercatoria Id. at 482. One authority suggests, nonetheless, 
that where the parties explicitly refer to the lex mercatoria or 
“general principles of law,” the choice may be given effect as 
contract terms rather than, strictly speaking, part of the applicable 
law. Goode at 1116. The same is true when they incorporate by 
reference a fixed text such as the UNIDROIT Principles. Id.
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Related to choice of law is choice of forum. Parties often 
designate, ex ante, a single forum or arbitral mechanism to 
which disputes related to the contract will be submitted.22 As 
with choice of law clauses, choice of forum provisions in 
international contracts are, to a great degree, honored by the 
courts, making them an essential feature of informed business 
planning.23 The efficacy of pre-dispute forum selection clauses 
is such that a judgment rendered in disregard of an apparently 
valid one may be unenforceable in certain legal systems.24 
Consequently, although their enforcement is not axiomatic,25
22 See generally Bom & Westin at 221-32; Fox at 218-22; North & 
Fawcett at 234-40.
23 T. Hartley, The Validity of Forum-Selection Agreements: A Prelimi­
nary Sketch, in C u r r e n t  I s s u e s  in  E u r o p e a n  a n d  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  156 (R. White & B. Smythe eds., 1990).
24 Cf. Juenger at 19-20 (“several legal systems enforce forum-selection 
clauses indirectly by refusing to recognize judgments rendered in 
disregard of such provisions . . .”).
Conventions applicable in much of Europe have codified and 
unified the rules applicable to forum selection clauses. The Brussels- 
Lugano approach which is to give exclusive jurisdiction to the 
adherent state court named in a properly documented forum 
designation clause, provided one of the parties is domiciled in an 
adherent state. If neither party is a contracting state domiciliary, 
courts not designated have jurisdiction only if the named court 
declines jurisdiction. Lugano Convention, art. 17.
25 Under U.S. federal case law, the strong presumption of en­
forceability accorded forum selection clauses may be uprooted if the 
clause is obtained by fraud or overreaching or there exist other 
circumstances rendering the clause fundamentally unfair. Enforce­
ment of the clause may also be declined where the chosen forum 
proves to be seriously inconvenient for the resisting party or 
inherently incapable of providing a fair trial; the presumption 
favoring enforcement of such clauses, however, is not easily sup­
planted. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); 
Carnival Cruise Line, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Scherk 
417 U.S. at 516 (a forum selection clause is “an almost indispens­
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such clauses are of substantial practical value when properly 
drafted and combined with a carefully drawn choice of law 
clause.
2 .4 .2  Judicial  Self-Restraint
As suggested earlier in this chapter, domestic bases of 
personal, subject matter and prescriptive jurisdiction are not 
designed necessarily to exclude suits that contain a predomi­
nance of foreign elements. The careful use of choice of forum 
clauses, mentioned above, is one influence countering the 
unpredictably caused by concurrent jurisdiction. Two other 
doctrinal checks on a plaintiffs discretion in choosing a forum 
are well-known to the common law, but offer only limited 
impediments to forum shopping. These are the doctrines of 
forum non conveniens26 and Us alibi pendens. Under the 
former, pursuant to the defendant’s request, the court deter­
mines whether the case should be dismissed in light of a 
preferable alternative forum. In the United States, the doctrine 
is discretionary, has evolved through case law27 and is
able precondition to achieving the orderliness and predictability 
essential to any international business transaction”). But see W. 
Park, Illusion and Reality in International Forum Selection, 30 Tex. 
Int’l L. J. 135, 202 (1995) (considering U.S. enactment of a federal 
court selection statute to promote reliability when a federal court is 
designated).
26 See generally Born & Westin at 275-318; North & Fawcett at 221- 
36.
27 The seminal American decisions are Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
454 U.S. 235 (1981) and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 
(1947). For recent commentary, see D. Epstein, An Examination of 
the “Adequacy of the Alternative Forumn Factor in Forum Non 
Conveniens Determinations, in Goldsmith at 295.
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associated primarily with transnational litigation. In the 
European Union the doctrine does not operate where 
supplanted by the Brussels Convention.
Lis alibi pendens authorizes a court to stay an action in light 
of the existence of a parallel action in another jurisdiction.28 
American courts have employed the doctrine as a matter of 
discretion, but most have adopted a general rule that jurisdic­
tion should be exercised absent exceptional justification 
favoring dismissal.29 Within the European Union, a treaty- 
based rule has created predictability not found under the 
American variant of the doctrine.30
28 American Courts in exercising their discretion consider “principles 
of comity, the adequacy of relief available in the alternative forum, 
promotion of judicial efficiency, the identity of the parties and issues 
in the two actions, the likelihood of prompt disposition in the al­
ternative forum, the convenience of the parties, counsel and 
witnesses and the possibility of prejudice if the stay is granted.” 
I.J.A., Inc. v. Marine Holdings, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 197, 198 (E.D. 
Pa. 1981). Introductions to the English approach are Jaffey at 127- 
28 and North & Fawcett at 231-34.
“Related” actions, i.e., those that are “closely connected” but do 
not involve the same cause of action, are treated in Article 22 of the 
Lugano Convention.
29 See G. Bom, L i t ig a t io n  at 461-70 (citing as the most influential 
case Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800 (1976), followed also in international cases).
30 Within much of Europe, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions 
remove discretion from contracting state courts by insisting upon a 
first-seised rule. According to Article 21 of the Lugano text:
[a]ny court other than the court first seised shall of its own 
motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction 
of the court first seized is established [whereupon it shall 
decline jurisdiction in favor of the court first seized].
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2.5 InternationalLitigationRevisited— Relative Deficiencies 
Cataloged and Compared
2 .5 .1  In  Gen er a l
The potential for forum shopping, parallelism and duplication 
mentioned above in relation to international litigation results 
from the present lack of a global regime imposing rationality 
upon national legal systems. To litigation in general, however, 
may be attributed additional negative attributes; to underscore 
the role of arbitration in international trade, an abridged survey 
of several such traits is presented in the remainder of this 
section. Some arguably positive traits, in turn, are suggested 
in § 2.6. Comparisons to ADR punctuate both overviews.
2 .5 .2 . Costliness a n d  D u r a tio n
Despite tax-subsidized features such as full-time judges and 
public court rooms, litigation is a costly enterprise. Lawyers’ 
fees are perhaps the principal expense. The involvement of 
multiple jurisdictions usually implies the need for multiple 
lawyers because of the regulation of legal services and 
numerous practical considerations. Even for litigants with 
substantial in-house legal departments, outside counsel will 
generally be necessary. Much of the time billed by outside 
counsel will relate to “discovery”—at least in common law 
systems.31 The disruption that such pre-trial investigation 
causes is another form of “cost” suffered by both sides. Cost,
31 C f Marriott at 30 (“It is well recognized that discovery is one of the 
most expensive features of English litigation”).
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of course, is closely related to longevity. The prolongation that 
often characterizes international litigation “American-style” 
translates into continuing financial commitment and burden; 
and, under the general “American Rule,” the victorious party 
cannot expect necessarily to recover its costs, as discussed in 
Chapters 7 (§ 7.13) and 11 (§ 11.19).
High direct costs are not the only result of protraction. In 
commercial disputes, the extended cloud over rights and duties 
implied by litigation often impairs the value of the underlying 
product or service; indeed, the passage of time may render the 
dispute itself largely moot. This is particularly so in “hi-tech” 
disputes because, given the rate of advancement in the field, 
the product life of many innovations is often as brief as a few 
months.32
While non-arbitral ADR can claim to be almost invariably 
superior to litigation in terms of cost and speed, the same 
cannot be said of arbitration. Experienced practitioners tend to 
appreciate arbitration’s capacity for alacrity and cost savings, 
but generally concede its too-often-realized potential for being 
as ponderous and expensive as litigation.33
32 Accordingly, much of the study undertaken to improve speed and 
efficiency in ADR has been sponsored or motivated by the hi-tech 
sector. “Technological perishability” is becoming ever more acute. 
This theme was recurrent among the speeches and interventions of 
practitioners and technical experts gathered, respectively, at the 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Conferences in New York (March 
21, 1997) and San Francisco (September 15-16, 1997).
33 Confirming this sense is Buhring-Uhle’s doctoral work which 
included a survey of international dispute resolution specialists 
designed to test supposed advantages of certain ADR techniques. 
Among the continental Europeans surveyed, excluding German 
respondents, almost 70 per cent held that arbitration typically offers 
no cost improvement over litigation; more optimistic were
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In pursuing arbitration, many factors impact cost and speed: 
these include the extent of discovery,34 number of 
arbitrators,35 legal culture36 and amount in controversy.37 A 
measure of delay, moreover, may be endemic to the arbitral 
process. In contrast to litigation systems which are staffed by 
full-time judges, the arbitral process depends on adjudicators 
who typically hold other full-time posts. Other sources of delay 
are not specific to arbitration. Both litigation and arbitration, 
for example, tend to encounter responding parties that embrace 
opportunities for delay. In arbitration, the available pretexts
Americans, almost half of whom thought that arbitration was 
“generally less expensive” than litigation and Germans, 64 per cent 
of whom selected that characterization. Biihring-Uhle at 141, 405- 
06. As to the relative speed of arbitration, the vast majority (75%) 
of the European replies selected “generally faster” than litigation 
while only 59 percent of the American sample so typified the 
method. Id. at 406-07.
34 The majority of respondents in Buhring-Uhle’s study felt that 
arbitration’s limited discovery was a distinct advantage relative to 
litigation. Biihring-Uhle at 136. Gans and Stryker report that 
Siemens’ corporate policy prefers arbitration in which only “very 
limited discovery” takes place. Gans and Stryker at 45-46 (citing 
cost and delay).
35 For cost and delay reasons, Siemens’ established policy is to prefer 
one arbitrator to three. Gans and Stryker at 43, 46.
36 The adversarial system known to the common law in particular 
relies heavily on the parties’ counsel to advance the proceedings. 
Arbitrator non-activism may therefore be an accepted tendency. Cf. 
Mustill and Boyd at 17 (“[T]he procedural initiative lies entirely 
with the parties . . . Unless invited to decree what is to happen 
next, the arbitrator need not [and in most cases does not] do 
anything at all”).
37 Cf. R. Bloore, A Designer Cost Allocation System to Take 
Arbitration into the Next Millennium, 63 Arbitration 194, 196 (study 
of 105 arbitrations demonstrated tendency for length of hearing to 
increase as amount in controversy increased).
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include the challenge of arbitrators,38 attacks on the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the episodic hiring and firing 
of counsel.39
As a matter of arbitral reform, there are no simple solutions 
to the problem of delay, given the many variables involved. As 
in litigation, the judicious application of case management 
techniques is often cited as the key to eliminating unnecessary 
prolongation.40 Increasingly, statutes and rule formulations 
have improved the tools available to arbitral tribunals; knowing
38 Standard rules texts provide the pretext by setting forth the 
procedure and the test, authorizing a party to challenge an arbitrator 
“if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.” UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 
10(1); see also UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 12(2) (adding basis 
that the arbitrator “does not possess qualifications agreed to by the 
parties”). A party intent on thwarting the arbitration can be expected 
to raise a challenge during the proceedings. The challenge will be 
evaluated, in the case of the UNCITRAL Rules, by the appointing 
authority. If the parties have not designated one and are unable to 
agree to one at the time of the challenge, the appointing authority 
will be selected by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, in the Hague, thus occasioning further delay. In 
institutionally administered arbitrations, challenges are referred to 
the institution. Depending upon the situs, however, the challenging 
party may be able to bring the matter directly to a local court, 
although the UNCITRAL Model Law is to the contrary, requiring 
that the appointing authority first be given an opportunity to assess 
the challenge.
39 Time is consumed while the party selects and briefs the replacement 
lawyers. In a complex case, the delay may be substantial.
40 See B. Davis, Laying Down A Gauntlet: The Thirty-Six Hour 
Chairman, 3 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 170 (1992); H. Holtzmann, 
Streamlining Arbitral Proceedings: Some Techniques of the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal, 11 Arb. Int’l 39 (1995).
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when and how to use them is not always self-evident, 
however.41
Institutions have also devised “fast-track” procedures with 
expedition in mind.42 Although arbitral tribunals lack 
contempt power, in many jurisdictions the arbitrators’ efforts 
can be augmented by judicial orders, procured at the urging of 
a party or upon the application of the tribunal.43 The arbitra­
tors’ authority to draw negative inferences can also stimulate 
timely action.44
2 .5 .3  Pr iv a c y  a n d  Co nfid en tia lity
The public venues used in litigation often are open to non­
litigants, including one’s competitors and the commercial 
press. While certain procedures can occur in camera, in 
general to air grievances in court is to do so in public. The 
decision of the court is often published as part of a system of 
precedent, especially in common law systems. Openly and 
robustly countering claims and asserting rights may be a useful 
strategy in building a reputation. Often, however, counter­
vailing considerations will outweigh the deterrence gained 
through publicity.
41 Many procedural issues bring competing concerns into apparent 
conflict. Tribunal indulgence shelters a slothful or resistant party. 
Yet, to prevent charges of procedural unfairness (potentially 
imperiling the award) an arbitrator may be inclined to grant requests 
for more time to prepare and present a case.
42 See generally Symposium, 2 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 138-62 (1991).
43 These mechanisms are discussed more fully in Chapters 10 and 11. 
See, e.g., §§ 10.5.1, 10.5.4 and 11.11.
44 See C. Brower, Evidence Before International Tribunals: The Need 
for Some Standard Rules, 28 Int’l Law. 47, 56-57 (1994).
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Arbitration and mediation proceed in private;45 moreover, 
arbitrators, mediators and administering institutions are bound 
to protect confidences and are generally forbidden to reveal the 
contents of any award or settlement that results from the 
proceeding. Similarly, in part to preserve confidentiality, all 
three classes are discouraged from participating in subsequent 
court actions designed to explore the details of the proceedings 
since completed.46
2 .5 .4  Formality of Procedure a n d  Rem edy
Litigation unfolds according to rules of court designed to 
discourage deviations from standard procedure. The fact­
finding process is subject to technical rules of evidence 
affecting admissibility; the availability of even the most 
flexible remedies, in turn, may be subject to myriad qualifica­
tions. These influences derive from laudable goals related to 
the integrity of the process. Nonetheless, in a given case they 
may be obstacles to effecting a just end to the dispute in 
question.
Adjudication by arbitration is characterized by procedural 
flexibility and (in general) remedial prerogatives untethered to
45 Thus, “privacy alone is often a compelling basis for the use of 
arbitration. . Gans and Stryker at 46. The majority of Buhring- 
Uhle’s sample considered arbitration’s “confidential procedure” to 
be among the more important attributes commending its use in lieu 
of litigation. Biihring-Uhle at 395.
46 The duty of the parties to refrain from making disclosures related to 
the dispute seems to be largely a matter of contract in many 
jurisdictions, though the requisite understanding can arise from joint 
adoption of rules that require such forbearance. See Chapter 11 
(§§ 11.9 and 11.18) for further discussion.
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technicalities. Mediation in turn is even more free-form; 
though the process generally unfolds in somewhat predictable 
stages,47 in general the parties are free to convert a legal 
dispute into a business marriage.
The malleability of ADR, and arbitration in particular, is the 
attribute that allows the procedural styles of the civil law and 
the common law to meet in relative harmony. This meshing is 
prefigured by standard rules which marry the common 
expectations from both families while reaching thoughtful 
compromises on otherwise divergent approaches. The parties 
ability to detach the proceedings from a specific body of 
remedial law allows private tribunals (or, in mediation, the 
parties themselves) to serve commercial justice whether or not 
to do so pays reverence to the sometimes vestigial procedural 
elements that bind the courts.
2 .5 .5  D ecision-M aker Expertise
Generally, one cannot select the judge who is to decide his or 
her case. This limitation may be the cost of enjoying 
adjudication subsidized by public resources. In highly complex 
cases, the fact that the judge will not seek compensation 
directly from the parties is little comfort if the he or she is 
simply ill-equipped to master the important details of the 
dispute. In the United States and certain other systems, 
generally there are not commercial courts to which to turn. 
Although special masters and court-appointed experts mitigate 
the risk somewhat, most litigants would probably prefer the
47 Fox at 194-95.
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option of jointly appointing the best judge for the assignment, 
a feature of arbitration often not replicated in the world’s 
litigation systems.48
2 .5 .6  Global Enforceability
As noted above, the United States, is party to no multilateral 
treaty, such as the Brussels Convention, that would require 
courts in other countries to give preclusive effects to American 
judgments; accordingly, the post-adjudication phase of U.S. 
litigation may elongate while the judgment is subjected to 
scrutiny abroad. As noted earlier, the foreign court addressed 
may consider, among other factors, the first court’s 
jurisdiction, its choice of law, and the excessiveness of the 
sums awarded. In the meantime, costs mount. Here again—at 
least where the alternative is U.S. litigation—arbitration offers 
a striking advantage. The New York Convention, dissected in
48 Arbitration may be apt when the complexity of the dispute reduces 
the probability that a jury will function well, yet an adjudicative 
proceeding is preferred. Concerning mediation, specialists disagree 
as to whether it is preferable to employ a mediator with knowledge 
of the field in which the dispute has arisen. Some view the neutral’s 
goal as merely facilitative. Others prefer the model in which the 
mediator is equipped to suggests legal strengths and weaknesses in 
the parties’ respective cases, and perhaps to predict a range of 
outcomes if the matter were to proceed to adjudication; the goal is 
to induce accords by tempering expectations. Naturally, some 
mediators practice a hybrid mediation approach. See, e.g., R. 
Lowry, To Evaluate or Not—That Is Not the Question/, 2(1) 
Resolutions 2 (1997) (advocating a flexible approach to evaluative 
mediation).
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Chapter Three, makes for relative predictability of award 
enforcement internationally.49
Empirical data confirm that in the perceptions of experts, 
international enforceability is a cardinal reason to prefer 
arbitration over other methods, equal in importance to its 
neutrality and more significant than a range of other arbitration 
attributes themselves thought to be influential.50
2 .5 .7  Bias a n d  Corruption
Regrettably, not all legal systems offer unbiased judges. 
Existing national loyalties can be exacerbated by various 
influences impinging upon independence. The result is a court 
highly predisposed to favor one party. Such partiality 
combined with unfamiliar procedures and surroundings makes 
the task facing the visiting litigant substantially more difficult. 
Time and money are spent in futility and the formal result—the
49 The New York Convention advantage is highly fact-dependant. 
Where enforcement is to occur in a Brussels-Lugano country, 
litigation in a Brussels-Lugano state may produce results as 
enforceable as arbitration. See generally Stone at 314-19, 344-51. 
Less predictable are the collaborative methods, which cannot 
promise any binding result nor a result that will enjoy global 
enforceability. Preliminary efforts to formulate a treaty that would 
afford mediated agreements international preclusive effect have not 
been fruitful. See O. Glossner, Enforcement of Conciliation 
Agreements, 11(4) Int’l Bus. Law. 151 (1983).
Another approach to the question is found in the 1988 California 
Act. It contains a provision allowing a conciliator, at the parties’ 
request, to embody in an award a written compromise reached in 
conciliation. Whether such converted agreements would qualify for 
New York Convention treatment has not been tested to the author’s 
knowledge. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.401.
50 Biihring-Uhle at 403-05.
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court’s judgment—will often be difficult to collaterally attack 
in the venue where enforcement is ultimately sought. For 
parties that have endured business litigation of that character, 
only modest reflection is necessary to appreciate arbitration, 
which allows the parties to select their own judges for a 
proceeding in a geographically, politically and juridically 
neutral place.
Despite the number of cases in which dissatisfied parties 
attack awards by asserting “evident partiality” (the FAA term 
of art), arbitration gives the parties substantial opportunity to 
assure that both the presiding and party-appointed arbitrators 
that form the tribunal are independent and impartial. This 
capacity combined with the power to select the situs allows the 
parties to greatly minimize predisposition in the process or the 
adjudicators.51 Not surprisingly, the well-informed regard 
neutrality of the forum as one of arbitration’s principal 
virtues.52
51 In mediation, the neutral acts for neither side and is bound ethically 
to remain impartial throughout the process. Because the mediator 
has no power to bind, neutrality is less often an issue in mediation 
than in arbitration and litigation. No party is favored in the resulting 
accord beyond the extent to which its counterpart has agreed. See 
AAA, Standards for Conduct for Mediators, 1995 (1) Disp. Resol. 
J. 78 (especially Canon 2: Impartiality).
52 In Buhring-Uhle’s survey of experts, over 80 per cent deemed 
arbitration’s capacity for neutrality to be either “highly relevant” or 
“significant” in the decision to choose arbitration. A much smaller 
percentage thought that it was merely one of many, roughly equal, 
factors. Biihring-Uhle at 136, 403.
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2.5.8. F i n a l i t y  t h e  A d v e r s a r i a l  W a y
In litigation, the trading of allegations which begins with 
plaintiffs initial filing continues throughout the first-instance 
process, and may be replicated once or twice before the 
underlying dispute can be said to be settled. Appellate review 
brings delay and interim uncertainty about rights and duties 
and the longer the adversarial process, the less it is likely that 
the parties will salvage any synergism. If goodwill remains 
after a claim is filed and answered, it rarely survives the 
further proceedings; the public nature of litigation encourages 
reciprocal posturing, and as each party invests more time, 
money and energy in pursuit of the “right” result, each 
becomes less likely to view the endeavor as merely a business 
exercise.
After the initial result and the appeal, there will still be a 
winner and a loser, and the latter will likely be dissatisfied 
with the process. The winner in turn may have to pay its own 
costs, at least under the prevailing American rule.
Given the foregoing, a single, private proceeding that leads 
to a comparatively immutable result offers ail attractive option 
if the potential for speed and finality are as important to the 
litigants as quality control. Indeed, because parties in 
arbitration may select their arbitrators, the governing law and 
the applicable rules of fact-finding, a one-step determination 
need not come at the expense of quality.
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2.6 Potential Benefits of Litigation
2 .6 .1  In  Gen er a l
Despite the foregoing list of complaints, there are reasons for 
preferring litigation in some circumstances; many of these have 
been alluded to above. It will be noted also that many of the 
following assume access to an American court, as distinct from 
a foreign court in which these perceived advantages may not 
be available.
2 .6 .2  Su b sid iz e d  Pu blicity
An aggressive public response to conduct likely to recur may 
be an effective deterrent. Courts provide a vehicle for 
mounting such an attack. For example, a competitor 
contemplating even a relatively small appropriation of a trade 
mark or similar activity may reconsider if the owner of the 
mark has without fail enforced its rights, even where to do so 
in the individual case was not cost-effective. A tour de force 
marshaled in arbitration goes much less far than in litigation in 
warning potential malefactors. The deterrent benefit of course 
has to be weighed against the possible perception that the 
plaintiff is prone to bully its smaller rivals.
2 .6 .3  Rights of  A ppea l  Re v isit e d : Pr e c e d e n t  a n d  
Re l a t e d  M atters
In certain circumstances litigation may be worth the time and 
money expended if helpful precedent is established thereby. It
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is often on appeal where the law is clarified in a final form. 
Even if a favorable rule does not emerge, there may be less 
confusion in the law as a result of the decision. That too would 
benefit business planners.
In arbitral adjudication the admonitory and educational 
functions of the result typically extend only to the immediate 
parties, and then only when the award is reasoned. Arbitral 
awards are not part of any ordered system of precedent, even 
in the diluted sense understood in the civil law. At present, 
only certain awards are published.53 Principally, these are 
awards that are voluntarily provided to a service, journal or 
yearbook by the parties (or, more controversially, unilaterally 
by a party).54 When published, awards are often redacted to 
obscure the parties identities.55 Although the present,
53 There is, however, a broad spectrum of views as to whether certain 
trappings of a precedent-based regime should be encouraged in 
international arbitration. See generally T. Carbonneau, Rendering 
Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law 
of International Transactions, 23 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 579 
(1985); J. Lew, The Case for Publication of Arbitration Awards, in 
The Art of Arbitration: Liber Amicorumfor Pieter Sanders 223 (J. 
Schultz & A. van den Berg eds., 1982); M. Hunter, Publication of 
Awards and Lex Mercatoria, 55(1) Arbitration 55 (1988).
54 Sometimes, it is an arbitrator that makes the award available, 
ordinarily with the parties’ permission.
55 Even when completely successful in hiding the parties’ identities, the 
present mechanisms for collecting and editing awards are imperfect. 
Many suggest that redaction (or “denaturing” as Lowenfeld has 
called it) leaves awards often unhelpful and sometimes misleading, 
Arbitrator’s View at 38, n.65. First, an identification of the 
arbitrators—an all-important detail—is often omitted. It is a fact of 
life that some arbitrators carry more authority than others; at a 
minimum, knowing an arbitrator’s background may illuminate his 
or her perspective. Second, the excerpts published may be so devoid 
of context as to make comparisons to an existing controversy
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haphazard, approach to replicating awards manages to offer a 
steady stream of arbitral authority for the specialists to 
consider, it is hardly systematic.56 Further, even if publication 
of awards became the norm,57 there would remain the 
fundamental matter of hierarchy; obviously stare decisis cannot 
operate without it. In the near term, its functional equivalent 
will continue to be the reputation of the arbitrators who 
rendered the award, to the extent that can be divined from the 
award in its revealed form.
difficult to make. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that in the hands 
of motivated advocates great mischief can result from published 
award abstracts.
56 Some in the international arbitration community endorse wider 
publication of awards; many arbitrators, lawyers and business 
persons would welcome ready access to as many awards as possible, 
perhaps in the law data bases already established. The advantages of 
such a system would be several according to its proponents: 
arbitrators and advocates could receive guidance from earlier cases; 
industries could reform trade practices and policies in light of past 
arbitrations; a more systematic elaboration of an international lex 
mercatoria would occur; and the existing system would improve 
because the relative availability of awards would prevent undue 
weight being given to the comparatively few awards presently 
published. See generally essays at supra note 53.
57 Most parties to arbitration are unlikely to relinquish the expectation 
(sometimes unwarranted) of relative confidentiality that attends 
arbitration. Consequently, a comprehensive system of publication 
would have to continue the present practice of redaction, done to 
obscure the identities of the parties. Even then, despite skillful and 
knowledgeable editors, in small industries it may be nearly 
impossible to fully mask the entities involved.
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2.6.4 Broad D iscovery
The American approach to discovery is designed to promote 
settlement, to reduce surprises in litigation and to provide the 
widest possible factual base from which to proceed to trial. 
American litigation attorneys are occasionally shocked and 
dismayed at the limited discovery allowed in arbitration.58 As 
a strategic matter, it may be that wide discovery is the only 
way that one party will likely enjoy parity and a chance of 
prevailing. Where the circumstances are such that all of the 
essential documents are in the hands of one party or a non­
litigant third party, and these cannot be identified with 
specificity, arbitral discovery orders are likely to either be 
unavailable or cast too narrowly. They are moreover fully 
discretionary.59 Accordingly, where access to a U.S. or other 
common law court would have been available, the 
disadvantaged litigant may lament the choice of arbitration, 
even though occasionally, courts will assist an arbitrating party 
by ordering discovery for use in the arbitration.60
58 International arbitration generally employs “reliance” discovery. 
Each party supplies the proofs upon which it intends to rely and if 
need be the tribunal asks for additional materials. Marriott at 30.
59 Under the English Arbitration Act 1996, for example, it is for the 
tribunal to determine, subject to the parties’ agreement to the 
contrary, “whether any and if so which documents or classes of 
documents should be disclosed between and produced by the parties 
and at what stage.” Id. § 34 (2)(d).
60 For such an exceptional case, see Oriental Commercial & Shipping 
Co. v. Rossell, N.V., 125 F.R.D. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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2.6.5 C o e r c iv e  J u d ic i a l  P o w e r
Unlike arbitral tribunals, courts are not inhibited by consent- 
based jurisdiction and competency. They may issue orders 
requiring actions by litigants and, as importantly, by non­
litigants over whom they have personal jurisdiction. Arbitrators 
by contrast have very restricted sway over third parties, 
generally limited, in America, to subpoena power. Unlike 
arbitrators, courts enjoy contempt power and (assuming that 
jurisdiction exists) may enforce their orders against litigants 
and non-litigants alike.
2.7 An Interim Synthesis and Prospectus
Given the influences and variables over which private actors 
can exert little control, one can readily appreciate the value of 
private dispute resolution methods that afford the parties wide 
latitude and flexibility. It is not surprising that arbitration in 
particular has emerged as an important fixture. The global 
efficacy of a well-drafted arbitration clause greatly reduces the 
likelihood of parallel proceedings. The internationally 
preclusive effect generally accorded an arbitral award under 
the New York Convention discourages dissatisfied parties who 
might otherwise pursue a second chance before a national 
court.
The autonomy of the parties in selecting the situs of the 
arbitration, the arbitral procedure, the substantive law that will 
govern their contract, and the arbitrators who will determine 
their claims—added to their ability to craft a detailed contract
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to begin with—makes for relative peace of mind. Similarly, the 
trend toward relaxing practice restrictions within popular 
international arbitration venues improves efficiency by 
reducing dependency upon ‘local’ counsel.
Additionally, the inherent flexibility of arbitration and other 
alternatives to litigation allows the parties to minimize conflicts 
in legal culture, or at least to establish a neutral format, free 
of idiosyncracies familiar to one side only; the malleability of 
arbitration also makes it amenable to augmentation by 
collaborative approaches to dispute resolution, such as 
mediation, allowing the latter to be viewed as an accessory to 
arbitration, rather than a format in competition with it.61
61 See generally M. Hoellering, Mediation and Arbitration: A Growing 
Interaction, 52(2) J. Disp. Resol. 23 (1997). Consensus-based 
approaches not only preserve relationships but may be preferable 
when culturally based sensibilities so dictate. It is often reported, for 
instance, that Asian and certain other cultures deplore confrontation 
and, hence, adjudication. See, e.g., S. Donahey, International 
Mediation and Conciliation, in Roth et al., Ch. 33, 3-5. While 
arbitration has a confrontational element, it seems to enjoy some 
acceptance within the commercial ranks of such societies. Nonethe­
less, mediation may be the strongly preferred first-instance 
procedure where collaboration is the ingrained tendency.
Non-arbitral ADR may be apt also if the amount in controversy 
is small compared to costs of processing the dispute in an 
adjudicative proceeding or if there is substantial merit in the 
positions of each side so that the win-lose formats of adjudication 
offer unappealing extremes.
The potential waste of human and monetary resources implied in 
the pursuit of non-binding procedures, while real, is easy to 
overstate; even unsuccessful proceedings may sharpen the issues and 
accomplish some discovery. Nonetheless, non-binding formats, 
which rely heavily upon mutual sincerity, can be abused by 
deleterious parties; where one party acts in bad faith, or has minimal 
motivation because of disparate bargaining power or a superior legal 
position, the exercise may only defer more fruitful activities.
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Consequently, non-adjudicative mechanisms are sometimes best 
pursued under the shadow of imminent adjudicative procedures. 
Where good faith abides, however, there is value in viewing the 
various techniques as together enabling a natural progression, with 
collaboration being exhausted before adjudication is fully employed.
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THE BINDING CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
Chapter Contents
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Cardinal Role of the Agreement to Arbitrate
3.3 The Role and Content of The New York Convention
3.1 Introduction
Within international arbitral practice and law, there is great 
diversity. Differing national legal structures combined with 
adaptations made by the parties result in such variety that 
generalizations are particularly difficult to formulate; because 
arbitrations proceed in private and awards are often not 
published, a comprehensive study of the topic faces an inherent 
obstacle.1 Nonetheless, certain rudiments characterize the 
field. One such element (or cluster of elements) relates to the 
internationally binding character of arbitration agreements and 
awards. This chapter’s goal is to describe and briefly analyze 
several related anchoring concepts, which subsequent chapters 
take for granted.
1 See P. Lalive, On the Inevitable and Dangerous Character of 
Generalizations in the Field of Arbitration, in International Arbitra­
tion: 60 Years Of ICC Arbitration—A Look at the Future 317, 324 
(1984).
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3.2 The Cardinal Role of the Agreement to Arbitrate
3 .2 .1  In  G en er a l
Arbitrators derive their power from the arbitral agreement and 
the scope of their mandate is limited by its terms. In one 
sense, the agreement is that accord by which the parties waive 
access to judicial settlement of their dispute. The attitude of a 
particular legal system toward arbitration can often be linked 
to that fact. Modem systems acknowledge that agreements to 
arbitrate can be effective even if reached before the dispute 
arises. Indeed, predispute agreements are the norm in interna­
tional trade. They constitute what the U.S. Supreme Court has 
called “a specialized kind of forum selection clause.”2 
The notion that the arbitrator’s mandate is circumscribed by 
the arbitral agreement is among first principles.3 An award 
rendered in excess of the submission is ordinarily subject to 
attack both at the place of rendition4 and at the place where 
enforcement is sought.5
2 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 507.
3 As the leading textbook on English arbitration explains:
The role of arbitrator is . . . entirely defined by the arbitration 
agreement. In order to ascertain the extent of the questions 
which he is empowered to investigate, the principles which he 
is to apply when deciding upon them, and the procedures 
which he is to adopt in the course of his investigation, recourse 
must be had solely to the express and implied terms of the 
private contract between the parties.
Mustill & Boyd at 641.
4 See, e.g., FAA, § 10(d)(vacatur available “[w]here the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers...”).
5 New York Convention, art. V(l)(c).
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It is not uncommon for the parties’ respective views about 
the arbitration to change after the dispute arises. Where both 
parties agree that arbitration has become undesirable, they may 
simply ignore their agreement and process the dispute in 
another fashion. When, however, only one party wishes to 
disavow the agreement to arbitrate, its binding nature becomes 
evident. Subject to some exceptions, contemporary legal 
systems generally hold that arbitration agreements when 
properly invoked by a party preclude litigation of the issues 
covered by the agreement6 as discussed in the next section. 
The New York Convention has engendered and reinforced this 
tendency.7 An important supporting doctrine allows 
arbitrations to proceed even without a recalcitrant party 
present.8 The resulting award is no less enforceable for having 
been rendered after a ‘limping’ {exparte) arbitration, provided 
the arbitrators have assessed the relevant facts and law, and 
have not merely adopted the views of the participant party.9
6 In the United States, stays of litigation are required by Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) §§2 and 3 for agreements not covered by a 
convention. Courts must cease court proceedings when it is shown 
that an agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and that it 
covers the dispute in question. See Finegold v. Setty & Assoc. Ltd., 
81 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In England, the same result is 
effected by § 9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996.
7 Article II of the Convention requires a court to “refer the parties to 
arbitration” when the action before it is covered by a written arbitra­
tion agreement, relates to arbitrable subject matter and the court is 
so petitioned by a party to that agreement.
8 See Redfern & Hunter at 351-53, 381-82.
9 Id. Messrs. Redfern and Hunter at 381 observe that when a party 
has declined to participate, the tribunal “is compelled to take a 
more positive role.” Thus:
[T]he tribunal must take upon itself the burden of testing the 
assertions made by the active party; and it must call for such
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Because the arbitral agreement is the legal foundation of the 
arbitration, its formation and interpretation occupy important 
places in the jurisprudence of international arbitration. A 
fundamental problem arises when the clause is unclear.10 
Commercial drafters all too frequently—for reasons which are 
not always apparent—fail to choose language sufficient to 
preclude judicial determination of issues intended for arbitra­
tion. It is the commitment to arbitrate that the courts honor 
when refusing to entertain a dispute covered by the clause. 
They are on less solid ground when the parties have unartfully 
expressed their commitment, such as by using ambiguous, 
contradictory or precatory language or by naming a nonexistent 
institution.11
3 .2 .2  Sever ability  a n d  Co m petenc e  to  A ssess Ju r is­
d ic tio n
The arbitration agreement’s autonomy in relation to the parties’ 
main agreement {i.e., its severability) is an important 
question.12 The issue arises when the validity or continuing
evidence and legal argument as it may require to this end. 
The task of an arbitral tribunal is not to “rubber stamp” 
claims which are presented to it.
10 The standard references customarily devote attention to the 
problem of defective (sometimes called “pathological”) arbitration 
clauses. For vivid examples, see Craig et al. at 157-66; see also 
Redfern & Hunter at 177 (“The main defects found in arbitration 
clauses are those of inconsistency, uncertainty and inoperability”).
11 See, e.g., Republic of Nicar. v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 
473 (9th Cir. 1991) (“London Arbitration Association”).
12 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 478-82; Schwebel at 1-60.
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existence of the main agreement has been called into question. 
The modem trend is to treat the arbitration clause as constitut­
ing an autonomous agreement which may be governed by a 
law other than that applicable to the underlying agreement13 
and which does not depend upon the validity of the main 
agreement for its own efficacy.14
The question of severability is closely linked to the question 
of arbitral competence. If the clause is deemed autonomous, 
the tribunal need look no further than the clause in determining 
its competency to proceed, provided that the subject matter in 
question is within arbitral competency. If the tribunal later 
determines that the contract in which the clause is embedded 
was frustrated, or induced by fraud, its jurisdiction to make a 
binding determination to that effect is not necessarily affect­
ed.15 As discussed in the next subsection, however, the 
relative conclusiveness of such findings and the role of the 
courts in reviewing them vary among jurisdictions.
Because severability arguably relies on a legal fiction, its 
doctrinal basis has been questioned by some. Nevertheless, 
other considered voices have endorsed it robustly.16 The
13 Schwebel at 6 n.4. Nevertheless, in practice the same law often 
governs both the arbitration clause and the contract in which it is 
embedded.
14 Cf. Sale of Goods Convention, art. 81(1) (avoidance of contract 
does not affect dispute settlement provision therein).
15 That is not to say that a court could not subsequently overrule the 
tribunal’s determination that it was competent to conduct the 
arbitration. That raises a related but distinct question, the answer 
to which will likely vary with the governing law. See Park at 
149-51.
16 Judge Stephen Schwebel has concluded, for example:
—As a matter of theory, the principle of the severability of 
an arbitration clause from the principal agreement which
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severability doctrine, while widely recognized, is not observed 
in the same manner throughout modem legal systems. In a 
given jurisdiction its application may vary with the nature of 
the aspersion cast upon the main agreement.17
3 .3 .3  Co m p e t e n c e d e  la  Co m petence—A  C lo s e r  L o o k  18
As broached in the preceding subsection, the severability 
doctrine and questions of arbitral competency are intimately 
connected. Doctrinal catch-phrases, however, such as 
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz” or “severability” often obscure the 
borders among distinct, if related, issues. The following five 
questions, for example, are discrete:
1. Is the arbitration agreement analytically separate from the 
main agreement in which it is embedded such that legal 
disabilities affecting the latter do not ipso facto impact the 
agreement to arbitrate? This is the basic severability question. 
In general, modem legal systems hold that the arbitration 
agreement is autonomous.19
contains it is sound.
—As a matter of practice, that principle has been sustained 
by the terms and implications of arbitration conventions and 
rules, and by case law, whether of public international law, 
international commercial arbitration, or national arbitration.
—In the analyses of the commentators, support for the 
principle of severability is both broad and compelling.
Schwebel at 60.
17 See, e.g., Mustill & Boyd at 108-14 (discussing pre-1996 Act 
law).
18 See generally Park; J. Rosen, Arbitration under Private International 
Law: The Doctrines of Separability and Competence de la 
Competence, 17 Fordham Int’l L. J. 599 (1994).
19 See, e.g., Model Law, Art. 16(1)(3).
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2. Do arbitrators have the authority to assess the existence 
and scope of the agreement to arbitrate—that is, to determine 
their own jurisdiction? This is the competence de la 
competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) question. Again in modem 
systems, to varying degrees, the answer to this question is also 
yes.20
3. If arbitrators have the authority referred to in question 2 
above, to what extent are their findings subject to judicial 
review? This question makes the important point that the 
arbitrators’ authority to determine tribunal competence may be 
both shared with the judiciary and subordinate to it. In general, 
it is safe to assume that the judiciary in most countries will not 
be wholly without power to review (and perhaps preempt) 
arbitral determinations on jurisdiction; the extent to which this 
is true, however, will depend in some systems upon what the 
parties have said in their agreement to arbitrate.
4. If the arbitrators’ jurisdictional determinations can be 
reviewed or obviated by the judicial assessments of the 
agreement to arbitrate, when in the process does the judiciary 
perform its function? In other words, do the arbitrators have 
the first opportunity to decide whether they have jurisdiction 
and then to act upon that determination, or is there some form 
of judicial vetting that forestalls futile proceedings?21
20 The English Arbitration Act of 1996, unlike the Model Law, 
sensibly treats severability and arbitral competence in separate 
clauses. Section 30 of the Act authorizes the tribunal to rule on 
arbitration agreement validity and the scope and on whether the 
tribunal is properly constituted. See Marriott at 97. Section 7 
establishes the severability of the arbitration clause. Id. at 103.
21 Under French law, competence de la competence is supported by a 
code of civil procedure that gives the arbitrators the initial role in 
assessing the scope and existence of the agreement to arbitrate.
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5. To what degree do the answers to the above depend upon 
the wishes of the parties as expressed in the agreement to 
arbitrate? Do the parties enjoy sufficient autonomy to confer 
upon the arbitral tribunal the primary or exclusive role in 
assessing its own jurisdiction?22
3.3 The Role and Content of Treaties 
3.3.1. In General
As suggested in Chapter One, treaties exert an important 
influence upon the transnational legal environment. In relation 
to arbitration, they engender predictability by establishing 
common approaches to the enforcement of arbitral agreements 
and awards.
Even treaties not dealing directly with arbitration may affect 
the process. Conventions that facilitate litigation, for example 
(such as those enhancing the enforcement of judgments), may 
influence the choice between arbitration and litigation. In
Courts may entertain challenges to arbitral jurisdiction, but not until 
after an award is rendered. After the award is made, the courts are 
free to review the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction. The pre-award 
judicial abstention characterizing the French approach contrasts with 
the traditional English and American stances, which have afforded 
resisting parties access to the courts to test arbitral jurisdiction early 
in the process. Park at 152.
22 In Germany, prior to its adoption of the Model Law, if the parties 
so provided, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine allowed the arbitral 
tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction conclusively. Park at 151. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kaplan similarly held that the parties 
may by unambiguous agreement limit review of the arbitrators’ 
jurisdictional findings. 115 S. Ct. 1923.
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addition, treaties effecting substantive unification, such as the 
Sales Convention, make choice of law analysis less determina­
tive of outcomes, a benefit that would seem to be conferred 
equally upon arbitration and litigation. They also provide 
positive texts to which arbitrators in particular are apt to refer 
in establishing a sense of common principles.23
Among treaties addressing arbitration directly are numerous 
Bilateral Investment Treaties24 and the ICSID Convention25 
which play important roles in their specific settings. Without 
doubt, however, the most important instrument affecting 
international commercial arbitration is the “New York” 
Convention of 1958, discussed in the next sub-section.
23 See infra Chapter 4 {passim).
24 Approximately 1200 bilateral investment treaties exist. The number 
increases annually. For texts and commentary on the current 
generation of BITs sponsored by the United States see K. 
Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties Policy and Practice 
(1992). The effect of BIT proliferation is “an increasingly dense 
network of treaty relationships between capital-exporting states and 
developing countries.” J. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries, 24 Int’l Law. 655, 656 (1990). 
BITs attempt to ensure that host states maintain predictable regimes 
in relation to foreign investment so as to inspire confidence. As part 
of a package of assurances, it has become commonplace for such 
treaties to contain dispute settlement provisions encouraging or 
requiring arbitration. The manifest trend is to specify ICSID arbitra­
tion, though variations are plentiful. See A. Parra, Provisions on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modem Investment Laws 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on 
Investment, 12 ICSID Rev. 287 (1997).
25 The ICSID Convention enjoys wide participation (approximately 120 
adherent states). It establishes a specialized and relatively compre­
hensive arbitral regime under which are decided investment disputes 
(as distinct from other commercial matters) between a state (or one 
of its agencies or subdivisions) and a non-state.
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3.3.2 A g r ee m e n ts  t o  A r b itr a te  U n d er  t h e  N ew  Y o rk  
C o n v e n tio n
Nearly 120 states are parties to the New York Convention,26 
ranking it as one of the more fruitful efforts of its type. As one 
standard reference has observed, “[the Convention] may be 
regarded as one of the major contributing factors to the rapid 
development of arbitration as a means of resolving internation­
al trade disputes.”27 It has two main features. First, it 
requires the courts of contracting states to refrain from 
adjudicating disputes covered by a qualifying arbitration agree­
ment, at least where a party invokes the agreement. By 
requiring courts to “refer the parties to arbitration,” the 
Convention greatly increases the chances that arbitration will 
take place. A party seeking to circumvent a written 
undertaking to arbitrate should meet with the same chilly 
reception in the courts of any Convention state, subject to the 
few qualifications within the Convention itself.
FAA Chapter 2, which implements the Convention, 
arguably exceeds the Convention’s mandate by authorizing 
U.S. courts to compel “that arbitration be held in accordance 
with the agreement...”28 Under the Convention, federal courts 
may direct that the parties arbitrate abroad if their agreement 
so provides, a power not available to them under the FAA’s
26 Professor van der Berg’s 1981 monograph remains an authoritative 
reference on the New York Convention. Cases analyzing the 
Convention are excerpted annually in the ICC A Y e a r b o o k  o f  
C o m m e r c ia l  A r b i t r a t i o n .
27 Redfern & Hunter at 63.
28 FAA, § 206. The section uses the phrase “direct that arbitration be 
held” which is stronger than the treaty’s “refer.” Id.
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first chapter.29 After accounting for U.S. reservations, many 
federal courts have adduced a four-part test for determining 
when to compel arbitration under the Convention. These courts 
require that:
1) There is an agreement in writing to arbitrate the subject 
of the dispute;
2) The agreement provides for arbitration in the territory 
of a New York Convention country;
3) The agreement arises out of a legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, which is considered 
commercial; and
4) At least one party to the contract is not an American 
citizen, or that the commercial relationship has some 
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.30
29 When no convention applies, federal district courts may only compel 
arbitration to take place within their own districts. See § 4. The 
Convention broadens the judicial reach in another respect; arbitra­
tion agreements arising in purely foreign transactions are not 
excluded under the Convention, whereas they apparently are under 
FAA Chapter One. Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Ma- 
ritima, S.A., 477 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), qff’d, 620 F.2d 
286 (2d Cir. 1980).
30 See Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat’l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 
1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 
184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l 
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The first condition combines two requisites (existence and scope 
of the arbitral agreement). Treatment of these two issues under the 
Convention is not noticeably different to that evident under the 
FAA’s first chapter. The same emphatic pro-arbitration policies and 
rules of construction apply, although they are sometimes said to 
have even greater vigor in relation to international contracts. 
Condition 2 imposes a species of reciprocity requirement not 
expressly authorized in the Convention (the treaty language refers 
only to awards); condition 3 reflects the U.S. reservation authorized
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3 .3 .3  Convention  Aw ards
The Convention obliges adherent states to “recognize arbitral 
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the 
rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied 
upon. ”31 Convention awards are those which are “made in the 
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition 
and enforcement of such awards are sought [or which are] not 
considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought. ”32 A contracting state 
may limit the application of the Convention. By insisting upon 
a form of reciprocity, i .e ., that it will accord Convention 
treatment only to awards “made . . . in the territory of another 
Contracting state”33 and may declare that it will apply the 
Convention only to disputes arising from relationships
under the Convention’s Article 1(3), allowing it to apply the 
Convention only to disputes arising from “commercial” 
relationships, as defined by U.S. law. See infra note 34. The 
American cases construing “commercial relationship” have generally 
given it a broad scope. See Societe General de Surveillance v. 
Raytheon European Management and Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863 (1st 
Cir. 1981). So have many non-American decisions. Born, 
A r b it r a t io n  at 288, n. 189. The fourth condition derives from FAA 
§ 202 and helps separate domestic from Convention agreements. 
Whether an arbitration clause meets the statute’s “reasonable 
relation” test merely by naming a non-American situs is subject to 
debate. See Bom, A r b it r a t io n  at 292; Rau at 249-51. The 
Restatement (Third) § 487, cmt. g, seems to posit that it does: “An 
agreement to arbitrate may come under this section . . .  if the 
agreed place of arbitration is in a foreign state[.]”
31 New York Convention, art. III.
32 Id., art. 1(1).
33 New York Convention, art. 1(3).
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characterized as “commercial” under its national law.34 The 
United States, for example, has adopted both qualifications.
The basic obligation to recognize and enforce is qualified by 
several exceptions. These have been narrowly construed and 
the burden of demonstrating an exception to enforcement is 
upon the resisting party.35
34 Id. The commercial relationship qualification of the Convention 
traditionally has been less widely adopted by Convention parties 
than the reciprocity requirement also found in Article 1(3). Cf. 
Restatement (Third) § 487, cmt. b. (current as of 1986). Among 
parties to the treaty, another type of reciprocity rule operates. 
Article XIV provides that one State may only enforce the Conven­
tion against another State to the extent that the first has itself 
accepted obligations. This provision is subject to learned debate as 
to its exact meaning and in particular whether it has relevance apart 
from conditioning the treaty obligations of the state parties inter se. 
See Bom, A r b it r a t io n  at 488. In connection with private litigants, 
it is difficult to know what it adds to the reciprocity requirement of 
Article I. Id. Perhaps it authorizes U.S. courts to look behind the 
fact of Convention membership to assess whether U.S. awards 
analogous to the type presented are honored at the place where the 
award was rendered. Consider, for example, the differing meanings 
of “commercial” likely to exist among the 115-plus parties to the 
Convention. Cf. Id. (offering hypothetical); see also Biotronik 
Mess-und Thereapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Instrument 
Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N. J. 1976) (“considerations of 
reciprocity . . . counsel courts to invoke the public policy defense 
with caution lest foreign courts frequently accept it as a defense to 
enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in die United States.” 
(quoting Parsons and Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 937)).
35 The “refusal grounds” are found in Article V of the Convention. 
Shorn of certain subtides, they include that:
(a) a party lacked capacity or the arbitration agreement was 
invalid under, in default of party choice, the law of place 
where the award was made;
(b) the resisting party was given improper notice or was 
otherwise unable to present its case;
(c) the award exceeds the parties’ submission;
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The Convention’s wide acceptance has standardized the 
general approach taken to foreign arbitral awards by contract­
ing states. So familiar and well established is the text that it 
was adopted by the Model Law for treatment of all awards 
governed thereby.36 So narrowly have its exceptions to its 
enforcement been generally construed that aberrant decisions 
are highly conspicuous.37 It has also greatly influenced the
(d) the tribunal’s composition or the procedure leading to the 
award was inconsistent with the parties’ agreement, or, 
absent an agreement, with the law of the place of the 
arbitration;
(e) the award is not binding, or has been set aside or suspended 
by a competent authority;
(f) the award purports to settle subject matter which is non- 
arbitral under the law of the country in which enforcement 
is sought;
(g) to enforce the award would violate the public policy of the 
country in which enforcement is sought.
36 The UNCITRAL Secretariat’s earlier study of over 100 decisions 
led it to conclude that, despite certain interpretive questions 
(especially related to applicable law under Article V), the 
Convention had functioned well. See Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 
1172-73 (excerpting Secretariat Study on the New York Convention, 
A/CN.9/168 (20 April 1979).
37 A search for published U.S. decisions in which a refusal ground was 
successfully invoked under the Convention yielded fewer than ten 
instances in nearly three decades. The unfavorable odds have 
presumably promoted voluntary compliance with Convention 
awards. At least two cases were found in which a court adjourned 
enforcement proceedings under Convention Article VI. Less tenable 
is a recent decision applying forum non conveniens to a Convention 
award enforcement action. See Melton v. Oy Nautor A.B. 97-15395 
(9th Cir. 1998), 13 Int’l Arb. Rep., Sept. 1998, at 9, H-l.
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structure of its younger regional counterpart, the Inter- 
American Convention of 1975.38
38 See C. Norberg, U.S. Ratification and Implementation of the Inter- 
American Convention: A Commentary, 1 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 588 
(1990). The Panama Convention is open for accession to any state 
but at present has only regional membership, which includes 16 
states; it closely parallels the New York Convention though the two 
instruments vary somewhat. Among the primary differences is that 
the Panama Convention establishes an institution, the Inter-American 
Commercial Arbitration Commission, whose arbitral rules are to 
govern in the absence of contrary party choice. The New York 
Convention has no provision for applicable procedural rules or 
institutional involvement.
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4.1 Introduction
Applicable law questions frequently arise in international 
commercial arbitration. This chapter introduces the conflicts 
methods and substantive sources that typify international 
arbitral practice. What emerges is the sense that the arbitration 
alternative functions with great detachment from national 
procedural and substantive regimes and that the combination of 
party autonomy and wide arbitral discretion has facilitated 
inventiveness in conflicts methodology, but only a measure of 
uniformity. The interim conclusion reached is that reform will 
be out of step with prevailing practices if it confines either the 
parties’ autonomy or, in default thereof, arbitral discretion in 
matters of applicable law. The chapter starts by noting some 
rudimentary analytical distinctions, before progressing through 
various related matters.
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4.2 Some Broad Distinctions1
In strict theory at least four applicable law analyses are 
distinct. The four address: the conduct of the arbitration; the 
parties’ substantive rights and duties under their commercial 
relationship; the agreement to arbitrate—its existence, validity 
and manner of enforcement; and the ultimate award. The first 
of these is sometimes referred to as the “curial law” or the lex 
arbitri. It is usually the “arbitration” law of the situs chosen 
for arbitration, i.e., the lex loci arbitri. Thus, in selecting a 
place for arbitration, the parties are in effect designating a 
curial law as well.2 When an American city is designated as
1 See generally Pryles.
2 The curial governs a range of important issues, typically including 
most matters, substantive and procedural, affecting the conduct of 
arbitration. See infra Chapter 5 (§ 5.2) and authority cited therein. 
Theoretically, the parties could expressly adopt a law other than that 
of the situs. In jurisdictions in which this substitution is permitted, 
the mandatory laws of the lex loci arbitri would supplant those of 
the chosen curial law—at least in the courts of the situs. See Pryles 
at 206 (suggesting that this would be true of the Model Law). 
Selection of a curial law other than that of the situs might confront 
a rather high standard of explicitness. See id. at 205, relying on 
Justice Saville’s approach in Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp, [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 48, 50-51. He found insufficient the 
designation “the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with 
the procedure provided in the Indian Arbitration Act 1940....” The 
choice of London as situs and the “highly unsatisfactory” situation 
which would result were the arbitration governed by two bodies of 
arbitral law were influential factors.
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the arbitral situs, the lex arbitri potentially comprises both state 
and federal arbitration laws.3
The second cluster of questions is at the heart of classical 
private international law and arises because international 
transactions touch more than one system; that is, two or more 
divergent laws may have a claim to application. The subset of 
procedural law developed to make such choices has played an 
important role in international arbitration, though not one 
fulfilled merely by replicating the practices of national courts.
The third governing law question, that raised by the 
agreement to arbitrate, in general is resolved predictably. 
Especially when that undertaking is imbedded in the main 
agreement, it is usually governed by the same law that governs 
the underlying contract, though it follows from the autonomy 
of the arbitration agreement that departures from this rule are 
theoretically possible.4
Under the New York and Panama Conventions and the 
Model Law, questions related to award enforcement—the 
fourth set of problems—are not invariably matters for the lex
3 In a sense, the curial law will also include the procedural rules 
chosen by the parties to the extent that they do not conflict with 
mandatory laws of the lex arbitri, or the lex loci arbitri.
4 See Pryles at 201-03. The arbitration agreement is, of course, more 
likely to be governed by a law other than that applicable to the main 
agreement when the two agreements are concluded at different times 
and places from each other, as is often true where the arbitration is 
founded upon a post-dispute “submission agreement. ” Conceivably, 
the law applicable to the agreement to arbitrate will vary depending 
upon whether that determination is being made by an arbitral 
tribunal (e.g., before whom a jurisdictional issue has been raised), 
a court asked to enforce the agreement to arbitrate, or a court asked 
to set aside or refuse enforcement to an award. Id.
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fori; sometimes the reference is to the lex arbitri, and 
sometimes to a third law.5
4.3 Substantive Law and Party Autonomy
4 .3 .1  A utonom y  In  General
In international arbitration, the parties’ ability to designate or 
soften the law or laws that will govern their relationship is part 
of a broader autonomy.6 Subject to certain general maxims,7 
and mandatory rules of the situs, the parties may tailor the 
scope of their submission, may designate the place of 
arbitration, may determine the size of the tribunal and select its 
members, may employ non-local advocates, may fix the 
language of the proceeding, may dictate to a large degree the 
procedure to be followed by the tribunal, and in certain Model
5 See Pryles at 202; see also New York Convention, art. V (choice of 
law directives applicable to “refusal” grounds).
6 Cf. Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 564-65 (discussing party autonomy 
over the proceedings as being “critical to an effective system of 
commercial arbitration for international cases”).
7 An example is that: “[t]he parties shall be treated with equality and 
each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case. ” 
UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 18. Similar guidelines are found, 
e.g., in Swiss and Dutch statutes. The equal treatment rule is 
addressed to arbitrators. Whether the parties could by agreement in 
effect waive the rule as to certain aspects of the proceedings is an 
interesting question. Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 583, conclude that, 
within the context of the Model Law, the parties may not deviate 
from the equal treatment rule.
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Law states, may secure its application by agreeing that the 
subject matter of their dispute is “international.”8 
Partied often establish a procedural framework by adopting 
standard rules, such as those of a particular institution.9 
Though such a text is designated, party autonomy remains 
robust; individual provisions ordinarily may be augmented or 
supplanted by agreement of the parties who may construct their 
own approach to myriad procedural issues. This aspect of party 
autonomy is revisited in Chapter 5.
4 .3 .2  Pa r t ie s’ D esig natio n  of  Su b st a n t iv e  La w
In international trade, the latitude the parties have in 
designating applicable law is by no means restricted to 
arbitration.10 In arbitration, however, there may be even 
greater accommodation of the parties’ choice than in litigation. 
A large number of modem arbitration statutes and mles 
explicate rather unqualified freedom of choice provisions that 
do not necessarily have counterparts among the statutes
8 See Model Law, Art. l(3)(c).
9 The designation of such rules would normally be implied by the 
choice of the institution itself, although the fact that institutions 
sometimes have several sets of rules can cause uncertainty. Well 
conceived rules are also available for ad hoc arbitrations (those not 
using an administering institution).
10 See generally P. North, General Course at 156-205; and see Y. 
Derains, The ICC Arbitral Process Part VIII. Choice of Law 
Applicable to the Contract and International Arbitration, 6(1) ICC 
Ct. Bull. 10 (1995) (“nowadays all legal systems allow the parties 
freedom to designate the law applicable to the contract, at least in 
so far as the substance is concerned”).
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governing court practice.11 The Model Law, for example, 
upon which dozens of statutes are now based, provides that 
“[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance 
with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as 
applicable to the substance of the dispute,”12 a phrasing 
adopted, e.g., in the corresponding Dutch provision.13
An important variant of party autonomy in relation to 
applicable law is that which enables the parties to override any 
undue harshness that the arbitrators may find within the 
governing law or within the contract’s strict terms. 
Empowering the tribunal to act as amiable compositeurs (as it 
is called in the French tradition) or to decide ex aequo et bono 
(the common law parallel) varies the usual form of arbitration, 
by inviting the tribunal to reach an equitable solution.14
11 Thus, an unremarkable ICC award states “[WJhen a contractual 
clause indicates the applicable law ... The law chosen in this manner 
must be applied.” Award No. 5865 (1989) excerpted in Extracts at 
23. Courts in the U.S. have seemed to endorse this sentiment when 
presented with awards. See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l 
Mktg., 811 F.2d 1265, 1270 (9th Cir, 1987)(mandatory Saudi law 
not applicable given parties’ choice of a different law).
12 Model Law, Art. 28 (1).
13 Article 1054, Netherlands Arbitration Act of 1986, reprinted in 
ICCA Handbook, Vol. IV. The approach, while prevalent, is by no 
means an UNCITRAL invention; the antecedent French counterpart 
contains a similar directive (“the...tribunal rules...in conformity 
with the rules of law the parties have chosen”) Article 1496, Code 
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Decree of May 12, 1981 as do 
the ICSID Convention of 1965 (art. 42(1)) and the 1961 European 
(“Geneva”) Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 
(art. VII).
14 See Redfern & Hunter at 35-38, noting “[i]n particular, amiable 
compositeurs may take a more flexible approach to the quantification 
of damages in order to reflect commercial fairness and reality, 
rather than regarding themselves as bound by the rules of law
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Parties more often than might be imagined give the tribunal 
this power, either on a general basis or with respect to certain 
issues only.15
The parties’ ability to authorize awards ex aequo et bono is 
endorsed in rules, statutes and in at least one arbitration 
treaty.16 In those texts, which replicate the international 
standard, the option depends wholly upon joint authorization; 
it is not a prerogative conferred by only one party, by the 
tribunal sua sponte, or by an administering institution.17
governing the measure of compensation.” Id. at 36; see also G. 
Delaume, “Amiable Composition" Is Device For Facilitating Just 
Awards, 5 News and Notes from the Inst, for Transnat’l Arb., No. 
2, 1 (April 1990). Despite the latitude implied in an amiable 
compositeur authorization, a tribunal so empowered may not proceed 
arbitrarily. Equality of the parties must be observed as must any 
mandatory rules of the situs, Redfem & Hunter at 36-38 and 
perhaps of other states. Naon at 97 (“amiable compositeurs remain 
bound by international mandatory norms of national origin”). 
Moreover, arbitrators will be disinclined to wholly disregard the 
parties’ contract, even when acting as amiable compositeurs. See, 
e.g., ICC Award No. 3267 (1989) excerpted in Jarvin et al., (eds.), 
II Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 43, 49 (1993).
15 Blessing at 64.
16 See ICSID, art. 43(3).
17 Rather than the standard Latin phrases, parties may prefer a more 
prolix authorization. For example, the clause found in a certain 
reinsurance-management contract, after a standard reference to 
arbitration, states:
The arbitrators shall interpret this Agreement as an honorable 
engagement and not merely a legal obligation; they are relieved of 
all judicial formalities and may abstain from following the strict 
rules of law, and they shall make their award with a view to 
effecting the general purpose of this Agreement in a reasonable 
manner rather than in accordance with a literal interpretation of 
the language.
Pacific Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reins. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 
1025 (1991).
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Moreover, such authorizations have not always received a 
warm reception in certain legal systems. Under former English 
law, for example, amiable compositieur designations were 
controversial, as were purported choices of a-national systems 
of law; in principle, only references to a national legal system 
were recognized.18 With enactment of the Arbitration Act of 
1996, however, the lingering questions should end; the Act 
sets forth a liberal party autonomy rule.19
4.4 Methodology Absent Parties’ Choice20
4 .4 .1  In  Gen er a l
The parties’ power to designate governing law derives its 
enormous significance in business planning from the state of 
affairs that obtains when they fail to so; predictably is
18 Craig et al. at 481. For learned discussion, see Mustill; F. Mann, 
The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws, 36 Int’l Comp. L. Q. 437 
(1987). Apparently, however, a Convention award produced by an 
amiable compositeur lawfully empowered at the arbitral seat would 
not be refused enforcement for want of a properly applicable law.
19 Under the 1996 Act, the parties may designate the lex mercatoria or 
empower a tribunal seated in England to act ex aequo et bono, 
though for reasons of accessibility neither Latin phrase has been 
used in the Act’s text. See Saville Report at para. 223 (discussing § 
46(1 )(b».
20 In monograph form alone, a wealth of scholarly discussion is 
available concerning choice of law in international commercial 
arbitration. See, e.g., O. Chukwumerije, C h o ic e  o f  L a w  in  
In t e r n a t io n a l  C o m m e r c ia l  A r b it r a tio n  (1994); H. Naon, 
C h o ic e  o f  L a w  P r o b lem s  in  In t e r n a t io n a l  C o m m e r c ia l  
A r b it r a t io n  (1992); J. Lew, A ppl ic a b l e  L a w  in  In t e r n a t io n a l  
C o m m e r c ia l  A r b it r a t io n  (1978).
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appreciably diminished because modem laws of arbitration and 
institutional rules confer broad discretion upon the tribunal in 
designating applicable law. Of the two prevailing formulations, 
one entitles the tribunal to select whatever choice of law 
technique it deems appropriate21 and, under the second, it 
may choose the governing law or substantive principles without 
reference to any choice of law rule.22 Where a choice of law 
directive is provided, typically by an arbitration statute, the 
method designated is usually a flexible, multi-factored test
21 The former ICC Rules (revised January 1, 1998) replicated the two- 
step approach found in the Geneva Convention and in certain 
statutes. See European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, Geneva, April 21, 1961, art. VII. They provided, “[i]n 
the absence of any indication by the parties as to the applicable law, 
the arbitrator shall apply the law designated as the proper law by the 
rule of conflict which he deems appropriate.” ICC Arbitration 
Rules, (1993), Art. 17(1) (emphasis added). The phrasing “any 
indication by the parties” has been replaced in the New ICC Rules 
by “agreement. ” Under the former text, arbitrators arguably had to 
look for an implied choice of law. Cf Merkin, para. 5.19. The two- 
step default approach removed from the ICC Rules remains in the 
UNCITRAL Rules (Art. 33(1)) and the Model Law (Art. 28(2)).
22 See AAA International Rules, Art. 29(1) (tribunal to apply, “such 
[substantive] law or rules of law as it determines to be appropri­
ate”); Accord ICC Rules (1998), Art. 17(1). This one-step approach 
is essentially that found in the French Code of Civil Procedure, 
1981, at Article 1496, and in the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986, 
at Article 1054. The latitude conferred by these texts is readily 
apparent. As Professor Juenger writes:
[t]hey do not even require the pretext of pretending first to 
select some national choice-of-law rule; rather, with 
commendable forthrightness they eliminate this intermediate 
step and allow arbitrators to apply directly whatever 
substantive law suits them.
F. Juenger, Contract Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 Amer. J. 
Compar. L. 195, 202 (1997).
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which retains for the arbitrators considerable leeway in its 
implementation.23
The lack of predictability that results from existing formulae, 
of course, does not imply that choice of law determinations by 
arbitrators are invariably unprincipled. Published awards and 
studies thereof suggest that arbitrators attend with care to 
choice of law. The following sections introduce a series of 
doctrines and practices that typify the handling of conflicts 
questions in cases in which the parties have failed to designate 
applicable law.
4 .4 .2  Obv ia tin g  Ch oice  o f  La w  A n a l y sis .
Choice of law analysis may be unnecessary if the controlling 
issue is simply one of contract interpretation; the outcome may 
be determined by applying the agreement’s terms, and perhaps 
applicable trade customs, to issues that are largely factual. 
Modem rules and statutes reinforce this approach by requiring 
arbitrators to apply the contract’s provisions and to consider 
applicable usages in rendering an award. This is true, for 
example, of the ICC Rules,24 the UNCITRAL Rules,25 the
23 See Swiss Private International Law Statute of 1987, Art. 187(1) 
(“The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute . . . according to the 
rules of law with which the case has the closest connection”); for 
commentary, see Blessing at 58-65 (1988). Accord Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code § 1297.283 and Republic of India Arbitration and Conciliation 
Ordinance 1996, § 28(l)(b)(iii), reprinted in ICCA Handbook, Vol. 
II (both requiring closest connection to be determined in light of “all 
the circumstances surrounding the dispute”).
24 Art. 17(2).
25 Id. Art. 33(3).
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AAA International Rules,26 the UNCITRAL Model Law27 
and California’s 1988 Act.28 The English Act, by contrast, 
departs from the familiar UNCITRAL phrasing by not 
mandating that the tribunal “take into account usages of the 
trade applicable to the transaction.” 29
Choice of law analysis also becomes unnecessary when 
reflection confirms that there is no outcome determinative 
conflict between laws because the potentially applicable laws 
have the same content or reach the same result. This might 
occur for example when the parties instinctive preference for 
a familiar law causes them to raise the issue, only to have it be 
subsequently determined that the ostensibly competing systems 
have been unified by treaty.
A third instance in which traditional choice of law analysis 
is of reduced importance occurs with the direct application of 
a-national commercial principles—some species of lex 
m ercatoria. The broad grants of discretion to be found in the 
leading texts promote such circumvention of national 
substantive law,30 although this methodology would seem to
26 Art. 29(2).
27 Art. 28(4).
28 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.285.
29 Saville Report at para. 222 (quoting Model Law, Art. 28). The 
Advisory Committee that produced the Bill reasoned that “[i]f the 
applicable law allows [usages to be taken into account] then the 
provision is not necessary; while if it does not, then it could be 
said that such a directive overrides that law, which to our minds 
would be incorrect. ” Id.
30 See, e.g., ICC Rules, Art. 17(1) “the rules of law which the 
tribunal determines to be appropriate. ”
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require some form of subsidiary analysis to determine when 
application of the lex mercatoria is appropriate.31
4 .4 .3  Primitive M ethod Taxonom y
The diversity of methods available to arbitrators has prompted 
scholars to devote entire monographs to the subject, perhaps 
without exhausting it. th e  technique selected is not merely of 
academic interest. In the United States alone several choice of 
law methods are in use. The governing law that results often 
varies with the approach used, as does the degree of 
predictability associated with the process. The considerable 
intricacies notwithstanding, broad similarities among method 
families have resulted from cross-fertilization and the 
interpenetration of legal systems.32 Thus, on a global basis, 
one finds both the traditional, single-factor rule selecting 
devices, with their mechanical security33 and the more fluid
31 Cf. Mustill at 98 (“little has been done to identify criteria”).
32 Cf. Born, L itig a tio n  at 493-94 (discussing influence of European 
scholars upon Joseph Story).
33 In the United States, the methods associated with the Restatement 
First, fit this general description. In the main they rely on initial 
characterization and applicable law choices dictated by single 
connecting factors. See generally L. Brilmayer, C o n f l ic t  o f  
L a w s : C a ses  a n d  M a t er ia l s  124-25 (4th ed. 1995). Once it is 
determined that the matter should be treated, for example, as a 
contracts claim (as opposed, e.g., to a tort claim), a sub- 
characterization focusing on the type of contract or issue may be 
undertaken; this further classification may be necessary to identify 
among the several possibilities the controlling factor or event. A 
contract problem, for example, can often be further classified as 
relating primarily to formation (or validity) or to performance. After 
the subclassification is accomplished, the legal system supplying the 
rule of decision is identified by locating the single connecting factor
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modem approaches that tend to be issue specific, multi­
factored and nuanced. Somewhere in between are approaches 
that attempt to draw the best from both families by combining 
rebuttable guides with factual balancing.
Typical of the several so-called modem approaches to which 
arbitrators often gravitate is that propounded in the 
Restatement (Second).34 Numerous international awards refer 
to it,35 and while notionally “American,” non-American 
lawyers and arbitrators readily understand its attempt to 
combine flexibility with explicit guidance.36 Its centerpiece is 
the “most significant relationship” test under which the rights 
and duties of the parties with respect to an issue are 
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to 
that issue, “has the most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties.”37
In Restatement (Second) analysis no single consideration 
dictates the result. Rather, two collections of factors are 
identified to aid in the choice of law determination: one list
designated as controlling. Restatement (First) of Conflict of 
Laws §§ 332-34. Single factor approaches are far from unique to 
American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Hober at 19 (“...under Soviet 
conflict of laws rules lex loci contractus is applied when the parties 
have not agreed on the applicable law”).
34 ALI, (1971).
35 See, e.g., Extracts at 23 (Final Award No. 6268 (1990); ICC 
Interim Award, Case 5314 (1988) excerpted in 4(2) ICC Ct. Bull. 
70 (1993).
36 The Rome Convention fits this general pattern.
37 Restatement (Second) § 188(1).
105
Chapter 4: Applicable Law
identifies contacts specific to contract cases;38 the other lists 
policies to be weighed generally.39
Apparently to make the outcomes more predictable, 
however, the Restatement Second injects several specific 
presumption-like propositions. Among these directives is that 
of Section 188(3) which observes that “[i]f the place of 
negotiating the contract and the place of performance are the
38 The contract-specific contacts are set forth in Section 188 as 
follows:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora­
tion and place of business of the parties.
They are, according to Section 188, “to be evaluated according to 
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.” Id. 
§ 188(2).
39 The general considerations relate to broad systemic policies. These 
are set forth in Section 6 and include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination 
of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law 
to be applied.
The conception that a state other than the forum may have an 
“interest” in having its law applied is a theme found in many 
contemporary American approaches, including the Restatement 
Second, as indicated in the above-listed factors. In fact, a method 
known as “interest analysis” is in use in a few states, albeit in 
different forms. The seminal literature includes Currie, Se l e c t e d  
E ssa y s  o n  t h e  Co n fl ic t  o f  L a w s  (1963). Professor Currie’s 
theories have not been adopted in full by arbitrators or courts.
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same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, 
except [in the case of land sale and certain other contracts or 
issues].”40 Other predictive references are provided but are 
subject to the possibility that, exceptionally, the factors of 
sections 6 and 188 will lead to a different result.41
A review of the literature reveals that the American 
arbitrator may have little difficulty in discussing choice of law 
with, for example, his Swedish counterpart42 and that, indeed, 
calling the Restatement Second’s approach “modem” may be 
a misnomer. In his digest of Swedish awards, Hober describes 
the multi-factor “centre of gravity” method in which the judge 
or arbitrator allocates among the legal systems implicated 
various contacts and uses in dubio mles to recommend to the 
arbitrator applicable law when the centre fails to reveal itself. 
The method’s similarity to the American analogue is striking 
and according to Hober, it originated in a Swedish Supreme 
Court case decided three decades before the Restatement 
Second was published!43
40 Issues related to land-sale contracts are governed ordinarily by the 
law of the situs of the property. Id. § 5.
41 See R. Cramton et a i ,  C o n f l ic t  o f  L a w s : C a se s -C o m m e n t s - 
Q u e st io n s  117-20 (5th ed. 1993).
42 See generally Hober.
43 Id. at 8. Hober’s summary of the technique could almost have 
appeared in an American primer on choice of law:
When applying the centre of gravity test all connecting factors 
relating to the contract in question must be taken into account... 
[T]he weighing of the various connecting factors [however] can 
never be a mechanical exercise.... Rather, a court must determine 
the relative weight and importance of the connecting factors in 
light of the individual case.
Id. at 9 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
Not unlike the presumptive references of the Restatement Second, 
the in dubio rules are non-binding “recommendations which may be
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Among the other standard conceptions is “proper law of 
contract” analysis developed by English courts,44 and still 
observed to varying degrees in many common law systems.45 
In the absence of an express or implied choice by the parties, 
it too resembles in broad outline the multi-factor tests familiar 
to Americans. Its goal is to determine the law with which the 
contract has its “closest and most real connection.”46 Among 
the relevant factors are: the place of performance, the place of 
formation, the places of business of the parties, and the type 
and subject-matter of the contract.47 A similar multi-factor 
approach is apparently called for under the Swiss variant of the 
“closest connection”test, though differences between the 
English and Swiss methods can be detected.48
relied upon if and when the centre of gravity test fails to give an 
unambiguous result.” Id. at 10.
44 See generally J. McClean, M o r r is : T h e  C o n f l ic t  o f  La w s  252- 
56 (4th ed. 1993) (hereinafter Morris); North & Fawcett at 458-59. 
In England, choice of contract law is now governed by the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act of 1990, which implements the Rome 
Convention. See North & Fawcett at 459 et seq. Choice of law, by 
arbitrators, however, is governed by the Arbitration Act 1996.
45 See, e.g., 'G. Bamodu, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in 
Transnational Dispute Resolution before the Nigerian Courts, 29 
Int’l Law 555, 564-73 (1995) (Nigerian courts in theory employ the 
English proper law approach but often demonstrate a lex fori 
preference).
46 Morris, supra note 44, at 255.
47 Id.(citing Re United Railways of the Havana and Regia Warehouses 
Ltd. (1990) Ch. 52, 91).
48 Dr. Blessing suggests that the Swiss formulation imposes few 
restrictions on the arbitrators, who may determine that selected 
“transnational” rules of law have the closest connection to “the 
case” (or as another translation has it, to the “dispute”). Blessing at 
60-61. By contrast, traditional English law usually conceives of the 
search as leading to a particular national system of law, a restriction 
reflected in the Rome Convention’s Article 4(1)
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4.5 Selecting Choice of Law Methods
Typically, the lex arbitri neither dictates the choice of law 
method nor requires an arbitral tribunal to employ the same 
choice of law rules as those used in the courts.49 Nor do most 
rule formulations supply the method. Although some awards 
designate an applicable law without explicating a choice of law
(“contract...governed by the law of the country with which it is 
most closely connected”). Country is used “in the sense of a 
territory having its own legal rules on contracts. ” Accordingly, “one 
cannot choose EC law, or public international law, or general 
principles of law recognized in civilized nations, since these do not 
contain a set of detailed rules of contract law.” Stone at 235. 
Additionally, the Rome Convention refers to a country’s connection 
with the contract, whereas the Swiss formulation refers to the 
connection to “the dispute” (or case). Cf. North & Fawcett at 490.
49 Cf. ICC Interim Award, Case No. 5314 (1988) excerpted at 4(2) 
ICC Ct. Bull. 70 (1993) (“[t]he ICC Rules do not oblige an 
arbitrator to follow the choice of law rules of the seat of the 
arbitration...”). Prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
it was unclear whether arbitrators proceeding in England were 
required to apply the Rome Convention. See, e.g . , Jaffee at 240-41; 
Merkin, § 5.27 (1991). Under § 46(3) of the 1996 Act, the tribunal 
may, in the absence of party choice, apply “the conflict of laws 
rules which it considers applicable,” the solution found in the Model 
Law, Article 28(2).
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analysis, thus leaving one to speculate,50 others confirm that 
arbitrators fill the vacuum in numerous ways.51
Not surprisingly, one approach in evidence is to borrow 
conflicts rules of one or more national system. Within this 
broad category, the possibilities are several. An obvious 
expedient is to refer to the choice of law rules used by the 
courts of the seat of arbitration.52 This may seem particularly 
attractive where the parties have designated the situs, since one 
might conclude that a tacit choice of the local law (including 
its choice of law rules) was also intended.53 It is, 
nevertheless, doubtful that the parties in an international case 
will have designated the arbitral situs for the conflicts rules 
used by the courts there.54 Rather, such a designation is better
50 It may happen that all the potentially applicable conflicts rules lead 
to the same substantive law or that all the potentially applicable 
substantive laws would lead to the same result. Alternatively, the 
arbitrator may have determined, sub rosa, that one substantive law, 
is simply most appropriate, more well-developed, more modern or 
more clear than the others. This practice is encouraged by 
institutional rules, such as those of the AAA and the ICC, that 
instruct the arbitrator to apply, in voie directe fashion, the 
substantive rules he or she considers “appropriate.” AAA 
International Rules Art. 28(1); ICC Rules, Art. 17(1).
51 See generally O. Lando, Applicable Law; Extracts; A. Lowenfeld, 
The Two-Way Mirror: International Arbitration as Comparative 
Procedure, (1985) Mich. Y.B. Int’l Legal Stud. 163, 177-84 (1985).
52 Lando, Applicable Law at 108.
53 Cf. Redfem & Hunter at 123 (though a diminishing practice, 
arbitrators have inferred a choice of substantive law from a choice 
of situs).
54 Parties often choose a locale for its linguistic and geographic 
neutrality and for myriad other reasons unrelated to the substantive 
law likely to be applied by the courts there. See also ICC Award 
No. 5717 (1988) excerpted in Extracts at 22 (“The choice of London 
as the place of arbitration and English as the language of the 
contract doe not, in itself, indicate an intention of the parties that
110
Chapter 4: Applicable Law
viewed as only one factor, to be weighed with the intrinsic 
merit of the rules themselves, in selecting a method.55
The ad seriatim (“cumulative”) use of municipal conflicts 
rules can also be found among the awards. The approach is to 
utilize, in series, the respective conflicts rules of several states 
connected to the transaction. Although the choice of law rules 
themselves may differ, when applied they may produce a total 
or partial concurrence in the identification of the proper 
substantive law.56
Arbitrators sometimes apply some type of a-mtional 
conflicts rule—that is, one not tied to any single national 
system. Thus, “general principles of private international law” 
have been invoked by some tribunals.57 Choice of law 
approaches found in international conventions are also often 
employed, sometimes irrespective of whether the states
English law should govern the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate’’). Accord, ICC Interim Award No. 5717 (1988), excerpted 
in Extracts at 22-23 (choice of London as place of arbitration did not 
preclude arbitrator from considering choice of law rules in addition 
to those used by English courts).
55 Though the implied choice rationale seems fictional, the parties 
ought not to be surprised if their choice of a situs is deemed by the 
tribunal to make the local conflicts rules at least prima facie 
relevant.
56 Award No. 5717, supra note 54 (listing this ‘cumulative application’ 
method as one ‘frequently used’). A variation of this method in­
volves comparing the conflicts rules of the states connected to the 
transaction to ascertain if there is a common choice of law rule or 
approach among two or more of those states; the predominantly 
occurring rule {e.g., place of formation, or closest connection) is 
then applied. Id. at 22 (“In complex international relationships such 
as that under review, a widely accepted choice of law principle in 
most jurisdictions, including England, Liechtenstein and France is 
the center of gravity, or the closest connection test”).
57 Id.
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connected to the disputes are convention adherents.58 A 
conventional formula may have many virtues, including ease 
of application, neutrality and accessibility. For example, in a 
sale of goods dispute, the “seller’s place” rule of the 1985 
Hague Convention seems inviting in its simplicity,59 and may 
be confirmed in a given case by application of the Rome 
Convention, which itself will often lead to a seller’s place 
reference.
A more recent entrant was signed in 1994 and awaits 
ratification. The Inter-American Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Contracts,60 which is sponsored by 
the Organization of American States (OAS), adopts a “closest 
ties” test.61 It seems rather more liberal than the Rome62 and
58 See generally Extracts from ICC Awards on the Application of 
International Conventions: Part II - Conventions on the Applicable 
Law; 7(1) ICC Ct. Bull. 82 (1996) (hereinafter Applicable Law 
Conventions).
59 24 I.L.M. 1574 (1985) (art. 8(2)): “the contract is governed by the 
law of the State where the seller has his place of business at the time 
of conclusion of the contract”). For authoritative commentary, see 
A. von Mehren, Explanatory Report, Convention On the Law 
Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1987) 
(published by the Hague Conference on Private International Law). 
Cf. Applicable Law Conventions, supra note 58 at 82 (listing both 
Rome and Hague Conventions as among those “most often referred 
to in ICC awards”).
60 Done at Mexico City, March 17, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 732 
(1994). See generally H. Burman, International Conflict of Laws, 
The 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts and Trends for the 1990’s, 28 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 367 (1995).
61 According to Article 9:
The Court will take into account all objective and subjective 
elements of the contract to determine the law of the State with 
which it has the closest ties. It shall also take into account the 
general principles of international commercial law recognized by
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Hague Convention Rules and thus may have special appeal to 
arbitrators.63
4.6 Negative Choice of Law and the Tronc Commun64
A variant of the party autonomy rule that is gaining some 
recognition in practice allows the tribunal to infer from silence 
a negative choice—that is, that certain laws were intended by 
the parties not to be applied. Under the tronc commun 
doctrine, when an otherwise detailed agreement fails to select 
either of the laws most closely associated with the parties, 
arbitrators should consider whether that silence implies a joint 
decision to reciprocally avoid the respective unknowns of the 
two national laws that would otherwise be obvious choices.
If silence does betoken an aversion by each party to the 
other’s legal system, logically this only applies to those 
principles which are not common to both systems. Thus, 
according to the doctrine, it is most in keeping with the 
parties’ real intentions to apply those substantive rules upon 
which their respective systems agree—the tronc commun, 
instead of a national law selected by standard choice of law
international organizations.
62 Article 4 (2) of the Rome Convention holds that, rebuttably, “it 
shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with 
the country where the party who is to effect the performance which 
is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, his habitual residence . . . ”
63 Cf. Juenger, supra note 22 at 205-05 (arbitrators free under Article 
9 to avoid undesireable national law in preference for substantive 
text developed by international experts).
64 See generally Rubino-Sammartano at 274-80.
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analysis.65 And what of the matters not covered by the tronc 
commun'I66
Like the lex mercatoria (discussed below), the tronc commun
doctrine is an attempt to substitute for standard conflicts
analysis a method designed to implement more fully the
parties’ probable intentions. As such, it has relative appeal.
Nonetheless, to be greatly preferred is a contract clause that
removes the need for negative inferences or legal fictions.
Such a provision emerged in the Channel Tunnel arbitration.
The disputed contract provided:
The construction, validity and performance of the contract 
shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with 
the principles common to both English law and French 
law, and in the absence of such common principles by 
such general principles of international trade law as have 
been applied by national and international tribunals. 
Subject in all cases, with respect to the works to be 
respectively performed in the French and in the English 
part of the site, to the respective French or English public 
policy (ordre public) provisions.57
65 Id. at 274-75.
66 Professor Rubino-Sammartano answers:
[I]n this situation the arbitrator will take inspiration from the 
principles of the legal systems of the parties and from the usages 
of the parties in their previous relationships and, in their absence, 
from the current usages in the countries to which the contracting 
parties belong, letting himself be guided by the principle of 
looking for a solution which is as near as possible to the 
expectations of both parties. If this were not achievable, the 
arbitrator might tend [to] apply, as to each contractual duty, the 
national law of the party which is under such a duty.
Id. at 275.
61 As excerpted by Rubino-Sammartano in The Channel Tunnel and the 
Tronc Commun Doctrine, 10(3) J. Int’l Arb. 58 (1993) (discussing 
Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd. [1993]
A.C. 334 (H.L.)).
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4.7 The Role of Mandatory Rules
An essential, but complex,68 subtopic related to choice of law 
is the identification and observance of mandatory rules (species 
of which are variously referred to as loi de police, imperative 
rules, or rules of immediate application).69 Rules deemed to 
have this character are thought to reflect a public policy so 
substantial that ordinary choice of law canons must move 
aside. It is their preemptive character that sets mandatory rules 
apart. 70
The literature is in general agreement concerning the types 
of laws that potentially are “mandatory.” Much debate can be 
found at the margins, however, in relation to the exact 
application of the general doctrine in particular situations. 
Laws governing competition, currency control, environmental 
protection, trade restrictions, and those protecting particular
68 “One can hardly avoid the conclusion that this topic is replete with 
issues comporting an unfortunate degree of complexity.” Mayer at 
322.
69 Mandatory rules are those which must be applied in a given situation 
notwithstanding the law chosen by the parties or that otherwise 
applicable. See generally id.; North, General Course at 184. 
Lawyers trained in America will most likely view the question as 
being whether a potentially applicable substantive rule should be 
denied application because it offends the fundamental policies of 
another state, typically the forum, whose nexus with the transaction 
entitles its policies to prevail. The mandatory rule concept prevalent 
in the civil law is slightly different in that it implies an affirmative 
duty to apply a particular substantive rule, rather than a prohibition 
against the application of an offensive rule.
70 Cf. North & Fawcett at 137.
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classes of persons such as employees, consumers, and 
commercial agents all raise the issue.71
In general, arbitrators are regarded as having the authority, 
and in appropriate circumstances the duty, to apply mandatory 
rules.72 The problem facing the tribunal is to determine which 
supposed imperative rules qualify for application; the question 
is multifaceted. According to some authorities, it involves 
considering the rule’s nexus with the transaction and, arguably, 
its legitimacy.73
The conflicts rules in use in the courts at the arbitral seat, or 
other national conflicts rules connected to the transaction, may 
have a well developed approach to mandatory rules. If adopted 
by the arbitrator, these may provide a coherent theory upon 
which to proceed. Moreover, the applicable conflicts rule may 
be the product of a multilateral convention; the consensus 
represented by such an agreed-upon text would tend to 
legitimize the arbitrator’s analysis. The several recent conven­
tions that attempt to treat the mandatory rules, however, adopt 
different stances on certain aspects of the mandatory rules
71 See id.; Mayer at 275.
72 Mayer at 280-86.
73 Id. at 291-93. A Dutch court performed a similar analysis in 
Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland,
B.V. (Dist. Ct., The Hague, Sept. 17, 1982), reprinted in 22 
I.L.M. 66 (1983). The court declined to give effect to an American 
trade embargo which it regarded as being inconsistent with interna­
tional law when applied extraterritorially in the case at bar. Id. at 
71-74.
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problem.74 The diversity attests to the complexity that 
surrounds the area in general.
Of course, when faced with supposed mandatory rules, often 
the arbitrator faces competing considerations: the desire to 
render an enforceable award75 versus the desire to honor the 
intent of the parties and the contract.76 Mandatory rules 
themselves may be in conflict77 further complicating the 
tribunal’s task. Moreover, there is room to argue that highly 
idiosyncratic or offensive rules, though imperative within their 
own system, should not be applied in an international 
arbitration. In such a case the arbitrator may reason that the 
rule embodies no international public policy and indeed may 
offend it.78
74 It remains controversial, for example, whether effect should be 
given to mandatory rules of a state having some connection, but not 
the preeminent connection, with the transaction in question. See 
North & Fawcett at 503.
75 A failure to apply an imperative rule of a particular state, of course, 
will imperil enforcement of the award in that state. There is thus a 
potential cost in ignoring mandatory rules. If that state is not the 
arbitral situs and enforcement can be accomplished at the situs or in 
another state, the risks involved are greatly reduced.
76 Mayer at 289.
77 Jarvin at 86.
78 Boycott laws that establish restrictions based upon race or religion 
would provide a classic example. Mayer at 291. As Professor 
Mayer suggests, in such a case, there being no lex fori, “the 
arbitrator finds the public policy in his conscience, or, as some 
might have it, in the fundamental tenets of a transnational lex 
mercatoria” Id.
117
Chapter 4: Applicable Law
4.8 State Contracts and Applicable Law
Questions of applicable law arising in arbitrations between a 
state (or state-owned entity) and a private enterprise have 
generated much scholarly commentary.79 In general, the 
question which arises is whether the fact that a state is a party 
should alter the process or outcome in choice of law matters. 
The studies of arbitral practice seem to warrant the following 
generalizations: First, there is no presumption that the law of 
the state party should supply the lex arbitri; quite the opposite, 
that a state is a party may enhance the wisdom of adopting an 
a-national procedural framework.80 Second, the methods
79 See generally Bockstiegel; R. Lillich, The Law Governing Disputes 
Under Economic Development Agreements: Reexamining the Concept 
of “Internationalization ” in In t e r n a t io n a l  A r b it r a t io n  in  t h e  
2 1st  C e n t u r y : T o w a r d s  “Ju d ic ia l iz a t io n ” a n d  U n if o r m it y ? 
61 (R. Lillich & C. Brower eds., 1993) (hereinafter 
Internationalization); K. Lipstein, International Arbitration Between 
Individuals and Governments and the Conflict of Laws, in 
C o n t e m p o r a r y  P r o b lem s  o f  In t e r n a t io n a l  L a w  177 (B. 
Cheng & E. Duncan eds., 1988); Toope at 55-97.
80 Bockstiegel at 23-25. In keeping with the standard analysis, the 
arbitration law of the state would apply if the arbitration were seated 
in that state and the procedural rule in question was mandatory. See 
id. at 24-25. The non-imperative character of the state party’s 
procedural law in cases where the arbitration is not seated in that 
state would seem to hold even where its law prohibits it from 
subjecting contracts to a law other than its own (a position 
traditionally attributed e.g., to Saudi Arabian law); such a limitation 
presumably would only be deemed to extend to the substantive rules 
governing the contract. Id. at 23-25; see Texas Overseas Petroleum 
Co. v. The Govt, of the Libyan Arab Republic (Libya) (Award of 
Jan. 19, 1977), 53 Int’l L. Rep. 389 (1978) (hereinafter TOPCO).
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employed for selecting substantive law have not been greatly 
influenced by the fact that a state is a party.81
Though in general the approaches to selecting applicable law 
in mixed arbitrations assimilate those used in other contexts, 
the range of substantive possibilities is enlarged when one of 
the parties is a state. Particularly noteworthy is the potential 
applicability of international law.82 The practice is specifically 
sanctioned in the ICSID treaty83 and has been adopted in 
important non-ICSID arbitrations as well.84 Under the 
prevailing nomenclature, contracts to which international law
81 Bockstiegel at 26 (surveying 40 jurisdictions). In apparent accord 
are the PC A Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two 
Parties of Which Only One is A State (eff. July 6, 1993). The 
learned drafters apparently found no attribute of mixed arbitration 
that warranted a departure from the standard UNCITRAL Rules 
formulation. Absent a contractual designation, the tribunal may 
proceed using “the conflict of laws rules which it considers applica­
ble.” Id., Art. 33.1.
82 Cf. R. Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment 
and Resolution of Disputes: General Course on Public International 
Law, 230 Re c u e il  d e s  C o u r s  188-89 (1991) (“undeniable that 
international arbitrators, as a species, are disposed to finding that 
international law is indeed relevant to such matters, even when faced 
by a domestic governing law clause”).
83 The ICSID Convention, Article 42(1) provides that in the absence 
of a law designated by the parties, the tribunal must apply the law 
of the state party to the dispute “(including its rules on the conflict 
of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.” 
The reference to the conflicts rules of the disputant state is unusual; 
thought it seems to authorize renovoi, more tenably it refers to the 
state’s mandatory rules. The reference to international law provides 
a check on idiosyncratic state laws that are out of step with 
international standards. See A. Broches. Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States of 1965: Explanatory Notes and Survey of Its 
Application, 18 Y.B. Com. Arb. 627, 668-69 (1993).
84 See, e.g., TOPCO, supra note 80.
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is deemed to apply are said to have been “internationalized.” 
The natural by-product of internationalization is that the 
municipal law of the state involved carries less influence.85
Reference to international law for a rule of decision is only 
one avenue evident in practice. Numerous combinations of 
national and supranational principles have been applied.86 The 
parties may* of course, also authorize the tribunal to conduct 
the arbitration as amiables compositeurs or to act ex aequo et 
bono,%1
4.9 The Lex Mercatoria
4.9 .1  In  General
The topic of lex mercatoria has engendered a robust and wide 
ranging, if esoteric, debate.88 The subject has some parallels 
to the question of delocalization of arbitral proceedings in 
general. The central issue is whether there exists an autono­
mous mercantile norm structure comprised of a-national
85 Often cited dictum concerning the theory of internationalized 
contracts is that of Professor Dupuy in the TOPCO award, supra 
note 80. According to Dupuy, the fact that the contract provides for 
international arbitration itself suffices to allow the application of 
international law, at least in the context of a long-term development 
agreement. Id. at 454-55. Less controversially, he posits that the 
parties may secure its application by expressly choosing it.
86 Toope at 62; Bockstiegel at 29 (listing twelve types of choice of law 
reference).
87 See generally C. Schreuer, Decisions Ex Aequo et Bono Under the 
ICSID Convention, 11 ICSID Rev. 37 (1996).
88 See, e.g., essays collected in Carbonneau.
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substantive principles sufficiently well developed and ascertain­
able to supply rules of decision in international commercial 
disputes. The problem arises when the parties have failed 
effectively to choose an applicable municipal law or have 
expressly designated the lex mercatoria or an equivalent 
supposed norm system89 to govern their rights and duties.
4 .9 .2  A rgum ents for  a n d  A gainst
Strong opinions exist on both sides of the debate. Professor 
Berthold Goldman is a leading proponent of the lex mercatoria 
theory. For Goldman, “lex mercatoria is, at the least, a set of 
general principles and customary rules spontaneously referred 
to or elaborated in the framework of international trade, 
without reference to a particular national system of law.”90 At 
the other extreme are various skeptics, including the late Dr. 
F.A. Mann, who agreed with the assessment that the lex 
mercatoria is no more than “a fig leaf to hide an unauthorized 
substitution of [the arbitrators’] own private normative 
preferences for . . . the properly applicable law.”91 Occupy­
89 In contracts between state entities and foreign private parties, one 
sometimes finds references to “principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations,” an apparent adaptation of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, Article 38. Bockstiegel at 29. For 
criticism, see Toope at 68-75. Sometimes in purely private contracts 
the parties refer to “general principles of international commercial 
law.” Whether this is synonymous with the lex mercatoria is 
debatable. Goldman at 113.
90 Goldman at 113, 116.
91 F.A. Mann’s introduction to Carbonneau at xxi (quoting W. Park, 
in Carbonneau at 109); see F. Mann, England Rejects “Delocalised” 
Contracts and Arbitration, 33 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 193 (1984).
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ing a middle ground is the sensibly restrained accommodation 
of the doctrine offered by Craig, Park and Paulsson. In their 
second edition, they suggest that one way of viewing the lex 
mercatoria is merely as a collection of established international 
trade usages which bind certain international traders.92
The lex mercatoria is said to offer substance which better 
matches the parties’ expectations than does a law chosen 
through normal conflicts rules, which themselves can boast 
only of moderate uniformity and predictability in 
application.93 Proponents also point to the law merchant’s 
augmentative qualities; where proof of the content of the 
apparently governing law proves elusive or incomplete, 
reference to e.g., general principles of commercial law 
(regarded by many as part of the lex mercatoria) may prove 
helpful in confirming substance and filling gaps.94
92 That is, lex mercatoria is “an expansion of the notion of usages to 
encompass particular contracts whose specificity is that they are 
international.” Craig, et al., at 614-15. Professor Andreas 
Lowenfeld suggests that lex mercatoria is:
not a self-contained system covering all aspects of international 
commercial law to the exclusion of national law, but rather . . .  a 
source of law made up of custom, practice, convention, prece­
dent—and many national laws—[which] can furnish an alternative 
to a conflict of laws search which is often artificial and 
inconclusive, and a way out of applying rules that are inconsistent 
with the needs and usages of international commerce and which 
were adopted by individual states with internal, not international 
transactions in mind.
Arbitrator's View at 50.
93 Id.
94 See ICC Proceedings No. 4761 (1984), excerpted in Rubino- 
Sammartano, at 272 (citing Y. Derains & S. Jarvin, Chronique des 
sentences arbitrates, Clunet 1984, at 1137).
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A number of conceptual and practical problems lead some to 
conclude that the lex m ercatoria , if it does exist, is not a 
desirable invention.95 A few examples illustrate the questions 
raised by the doctrine’s detractors. First, ascertaining the lex  
m ercatoria  requires the arbitrator to canvas the diverse and 
numerous national laws of the trading nations to distill the 
essential and universal principles. Such a task may be arduous, 
even for an accomplished comparative law specialist.96 
Second, the use of standard form contracts as a source of lex  
m ercatoria , a widely endorsed notion among mercatorists, is 
questioned because in practice there is not the requisite 
homogeneity among such forms.97 Third, it is doubted by the 
skeptics that the lex m ercatoria  has established sufficient global 
legitimacy to form the basis of an award. Thus, purported 
application of the lex m ercatoria , particularly where the parties 
did not designate it as governing, would subject the award to 
attack.98 Fourth, the doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings are 
not sufficiently well articulated to enable a principled approach 
to its application. Determining to which transactions it applies, 
and under what conditions, remains a matter of some specula­
tion.99 Finally, there is the intensely practical consideration of
95 See K. Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 
613, 627-28 (1989); C. Stoecker, The Lex Mercatoria: To What 
Extent Does It Exist?, 7(1) J. Int’l Arb. 101 (1990).
96 Mustill at 92-93.
97 Moreover, “the mechanism whereby the use of standard forms 
becomes a source of law is nowhere clearly explained.” Id. at 95.
98 Id. at 118.
99 As Lord Mustill has observed: “Given the weight of analysis to 
which the lex mercatoria has been subjected, it is surprising how 
little has been done to identify the criteria which distinguish those 
transactions which are governed by it from those which are not. ” Id.
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business feasibility. Given that the contours and content of lex 
mercatoria are not well-defined, how can commercial entities 
assess their rights and duties while administering the 
contract?100 There is no identifiable, agreed upon, corpus of 
principles sufficiently accessible to the parties to create legal 
certainty; the substantive rules most likely to be widely agreed 
upon are few and often are unmanageably abstract.
According to the skeptics, the same ethereal qualities make 
the new law merchant slippery at best when in the hands of the 
arbitrators; the lack of precision with which the content of lex 
mercatoria is defined ultimately provides an arbitrator with 
only blurry rules of decision. The inevitable result is the 
exercise of broad arbitrator discretion, which brings the 
arbitral exercise “perilously close to a crap-shoot.”101
4 .9 .3  Its Content an d  U se
Perhaps the most convincing proponents of the lex mercaxo-
ria are those who have had practical experience with its
application; in general, these authorities give the doctrine its
most pragmatic gloss. Professor Lowenfeld, for example,
responded to Lord Mustill’s leading critique of the lex
mercatoria by attributing to the doctrine a modest but
functional role:
Lord Justice Mustill asks with some justification what are 
the rules of lex mercatoria. He proposes a sample of 
twenty such rules, drawn directly or indirectly from past
at 98.
100 Id. at 93, 117.
101 M. Reisman, Book Review: International Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration, 80 Am. J. Inf 1 L. 268, 271 (1986).
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arbitral awards. I have not read most of the awards he 
builds on. . .1 think, however, the statement of principles 
is fair, and I cannot do better than to reproduce some 
excerpts (slightly edited) from Justice Mustill’s 
abstracts.102
I. Contracts should prima facie be enforced according 
to their terms (pacta sunt servanda).
5. A contract should be performed in good faith.
7. A State entity cannot be permitted to evade the 
enforcement of its obligations by denying its own capacity 
to make a binding agreement to arbitrate, or by asserting 
that the agreement is unenforceable for want of 
procedural formalities to which the entity is subject.
9. If unforeseen difficulties intervene in the per­
formance of a contract, the parties should negotiate in 
good faith to overcome them, even if the contract contains 
no revision clause.
II. One party is entitled to treat itself as discharged 
from its obligations if the other has committed a breach, 
but only if the breach is substantial.
12. No party can be allowed by its own act to bring 
about a nonperformance of a condition precedent to its 
own obligation.
15. A party that has suffered a breach of contract must 
take reasonable steps to mitigate its loss.
17. A party must act promptly to enforce its rights, on 
pain of losing them by waiver.
19. Contracts should be construed according to the 
principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
20. Failure by one party to respond to a letter written
102 Arbitrator’s View at 37 (citing Mustill at 174-77).
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to it by the other is regarded as evidence of assent to its 
terms.
Justice Mustill regards his list of twenty principles, of 
which I have here produced ten, as a rather modest haul.
I suppose that could be said o f the Ten Commandments 
or of the American Bill o f Rights as well. To me, just the 
excerpts here quoted give a quite clear picture of the 
thrust of a modern international commercial law.103
Lex mercatoria is not, in other words, supposed to be 
revolutionary. What it does do, if properly used, is to 
clarify, to fill gaps, and to reduce the impact of 
peculiarities of individual countries’ laws, often not 
designed for international transactions at all.104
The concept of lex mercatoria as a default methodology has
received a modicum of acceptance in practice. In one often-
cited award, Norsolor,105 the learned arbitrators apparently
endorsed a species of lex mercatoria, reasoning as follows:
Recourse to the general principles of the laws is the most 
frequent attitude of arbitrators in international trade. It is 
to be found in awards whether they base themselves or 
not on international law; this is sometimes expressed and 
more frequently tacit. The general principles are deducted 
by comparative analysis of various legal systems by 
starting from an abstract reasoning where the legal culture 
of the arbitrator obviously plays an important role. The 
formation of a common law of the nations directly arises 
from this arbitral method.106
The arbitrators were motivated to look beyond normal choice
of law analysis by . . difficulty [in] choosing a national law
103 Id. at 55-56.
104 Id.
105 ICC Arbitration No. 3327 (1981).
106 Rubino-Sammartano at 271-72 (citing Norsolor, ICC Proceedings 
No. 3327 (1981)).
126
Chapter 4: Applicable Law
the application of which is sufficiently compelling.”107 The 
tribunal deduced that a general principle required both parties 
to act in good faith in the execution of the contract; 
accordingly, one party, having abused its superior position of 
strength, was obliged to pay damages.108 Demonstrating the 
difficulty the doctrine faces in practice, however, the Court of 
Appeal in Vienna partially set the award aside for the 
arbitrators’ failure to determine the applicable national law. 
The Court reasoned that the tribunal had in effect acted as 
am iable com positeur, a function that the parties had not 
authorized. While, ultimately, the Austrian Supreme Court 
reversed the Court of Appeal, the case illustrates the risks 
attendant awards based upon the lex m ercatoria  particularly 
where it is not expressly chosen by the parties.109
For parties to a non-state contract, the relative wisdom of 
dedicating the contract to the lex m ercatoria , “general 
principles of commercial law” or a similar “a-national” 
collection of rules depends upon the circumstances. A party 
with weak bargaining power, facing the application of an 
unfamiliar or inhospitable domestic law, may regard a 
reference to the lex m ercatoria  as preferable. However, if both 
parties are comfortable with a body of law more closely 
associated with one of them, and that law is well-developed 
and honors party autonomy, the appeal of the lex m ercatoria
107 As excerpted in 8 ICCA Y.B. Comm. Arb. 362 (1983).
108 Id.
109 Rubino-Sammartano at 2271-72. That the application of the lex 
mercatoria should be reserved to cases in which the parties have 
expressly chosen it was the position of three arbitrators in ICC 
Award No. 4650 (1985) (Briner (chair), Merkt and Morison), 12 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. I l l  (1987).
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seems relatively slight. The party who acquiesces in the 
naming of such a national law has little to fear where time is 
taken to craft a balanced agreement.110
4.9.4 Th e  U n id r o it  Prin c iples111
As recounted above, while attractive in some respects, the 
strategy of naming the lex mercatoria (or other a-national 
source) as a governing law—like the practice of consulting it 
for a rule of decision—affords a rather imperfect method for 
avoiding the risks and vagaries of traditional conflicts analysis. 
Lex mercatoria?s elusive content invites controversy, at least 
once one leaves the realm of general maxims and abstract 
principles in trying to resolve concrete disputes. The associated 
method challenges even adept and objective comparative law 
specialists. Consequently, security of contract arguably is lost 
to a great extent once a supra-national norm structure, such as
110 Where an “a-national” formulation such as the lex mercatoria 
seems the lesser of the evils, a reference to it can be amplified by 
incorporation of existing texts to assist the tribunal and enhance 
predictability. E.g., “the parties deem the lex mercatoria to 
include in particular The Vienna Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980), INCOTERMS (ICC 1990), and the 
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (ICC 
1993).” Similarly, after careful study, adoption of the 
UNIDROIT Principles may supply the needed detail and struc­
ture, as discussed in the following sub-section.
111 See generally A. Garro, The Contribution of the UNIDROIT 
Principles to the Advancement of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 93 (1995); O. Lando, 
Assessing the Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in the Harmoniza­
tion of Arbitration Law, 3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 129 (1995).
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the lex mercatoria or general principles of commercial law, is 
designated without further detail.
In response to the uncertainties just mentioned have come 
the UNIDROIT Principles. Arranged in seven chapters 
containing well over 100 articles, the Principles present in 
some detail a law of international contracts developed to treat 
common issues in recognized or acceptable ways. They are not 
purely a model law, although they may serve that function.112 
They are not a convention and thus require no international 
assent or domestic implementation to achieve utility. Rather, 
they are analogous to certain ICC formulations such as the 
INCOTERMS, although the subject matter addressed in the 
Principles is much broader, indeed, surpassing that of the Sale 
of Goods Convention.
The Principles fill an appreciable void. Early signs suggest 
that they are already becoming an important fixture.113 The 
U.N. Claims Commission has drawn upon them and several 
arbitral awards have applied them in various contexts.114
112 The Principles’ preambular text explains that (to paraphrase) they 
shall be applied when the parties have contractually designated 
them and may obtain when the parties have agreed that their 
contract is governed by “general principles of law,” the “lex 
mercatoria” or similar norms. The Principles may provide a 
solution also when the relevant rule of the applicable law cannot 
be established and may be used to interpret or supplement 
international uniform law instruments. They may also serve as a 
model for national and international legislators.
113 See UNIDROIT, The Use of the UNIDROIT Principles in 
Practice (Results of the first Secretariat survey; on file with the 
author).
114 iSee Bonell at 240-54. See also White & Case, 10(1) Int’l Disp. 
Resol. 3 (1997) (ICC partial award applied both New York law 
and the UNIDROIT Principles).
129
Chapter 4: Applicable Law
Their application is also impliedly authorized in the Mexico 
City Convention.115
115 See Juenger, supra note 22, at 205-06. Indeed, the American 
delegation unsuccessfully proposed that the Convention’s default 
rule refer expressly to the UNIDROIT Principles. Id. at 206.
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5.1 Introduction
In relation to traditional doctrine, it is difficult to overstate the 
importance—both legal and practical—of the situs of arbitra­
tion.1 After setting forth in summary fashion the still-valid
1 The situs is also sometimes referred to as the “place” or “seat” of 
arbitration. Semantical problems may arise because of the possible 
dual meanings given in particular to “place.” It has both geographic­
al and juridical connotations. The English Arbitration Act, for 
example, adopts “seat” instead of the Model Law’s “place” when 
detailing elements to be registered in the award. Saville Report at 
para. 250. It was considered that the Model Law used the phrase to 
mean seat and that “there [is] no obvious legal reason to stipulate 
the geographical place where the award was made.” Id. This chapter 
refers both to the juridical and practical impacts of the place of
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conventional wisdom associated with the place of arbitration, 
this chapter identifies various factors and trends that have 
reduced its influence and made its selection less critical than it 
once was. Chapter 6, in turn, explores the impact that technol­
ogy will have upon the traditional paradigm.
5.2 Legal Importance—The Lex Arbitri2
That the place of arbitration ordinarily dictates the legal regime 
to which the arbitration is deemed to belong,3 has been noted 
in Chapter 4.4 The significance of this general rule is that 
when the parties, or some entity on their behalf, designate the 
place of arbitration, they are identifying the legal system that 
will govern a range of important issues including:5 the inter­
arbitration. It is hoped that the context supplied will prevent 
confusion.
2 See generally H. Holtzmann, The Importance of Choosing the Right 
Place to Arbitrate an International Case, in P r iv a t e  In v est o r s  
Ab r o a d  183 (1977); J. Paulsson, International Commercial Arbitra­
tions, in H a n d b o o k  o f  A r b it r a t io n  Pr a c t ic e  425, 445-48 (R. 
Bernstein & D. Wood eds., 2d ed. 1993).
3 See generally Redfern & Hunter at 70-95. English authorities, in 
particular, have recognized that the parties may choose a procedural 
law other than that of the situs. See Collins at 126; Pryles at 206. 
This possibility is even more clearly sanctioned under the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996.
4 Stated another way, the lex loci arbitri (arbitration law of the situs) 
is generally also the lex arbitri. Common law lawyers often use the 
term ‘curial law’ as synonymous with lex arbitri. Redfern & Hunter 
at 72 n.3.
5 For lists of these issues see id. at 79; Craig et al. at 447-49; Pryles 
at 200, 204 (quoting the enumeration provided in L. Collins (ed.), 
Dicey and Morris,T h e  C o n fl ic t  o f  Law s  582-83 (12th ed., 1993)). 
To deter departures from the general rule, the WIPO Rules (Art.
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pretation and validity of the arbitration agreement; the avail­
ability of interim measures; the grounds upon which an 
arbitrator or his award can be challenged; and the various 
forms of judicial supervision that may be imposed.
The law of the place of arbitration also influences who may 
serve as advocates and arbitrators and affects the global 
enforceability of the eventual award, by virtue of any enforce­
ment convention to which the situs state may be a party. As 
noted in Chapter 3, typically the award is affiliated for conven­
tion purposes with the place where the award is made, which 
is usually also the arbitration’s juridical seat.6 Moreover, in 
matters of award enforcement, the law of the situs provides an 
important default standard.7
59(b)) and the LCIA Rules (Art. 16.3) expressly establish the 
default proposition that the law governing the arbitration, absent an 
effective parties’ designation to the contrary, shall be the law of the 
place (seat) of arbitration.
6 An award rendered in a non-convention state may nonetheless be 
enforceable abroad by virtue of “comity,” subject to the kinds of 
defenses applicable to foreign judgments. Cf. Restatement (Third) 
§ 487 n.8 (awards not enforced by Convention generally enforced 
on other grounds).
7 The New York and Panama Conventions and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law all condone refusals to enforce when:
[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure 
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing 
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place.
New York Convention, art. V(l)(d)(emphasis added); see Panama 
Convention, art. 5(l)(d); UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 36 (l)(b)(iv).
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5.3 Practical Importance
Myriad non-jurisprudential factors related to the place of 
arbitration may influence the proceedings, so that in practice 
several practical criteria should affect situs selection. First, the 
place chosen should be linguistically neutral in relation to the 
parties’ abilities. Second, the place ought not to be so remote 
or otherwise undesirable as to discourage prospective arbitra­
tors from serving nor limit the accessibility of persons and 
subject matter central to the proceedings.8 Third, various 
aspects of infrastructure and similarly prosaic matters deserve 
attention: reliable telecommunications facilities—including 
readily available FAX machines and electronic data bas­
es—should be in place; hours of operation for essential 
purveyors of goods and services should be convenient given 
that hearings may fill normal business hours; suitable meeting 
rooms and duplication services should be available as should 
competent and neutral translators, interpreters, and stenogra­
phers.9
8 Aksen at 67. When choosing a situs, some thought should also be 
given, albeit secondarily, to the relative distances to be traveled by 
each side and the time differences between the situs and the home 
offices of the parties. Over the course of a several-day hearing, the 
sleep deprivation implied in communicating with a main office via 
phone can impact the quality of one’s participation in the proceed­
ings. Fax and e-mail have become important substitutes for 
telephonic dialogue, which, nonetheless, remains preferable when 
immediacy and spontaneity are essential.
9 Many of the foregoing concerns, of course, can be addressed 
through affiliating with an appropriate local law firm, the selection 
of which is itself an art form. See D. Wilson, International Business 
Transactions: A Primer for the Selection of Assisting Foreign 
Counsel, 10 Int’l Law. 325 (1976). That firm may be instrumental
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5.4 Party Autonomy, Default Mechanisms and Planning
The ability of parties (or more correctly, their lawyers) to fix 
the situs of arbitration is an essential aspect of business 
planning. That they may do so before the dispute arises allows 
them to confine a cluster of known risks viz., that time and 
money will be wasted in negotiating the situs issue after 
dispute has arisen and that the mechanisms that function in the 
absence of party choice will serve the parties less well than a 
placement of their own design.10 Where the parties fail to 
name a situs, it will be determined by the institution, if any, or 
by the arbitrators.11 Though neither entity would make a 
frivolous choice of situs,12 many drafters prefer to identify
in procuring the facilities and expertise mentioned above, perhaps 
with the cooperation of a local arbitral institution, and in alerting the 
principals to matters affecting scheduling, such as local holidays. A 
vivid example of the impact of holidays is found at the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal at the Hague. The docket advances little there 
during Ramadan and the Christmas holidays. Added to these and 
similar celebrations specific to the parties are a range of Dutch 
holidays.
10 Institutional rules brochures often invite the parties to designate the 
situs for the arbitration. As one experienced practitioner notes, 
however, “one of the most common prearbitral disputes is over the 
situs of the hearing itself.” Aksen at 66.
11 Article 13(1) of the AAA International Rules provides, for example:
If the parties disagree as to the place of arbitration, the administra­
tor may initially determine the place of arbitration, subject to the 
power of the tribunal to determine finally the place of arbitration 
within sixty days after its constitution. All such determinations 
shall be made having regard for the contentions of the parties and 
the circumstances of the arbitration.
12 See S. Jarvin, The Place of Arbitration 7(2)ICC Ct. Bull. 54 (1996). 
But see Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Assn., 478 
F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding AAA’s controversial choice of 
New York as situs for arbitration between California and Israeli
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suitable places and to establish one clearly in the clause. Under 
American law, to do so promotes access to the FAA provisions 
which implement the New York Convention, while to fail to 
name a situs places in doubt orders mandating specific perfor­
mance of the arbitration agreement.13
The parties’ wide latitude in avoiding certain venues and 
flocking to others naturally promotes on the parts of lawmakers 
a consumer-friendly attitude toward formulation of arbitration 
law. Thus, much of the arbitration legislation emerging over 
the last two decades has been designed to liberalize the regime 
applicable to “international” arbitration, either as part of a 
general modernization affecting commercial arbitration or on 
a more surgical basis aimed expressly at transnational disputes.
Anecdotal accounts and a survey of the literature leave few 
mysteries as to what practitioners typically look for in an 
arbitral situs, at least in terms of legal climate. New York 
Convention membership is nearly an absolute prerequisite; for, 
enforcement of an award will often take place in a country 
other than the situs.14 Beyond that, the regime governing 
commercial arbitration at the situs should be characterized by 
self-restraint on the part of the local judiciary, save as is
entities).
13 FAA, § 206 authorizes courts to compel arbitration at the place 
named in the clause; where none is named, at most, a court can 
order arbitration to occur within its own district, which may be 
geographically less desirable than a situs chosen by the parties.
14 The place of arbitration is often chosen for its neutrality and legal 
regime, and thus may have no connection to the recalcitrant party 
or his assets.
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necessary to make arbitration more effective.15 One generally 
welcomes, for example, the availability of provisional remedies 
to preserve the status quo, speedy judicial mechanisms for 
replacing arbitrators, court assistance in enforcing arbitral 
subpoenas and similar features that facilitate rather than 
interfere with the proceedings.
By contrast, venues are to be avoided where the judiciaries 
enthusiastically entertain direct interim challenges to arbitra­
tors, perform interlocutory review of arbitral orders (or of the 
proceedings in general) or practice wide-ranging review of the 
tribunals’ substantive decisions.16 Places where the local law 
precludes all but local lawyers from serving as advocates or 
arbitrators are also dubious choices.17
5.5 Detachment From, and Liberalization at, the Arbi­
tral Situs—Theories, Policies and Approaches
5.5 .1  In  General
There exists in the literature a rich debate about the extent to 
which international commercial arbitration can and should be
15 See generally M. Ball, Structuring the Arbitration in Advance—the 
Arbitration Clause in an International Development Agreement, in 
Lew at 297, 304-06.
16 For a description of the pre-1979 English law and associated judicial 
intervention (or, as some would have it, “interference”) see J. 
Parris, A r b it r a t io n  P r in c ipl e s  a n d  Pr a c t ic e  161-170 (1983).
17 See generally D. Rivkin, Keeping Lawyers Out of International 
Arbitration, Int’l Fin. L. Rev., Feb. 1990, at 11.
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free from the legal regime otherwise applicable at the situs.18 
Approaches to the topic are multifaceted and diverse, and have 
been overtaken to some extent by unification among arbitration 
laws and other developments over the last two decades. Simpli­
fied and framed in practical terms, the discussion is typified 
(but not exhausted) by two principal questions: to what extent 
should international arbitration be free of pre-award and post­
award intervention by the courts of the situs and should a 
failure to comply with local arbitration law restrict the 
resulting award’s international enforceability?19
At the heart of pro-detachment policy is the premise that 
international arbitration is distinguishable from its domestic 
cousin and that its international character ought to free it of
18 See generally Craig, et al., at 273-74, 441-43, 449-59; Redfern & 
Hunter, at 81-95; F. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum in In t e r n a t io n a l  
A r b it r a t io n : L ib e r  A m ic o r u m  F o r  M a r t in  D o m k e  157 (P. 
Sanders ed., 1967); M. Mustill, Transnational Arbitration in English 
Law, in In t e r n a t io n a l  C o m m e r c ia l  a n d  M a r it im e  A r b it r a ­
t io n  15 (F . Rose ed., 1988); J. Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: 
Award Detached From the Law of Its Country of Origin, 30 Int’l & 
Comp. L.Q. 358 (1981); J. Paulsson, Delocalisation of International 
Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters, 32 Int’l & 
Comp. L.Q. 53 (1983) (hereinafter Delocalisation)', J. Paulsson, 
Arbitration Unbound in Belgium, 2 Arb. Int’l 68 (1986) (hereinafter 
Unbound in Belgium).
19 Among the questions mooted in the learned writings are: Should 
awards resulting from proceedings not in total compliance with 
mandatory rules peculiar to the situs nonetheless be given effect in 
states other than die situs, and perhaps in the courts of the situs too? 
More heretically, should an award produced from an international 
arbitration be enforceable abroad even though it has been affirma­
tively nullified by a court at the situs for failure to follow local 
procedures?
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parochial control mechanisms.20 That is, for truly interna­
tional arbitration, choice of situs ought not to be dictated by 
the need to avoid the diverse peculiarities and provincial 
requirements in the various national systems.21
Even the most ardent proponents of detaching international 
arbitration from the regulation of the situs, however, do not 
contend that a complete disassociation is possible or desirable. 
In many contexts, as noted above, local court assistance is 
beneficial: compliance with arbitral agreements may need to be 
compelled, arbitrators may need to be appointed or replaced 
and awards may need to be confirmed or enforced. According­
ly, arbitral reform over the last decade has been concerned 
with establishing the apt blend of supervision, facilitation and 
non-intervention.
For law and policy makers, ensuring solicitous treatment for 
international arbitration can be accomplished in various ways; 
legislation is the vehicle most often employed. In the absence 
of a system-wide legislative approach to reform, the United 
States has nonetheless moved forward, albeit largely through
20 Often referring to an arbitration as “international” is simply another 
way of saying that the situs is being selected for reasons of geo­
graphic and political neutrality rather than to assure the application 
of die indigenous laws of the situs affecting commerce and arbitra­
tion. Cf Explanatory Note at para. 46 (territorial approach to 
awards “inappropriate in view of the limited importance of the place 
of arbitration in international cases [which is] often chosen for 
reasons of convenience of the parties the dispute may have little or 
no connection with the State where the arbitration takes place”).
21 See J. Paulsson, The Extent of Independence of International 
Arbitration from the Law of the Situs, in Lew at 141, 141-42 
(hereinafter Independence); cf. Craig et al., at 10-15 (“The ICC 
does not want the result of ICC arbitration to differ depending on 
the situs”).
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the rather blunt instrument of decisional law affecting commer­
cial arbitration in general, as outlined in the next sub-section.
5 .5 .2  Th e  U n it e d  Sta tes—W id e  A c c o m m o d a tio n  For  
C o m m er c ia l  A rbitratio n  Th ro ug h  Ca se  L aw
In the United States, Supreme Court doctrine has promoted 
commercial arbitration in general by expanding subject matter 
arbitrability,22 by mandating that courts approach arbitration 
clauses using pro-arbitration rules of construction,23 by dra­
matically restricting states’ ability to impose consumer-related
22 U.S. Supreme Court case law has expanded subject matter 
arbitrability to include: federal antitrust [Mitsubishi 1985)]; securi­
ties regulation under the 1933 and 1934 Acts [Scherk (1974)(1934 
Act claims arbitrable in international cases); [McMahon (1987)(1934 
Act claims arbitrable in domestic cases)]; federal racketeering claims 
[McMahon (1987)]; Age Discrimination Act claims [Gilmer (1991)] 
and disputes governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
(COGSA), a treaty-based statute codifying the “Hague Rules,” 
[Vimar Seguros (1995)].
23 See Moses Cone (1983). An unbroken chain of Supreme Court 
decisions has reiterated Moses Cone, admonishing courts that “in 
applying state-law principles of contract interpretation to the 
interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the 
[FAA] . . . ambiguities as to scope of the arbitration clause itself 
must be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Volt, 489 U.S. at 475-76. 
(Citation omitted). The pro-arbitration gloss is to apply “whether the 
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or 
an allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability.” 
Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. It does not apply to the question 
whether the parties have authorized the tribunal to determine 
preclusively the existence of the arbitration clause or its scope. 
Kaplan (1995).
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and other restrictions on arbitrability,24 and by identifying 
facilitation of party autonomy as the FAA’s raison d ’etre.15 
Taken together these decisions establish a robustly pro-arbitra­
tion, pro-party-autonomy federal common law of arbitration, 
largely built upon a single FAA provision.26 The Court has 
also nurtured arbitration by endorsing an approach to arbitral 
awards (foreign and domestic) that makes them very difficult 
to successfully attack, as more fully discussed in § 5.6 below. 
Interestingly, while the rationales of the seminal cases in this 
train of authority depended heavily upon the special needs of 
disputants in international trade,27 ultimately the need to honor 
party autonomy emerged as the controlling concern; conse­
quently, the benefits of liberalization have flowed to commer­
cial arbitration in general.
Even without the help of Supreme Court authority directly 
on point, federal courts have added to the pro-arbitration case 
law edifice by, e.g., refusing to entertain challenges to arbitrat­
or’s fitness to serve until after an award has been rendered28 
and, in some jurisdictions, by refusing to consider requests for
24 See, e.g., Casarotto (1996) (Montana’s first page notice of arbitra­
tion requirement preempted by FAA); Terminix (1995) (involving 
commerce predicate to FAA application intended to be broadly con­
strued); Perry (1987) (state limitation on wage collection arbitration 
preempted by FAA).
25 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78.
26 Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitral agreements covered by 
Chapter 1 “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract. ”
27 See, e.g., Scherk (1974).
28 See, e.g., Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council 
Carpenters, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984)(no power to review pre­
award partiality).
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interim relief affecting arbitration, reasoning that parties to an 
arbitration agreement have bargained for a lack of judicial 
intervention.29
5 .5 .3  A c c o m m o d a tin g  In t e r n a t io n a l  A rbitratio n  a s  
P ar t  o f  A  Br o ad er  Sta tu to r y  R eform
Many arbitral venues are enhancing their attractiveness to 
international arbitration as a by-product of general statutory 
modernization.30 Bulgaria, Canada (federal level and Que­
bec)31 Egypt,32 Germany, India, Mexico, New Zealand and 
Sweden, for example, have enacted (or soon will enact) the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in a form not confined to internation­
al disputes.33 In the case of Germany, the new law applies 
even to non-commercial arbitration.34
The English Arbitration Act, is applicable to commercial 
arbitration generally. The underlying Bill initially distinguished 
between domestic and non-domestic arbitration (allowing 
greater party autonomy as to the latter) but, in deference to
29 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. De Caro, 
577 F. Supp. 616, 624-25 (W.P. Mo. 1983)(court’s role limited to 
enforcing agreements to arbitrate).
30 See generally Sanders.
31 Sanders at 5; Paterson at 160-61.
32 M. Aboul-Enein, Reflections on the New Egyptian Law on Arbitra­
tion, 11 Arb. Int’l 75, 77(1995).
33 Weigand at 399-401. F. Nariman, India’s New Arbitration Law, 8(1) 
ICC Ct. of Arb. Bull. 37 (1997); J. Verma, The Relationship 
Between the Courts and the Arbitral Process, Paper presented by 
Chief Justice of India, Oct. 24, 1997 (IFCAI Conference, Geneva; 
on file with author); M. Richardson, Arbitration Law Reform: The 
New Zealand Experience, 12 Arb. Int’l 57, 60 (1996).
34 Weigand at 400.
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European Law, the distinction was ultimately not implement­
ed.35 Accordingly, the more restrictive rules that would other­
wise have governed domestic arbitration do not obtain.36
35 See Landau, at 161; Marriott at 35 (1997). The distinction was 
thought not tenable given Article 6 of the Treaty of Rome (Art. 7 
Treaty of Union) which prohibits “any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.”
36 Landau at 161. Consequently, parties may enter into effective 
exclusion agreements (discussed below in § 5.6.1)) before dispute 
arises whether or not the arbitration would have been considered 
domestic under the former statute; additionally, courts no longer 
have discretion in staying proceedings covered by a valid arbitration 
agreement, even if by the former standards the agreement contem­
plates a domestic arbitration. Id.
Additionally, for all arbitrations covered by the Act, only the 
tribunal is empowered to require security for costs of a party; there 
is no longer power in the courts to do so. The provision, found in 
§ 38, in effect reverses the controversial House of Lords decision 
in Coppee-Lavalin S.A. v. Ken-Ren Chem. & Fert., Ltd., [1995] 
1 App. Cases 38. In Ken-Ren, the Law Lords in a 3:2 decision held 
that English courts may order security for costs in aid of a party to 
an international arbitration in which neither party is English, [1995] 
1 App. Cas. 38 (H.L., appeal taken from England). On the side of 
the dissenters, one English authority commented:
[T]he Law Lords have placed a disincentive to parties to come to 
arbitration in England. Why should parties who come to England 
due to its neutrality, and local legal expertise be subject to the 
inconvenience, and sometimes idiosyncracies, of certain English 
procedures?
J. Lew, A Question o f Costs, Fin. Times, June 28, 1994, at 14 
(paragraphing abridged, punctuation added). See also R. Coulson, 
Security for Costs, Transnationalism and Institutional Arbitration in 
U.K., 9(3) News & Notes Inst. Transnational Arb. 1 (1994)(decision 
remarkable because “neither party [was] English, the arbitration 
clause specifie[d] ICC rules and foreign substantive law, and the 
clause state[d] there shall be “no recourse to local courts”).
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5 .5 .4  Sepa r a te  R egim es for  In t e r n a t io n a l  Co m m erc ial  
A rbitratio n
For lawmakers, the decision to not treat international arbitra­
tion separately often results from the sense that the distinction 
between international and domestic arbitration is difficult to 
implement textually, difficult to apply in practice and leads, 
undesirably, to the development of two bodies of law when as 
a matter of policy one should be adequate.37 Nonetheless, a 
number of states have opted for discrete treatment of interna­
tional arbitration in keeping with the Model Law’s original 
premise. States representing the common law,38 the civil 
law39 and a blend of traditions40 have used the Model for this 
purpose. In Mexico, the Model law has been used to consoli­
date what were previously separate regimes for international 
and domestic arbitrations.41 In certain other countries, modem 
enactments treat domestic arbitration and international arbitra­
37 Weigand at 399-400.
38 These include, e.g. : Bermuda, Bermuda International Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1993, reprinted in ICC A Handbook, Vol. I; 
British Columbia, International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.B.C. 
1986 Ch. 14, reprinted in ICCA Handbook, Vol. 1; Hong Kong (R. 
Morgan, The Arbitration Act 1996 and Arbitration Law Reform in 
Hong Kong and Singapore: A Brave New World?, [1997] Arb. Disp. 
Res. L.J. 177); Nigeria, (Sanders at 5); and Singapore (Morgan, 
supra, at 177).
39 E.g., Tunisia. See Code of Arbitration Ch. Ill (eff. 27 October 
1993), reprinted in ICCA Handbook, Vol. IV.
40 E.g., Scotland. See W. Semple, The UNCITRAL Model Law is 
Enacted in Scotland, LCIA Briefing Note No. 5, April 1991, at 5 
(discussing § 66 and Sched. 7 of Law Reform (Scotland) Act 1990) 
excerpted in ICCA Handbook, Vol. IV.
41 J. Siqueiros, Mexican Arbitration—the New Statute, 30 Tex. Int’l L. 
J. 227, 230-31 (1995).
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tion in separate acts or chapters, both of which have been 
influenced by the Model Law.42 In some cases, however, 
these otherwise separate parts refer to each other for supple­
mentation, a technique which at least one expert cautions 
against.43
5.6 Elements Freeing Awards From Situs Influence
5 .6 .1  N a r r o w ed  Reco ur se  A g a in st  A w a r d s  B y  Sta tu te  
a n d  E x p a n d e d  Pa r ty  A uto n o m y
Various statutory formulae contemplate lessened review for 
awards produced in an international proceeding. For example, 
for over a decade, disputants with no connection to Belgium 
have been promised relative award finality. According to the 
Belgian Judicial Code as amended in March 1985, “[t]he 
courts of Belgium may be seized of a request for annulment 
only if at least one of the parties to the dispute decided by the 
arbitral award is either a physical person having Belgian 
nationality or residence, or a legal entity created in Belgium or 
having a branch or any other establishment in Belgium.”44 In
42 E.g., British Columbia. See Paterson at 161.
43 Sanders at 6-7. The FAA presently employs similar cross-incorpora­
tion.
44 Belgian Code Judiciare, Art. 1717, ‘Law Relating to the Annulment 
of Arbitral Awards’ (enacted March 27, 1985). See Berger at 636- 
37. The aim, of course, is to encourage selection of Belgium as a 
neutral situs, leading Paulsson soon after to comment: “Belgium has 
now instantly emerged as a major contender in the arbitration venue 
sweepstakes, and has overtaken everyone in its efforts to please 
those who want arbitration without court interference.” Unbound In
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some jurisdictions, the parties may limit judicial review of the 
final award by agreement.45 Since 1979, the arbitration laws 
of England have exemplified this approach. Under the 1979 
Act parties could curtail court review of an award, subject to 
certain qualifications, by entering into an ‘exclusion agree­
ment,’ a policy continued and edified under the 1996 Act.46 
Further examples are provided by such important venues as 
France47 and Switzerland.48
Belgium, supra note 18 at 68.
45 See generally Berger, In t e r n a t io n a l  A r b it r a t io n  709-12,724-25 
(table of jurisdictions).
46 Under the 1979 Act, only ‘non-domestic’ arbitration agreements 
could contain exclusion agreements reached before the dispute arose. 
Valid exclusion agreements ordinarily precluded the exercise of 
certain supervisory fimctions by English courts. See Mustill & Boyd 
at 373-74, 631-37. Under the 1996 Act as implemented, the 
domestic/non-domestic distinction no longer applies. Otherwise valid 
exclusion agreements will be given effect generally. See note 36 
supra and authorities cited therein. Notwithstanding a valid exclu­
sion agreement, an award may be set aside if there has occurred a 
“serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings, or the 
award” but only “if the court finds that it would be inappropriate to 
remit the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration.” 
Arbitration Act 1996 § 68(1),(3). The serious irregularity provision 
in meant to apply only in extreme cases. To succeed the applicant 
must demonstrate an irregularity from among those on an exclusive 
list, and the court must be convinced that it will or has led to 
“substantial injustice.” See Saville Report at 58-59.
In some jurisdictions, such as England and the United States, the 
parties may agree to forego a reasoned award, making judicial 
review for errors of fact or law difficult. In other jurisdictions, 
however, reasoned awards may be obligatory.
47 The French Code of Civil Procedure provides in Article 1482 that 
the parties may “in the arbitration agreement, waive their right to 
appeal.” French Civ. Proc. Code, Art. 1482. Under the same 
Article, appeal is precluded if the parties have empowered the 
arbitrator to act as amiable compositeur, unless the parties expressly
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The Model Law, arguably the emerging international 
standard, also demonstrates a tendency to limit substantive 
review of awards, even in the absence of some form of 
exclusion agreement.49 The Model Law grounds for the 
setting aside and non-recognition of awards, borrowed from 
the New York Convention, are largely procedural, not unlike 
the prevailing American approach; tribunal misapplication or 
misdesignation of the applicable substantive law are not among 
the express bases upon which an award can be attacked.50
Among the Model Law’s innovations is that it unifies the 
grounds for setting aside and nonrecognition of awards. Thus,
retain the right to make an appeal. Article 1484, qualifies the ability 
to waive appeal, however, in respect of certain procedure-related 
complaints exclusively listed therein; the list while exclusive does 
include that “the arbitral tribunal violated a rule of public policy. ”
48 See Blessing at 75-77, 88. Article 192(1) of the Swiss Statute 
provides in pertinent part:
[W]here none of the parties has its domicile, its habitual resi­
dence, or a business establishment in Switzerland, they may by 
an express statement in the arbitration agreement or by a 
subsequent agreement in writing, exclude all setting aside 
proceedings, or they may limit such proceedings to one or 
several of the grounds listed [elsewhere in the Act for setting 
aside awards].
49 The Model Law does not authorize exclusion agreements.
50 Courts, of course, retain latitude under the public policy heading 
provided in Article 34(2)(b)(ii)(setting aside) and Article 36(l)(b)(ii)- 
(non-recognition). Limitations upon subject-matter arbitrability 
within the lex loci arbitri may also be given effect. Additionally, 
local rules of construction could conceivably narrow the range of 
issues deemed submitted to the tribunal; awards would, therefore, 
more readily be ruled excessive and subject to setting aside on that 
basis, at least in part, under Article 36(l)(a)(iii). Restrictive 
domestic rules governing capacity to enter into arbitration clauses or 
other invalidating causes might also imperil an award under Article 
34(2)(a)(i).
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“[b]y treating awards rendered in international commercial 
arbitration in a uniform manner irrespective of where they 
were made, the Model law draws a new demarcation line 
between ‘international’ and ‘non-international’ awards instead 
of the traditional line between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ 
awards.”51 By setting forth as the common grounds the time- 
honored bases to be found in Article V of the New York 
Convention, the Model Law has ensured that awards will be 
subjected to tests already familiar to most courts.
5 .6 .2  U n p r e d ic ta b le  D e fe r e n c e  A b ro a d  t o  t h e  C u r ia l  
L aw  a n d  t o  S itu s  C o u r t  P r o n o u n c em en ts
Mandatory rules of the place of arbitration, de facto , have a 
territorial character; especially in the absence of treaty guid­
ance, they are vindicated abroad only episodically. Usually, the 
physical situs of an international arbitration is not chosen for 
its connection to a party but for geographic and juristic 
suitability. In that setting, neither party may expect to enforce 
the award at the situs in the event enforcement is necessary; 
rather there will be a search for the resisting party’s assets and 
a corresponding proceeding where they are found. Whatever 
the curial law might have been, the courts of the state of 
enforcement may give it a muted effect, both because of the 
narrowness of the New York Convention grounds and, 
possibly, because of a “homing instinct” that relegates
51 Explanatory Note at para. 46. Accordingly, under the Model Law, 
an international award (the only kind covered by the Law) can be set 
aside or refused recognition only if the grounds borrowed from 
Article V of the New York Convention have been established.
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restrictions of the situs to a secondary status. The courts of the 
United States, for example, in those cases in which foreign law 
has been invoked, generally have been unmoved by assertions 
that an arbitral agreement or award was not fully in keeping 
with the requirements of the place of arbitration.52 U.S. 
courts have been particularly willing to deemphasize the lex 
loci arbitri if to do so helped vindicate the prevailing pro­
52 American courts have invoked a supposed international standard to 
avoid giving undue effect to foreign law in the enforcement of 
agreements covered by the New York Convention, Article II (3) of 
which allows a court to decline enforcement when the agreement to 
arbitrate is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per­
formed.” Thus, in Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia v. Lauro, 712 
F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983), the party resisting arbitration relied on 
Italian law, alleging that an arbitration clause calling for an even 
number of arbitrators and an Italian situs was null and void. Noting 
the absence in Article II of guidance as to the applicable law, the 
court concluded that the policies behind it were best implemented by 
not deferring to parochial rules. 712 F.2d at 53-54. It concluded that 
since “[t]he rule of one state as to the required number of arbitrators 
does not implicate the fundamental concerns of either the interna­
tional system or forum, the agreement is not void.” Id. at 54.
Similarly, in Meadows Indem. Co. v. Baccala & Shoop Ins. 
Servs., Inc. eta l., 760 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), the district 
addressed whether subject matter arbitrability under the Convention 
should be judged by the law of the place where enforcement is likely 
to be sought. It was argued that enforcement of the clause should be 
declined because the law of Guernsey purportedly deemed fraud to 
be non-arbitrable subject matter. The court declined to be influenced 
by the law of only one country. Not unlike the Rhone court, it 
reasoned that the Article 11(1) determination "must be made on an 
international scale, with reference to the laws of the countries party 
to the Convention.” Id. at 1042. The court noted that fraud claims 
are arbitrable under American law, and the party resisting arbitra­
tion had failed to establish that Guernsey’s law represented the 
international standard. Id. at 1043. The court did not explain, 
however, why American law should be assumed to represent the 
international standard.
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arbitration, pro-enforcement bias evident in the modem 
cases.53 At least one U.S. court has held, for example, that an 
award may be enforced under the Convention though it was 
not subject to any national law54 relying in part upon a Dutch 
decision55 and distinguishing an English one.56 It observed 
that “allowing the parties to untether themselves from a pre­
existing ‘national law’ still leaves certain safeguards in place 
to guard against an otherwise unfair arbitration award.”57 
Perhaps more stunning is a recent district court decision 
enforcing an award that had been affirmatively set aside by an 
Egyptian court. Matter of Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab
53 Cf. Al Haddad Bros, infra note 57 (foreign law relied upon if 
helpful to enforcement).
54 Ministry of Defense of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 887 F.2d. 1357 (9th 
Cir. 1989).
55 Societe Europeen D’ Etudes et D ’ Enterprises v. Socialist Fed. Rep. 
of Yugoslavia, HR (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) NJ 74, 361 
(1974).
56 Dallal v. Bank Mellat, 1 All E.R. 239 (Q.B. 1986).
57 887 F.2d at 1365. The dictum and implications of Gould stand in 
marked contrast to the traditional and still-in-effect English position, 
typified by the Saville Report at para. 27: “English law does not at 
present recognize the concept of an arbitration which has no seat, 
and we do not recommend that it should do so.”
Despite Gould’s deemphasis of Dutch law, U.S. courts sometimes 
invoke the law of the situs in support of enforcement, suggesting 
that the prevailing pro-enforcement bias is more determinative of 
U.S. courts’ analysis than any coherent theory addressing the role 
of the lex arbitri. See, e.g., Al Haddad Bros. Enterprises v. M/S 
Agapi, 635 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1986), ajf’d, 813 F.2d 396 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (English award by claimant’s appointed arbitrator turned 
umpire enforceable despite Article V(l)(d) of the Convention and 
provision in the parties’ agreement calling for three arbitrators, 
given that default appointment procedure was lawful under English 
law).
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Republic of Egypt,58 arose out of a military procurement con­
tract. The arbitration in question took place in Egypt; the 
award according to the court “was made in Egypt, under the 
laws of Egypt and [was] nullified by the court designated [for 
that function].”59 The court also conceded that the reviewing 
court was correct in determining that the tribunal had misap­
plied Egyptian law, /.e. “that the decision of the Court of 
Appeal at Cairo is proper under applicable Egyptian law.”60 
Nonetheless, noting the permissive phrasing of Article V of the 
Convention (it states “may refuse” not “must refuse”), the 
court reasoned that the Convention allows awards that would 
otherwise be enforced under the FAA to be confirmed though 
set aside by the courts at the place of arbitration. Because the 
grounds upon which the award was set aside amounted merely 
to a mistake of law, the award would not have been vacated in 
a U.S. court.61 The court characterized as “specious” Egypt’s 
reliance on the parties’ choice of both Egyptian law and Egypt 
as the situs.62 For the parties had also expressly bargained for 
a “final and binding” arbitration the result of which was not to 
“be made subject to any appeal or other recourse.”63 The
58 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).
59 939 F. Supp. at 909.
60 Id. at n.6.
61 Id. at 911.
62 Id. at 914.
63 Id. at 914 (quoting contract).
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decision, which has attracted negative comment,64 has not 
been appealed.
5 .6 .3  V o l u n t a r y  Co m plia n c e
Mandatory rules of situs are unlikely to have an effect unless 
invoked by a party in attacking the award, either at the situs or 
latter when the award is presented for enforcement. If certain 
reports are to be credited, parties voluntarily comply with 
awards in the majority of cases. This capitulation presumably 
has prevailed even in cases in which rules of the situs have 
been transgressed. Whether this has occurred due to satisfac­
tion with the process or merely to avoid further costs, the by­
product is a diminished role for rules that might have been 
treated as imperative within the courts of the situs.
5.7 The Proceedings—Lex Arbitri Unification Built Upon
A Liberal Model
5 .7 .1  In  G en er a l
In a sense the shrinking access to appeal and narrowing bases 
of attack upon awards is merely part of a broader evolu­
tion—one tending toward unification and liberalization. The
64 See R. Hulbert, Further Observations on Chromalloy: A Contract 
Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied, and an Opportunity Foregone, 
paper presented to the Fourteenth Joint Colloquium on International 
Arbitration, Nov. 21, 1997, (Washington, D.C) (on file with 
author).
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hallmarks of this process have been a reduction in the number 
and rigor of mandatory rules and a corresponding increase in 
the autonomy given to the parties. Modem statutes, in many 
cases influenced by the Model Law, endeavor to strictly limit 
opportunities for judicial interference with the arbitral process. 
The Model Law itself devotes Article 5 to the admonition: “In 
matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except 
where so provided in this law.”65 The Model’s specific 
provisions detailing local court interaction with arbitration, on 
balance, establish a supportive role for the judiciary.66 Gener­
ally, courts are not to be the first resort where a party has a 
complaint about an arbitrator or his or her interim rulings.67
65 The provision is designed in part to assure the reader—“especially 
foreign readers and users, who constitute the majority of potential 
users and may be viewed as the primary addressees of any special 
law on international commercial arbitration”—that there is no need 
to look outside the Model Law for other possible sources of judicial 
interference. Explanatory Note at para. 16; cf. Arbitration Act of 
1996 (England); Part 1, § 1(c) (“in matters governed by this Part 
the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part”).
66 For example, when other mechanisms for appointment or replace­
ment of arbitrators have broken down, a court designated under the 
law may appoint arbitrators. Model Law, Arts. 11 and 14. More­
over, the appointment or replacement, once made, is not subject to 
further appeal. Id. at Arts. 11(5) and 14(1). See also id ., Article 13 
(challenge procedures follow the same pattern).
67 Direct access to the courts is allowed, however, to pursue interim 
measures of protection, a provision which is generally regarded as 
complementary to the arbitral process. Some, however, rightly 
regard certain kinds of intervention as undesirable. Concerning 
court-mandated security for costs, see supra note 36 (noting Ken- 
Ren and response thereto in the 1996 Act).
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5.7.2 Deliberate Reductions In Mandatory Rules
The waning influence of the situs in international arbitration is 
also reflected in the decreasing numbers of mandatory rules 
within the various national laws of arbitration and the corre­
sponding ability of the parties to shape the proceedings at will.
The Model Law’s travawc suggests that such liberality was 
deemed essential from the outset. During the formative stages 
of the Model Law project, the UNCITRAL Secretariat recom­
mended that especial account be taken of oft-heard criticisms 
leveled against international commercial arbitration.68 The 
catalog of complaints included unwelcomed supervision and 
control by courts of the situs, especially in relation to the 
merits of the case,69 and mandatory restrictions on: the sub­
mission of future disputes to arbitration, the appointment of 
arbitrators, kompetenz-kompetenz, arbitral powers to fashion 
the proceedings in light of the parties’ wishes and choice of 
law analysis affecting substance and procedure.70 True to that 
early vision, the Model Law’s mandatory provisions are 
neither comprehensive nor invasive.71 The same tendency is 
seen in recent enactments not fully based on the Model Law.
68 First Secretariat Note: Possible Features of a Model Law A/CN. 
9/207 (14 May 1981), excerpted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 1193.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 583, suggesting that the following 
Articles or parts thereof are mandatory: 18 (party equality); 23(1) 
(statements of claim and defense); 24(2)-(3) (notice of hearings and 
meetings and related matters); 27 (court assistance in taking 
evidence at request of party or tribunal); 30(2); 31(1),(3),(4) (award 
formalities); 32 (termination of proceedings) and 33(l)(a),(2),(4),(5) 
(post-award correction; additional awards).
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Under the English Act 1996, for instance, most provisions may
be varied by agreement.72 As one commentary explains:
It is fundamental to the whole approach of the Act that, so far 
as is consistent with the requirements of public policy, parties 
to arbitration agreements should have the maximum possible 
freedom to choose how their tribunals are to be structured, 
how their cases are to be run, what their awards are to 
contain, and so on. Therefore, most of the Act’s provisions are
. non-mandatory The mandatory provisions, which must
apply whatever the parties may choose to agree, have been 
kept to a minimum.73
The 1987 Swiss enactment, seems similarly bereft of 
obligatory provisions. Section 182 (1) of that Law allows the 
parties to determine the arbitral procedure and to submit the 
arbitration “to a procedural law of their choice.” The only 
apparent limitation is found in Section 182(3) which requires 
the tribunal, whatever the chosen procedural law or rules, to 
“assure equal treatment of the parties and the right of the 
parties to be heard in an adversarial procedure.”74
72 The English Arbitration Act of 1996 lists, in a 21-entry schedule 
attached to the Act, the Act’s mandatory provisions.
73 Harris, et al. at 5. The dominion given to the parties seems so 
broad that, in theory a Canadian claimant and a Mexican respondent 
arbitrating in London could under the 1996 Act agree that their 
arbitration was to proceed according to the international arbitration 
law of California. In such a case, the curial law would be that of 
California (an UNCITRAL-based system) subject to the limited 
mandatory provisions to be found in the Act.
74 Blessing at 85. Dr. Blessing notes that Section 182 was much 
debated; ultimately a default rule referring to local procedural law 
in the absence of an affirmative designation by the arbitrators or 
parties was omitted. Id. at 47.
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5.S Party Autonomy, Standard Rules and the 
Customized Situs
5 .8 .1  U n if ic a t io n  T h ro u g h  S ta n d a r d  R u le s
To the extent wide party autonomy prevails at the situs, the 
standard formulations authored by the various administering or 
advisory institutions become an important source of rules 
specific to the disputing parties. These rules guide the proceed­
ings to a great extent whether the parties are in London, New 
York or Paris. While national arbitration laws have evolved, 
so have the various rule formulations. Increasingly, the leading 
rules adopt a unified conception of international arbitration; 
open and shameless borrowing and cross-fertilization among 
sponsoring institutions have conduced to a corpus of common 
approaches, or at least to a collection of well known alterna­
tives. The increasing unity of approach, when combined with 
the continuing subsidence of imperative arbitration law, will 
lead quite naturally to proceedings free of national mark­
ings.75
5 .8 .2  C h o ice  o f  A r b itr a to r s , C o u n se l a n d  L a n g u a g e
Much of the utility and desirability of international arbitration 
would be lost if parties were required to employ only counsel, 
and appoint only arbitrators, licensed at the situs of arbitration.
75 Hence, it is increasingly apt to be true that hypothetical ICC 
arbitrations in Vancouver, New York and London (involving the 
same hypothetical dispute, lawyers and parties) will greatly resemble 
each other.
156
Chapter 5: Arbitral Situs
Fortunately, the prevailing position among leading arbitration 
host states is that the parties may appoint whomever they wish 
to represent them76 in arbitration and may compose the tribu­
nal with similar flexibility. When added to the parties’ ability 
to select the language or languages of the arbitration and 
structure the proceedings largely at will, this accommodation 
allows the parties to surround themselves with the familiar, 
though arbitrating far from home.
5.9 The Place’s Geographical Dimension: Tribunal 
Powers To Limit Physical Inconvenience
Rules and statutes often give an arbitral tribunal the power to 
convene hearings, inspections and deliberations away from the 
arbitration’s official seat. Choice of situs therefore does not 
modemly imply a territorial circumscription per se, although 
an arbitration which carries on proceedings wholly outside of 
the arbitration’s putative situs may encounter an identity crisis 
of sorts, one which may affect access to the courts of the situs 
and the resulting award’s nationality for enforcement purpos­
es.77 The next chapter returns to this point while pursuing the 
impact of technology on both the physical and the jurispruden­
tial aspects of arbitral situs.
76 But see discussion at Chapter 11 (§ 11.20).
77 Cf. Blessing at 22 (contrasting the more liberal Swiss position with 
the German one, as of 1988).
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ARBITRAL METHOD AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
ADVANCEMENT
Chapter Contents
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6.3 Legal Culture Meets Technological Culture
6.4 The Traditional Model and the 21st Century—The 
Need to Anticipate
6.5 Technology and Arbitration—The Emerging New 
Paradigm (The S and D Arbitration Revisited).
6.1 Introduction
Arbitration in the next century will be greatly influenced by 
technological advancement. The 1990s have already ushered in 
telecommunication modes that have affected the professions in 
subtle and dramatic ways. FAX and e-mail have added speed, 
spontaneity and economy to business correspondence. Data 
storage and retrieval systems offer unprecedented access to 
information, which in conjunction with existing global net­
works, offer virtually limitless possibilities for distributing 
data. With these new ways of gathering and dispensing 
information have come new issues of security, privacy and 
authentication. Lawyers and business persons increasingly are 
being introduced to encryption techniques and nomenclature 
previously reserved for spy novel enthusiasts.1
1 Encryption is the putting of a message into code. See generally 
Baker.
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6.2 On-Line Dispute Resolution—The Present
An intriguing glimpse of the near future is provided by a 
recent AAA initiative. Created in late-1995, the Virtual 
Magistrate Project contemplates the resolution of disputes by 
reference to a panel of arbitrators who, on an expedited basis, 
settle disputes arising on global networks from on-line commu­
nications, postings and files.2 The AAA’s fully on-line 
administration of the proceedings will use the World Wide 
Web as a “gateway.”3 Thus, for instance, if party A in an on­
line posting maligns party B’s products, party B may (if party 
A has agreed) submit a claim to a panel member of the Project 
with expertise in trade libel and on-line operations. The 
complaint is submitted by computer and the award will 
ordinarily be communicated by e-mail or similar means. The 
award could, for example, instruct A to cease any inaccurate 
commentary found to exist and perhaps to post a correction. 
The system operator in turn would be expected to take such 
measures as are recommended by the arbitrator to help the 
parties implement the award.4 During the course of the
2 See generally G. Friedman, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the 
Emerging Online Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities, 19 
Hast. Comm. & Ent. L. J. 695 (1997). The Project is a venture 
shared among the Cyberspace Law Institute, the Villanova Center 
for Information Law and Policy and the American Arbitration 
Association. Id. at 701. It was formally inaugurated on March 4, 
1996. Id.
3 Id.
4 The Project’s first case, Tierney v. America On-line, was prompted 
by an AOL subscriber’s request that an allegedly deceptive adver-
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proceedings, none of the central players will have convened in 
the same physical place.5
In a similar vein, the World Intellectual Property Organiza­
tion (WIPO) will soon inaugurate a regime devoted to the 
resolution of domain name disputes.6 The system would 
operate in conjunction with a domain name registration scheme 
and the disputes would be decided by a WIPO panel member 
in a summary fashion, using on-line proceedings.7
tisement be removed as an AOL posting. The award was rendered, 
ex parte, within four days from submission. AOL was instructed to 
remove the posting, which instruction it followed. Id. at 705.
5 The brief introduction offered in this paragraph does not convey 
many details of importance. The long-term potential for conducting 
international commercial arbitration based on a model similar to the 
Virtual Magistrate is apparent. Conventional modes of analysis, 
however, may require substantial retooling. Consider, for example, 
questions of applicable law. See Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice 
of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 75 
(1996).
6 A domain name is an identification, functioning not unlike an 
address, that enables one computer to access another. The domain 
name of particular enterprises naturally takes on utility as an 
identifier of goods and services, yet, as with trade marks and 
service marks there is potential for duplication and confusion when 
similar or identical names are chosen by multiple concerns. 
Consider for instance the example given at a recent conference 
hosted by WIPO: the domain name “SBC.com.” Conceivably, the 
Swiss Bank Corporation, Southern Bell Corporation and the Swiss 
Broadcasting Corporation might each adopt, or wish to adopt the 
“SBC” formulation. Presentation of Chris Gibson, Esq., Senior 
Legal Advisor, WIPO, Geneva Conference, infra note 7.
7 Presentation by Francis Gurry, Director WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center, at Biennial Conference of the International 
Federation of Commercial Arbitration Institutions (IFCAI), Geneva, 
October 24, 1997; see also C. Gibson, Arbitration in Intellectual 
Property Disputes, 8(1) Cal. Int’l Practitioner 2, 9 (1997).
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6.3 Legal Culture Meets Technological Culture
It takes little imagination to conceive of myriad ways in which 
arbitral proceedings may be altered by seemingly commonplace 
technology. Yet, the supplanting of traditional arbitral proce­
dures, while inevitable, will not occur overnight, for at least 
two reasons. First, the practice world embraces two to three 
generations of specialists. While the emerging generation of 
lawyers may demonstrate predictable affinity for on-line 
operations, the same cannot be said about advocates and 
arbitrators at every level of seniority; doubtless, many distin­
guished arbitrators remain perfectly comfortable to proceed, at 
least to some extent, in the manner in which they have 
proceeded for decades. Second, lawyers, including those 
forming the arbitration elite, are—by and large—a conservative 
lot who favor convention and proven methods.
Technical problems large and small may also discourage the 
adoption of the most current methods. Consider, for example, 
the party who supposes that he may file his demand for 
arbitration or a prehearing memorandum by supplying the 
relevant document in disk form.8 After all, is it not true that 
the tribunal and opposing party need only insert the disk in any 
computer-printer combination to print the document? In fact, 
despite great strides in systems compatibility, it cannot be 
assumed in the international context that a disk prepared on 
America’s most popular software can be easily read or printed
8 Cf. Yukiyo, Ltd. v. Shiro Watanabe, 111 F.3d. 883 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (an apparent case of first impression in which a party filed a 
brief in CD-ROM form).
161
Chapter 6: Technological Advancement
by the equipment available to one’s counterpart or the tribunal. 
Nor is every arbitrator willing or able to perform even the 
rudimentary reformatting necessary to achieve a hardcopy.
Moreover, it may be debatable under the governing rules 
whether providing a disk even in a compatible format would 
satisfy the requirement that, for example, statements of claim 
and defense be “in writing.’’9 In certain settings, of course, 
this may call into question a party’s compliance with time 
limits set by the governing rules or the tribunal. Certainly, by 
explicit agreement or an appropriate rule coverage10 the 
parties can settle the matter; absent that clarification, however, 
controversy may ensue.
The use of video-conferencing is another example of a 
technology which, while taken for granted by some, will 
nonetheless be slow to gain universal acceptance within 
arbitration. Though ostensibly there is great appeal to any 
mechanism that curtails travel costs and time consumption on 
the parts of parties, their counsel and the arbitrators, its use 
might be resisted (even assuming that such technology were
9 See, e.g., the UNCITRAL Rules (1976), Art. 18 (“within a period 
of time to be determined by the tribunal, the claimant shall commu­
nicate his statement of claim in writing...”).
10 The AAA International Rules provide at Article 18 (1), for example:
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the tribunal, 
all notices, statements and written communications may be served 
on a party by air mail, air courier, facsimile transmission, telex, 
telegram or other written forms of electronic communication 
addressed to the party or its representative at its last known 
address or by personal service. Accord LCIA Rules (effective 
January 1, 1998), Art. 4.1 (“...shall be delivered by ... or trans­
mitted by facsimile, telex, e-mail or any other means of telecom­
munications that provide a record of its transmission”).
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available to all involved).11 Several concerns arise. First, the 
lack of on-site tribunal supervision inherent in video 
conferencing may encourage misconduct; how, for example, 
does one enforce witness sequestration or prevent witness 
coaching during a video hearing? Second, there will be 
additional intricacies involved; in light of the misunderstand­
ings that can already easily occur, it will ordinarily be prudent 
for the tribunal to formulate and publish—perhaps at the 
prehearing conference—detailed rules for conducting the video 
conference. The required further tribunal work may counsel 
against forgoing the traditional hearing.
Third, advocates and arbitrators sometimes also express 
concern about the quality of interaction available through video 
proceedings. Non-verbal cues account for much human 
communication. Video formats mute or eliminate much of this 
information, making some advocates and arbitrators highly 
uncomfortable. These dynamics also would affect the delibera­
tion process undertaken by tribunal members inter se in the 
event live video exchanges are substituted for the traditional 
mustering of arbitrators. Apart from communications among 
counsel and tribunal members, there is the testimony of 
witnesses to consider. Arguably, many of the elements affected 
by use of video are important in accurately assessing demean­
or. The comportment of the parties themselves would be 
similarly difficult to study through the camera’s lens.
11 Cf. Yukiyo, 111 F.3d at 886 (motion to strike CD-Rom pleading 
granted in part because opposing party would be required to procure 
additional computer equipment in order to view the brief).
163
Chapter 6: Technological Advancement
From the foregoing there may result a continuing preference 
for face-to-face hearings. Perhaps, the incremental approach to 
be anticipated over the next decade is use of video conferen­
cing limited to preliminary meetings and the like.12 Full video 
hearings, by contrast, will probably continue to be the excep­
tion in the near term; so presumably will be total reliance on 
conference-call or video deliberations. In the longer term, 
however, on-line and other technology-assisted proceedings are 
likely to become commonplace. The next section explores the 
new paradigm.
6.4 The Traditional Model and the 21st Century—The 
Need to Anticipate
6 .4 .1  B asic  F a c t s—Th e  S a n d  D  D istributio n  A gree­
m e n t
The year is 2000. A dispute arising from a distribution agree­
ment between Supplier (S) and Distributor (D) has led to 
arbitration per the following further facts.
S is incorporated in Delaware. Members of its management 
team live respectively in Palo Alto, California, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, New Orleans, Louisiana and Seattle Washington. S’s
12 In an arbitration administered by ICSID in which the sole arbitrator 
presided from Sydney, the tribunal’s secretary (an ICSID staff 
lawyer) participated in the proceedings from Washington, D.C. via 
satellite-assisted video link. The secretary could see, and was seen 
by, the others in attendance. The necessary equipment was made 
available through the good offices of the World Bank and an 
Australian court. Phone conversation with Antonio Para, ICSID 
legal staff, Feb. 6, 1998.
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monthly physical meetings of management alternate hotel 
venues among the four cities mentioned above. During the 
interim, the team members interact electronically.
S was attracted to D in late 1998 by D’s web site, which S’s 
management “visited” in trying to identify European outlets 
with sufficient substance to offer prestige, sales know-how and 
technical services to the target market (large multinational 
corporations). D is an English company notionally headquar­
tered in London, but, like S, is managed as a virtual enter­
prise;13 management rarely convenes together physically.
The product in question is based upon patented software 
designed to perform myriad bookkeeping and inventory control 
tasks. Specifically, it is intended to solve problems caused by 
multiple European currencies and the introduction of the 
Euro.14 It also addresses in an effective way date and pro­
gramming irregularities caused within computers by the year 
2000.15 It can be delivered on-line, though occasionally on­
site debugging is required.
13 The “virtual office” concept has already been adopted by many 
enterprises, albeit to varying degrees. See generally S. Hennink, 
Working it Out, Holland Herald, Oct. 1997, at 69 (describing 
various formats and the emerging American practice of setting up 
“hotel offices”).
14 Cf. European Commission, EMU and the Euro: How Enterprises 
Could Approach the Changeover (1997) (booklet).
15 The problem is that most software is written using two digits 
(instead of four) and is thus unable to distinguish the year 2000 from 
the year 1900. See H. Gutman, The Year 2000 Date Change, paper 
presented Dec. 4, 1997 at Seminar on Computer Law, Seattle, WA 
(on file with the author). One study suggests that it could cost $600 
billion to remedy the pervasive problem. Id. at 1.
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S and D are both relatively young companies; neither is 
publicly traded, but both have aspirations that include an 
eventual on-line offering of shares.16
In preparing to negotiate, each downloaded from the other’s 
site various promotional documents. As negotiations pro­
gressed, other, confidential exchanges were made by encrypted 
e-mail. To enhance the personal aspect to the budding relation­
ship, the final stages of the contract discussions occurred by a 
live video conference (none of the principals traveled away 
from their virtual offices); the final details were refined 
through e-mail exchanges and internet-assisted “real-time” 
phone calls between the two management teams.17 In the 
interest of keeping costs minimal, neither had legal advice 
during the negotiation and closing of the deal.18 During 
negotiations, applicable law and dispute resolution were not 
discussed and no documentation surrounding the agreement 
deals with those issues. The contract is evidenced only by a 
synoptic e-mail printout, authored by D, but bearing no hand­
written signature.
16 Cf., e.g., R. Hudson, British Start-up to Trade Stocks on the 
Internet, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at A7A (planned creation of 
stock exchange on the Internet).
17 See Chasia at 2 (“[A]dvances in technology are making it possible 
for subscribers equipped with ordinary handsets connected to the 
public switched telephone network, to make long distance calls to 
each other via the Internet . . .  for a fraction of the price of a 
traditional phone call”).
18 One by-product of the enabling power of on-line commerce for 
small, novice companies is market entry undertaken on the thinnest 
of funding and with no appreciation for the domestic law, and a 
fortiori, the foreign law implications of instant global market reach. 
This was a recurrent theme among the presenters at the Seattle 
Computer Law Seminar, supra note 15.
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Part of the software package made available to D was secret 
know-how developed by S but not covered by its patent.
6 .4 .2  The  D ispute
D now seeks several million pounds in compensation for 
damages which it alleges will result from S’s breach of the 
distribution agreement. It is common ground that six months 
after formation of the S-D agreement, S forged a similar pact 
with another European concern to distribute what it refers to 
as the “Generation II Program.” D contends that it alone is 
entitled to distribute the latter program. S in turn maintains 
that Generation II is a different product from that covered by 
the S-D agreement.19
S wishes to resolve the matter as quickly as possible, aware 
that its competition is rapidly developing rival software, which 
it may not be able to block using its patent.20 S speculates that 
the competitor may have benefitted from discovering certain of 
S’s know how via unauthorized access, promoted, S believes, 
by D’s willful or negligent failure to observe reasonable 
security measures. Like S, D has much to gain from a speedy 
determination of rights and duties.
19 Another common form of dispute is somewhat the reverse of that 
portrayed here; a licensee develops a product that is similar to that 
licensed and asserts the right to market it free of royalty obligations. 
The licensor, of course, contends that royalties are still payable 
because the product derives directly or indirectly from the licensed 
material.
20 Under current law, not all aspects of the software are protected, in 
all relevant countries, by a copyright or a patent.
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6.4.3 The Arbitration
The two sides have agreed to arbitrate. Their submission 
agreement (negotiated by e-mail exchanges) authorizes a three- 
person tribunal21 to conduct the proceeding as an ad hoc, 
“fast-track” arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules and to 
employ (and to allow to be employed) existing time and 
money-saving technology.
After an internet-assisted conference call, serving as a first 
pre-hearing meeting, the tribunal issued an electronic procedur­
al order, which authorized each side to conduct limited 
discovery including video depositions of each other and of 
certain non-parties, to be taken under an oath administered 
from afar by the presiding arbitrator.22
Simultaneous pleadings were exchanged by CD-ROM. Each 
tribunal member received a copy.23 After the tribunal had
21 D appointed a commercial QC with a background in computers; S 
appointed a litigation partner at a major California law firm. The 
two party-appointed arbitrators appointed a Canadian law professor, 
based in Toronto, to preside as third arbitrator.
22 The use of sworn depositions was suggested by D’s representative, 
who called the tribunal’s attention to Section 38 (5) of the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996, which provides in pertinent part:
The tribunal may direct that a party or witness shall be 
examined on oath or affirmation, and may for that purpose 
administer any necessary oath or take any necessary affirma­
tion.
The tribunal did not expressly conclude that the English Act 
governed the proceedings but said that it was “informed” by the 
above-referenced provision in conjunction with FAA § 7, which it 
regarded as conveying “a similar, complementary power. ”
23 The CD-ROM pleadings contained not only the text of the argument 
presented in traditional form, with references to supporting materi­
als, but also a system of “hypertext.” The hypertext, which the 
arbitrators could access via the “hyper-links” in the basic text
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studied the parties’ “written” submissions for two days,24 a 
second preliminary meeting was held by digital telephone 
conference call; the tribunal’s subsequent procedural order set 
the hearing schedule and was communicated by encrypted e- 
mail in French.25 It limited each side to two, 5-hour, hearing 
days; days two and three were separated by a non-hearing day.
contained all supporting documents in full (statutes, cases and expert 
reports etc.) as well as complete copies of the video taped deposi­
tions authorized by the tribunal. See Yukido, 111 F.3d at 885.
24 D contended that S violated the exclusivity understanding alleged to 
exist between the two concerns by distributing related technology 
through the distributor’s competitor. S responded that any agreement 
reached between the two did not cover the “second generation” 
product supplied to the competitor. (S’s expert, in her video 
affidavit, attempted to distinguish the two applications in question on 
various technical grounds). S also alleged that any contract between 
the two disputants would have come to an end in any case due to 
D’s willful or negligent failure to protect S’s secret know-how. S 
also alleged fraud in the inducement based on purported inaccuracies 
found in the distributor’s web site. For good measure, S invoked the 
Statute of Frauds, asserted that the alleged contract was unenforce­
able under EU Competition Law and that D had violated the federal 
RICO statute.
D replied that, despite a lack of formality in the deal’s documen­
tation, the contract was enforceable, that any proliferation in the 
data resulted from S’s failure to follow agreed upon e-mail encryp­
tion procedures and that the agreement was either not caught by 
Article 85(1) or would fall under a block exemption. For his part, 
D’s expert maintained that the “second generation” software was 
fundamentally the same as that contemplated in the contract 
description.
25 The order was drafted by the tribunal chair, who preferred on 
occasion to compose orders and draft awards in French. All 
concerned, however, have e-mail programs that translate messages 
sent in one language into one of three other languages. See P. 
Elstrom, This E-Mail Manager is Multilingual, Bus. Week, Sept. 8, 
1997, at p. 130c.
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The hearing was conducted in a live video conference format 
in which neither the tribunal nor the parties traveled to a 
central venue. However, to facilitate the video hearing and 
greater spontaneity, uncharacteristically, the management team 
of each party congregated in person with their respective teams 
of counsel. D’s group was in London; S’s team was in 
California. The arbitrators participated from their respective 
studies. Each day of hearing began at 7:00 a.m. PST (4:00 
p.m. London time) and ended at 1 p.m. PST (10 p.m. London 
time) including four 15-minute coffee breaks). The parties 
were allowed limited cross-examination of witnesses and both 
made use of text retrieval technology to show inconsistencies 
between deposition testimony and that offered at hearing.26 
Both sides employed during their oral presentations “air 
mouse” prompts to coordinate charts and other demonstrative 
evidence with the advocate’s oral presentation and “laser 
pointers”27 to direct the attention of the tribunal as needed. 
Both sides offered expert witness testimony, which had been 
prefigured by the expert reports contained in the parties’ CD- 
ROM submissions. At set junctures during the hearing, the 
tribunal asked questions of the parties and witnesses.
When declaring the video hearing closed, the tribunal autho­
rized each side to submit by encrypted e-mail a post-hearing 
memorial recapitulating their positions and addressing in 
particular specific governing law issues, the content of any
26 Present retrieval systems use a pen-shaped scanner to activate by 
swiping a bar code in a “trial notebook” to conjure specific depo­
sition text, a chart, document or picture, etc. McElhaney at 74.
27 A laser pointer is the size of a fountain pen, is battery powered, and 
can place a bright red dot of light on a surface from across a room. 
McElhaney at 74.
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applicable trade usage and the quantum of damages to which 
D would be entitled in the event breach was established.
6 .4 .5  Th e  A w a r d
Within the 14 day deadline established by the parties’ submis­
sion agreement, the tribunal distributed its award by encrypted 
e-mail. The award came into being through digital phone 
deliberations28 among the arbitrators, after which the presid­
ing arbitrator dictated an initial draft using voice recognition 
word processing.29 The award was in favor of D; it ordered 
S to pay D pounds sterling 1000,000 (one million) and certain 
of D’s costs.
S sought to vacate the award in the federal district court for 
the northern district of California.30 D presented the award
28 Digital phones communicate using a non-analogue signal which at 
present cannot be intercepted by scanners or other eavesdropping 
devices. Conversation between the author and Bruce Bowman, 
representative C. Crane Company, on November 2, 1997.
29 Voice recognition technology allows a computer to turn the spoken 
word into digital text. D. Beckman and D. Hirsch, In Re Technolo­
gy, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 84.
30 Personal jurisdiction over D, and subject matter jurisdiction over the 
dispute, would have to be established for the district court to 
proceed. Unless the submission agreement was construed to be an 
implied consent to jurisdiction, or the arbitration was deemed to 
have taken place in California, personal jurisdiction would require 
an analysis of D’s contacts with California and the reasonableness 
of making D defend there. The fact that the dispute arguably arises 
out of D’s contact with the state (albeit on-line contact) may lessen 
plaintiffs burden in establishing jurisdiction in personam. For a 
discussion of traditional analysis in relation to on-line operations, 
see Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the World-Wide Web: Bits (and 
Bytes) o f Minimum Contacts, 23 Rutgers Comput. L. J. 143 (1997).
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for enforcement in a London court, invoking the statutory 
provisions implementing the New York Convention.31
6.5 Technology and Arbitration—The Emerging New 
Paradigm (The S and D Arbitration Revisited).
6 .5 .1  In  Ge n er a l
In general, technology outstrips quite appreciably the evolution 
of legal doctrine. The arbitration between S and D summarized 
above is designed to demonstrate the use of fast-approaching 
technologies and to some degree the pressure these advances 
will inevitably place upon the traditional model of international 
arbitration. The selected questions posed under the following 
two headings are by no means the only ones raised by the S 
and D scenario, to which an entire book could be devoted.
Subject matter jurisdiction would depend in part on whether the 
award was deemed to be a convention award or merely one 
governed by Chapter One of the FAA.
31 See Arbitration Act of 1996, §§ 100-103. Note that for purposes of 
the Act, a “New York Convention award” is one “made, in 
pursuance of an arbitration agreement, in the territory of a state 
(other than the United Kingdom) which is a party to the New York 
Convention.” Id. § 100(1) (emphasis added). Subsection 100 (2)(b) 
provides that “an award shall be treated as made at the seat of the 
arbitration regardless of where it was signed, dispatched or 
delivered to any of the parties.”
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6 .5 .2  W here is the Situs of A rbitration?
Traditional doctrine depends heavily upon the notion that an 
arbitration has a juridical seat. The “seat” or “situs” or 
“place” of arbitration is an essential anchor. It supplies the 
curial law (or at a minimum certain mandatory rules) and it 
ordinarily gives the award its national affiliation for purposes 
of administering the New York Convention’s recognition and 
enforcement obligations. Moreover, it is typically to the courts 
of the situs that one looks for assistance in furthering the 
arbitration. In the S and D arbitration, which state was the 
situs?
Under the UNCITRAL Rules, if the parties have not 
designated a situs, the tribunal is supposed to do so “having 
regard to the circumstances of the arbitration,”32 though no 
time parameters are imposed by the Rules.33 Under the 
traditional conception, the designation of a place would suggest 
that certain of the arbitral proceedings would occur there. In
32 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 16(1). The requirement is reenforced by 
Article 32 (4) which requires that the award “contain ...the place 
where the award is made” and by Article 16(4), which mandates 
that the award be “made at the place of arbitration. ” The UNCITR­
AL Model Law, unlike the UNCITRAL Rules, introduces expressly 
the concept of the deemed situs, providing in Article 31(3) [in 
conjunction with Article 20(1)] that the award is deemed rendered 
at the place designated for the arbitral proceedings. The place of 
drafting or signing the award therefore is not controlling. The 
Model Law, however, does not provide for all purposes that a 
wholly deemed situs will suffice to place an arbitration within it’s 
ambit.
33 Until the tribunal does so, the arbitration ex hypothesi carries no 
geographic or national affiliation—a floating arbitration.
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the case portrayed above, any situs chosen will be largely a 
“deemed” situs, designated primarily to supply a juridical seat. 
Given that, what state should be selected by the tribunal 
(assuming the parties have not identified one) and when should 
that designation occur? Traditional dogma, of course, makes 
no room for multiple seats and the chosen rules appear to 
preclude allowing the arbitration to float for its entire duration.
Perhaps the answer is to designate the presiding arbitrator’s 
habitual residence (Toronto, Ontario). Under the modem trend, 
this designation would not require him to have actually 
conducted a majority of the proceedings there,34 but it would 
provide a territorial affiliation supported by an actual connec­
tion to the proceedings. It has the notional advantage of being 
both juridically and geographically neutral.35 Alternatively, 
the tribunal might designate as the situs that New York 
Convention state connected to the proceedings having the least 
restrictive arbitration law.
The notion that a deemed situs (whether accomplished by the 
parties or the tribunal) may suffice when the arbitration has no 
clear center of gravity is consistent with the general trend 
toward deemphasizing situs importance developed in Chapter 
5. Nonetheless, to remove from the traditional seat theory any
34 Thus, the award, by virtue of its deemed situs, would be a Canadian 
award deserving of New York Convention treatment; the curial law 
would be that of Ontario, which is based upon the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Would an Ontario court, however, consider itself the 
situs for purposes of assisting the proceedings?
35 “Notional” in the sense that the parties would be influenced only 
indirectly by Ontario’s relative convenience and legal environment. 
For them, Canada’s adherence to the New York Convention is 
Ontario’s defining characteristic given that no resort was had to 
local courts.
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implication of physicality may stretch the existing paradigm 
beyond the limits envisioned by some law-makers.
Consider, for instance, the many national laws now based 
upon the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 1 of that instrument 
provides that with some exceptions, the provisions of the 
Model apply “only if the place of arbitration is in the territory 
of this State.* Is this broad enough to include a deemed place 
designated, almost clerically, to facilitate a virtual arbitra­
tion?36
And what of non-Model Law jurisdictions? Suppose for 
example, the S-D tribunal designated Geneva; should English 
courts characterize as “Swiss” the award presented by D? 
Further, would the courts of that or another deemed situs 
welcome petitions for interim measures, replacement of 
arbitrators, determinations of arbitral jurisdiction and the 
setting aside of the award? In the absence of more unifying 
influences than presently exist, courts are likely to treat such 
issues unpredictably, and in a manner that will vary from state 
to state.37
36 “In the territory” arguably suggests a geographic nexus.
37 Doubtless, until a coherent doctrine of cyber-arbitration develops, 
judicial assistance to an arbitration having only deemed connection 
to the court in question will remain problematic. Distinct but equally 
engaging questions will arise before courts asked to enforce awards 
carrying a deemed territorial affiliation. In courts accustomed to the 
New York Convention’s territorial orientation (,see art. I: “awards 
made in the territory of [another State]”) there may be a sense that 
a national designation unsupported by any physical nexus ought not 
to be honored. Other more liberal courts, such as those of the 
United States will accept the deemed affiliation, characterize the 
award as not “domestic” (see id., art. I), or enforce it as a matter 
of comity, extra-conventionally. Complementary to the likely U.S.
175
Chapter 6: Technological Advancement
6 .5 .3  Applicable Law
The applicable curial law is a function of the lex loci arbitri 
and the parties’ jointly expressed wishes (if any). The law 
governing the substance of the dispute depends, however, in 
the absence of party choice, upon the tribunal’s own choice of 
law analysis. The diffuseness of virtual arbitration and the 
evasiveness of connecting factors in that setting may also 
challenge time-honored approaches. In the S and D arbitration, 
suppose the tribunal adopts as its choice of law guide the 
seller’s-place rule, subject to any mandatory rules to be found 
at the places of performance. Such an approach would roughly 
assimilate both the Rome and Hague Conventions. In a world 
of virtual offices, however, where is the seller’s place of 
business? In the minds of those imbued in technological 
culture, the answer is wherever the seller’s computer is. In the 
case of S and D, both parties are juridical entities; so perhaps 
the simplest approach is to use seller’s place of incorporation 
(Delaware) even though its real seat is no single place.38
position (developed above in Chapter 5 (§ 5.6.2) is the Model Law’s 
deemphasis upon award nationality. See Model Law, Art. 35(1) 
(“international” awards enforceable regardless of country in which 
made).
38 If one changes the hypothetical, certain other connecting factors may 
become slippery. Suppose that the seller’s product is the creation 
and implementation, on-line, of commercial web sites, a service she 
renders using a laptop unit from wherever convenience dictates. A 
tribunal might well consider in a breach of warranty dispute that the 
place of performance is an important factor in implementing a 
traditional proper law analysis. But, in this variation where is the 
place of performance? Arguably, somewhere in cyberspace. The 
stage is already set for this not-so-hypothetical situation. Cf. West 
Group Will Make Your Law Firm Home Page, A.B.A. J., Nov.
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6 .5 .4  Th e  Tim e  Z o n e  Problem
When the parties are physically distant, as in the S and D 
arbitration, telecommunications advances do little to bridge the 
time zone disparity. Even under the facts as given, one team 
had to start relatively early and the other to stay relatively late. 
That was so even though an effort was made to limit the length 
of each hearing day. The problem would be exacerbated if S’s 
team had convened in, for example, Honolulu.
A more clerical and perhaps easier question relates to which 
time zone should be used to judge compliance with deadlines 
set by the tribunal. If a respondent’s reply is to be communi­
cated by e-mail within thirty days of its receipt, is the deadline 
linked to the time at claimant’s place or that at respondent’s 
place or that relevant to the presiding arbitrator or perhaps, in 
lieu of the forgoing, that existing at some neutral mid-Atlantic 
place?
6 .5 .5  C o n f id e n t ia l i ty  R e v is ited
The references in the D and S fact pattern to encryption and 
certain other unstated premises take for granted a cluster of 
significant cyberspace concerns which great minds continue to
1997, at 5. According to a West Group Internet Marketing Consul­
tant, the web sights on offer may, after creation, be housed either 
in the West mainframe or transferred online to a remote host 
computer, presumably anywhere in the world. Telephone conversa­
tion with Mr. A1 Fiene, West Group, November 4, 1997.
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study. The initiated debate the merits of “encryption,”39 “fire 
walls,”40 “anonymous remailers,”41 and “digital certifi­
cates.”42
High-tech disputes in particular often require selective 
revelation of secret information that may be the basis of a 
competitive advantage; such information has commercial value 
because, but only to the extent that, it is secret. Issues of 
authentication also arise; when the parties communicate with 
each other and the tribunal, and when the tribunal issues orders 
and awards, some means of assuring integrity and genuineness 
will often be essential. Security issues trouble the business 
world in general and a detailed exploration is beyond the scope 
of this work. Suffice it to note that, given the rate at which
39 One of the issues associated with encryption technology and its 
ready availability arises from national security concerns. Govern­
ments are presently attempting to develop suitable policies given the 
industrial need for powerful encryption and the countervailing desire 
to keep such cloaking capability out of the hands of criminals and 
enemies of state. See Baker at 745-50 (discussing “lawful access” 
principle in OECD Cryptography Guidelines).
40 A “fire wall,” is a measure that isolates certain data and systems 
(those to be protected) from other data and systems intended to be 
made available. See C. Crumlish, T h e  In t e r n e t  D ic t io n a r y  70 
(1995); and see Howard at 249 (“... a set of software and hardware 
tools, programs and diagnostics that allow and organization to scan 
all incoming (and outgoing) messages to ensure that they are from 
authorized parties who have permission to use the system”).
41 Anonymous remailers (or untraceable mail services) are businesses 
that exist to promote confidentiality. They forward messages after 
taking measures to obscure the identification of the addressee and 
sender. See Howard at 216-17.
42 Digital certificates are software mechanisms that prove the user’s 
identity and hence his or her entitlement to enter into a particular 
transaction on-line. They are issues by a Certificate Authority (e.g., 
a government agency). They are said to be an essential element in 
securing avenues for online commerce. See Adams at 42.
178
Chapter 6: Technological Advancement
developments occur, the “cutting-edge” technology being 
applied today to address these problems will be passe by the 
year 2000.43
6 .5 .6  M a tter s  o f  F orm
Important questions of form also surface when traditional 
conceptions are applied to electronic interaction. When is an 
on-line arbitration agreement or award “in writing” as required 
by the New York Convention and myriad statutes? Is it a 
written award only when it is apprehended in a fixed medium? 
Similarly, what constitutes the requisite signature upon an 
electronic award?44
43 Howard at 216-19; Adams at 42.
44 See Chapter 9 (§ 9.2.7). Article 31 (1) of the Model Law requires 
awards to be signed. Accord Article 48 of the ICSID Convention. 
Under the New York Convention (art. IV), the award recipient must 
present the “duly authenticated original award or a duly certified 
copy therof.” Under American commercial law, “signature” has a 
broad meaning and ready accommodation of reasonable means of 
authentication will likely occur. Cf U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (“‘Signed’ 
includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present 
intention to authenticate a writing”).
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7.1 Introduction
When conducted in the United States, international commercial 
arbitration is influenced by several factors that the non-Ameri­
can lawyer may find unusual in concept or application. This 
chapter offers a brief survey of elements that are distinctive 
when viewed in comparative context. The selective coverage
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presented is designed to foreshadow the recommendations to be 
made in this work’s final chapters.
7.2 The U.S. Constitution
The American legal regime affecting commercial arbitration is 
contoured by the U.S. Constitution in subtle and dramatic 
ways. Congress’ power to regulate the majority of commercial 
arbitrations—its Commerce Power—derives from that docu­
ment as does the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts.1 
Restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by Ameri­
can courts also emanate from the Constitution’s Due Process 
Clauses.2 Notions developed under those same clauses guide 
courts in performing their occasional and limited review of 
domestic and foreign arbitral awards. In addition, the U.S. 
Constitution provides part of the framework within which the 
sometimes uncertain relationship between state and federal law 
is reconciled, a topic dealt with in the following section.
1 U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
2 The Fifth Amendment, which is directed towards the federal govern­
ment, provides in pertinent part: “No person shall be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . U.S. 
Const, amend. V.
In parallel phrasing, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due 
process in relation to state activities. The modem approach to testing 
due process in the exercise of personal jurisdiction derives from 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), in 
which the Supreme Court enunciated the “minimum contacts” test. 
Id. at 319. This test focuses primarily on the defendant’s connection 
with plaintiffs chosen forum to determine if it is fair to the 
defendant and reasonable to proceed. See generally Bom & Westin, 
ch. 2.
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7.3 American Federalism: The FAA, Intra-State Choice 
of Law, Volt and Limited Preemption
In the United States, state and federal courts co-exist and enjoy 
concurrent jurisdiction as to many matters affecting interna­
tional commercial arbitration; arbitral agreements and awards 
can be enforced in both systems, and remedies designed to 
protect the rights of an arbitrating party can, in general, be 
pursued in either one. Co-existing federal and state laws (both 
statutory and decisional) have necessitated internal rules 
designed to determine choice and priority of laws. To summa­
rize the essential maxims: preemptive federal law applies in 
state and federal courts;3 but state courts may apply state law 
in the absence of controlling federal law. For procedural law, 
federal courts apply the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate 
Procedure, regardless of the branch of subject matter jurisdic­
tion that obtains.4 Under the Erie doctrine,5 however, when
3 U.S. Const, art. VI, § 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Congress must act pursuant to a constitutionally enumerated power, 
the most embracive of which is that contained in Article I, Section 
8, Clause 2 authorizing it “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
4 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). Section 1332 implements the subject 
matter jurisdictional base established in Article III of the Constitu­
tion known as diversity jurisdiction. Access to federal courts can also 
be obtained via federal question jurisdiction, governed by 28 USC 
§ 1331 and present when the dispute contains a pivotal question of 
federal law. The somewhat anomalous “diversity” basis requires an
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jurisdiction is founded upon “diversity” they are not free to 
prefer a federal substantive rule to an applicable state princi­
ple,6 unless the federal rule is of preemptive character (a 
question of legislative intent). When the federal rule is preemp­
tive, or jurisdiction is founded upon a federal claim, Erie does 
not apply; in those circumstances, federal courts may look to 
federal law for a rule of decision.7
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00 (exclusive of interest 
and costs) and a dispute between inter alia:
(1) citizens of different American states; and
(2) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state;
For statutory purposes, resident aliens are citizens of their 
domiciliary state, while corporations are citizens of both the state of 
incorporation and the state where the corporation has its principal 
place of business.
5 See Erie (1938), wherein Justice Brandeis wrote for the majority, in 
relation to federal diversity cases:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law 
of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared 
by its Legislature in a statue or by its highest court in a 
decision is not a matter of federal concern.
Id. at 78. See generally I. Younger, What Happened in Erie?, 56 
Tex. L. Rev. 1011 (1978). Several subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions have elaborated the Erie Doctrine, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elect. Coop., Inc., 
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
6 The distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” is not always 
self-evident when no federal rule of procedure applies. See, e.g., 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)(In the absence 
of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly on point, state law 
governs what constitutes commencement of action for purposes of 
applying state limitations period).
7 Sometimes, however, federal courts will borrow from state law in 
fashioning a federal rule.
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The seminal cases confirming the above rudiments are 
decades old. The application of Erie in matters governed by the 
FAA nonetheless is somewhat murky. One recurrent question 
has been the degree to which state law should influence the 
implementation of FAA Section 2, a preemptive provision.8 
The latter insists that arbitration clauses are valid but sets forth 
neither rules of formation nor guidance as to applicable law. 
Under FAA Chapter One, jurisdiction is ordinarily founded 
upon diversity. Therefore, when operating under that Chapter, 
federal courts would seem bound under Erie to apply state 
rules of mutual assent in determining the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate.9
In practice, most federal and state courts have adopted a 
blended approach; it is customary to apply state law to the 
rudiments of formation while interpreting the arbitration clause 
in light of federal policies favoring arbitration. The Supreme 
Court seems to have endorsed this tendency. It noted in May 
of 1995, that “when deciding whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate a certain matter . .  . courts generally . . .  should apply
8 Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract 
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract transaction, 
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca­
tion of any contract.
9 The alternative, federal law, would be based upon generic rules of 
offer and acceptance that might vary from a specific state’s contract 
law. Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 984 F.2d 58,60-61 (2d 
Cir. 1993). Cf. Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus. Corp., 862 F.2d 
754 (9th Cir. 1989) (determining law of waiver).
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ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 
contracts.”10 Whether the general rule offered by the Court 
extends to arbitration agreements covered by the New York or 
Inter-American Conventions, however, remains debatable.11
Under supremacy principles, legitimately enacted federal law 
may occupy an entire field, thus displacing state law in both 
state and federal courts.12 The scope of preemption, however, 
turns upon Congressional intent and the FAA has been held to 
not completely preclude state involvement in the arbitration 
field. In Volt (1989),13 the Court confirmed that state law is 
preempted only “to the extent that it actually conflicts with 
federal law—that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’”14 The determinative question, said 
the Court, was whether the state court’s application of the state 
rule “would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”15 
The particular state rule in question in Volt subordinated 
arbitration to litigation in certain cases of related proceedings.
10 Kaplan 115 S. Ct. at 1924.
" The applicable law question is complicated by the fact that diversity 
of citizenship is a basis for subject matter jurisdiction only under 
Chapter 1 of the FAA. Chapters 2 and 3, which implement the New 
York and Panama Conventions, respectively, afford independent 
bases of federal question jurisdiction. Thus, Erie (which applies only 
in diversity cases) would seem not to control when either convention 
chapter applies. Nor does Erie apply under Chapter 1 as to issues 
which the FAA clearly preempts, such as those covered by Section 
2 .
12 See generally J. Novak & R. Rotunda, C o n st it u t io n a l  L a w  311- 
15 (4th ed. 1991).
13 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
14 Id. at A ll  (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
15 Id. at 477-78.
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The Court held that the state provision in question—at least 
where the parties had designated its application—would not 
detract from the goals and policies embodied in the FAA. The 
FAA, it reasoned, only requires that an arbitration agreement 
be enforced according to its terms, which terms included 
qualifications found in the state law designated by the par­
ties.16
Volt, though a departure from a train of decisions establish­
ing an unmistakably pro-arbitration slant, underscores the 
autonomy enjoyed by the parties in designating the conditions 
and procedures that are to govern their agreement to arbitrate. 
Regrettably, the latitude it appears to grant state courts in 
construing parties’ intent, ensures that federal policies and the 
parties’ actual intent will be thwarted upon occasion.17
Volt notwithstanding, in cases in which no arguable choice 
of state arbitration law has occurred, FAA Section 2 remains 
a significant constraint upon state laws limiting arbitration. 
When combined with the Supreme Court’s expansive interpre­
tation of the “involving commerce” prerequisite to FAA 
application,18 Section 2 nullifies a number of state conditions
16 Id. at 478-79.
17 The choice of law clause in the parties’ contract, which obliquely 
referred to a California law, had been construed to include the state’s 
arbitration and related procedural law. California law required 
arbitration to be stayed in deference to related litigation under 
certain conditions. The Supreme Court refused to pass on the 
California courts’ questionable choice of law analysis, a failing 
which prompted a well-reasoned dissent. 489 U.S at 479 (Justices 
Brennan and Marshall dissenting).
18 The test is whether the underlying transaction “in fact” involved 
interstate commerce. The parties’ intent is not controlling. Terminix, 
115 S. Ct. at 843. Moreover, “involving” is given an expansive 
reading, on the premise that Congress intended “to provide for the
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and qualifications that might otherwise be imposed upon 
arbitration agreements by state courts—such as consumer- 
related formality requirements and subject matter arbitrability 
limitations. Manifold Supreme Court and appellate court 
pronouncements reiterate the strong policies driving Section 2 
and Congress’ corresponding desire to “foreclose state legisla­
tive attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agree­
ments.”19
7.4 State International Arbitration Law
The ability of state laws to address international commercial 
arbitration is significant because the FAA’s coverage is 
fragmentary and of limited application in state courts. Many 
states have rather comprehensive arbitration laws and several
enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the 
Commerce Clause.” Id. (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 490).
19 Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 11-12). A 
recent addition to this “preemption” chain of authority is Casarotto 
(1996), in which the Supreme Court held that Montana’s first-page 
notice requirement for arbitration clauses was preempted by the 
FAA. Justice Ginsberg applied the established doctrine, explaining: 
By enacting § 2 . . . Congress precluded States from sin­
gling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requir­
ing instead that such provisions be placed “upon the same 
footing as other contracts.” Montana’s [notice require­
ment] directly conflicts with § 2 of the FAA because the 
State’s law conditions the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements on compliance with a special notice require­
ment not applicable to contracts generally.
Casarotto, 1996 WL 262287 at 4-5 (some footnotes omitted); see 
also Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-90 (California code purporting to 
insulate wage collection actions from arbitration agreements preempt­
ed by FAA Section 2).
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states have recently passed specific legislation intended to 
accommodate international commercial arbitration. These 
include California,20 Colorado,21 Connecticut, Florida,22 
Georgia,23 Hawaii,24 Maryland,25 North Carolina,26 
Ohio,27 and Texas.28 Some of these are openly based upon 
the UNCITRAL Model Law;29 others have merely been influ­
enced by it. Accordingly, in an area traditionally associated 
with federal law and policy, the Model Law has given certain 
states a claim to relative currency.
20 Title 9.3 Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commercial 
Disputes, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1297.11 et. seq. (West 1982 & 
Supp. 1996) (eff. Mar. 7, 1988).
21 Colo. International Dispute Resolution Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13- 
22-501 et. seq. (1987) (eff. Apr. 12, 1993).
22 Fla. International Arbitration Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 684.01 et. seq. 
(West 1990 & Supp. 1996) (eff. 1986).
23 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-9-30 et. seq. (1982 & Supp. 1995) (eff. July 1, 
1988).
24 Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 658-1 et. seq. (1985 & Supp. 1994) (eff. 1988).
25 Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-2B-01 et. seq. (1995) (eff. 
July 1, 1990).
26 N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-567, 30-1-567.68 (1996).
27 International Commercial Arbitration, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§§ 2712.01 et. seq. (Anderson 1992) (eff. Oct. 23, 1991).
28 Uniform Arbitration Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§§ 171.001 etseq. (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) (eff. Sept. 1, 1995).
29 Notably: California, Connecticut, Oregon and Texas. Concerning 
American states’ enactment of the Model Law see J. McClendon, 
State International Arbitration Laws: Are They Needed or Desirable? 
1 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 245 (1990).
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7.5 Courts of General Jurisdiction and The Litigation 
Avalanche
In recent decades, several factors have led to severe and 
sustained overcrowding in American courts. Tort theories of 
recovery have evolved in a pro-plaintiff direction, and many 
attorneys are willing to take promising cases on a contingency 
basis, thus encouraging litigation by reducing the financial 
risks to the plaintiff. Those risks are further reduced in 
American courts because the losing litigant is not ordinarily 
required to pay the prevailing parties’ costs. Amplified 
criminal dockets have also contributed to delay of civil court 
cases. Criminal cases take precedence over the civil docket in 
American courts, and because the number of drug-related cases 
is especially overwhelming, they have taxed the American 
court system.
Not surprisingly, many among the commercial bar would 
welcome a separate court system or docket limited to commer­
cial disputes. Despite the apparent success of the recently 
inaugurated commercial division in New York,30 and the well-
30 New York’s commercial division began as an experiment in January 
of 1993; four of the forty-five judges then serving were assigned to 
the “Commercial Parts.” See A. Field, New York’s Business Courts: 
A Successful Experiment, paper presented to the Business Law Sec., 
ABA Annual Mtg. (Aug. 9, 1994)(hereinafter Successful Exper­
iment). At that time, their dockets became devoted entirely to 
business disputes. Proceedings before the four judges were handled 
with uncommon dispatch through flexible procedures and aggressive 
case management. In late 1995, the concept was formalized as a the 
Commercial Division. See R. Haig, New York Creates Business 
Courts, 6(1) Bus. L. Today 32 (Sept.-Oct. 1996). Several thousand 
pending cases were transferred from the Commercial Parts to the 
new division. Among the Division’s modem features is a network of
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known English example31 few states seem poised to initiate 
separate venues limited to commercial cases and staffed by 
experts in commercial law.32 Nor are the federal courts likely 
to establish general commercial courts, despite the logic of 
doing so.33
Delays resulting from burgeoning caseloads, unpredictable 
juries, excessive costs and jurists whose expertise may not 
extend to commercial matters are cited by proponents of a 
commercial court system.34 They conclude that business 
litigants are at present induced to employ private dispute 
resolution as the lesser of the evils. In doing so, however, they
personal computers linking the chambers and employing uniform 
case-management software. Id.
31 See R. Goode, C o m m e r c ia l  L a w  1170-72 (2d ed. 1995). As 
Professor Goode succinctly explains:
A part of the Queen’s Bench Division, the Commercial Court 
is designated to provide a speedy, specialist service to the 
commercial world in the trial of commercial actions. The court 
has now been in existence for 100 years. It is manned by 
judges . . . with particular experience in commercial work. . . .
Id. at 1170 (footnotes omitted).
32 Proposed initiatives in other states have encountered greater difficul­
ty—primarily from sectors of the bar that would not substantially 
benefit from such a reform. The California Trial Lawyers Associa­
tion, for example, has opposed the creation of a business court in 
that state. D. Devries, Point Counter Point, Cal. St. B.J. 12 (July
1994) (commentary by President of California Trial Lawyers Assn. 
opposing the establishment of business courts).
33 The federal system, however, does contain various specialized courts. 
These are the Bankruptcy Court, the Patents Court, the United States 
Claims Court, and the Court of International Trade. Further, ordinary 
state and federal courts may appoint special masters, with expertise 
appropriate to an issue or issues in the case. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 53.
34 See T. Ambro, Business Courts: Litigation Reform in Delaware, 
paper presented to the Business Law Sec., ABA Annual Mtg. (Aug. 
9, 1994) (hereinafter Business Courts).
190
Chapter 7: Selected Features of the American System
must forego such desirable litigation attributes as wide discov­
ery, precedent-based outcomes, and substantive appeal.35
Those opposed to segregating commercial cases contend that 
already scarce judicial resources would be weakened by the 
gleaning of talent implied in the composition of commercial 
courts; flexibility in staffing the bench, it is argued, would be 
reduced accordingly.36 Opponents hold, moreover, that a 
disparity in judicial quality would result, creating a caste 
system among judges and litigants alike in which the commer­
cial disputants and judges form the elite.37
Two other concerns are sometimes expressed. The first is 
that judges should be generalists, not specialists, so that their 
decisions can be informed by developments in all areas of the 
law. A second, related fear is that the law emerging from 
specialized commercial courts may depart from principles 
developed in analogous subject areas by the general courts.38
7.6 American Private International Law and Distinctions 
Based Upon International Character
The United States has no systematic codification of the rules 
generally associated with private international law. While
35 Id. at 1-2.
36 Id. at 2; R. Brandel, Increasing Cost Effective Justice: Are Business 
Courts the Answer? 6-9, paper presented to the Business Law Sec., 
ABA Annual Mtg. (Aug. 9, 1994) (hereinafter Cost Effective 
Justice).
37 Id. at 6-7.
38 See A Specialized Business Court for the State o f California 33-38 
(Preliminary Report of the Business Court Comm, of the Business 
Law Section of the State Bar of California (July 20, 1991)).
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various state and federal provisions address selected aspects of 
international litigation and arbitration, many important topics 
are treated primarily by judge-made law. In general, the 
relevant rules are not exclusive to international conflicts 
problems; often the rules developed in the sister-state context 
are pressed into service to address analogous international 
matters. In addition, except where federal law has unified the 
approach,39 the prevailing multi-jurisdictional model produces 
wide differences in the choice of law outcomes.
The failure to treat international cases as discrete in choice 
of law matters is only a general tendency. The FAA, for 
example, distinguishes domestic from non-domestic arbitral 
agreements and awards for purposes of implementing the New 
York and Panama Conventions. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has relied heavily on the supposed special needs of 
international commerce in expanding traders’ ability to select 
arbitral and judicial fora abroad. According to the Court, the 
ability of business entities to eliminate the uncertainties of 
potential litigation by fixing the site in advance “is an indis­
pensable element in international trade, commerce, and 
contracting.”40 This and related rationales have signaled 
enhanced party autonomy and expanded subject matter
39 Issues of foreign state immunity, for example, are governed by the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 
1441(d), 1602 et seq. (1988)(FSIA). Preemptive federal law, the 
FSIA is applicable in state and federal courts. Supreme Court case 
law has also brought partial unification to American private interna­
tional law; the law of personal jurisdiction is an example.
40 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972); see 
also Mitsubishi (1985); Scherk (1974); Asahi (1987).
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arbitrability; the result has been unprecedented legitimacy and 
vitality for international and domestic commercial arbitration.
The distinction between international disputes and others has 
not been the centerpiece of the Court’s more recent jurispru­
dence, however. Rather, it is merely one theme. The pro- 
arbitration inclination briefly reserved for international cases 
is now part of a broader endorsement of party autonomy given 
effect equally in domestic settings.41
As noted above, “international” disputes are also set apart 
in some states by special enactments addressed to international 
commercial disputes.42
7.7 Public Policy, Public Laws and Party Autonomy
Over two decades ago the Supreme Court began to speak ill of 
parochial restraints on party autonomy. It observed: “We 
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and interna­
tional waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws 
and resolved in our courts.”43 By then the federal antitrust
41 See, e.g., McMahon (1987)(claims under Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (SEA), 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a et seq. and under RICO arbitrable 
because no contrary expression of Congressional intent found). The 
McMahon Court extended Scherk (1974), which had held SEA 
claims to be arbitrable when arising in an international transaction. 
It reasoned that “[although the holding in [Scherk] was limited to 
international agreements, the competence of arbitral tribunals to 
resolve § 10(b) [SEA] claims is the same in both settings.” McMah­
on, 482 U.S. at 232.
42 For example, California’s 1988 Model Law enactment naturally 
adopts the Model Law definition of “international.” Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code § 1297.13 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
43 M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
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and securities laws had become well-established emblems of 
strong regulatory policy. Since then, federal regulation of com­
merce has remained vigorous, arguably increasing. Traditional 
market policy bulwarks such as the antitrust laws have been 
joined by newer statutes that similarly encourage private 
enforcement by authorizing claims for multiple damages and 
attorney’s fees.44 It can be legitimately questioned whether 
vigorous policing of trade can be reconciled with commercial 
actors’ increasing ability to dedicate all facets of their disputes 
to private adjudication. Expanded subject matter arbitrability, 
combined with the parties’ ability to choose their arbitrators 
and the governing law, may invite attempts to evade federal 
regulations. The obvious tension between party autonomy and 
regulatory interests persists, and courts have not fully recon­
ciled these competing aims. Neither has the Supreme Court 
attempted to harmonize what it has termed the “indispensable” 
practice of fixing fora in advance and the parties’ ability to 
choose applicable law with the need to enforce vigorously 
antitrust, anti-racketeering, and other such laws. The decisional 
centerpiece affecting the topic is Mitsubishi (1985).45
In Mitsubishi, the Court held that antitrust claims arising 
from an international contract could be submitted to arbitra­
tion. The case arose from a distributorship agreement between 
a Puerto Rican distributor and a Japanese supplier. The 
contract called for arbitration in Japan under the Rules of the 
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association and designated
44 RICO, for example, authorizes plaintiffs in a civil suit to recover 
attorneys’ fees. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1964 (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp.
1995).
45 473 U.S. 614.
194
Chapter 7: Selected Features of the American System
Swiss substantive law.46 Though the supplier’s policies
allegedly violated U.S. antitrust law, the Court declined to
assume that U.S. law would not be vindicated, despite the
choice of Swiss law. In dictum, however, it advised:
[I]n the event the choice-of-foram and choice-of-law 
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a 
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust 
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning 
the agreement as against public policy.47
Lower courts apparently have not viewed that language as a 
mandate to decline enforcement of otherwise valid arbitration 
clauses that designate foreign seats and foreign law, even where 
it is questionable whether federal statutory rights will be fully 
addressed. The expansive holding of Mitsubishi seemingly has 
been far more influential than some of the dicta that appears to 
qualify it.48 Indeed, opponents of comprehensive FAA reform 
cite the loss of Mitsubishi and other progressive cases as one 
of the costs of reform, as discussed in Chapter 9 (§9.3.2).
In Mitsubishi, the Court also stated that “[hjaving permitted 
the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United 
States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage 
to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the 
antitrust laws has been addressed.”49 Elaborating upon that
46 Id. at 637, n.19.
47 Id.
48 Cf. Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360-61 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (“In the absence of other considerations, the agreement to 
submit to arbitration or the jurisdiction of English courts must be 
enforced even if that agreement tacitly includes the forfeiture of 
some claims that could have been brought in a different forum”) 
cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 385 (1993). But see McCarthy v. Azure, 22 
F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 1994).
49 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
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reference to the New York Convention’s “public policy” 
exception, the Court observed that “it would not require 
intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance 
of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.”50 The 
“second look” concept implied in the foregoing language has 
attracted considerable academic commentary.51 It appears, 
however, that no awards involving statutory claims have been 
denied enforcement under it, although such a ruling is conceiv­
able.52
50 Id. at 638.
51 See, e.g., T. Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic 
Internationalism: Assessing the Folly o f  Mitsubishi, 19 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 263,297-98 (1986); W. Park, Private Adjudicators and 
the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope o f International Arbi­
tration, 12 Brook. J. Int’l L. 629 (1986).
52 Some courts are prone to couch implementation of Mitsubishi in 
admonitory terms. Consider, for example, the remarkable language 
of one district court in compelling London arbitration; the plaintiff 
had alleged that the defendant was using the disputed licensing 
agreement as anti-competitive device:
At oral argument, [defendant’s] counsel expressly represented that 
[plaintiffs] claims will be arbitrated pursuant to the substantive 
antitrust laws of the United States and that defendant consents to 
arbitration on that basis...The Court expressly refers [plaintiffs] 
claims to arbitration [on that basis]...As noted by [defendant’s] 
counsel at oral argument, the Court may, and certainly will, withdraw 
the reference to arbitration if U.S. antitrust law does not govern the 
substantive resolution of [plaintiffs] claims. In addition, the Court 
directs that any damages determination, or arbitral award, made by 
the arbitrators shall be determined according to the U.S. antitrust law 
irrespective of any conflict that may exist between those laws and the 
laws of England. Finally, the Court will retain jurisdiction over this 
matter in order to ensure that the arbitration directed by this Order 
is conducted in accordance with this Order.
PPG Indus, v. Pilkington, PLC, 825 F. Supp. 1465, 1483 (D. Ariz. 
1993). One may properly question whether the court exceeded its 
authority in deciding for a tribunal, not yet appointed, the law that 
would govern the merits of the dispute to be decided by that tribunal
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7.8 Multi-Jurisdictionalism
It is sometimes very inaccurate to speak of the “American 
position” on a particular issue related to commercial arbitration. 
As might be expected, substantive approaches to various issues 
differ from state to state. What may be surprising is the extent 
to which federal courts differ. There are thirteen “circuits” 
within the federal court system. Most circuits have appellate 
jurisdiction over several districts and draw appeals from 
districts in several states.53 U.S. Supreme Court decisions bind
in London. C f First Commercial Fin. Group, Inc. v. Baghdoian, 812 
F. Supp. 837 (N.D. 111. 1993) (suggesting that a tribunal’s failure to 
apply the Commodity Exchange Act would permit vacatur of the 
resulting award).
53 The following table lists the states and other units encompassed by 
each of the thirteen circuits.
First Circuit:
Second Circuit: 
Third Circuit:
Fourth Circuit:
Fifth Circuit: 
Sixth Circuit: 
Seventh Circuit: 
Eight Circuit:
Ninth Circuit:
Tenth Circuit:
Eleventh Circuit: 
D.C. Circuit: 
Federal Circuit:
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Puerto Rico 
Connecticut, New York, and Vermont 
Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the 
Virgin Islands
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
West Virginia
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas 
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee 
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin 
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands.
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, 
and Wyoming
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia 
Washington, D. C.
Washington, D. C.
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all inferior courts. Circuits are of equal authority, and absent 
Supreme Court guidance can adopt their own approaches to 
particular issues.
The Circuits have developed differing positions on the ele­
ments necessary to demonstrate waiver of the arbitration 
agreement, the availability of interim relief in aid of arbitration, 
the propriety of consolidating related arbitrations, the rate of 
interest to be borne by awards and, prior to the Supreme 
Court’s recent clarification of the matter, the power of arbitra­
tors to award punitive damages.54 Some of these splits are 
long-standing; the Supreme Court is not always quick to 
attempt unification of the law.55
Certain districts, and hence the circuits that serve them, 
encounter more commercial arbitration cases than other 
districts. Consequently, a particular circuit may have developed 
a clear position on a range of issues not dealt with elsewhere. 
For example, much litigation related to international commer­
cial arbitration is initiated within the district serving New York 
City. As a result, the Second Circuit has become a prodigious 
source of appellate decisional law related to commercial 
arbitration. The trend has been reinforced by the increasing
54 Mastrobuono (1995).
55 See, e.g., J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. 2182, 2183 
(1994)(0’Connor, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
[C]ourts in different jurisdictions reach contrary results with 
respect to the availability of punitive damages in cases involv­
ing similarly situated parties and identical arbitration agree­
ments. The Federal Arbitration Act was passed, in part, to 
prevent this kind of disarray. [T]he ability of arbitrators to 
award punitive damages in these circumstances is an important 
and recurring question of federal law. The state and federal 
courts have divided as to how this question should be answered;
I would therefore grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
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number of securities-related disputes being submitted to 
arbitration. Similarly, New York commercial law has become 
highly developed through the hundreds of state and federal 
cases expounding it.56
7.9 The Civil Jury
Another characteristic feature of the American system is the 
civil jury.57 In federal courts the right to a jury trial is assured 
“in actions at law” (as distinguished from those in equity) by 
the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.58 State 
constitutions contain analogous provisions applicable in state 
courts. One can reasonably doubt the wisdom of delegating to 
a lay jury factual questions arising in intricate and perplexing 
commercial matters.59 Indeed, some federal courts have found 
qualifications to the guarantee in highly technical cases and
56 Delaware occupies a similar position with respect to corporate law 
because of the high number of public entities incorporated there. The 
Delaware Chancery Court is therefore a leading exponent of 
principles governing the majority of larger U.S. companies.
57 In other legal systems, even those based upon the common law, the 
civil jury is little known in commercial cases.
58 U.S. Const, amend. VII, provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.
59 See generally P. Lansing and N. Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial in 
Complex Commercial Litigation: A Comparative Law Perspective, 
14 Loy. L.A. Inf 1 & Comp. L.J. 121 (1991).
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have refused to impanel a jury in such cases.60 Others remain 
convinced that the right to jury trial is not conditioned upon a 
requisite level of simplicity, believing—for better or 
worse—that even the most esoteric case must be submitted to 
the jury.61
The jury has a role under the FAA when a party seeks an 
order compelling arbitration. Generally, however, the issue 
dedicated to the jury, viz., whether or not the requisite agree­
ment to arbitrate exists, is not complex. According to Section 
4, the right to demand jury trial belongs to “the party alleged 
to be in default” under the agreement to arbitrate.62 However, 
if the jury process could be initiated by demand alone, a 
convenient and effective method of delaying enforcement of an 
arbitration clause would be available to every party resisting 
arbitration. Consequently, courts have declined to respond to 
“naked” demands for a jury trial.63 Rather, the burden is upon 
the party requesting a jury trial to establish that the arbitration 
agreement is “in issue,”64 that is, to make “at least some 
showing that under prevailing law, [the resisting party] would 
be relieved of his contractual obligation to arbitrate if his 
allegations proved to be true [and] must produce at least some
60 See, e.g., Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that jury trials 
may be denied in cases that are so exceptionally complex as to 
preclude rational decision-making by a jury with a reasonable 
understanding of the evidence and controlling law).
61 See, e.g., United States Fin. Securities Litig. v. Bache and Co., 609 
F.2d 411, 418 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the Seventh Amendment 
right is not dependent upon the abilities and limitations of juries).
62 FAA, § 4.
63 Par-Knit Mills, Inc., v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 55 (3d 
Cir. 1980).
64 Bhatia v. Johnson, 818 F.2d 418, 422 (5th Cir. 1987).
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evidence to substantiate his factual allegations.”65
Jury trial is not available in admiralty cases;66 nor are the 
jury trial provisions of the FAA preemptive.67
7.10 Advocacy Style and Other Elements of Legal Culture
Arbitral proceedings are invariably affected by the legal culture 
of the lawyers involved—those representing the parties and 
those forming the tribunal. The flexibility that characterizes 
arbitration allows participants in the process to replicate the 
familiar. This may explain why arbitration is sometimes 
criticized for being too much like litigation. Such criticism 
aside, the melange of styles that may be evident in a particular 
international arbitration makes for innumerable variations and 
intriguing comparisons.68
To the extent that proceedings are shaped by American
65 Dillard v. Merrill Lynch e ta l., 961 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1992). 
Id. At least one court has found that jury trial is available where the 
demanding party seeks a stay of arbitration. PMC, Inc. v. Atomergic 
Chemetals Corp., 844 F. Supp. 177, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Where 
a request for a jury trial is denied, that decision may be the subject 
of appeal after the arbitration is completed. In re American Marine 
Holding Co., 14 F.3d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Republic of 
Nicar. v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, 
denied, 503 U.S. 919 (1992); Saturday Evening Post Co. v. 
Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1987).
66 FAA, § 4.
67 See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp., No. 
S050952 (Cal. S. Ct., Dec. 12, 1996) (FAA jury provisions not 
applicable in California courts).
68 See A. Lowenfeld, The Two-Way Mirror: International Arbitration 
as Comparative Procedure, (1985) Mich. Y.B. Int’l Legal Stud. 163.
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lawyers, several attitudes and preferences may be manifest. The 
oral tradition, for example, transmitted through English roots, 
is well ingrained in the American legal culture. It is thus a rare 
American lawyer who would comfortably waive the hearing 
and rely solely upon documentary submissions. The preference 
no doubt results from notions of what zealous advocacy entails, 
from habit and from a sense that “due process” requires a 
hearing.69
Aspects of pre-hearing proceedings also occasionally bear a 
distinctive American mark. Arbitrators trained outside of the 
United States sometimes are taken aback by an American advo­
cate’s summary judgment motion, a maneuver borrowed from 
litigation and designed to dispose of all or part of the claim, 
often at a preliminary juncture.70
A feature of American litigation that typically is absent in 
arbitration is wide-ranging discovery. Few legal systems—even 
those based upon the common law—confer upon the parties 
such broad rights ofpre-trial investigation in the furtherance of 
a pending lawsuit. In general, using various methods,71 the 
parties may pursue discovery with each other as to any matter
69 Nonetheless, parties to an arbitration agreement are entitled to waive 
an oral hearing. Indeed, vacatur is not axiomatic where the tribunal 
conducts aspects of the proceeding on a documents-only basis over 
the objection of a party. See Intercarbon Ltd. v. Caldex Trading, 146 
F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (arbitrator’s determination of certain 
contract issues without live testimony, over the protest of a party, 
reasonable under the circumstances).
70 See generally, M. Hoellering, Dispositive Motions in Arbitration 1(1) 
ADR Currents 1 (1996) (recent American case law confirms arbitral 
discretion to entertain such motions, provided a fair opportunity is 
given for the responding party to present its case).
71 E.g.,written interrogatories among parties, depositions, and requests 
for production of documents.
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which pertains to the lawsuit, provided it is relevant and non­
privileged. American litigators, accustomed to a discovery 
process that may entail years for a single case, sometimes 
question whether the restricted inquiry of arbitration is able to 
capture a true sense of either party’s case. This and related 
apprehensions sometimes give rise to unexpected opposition to 
arbitration clauses during contract negotiation. The same 
sentiments may subsequently fuel attempts to disavow a clause 
once a dispute has arisen.
The degree to which tribunal members are inclined to pursue 
various aspects of inquiry is also derived from legal culture. 
The division of labor established in American litigation places 
the burden of developing the evidence and legal theories upon 
the parties. The American bench is thus generally less involved 
in these activities than its civil law counterpart and anecdotal 
accounts suggest that this is often true in arbitral settings as 
well.
Given the deep attachment to litigation maintained by some 
members of the American bar, it is ironic that familiarity with 
ADR is itself coming to distinguish American legal culture. It 
is no longer a novel law firm that maintains an ADR depart­
ment or specializes in ADR. Legal education contributes to this 
trend as most U.S. law schools offer ADR courses72 and regu­
larly feature related topics in the journals they publish.73
Similarly, some form of court-annexed arbitration or media­
tion is now a standard feature of first instance courts. The 
allure of ADR has been widely felt; federal agencies and the
72 C. Fazzi, Schools Awaken to ADR, Disp. Resol. Times, Summer 
1994, at 1.
73 E.g., J. Disp. Resol.; Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol.
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Department of Justice have recently embraced it.74 In sum, the 
American legal profession increasingly is comprised of 
members who have had regular exposure to alternatives to 
litigation. Whether these influences translate into predictable 
adroitness in international commercial dispute resolution is, of 
course, a separate question.75
If pervasive exposure to “ADR” is one influence on Ameri­
can legal culture, technology is another. The on-line world is 
second nature to most persons called to an American bar during 
the last five years. Law students today expect to communicate 
with their professors via e-mail and receive assignments on the 
professor’s web page. They perform research using compre­
74 R. McMillion, Growing Acceptance for ADR, A.B.A. J. 106 (May
1996).
75 Moreover, while ADR users often voice satisfaction, the ADR move­
ment has by no means persuaded everyone. See, e.g., S. Paltrow, An 
Arbitrary Process? Most Disputes Between Investors and Brokerages 
Go to Arbitration. But Skeptics See Signs That the Arbitrator’s Links 
to Wall Street—Not the Evidence—Are Dictating the Results, L.A. 
Times, July 16, 1995, at Dl; cf. R. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns 
Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., August 1996, 55, 57 (arbitration losing favor 
as mediation becomes more popular).
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hensive law data bases and the internet. They take lecture notes 
and answer exam questions using computers.76
It follows that American counsel will increasingly carry into 
the international dispute resolution arena reasonable comfort 
with high-tech proceedings, and perhaps unwarranted enthusi­
asm for high-tech trappings.77 There may also be a sense of 
disquiet on their parts when either the client, their learned 
adversary, or the tribunal, wishes to proceed in more tradition­
al, less technology-intensive ways.
7.11 Arbitrator Independence and Partiality
It is common for international arbitrations to proceed using a 
three-person tribunal. Often, each party chooses one arbitrator; 
the two party-appointed arbitrators, or sometimes an institution, 
in turn choose the third. Whether party-appointed arbitrators 
should be subject to different standards of conduct than the 
presiding (third) arbitrator has been the subject of ongoing 
discussion. The international standard, typified by the 
UNCITRAL Rules, is in general quite clear. “[A]ny arbitrator
76 For their parts, law schools struggle to keep pace. For those leading 
the way, this means not only curricula additions such “Computer 
Law” and “Electronic Commercial Law” but also infrastructure 
development designed to accommodate advances barely visible on 
the horizon. See generally Building the High-Tech Law School, The 
Law Sch. Mag. 121 (Autumn 1997).
In a similar fashion (and subject to the same kinds of financial 
considerations) the American justice system is incorporating 
technology into the courtroom. See M. Rosenbaum, Courting 
Technology, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 112.
77 Cf. McElhaney at 74 (cautioning against undue use of technology).
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may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or inde­
pendence.”78 Yet, the AAA-ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitra­
tors in Commercial Disputes (1977) recognizes “non-neutral” 
party-appointed arbitrators as a discrete category; they are 
expected to adhere to some, but not all, of the standards 
applicable to “neutral” arbitrators.
The AAA-ABA approach reflects the practice developed in 
the United States for some domestic commercial arbitrations.79 
Adding to the confusion, treatment of the issue within the FAA 
is indirect, subject to differing interpretations, and arguably 
diverges from state statutes on the question.80 Because Ameri­
78 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 10.1. Accord IBA, Ethics for International 
Arbitrators, Arts. 2.1, 3.1. Similarly, an ICC arbitrator at the time of 
appointment signs a declaration that he or she “is independent of 
each of the parties and intends to remain so.” E. Schwartz, The 
Rights and Duties o f ICC Arbitrators, in The Status o f the Arbitrator 
67 (ICC Special Supp. 1995) (quoting Standard Form of Arbitrator’s 
Declaration of Acceptance and Statement of Independence).
79 Robert Coulson, then-President of the American Arbitration Associa­
tion, explained the position as follows:
The AAA-ABA Code reflects a pragmatic approach. It is 
known that in the United States some party-appointed arbitra­
tors are expected to favor their appointing party’s point of view. 
They are not strictly neutral. . . Some systems of arbitration in 
the United States assume that party appointed arbitrators serve 
as advocates during the arbitrators’ deliberations, making 
certain that their party’s point of view is fairly understood by 
the neutral arbitrator.
Coulson at 107. See generally Carter.
80 FAA § 10(b) allows an award to be vacated “[w]here there was 
evident partiality . . .  in the arbitrators or either of them.” The 
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) upon which many state arbitration 
laws are based refers to evident partiality “by an arbitrator appointed 
as a neutral” thus acknowledging a non-neutral status; UAA § 12; 
accord N.Y. Civ. Practice L & R § 751 l(b)(l)(ii).
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can commercial arbitration practices are not uniform, pre­
arbitration clarification of the applicable standard is essential. 
Neither the arbitrators nor the parties should labor under a 
misunderstanding; the AAA-ABA Code stresses as much.81
Of course, the perceived risk that arbitrators will embrace 
inappropriate roles and attitudes ought not to be exaggerated. 
Among mitigating elements is a decisional trend toward 
heightening the standard applicable to party-appointed arbitra­
tors in domestic cases; the expected posture is “a more neutral 
and less partisan position that is more closely aligned to the 
international standard.”82 Additionally, multiple texts now 
incorporate the international standard; unwitting transgression 
by appointees is therefore less likely to occur,83 especially 
given that institutions often call attention to the standard at the 
time an appointee is nominated. Indeed, even the AAA-ABA 
Code, a 1977 formulation, is not without caveats. It cautions:
It should be noted that in cases where the arbitration is 
conducted outside the United States, the applicable law 
may require that all arbitrators be neutral. Accordingly, 
in such cases the governing law should be considered 
before applying any of the following provisions relating
81 Introductory note to Canon VII, AAA-ABA Code of Ethics for 
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1977).
82 M. Hoellering, The Independence of Party Appointees, in ARBITRA­
TION AND THE L a w  1992-93, at 26, 28 (1993).
83 The American Bar Association House of Delegates in November of 
1989 adopted a resolution calling for an amendment to the AAA- 
ABA Code which provides that “unless otherwise agreed party- 
appointed arbitrators in international commercial arbitrations should, 
to the extent practicable in the circumstances, serve as neutrals.” In 
addition, the AAA International Rules (eff. April 11, 1997) replicate 
the UNCITRAL standard by allowing an arbitrator to be challenged 
“whenever circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as 
to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.” Id. at Art. 8.1.
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to non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators.84
Related questions are raised by the practice of interviewing 
potential arbitrators. In the United States, it is considered 
acceptable to conduct a pre-appointment conversation to 
determine whether the candidate has the qualifications neces­
sary to fulfill his or her mission. Thus, it would not be 
inappropriate to ask about, for example, the number and type 
of prior arbitrations undertaken by the person, his or her 
experience in particular areas of law and commerce and 
whether any existing obligations will prevent concentrated 
attention being devoted to the proceeding. On the other hand, 
under the international standard it would be improper to 
discuss the merits of the case beyond perhaps describing its 
general nature. It would thus be wholly unacceptable for a 
party to attempt to secure any understanding that would call 
into question the arbitrator’s independence.85
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, 10 and 11 below, any 
new statute devoted to international disputes should address 
pre-appointment interviews and other forms of ex parte
84 Yet, by negative inference, this language implies there is a dual 
standard for intra-U.S. arbitration.
85 The details of such a meeting vary widely in practice. It is usual, but 
not essential, that the meeting be held face-to-face, at the candidate’s 
office. The interviewing lawyer, who may be accompanied by the 
party, expects to gain a better sense of the candidate’s demeanor, 
abilities in the languages relevant to the arbitration, and of whether 
the candidate possesses special qualifications germane to the dispute. 
Concurrently, the prospective arbitrator usually attempts to assess the 
time commitment involved in the assignment, his or her competency 
given the subject matter and any conflicts of interest that are readily 
apparent. Some arbitrators decline to be interviewed beyond, 
perhaps, referring interested parties to a source for securing the 
candidate’s resume.
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interaction.
7.12 Punitive Damages
American law recognizes an aggrieved party’s right in some 
circumstances to receive a measure of damages in addition to 
that designed to compensate.86 Although generally confined to 
tort cases, punitive damages are sometimes awarded in com­
mercial cases to recognize particularly reprehensible conduct 
by the defendant.87 The amount awarded is often a multiple 
of the compensatory measure. Another species of punitive 
damages is that authorized by statute in an effort to strengthen 
enforcement of certain federal public laws, such as those 
addressing antitrust, racketeering, and securities fraud. Certain 
state statutes may also instruct courts to award multiple damag-
86 See generally R. Blatt et al., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A St a t e -B y -
St a te  G u id e  t o  La w  a n d  P r a c t ic e  (1991).
87 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713,
715 (7th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (arbitrators
awarded $400,000 in punitive damages in addition to approximately 
$150,000 in compensation; plaintiffs had alleged unauthorized trading, 
margin exposure and churning, activities which allegedly violated state 
and federal consumer protection laws).
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es.88 Neither form of punitive measure is prevalent in other 
countries in commercial cases.89
Whether arbitrators proceeding in an American jurisdiction 
have the authority to award punitive damages of either variety 
depends upon the arbitration clause and whether the FAA 
governs the arbitration.90 Prior to Mastrobuono (1995),91 
American courts were dramatically split on whether an arbitra­
tor conducting a proceeding governed by the FAA could award 
such damages. New York law prohibited the remedy in 
arbitration, reflecting the view that punitive damages are 
assessed to advance a public concern and as such are only for 
the judiciary to mete out.92 Many federal courts were enforc­
ing that limitation where the parties had chosen New York or 
an equivalent law to govern the underlying contract.93
88 See, e.g., Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1979) (applying Texas Deceptive Trade Practice - Consumer 
Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(a) (West 
1991)).
89 Cf J. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages in International 
Commercial Arbitrations in the Wake of  Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc, 38 Harv. Int’l Law J. 59, 61-64 (1997)(While 
known in common law jurisdictions, typically punitive damages are 
awarded in tort actions). In the United States, it is recognized that 
there are constitutional limits on a court’s ability to award punitive 
damages. The limits, which derive primarily from the due process 
clauses of the U.S. Constitution, have only been sketched by the 
Court. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 64 U.S.L.W. 4335 (U.S. May 
20, 1996) (Punitive award that was 500 times greater than the 
compensatory amount was grossly excessive when viewed in context; 
Court outlined a three-part test).
90 See generally A. Farnsworth, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, 20 
Stetson L. Rev. 395 (1991).
91 115 S. Ct. at 1212.
92 See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
93 See, e.g., Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716-17, rev’d, 115 S. Ct. 1212.
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In Mastrobuono, the underlying contract contained separate 
choice-of-law and arbitration provisions stating respectively 
that the entire agreement “shall be governed by the laws of the 
state of New York,” and that “any controversy” arising out of 
the parties’ transactions “shall be settled by arbitration.” It 
designated procedural rules that did not preclude an award of 
punitive damages. The Court held that choice of New York 
law to govern the parties’ rights and duties under the contract 
did not unambiguously imply that the parties also desired New 
York’s limitation on punitive damages to govern. It reiterated 
that the FAA’s main aim is to ensure enforcement of the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate according to its terms, a theme 
developed in the Court’s Volt decision.94 The arbitration 
provision was free-standing and contained no limitation on 
remedies. Thus, the award of punitive damages giving rise to 
the appeal should have been confirmed below.
The Court by implication established that under the FAA, 
arbitrators may award punitive damages where the parties have 
not precluded them from doing so. As such, the decision is 
consistent with the courts several earlier rulings recognizing 
arbitrator competency and declining to confer upon arbitration 
a secondary status relative to judicial dispute settlement. 
Whether as a matter of policy punitive damages should be 
readily available in international arbitration is a question 
treated in Chapter 11 (§11.13).
94 In contradistinction to Volt, however, the Court was assertive in 
construing the pivotal contract language.
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7.13 The Costs of Settling Disputes—Attorneys’ Fees
The total cost of conducting an arbitration in the United States 
and whether that compares favorably with another jurisdiction 
will depend upon a number of variables. The venue of the 
arbitration is one important factor; room and board and similar 
costs vary greatly among American cities. The strength of the 
dollar against other currencies naturally will play a role, as 
will the number of arbitrators, lawyers and specialists in­
volved.
Attorneys’ fees often form the bulk of the tangible costs 
incurred in bringing an end to a commercial dispute. Given the 
cost of succeeding in American litigation, some non-American 
observers find it surprising that ordinarily each party pays its 
own legal fees. That rule is often adopted by arbitrators as 
well as judges. It is therefore not every award that grants the 
victorious party a sum representing its attorneys fees.
The U.S. practice stands in marked contrast to the traditional 
English rule under which, generally, “costs follow the 
event.”95 The American Rule, of course, does carry excep­
tions. Attorneys’ fees may be recovered, for example, where 
a statute so authorizes,96 or where the parties have so agreed 
in the underlying contact,97 or where the losing party has been
95 See Mustill & Boyd at 25-26; H. Kritzer, Legal Fees A.B.A. J., Nov. 
1992, at 55; M. Coffino and M. Wolff, The “English Rule”: Alive 
and Well in the U.S.A., 6(2) Cal. Int’l Pract. 26 (1995).
96 Many such enactments exist. Examples are the antitrust laws, 15 
U.S.C. § 15 (1988); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(b) (1988); and the Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) 
(1988). See D. Laycock, M o d er n  A m e r ic a n  Re m e d ie s  849 (2d ed. 
1994) (hereinafter Laycock).
97 Laycock, supra note 96 at 847.
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demonstrably deleterious or has otherwise acted in bad faith.98 
This latter exception may be fulfilled through a request for 
sanctions under Federal Rule l l , 99 or a state analogue.100
Chapter 11 (§ 11.19), suggests that arbitral discretion, not 
the American Rule, should by statute govern awards of costs 
in international arbitrations seated in the United States.
98 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 
(1975).
99 Under Rule 11, federal courts may penalize parties for submissions 
that are ill-founded or motivated by an improper purpose, including 
unwarranted resistance to an arbitration clause or award. See Widell 
v. Wolf and Wolf Indus., 43 F.3d 1150, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1994)(“a 
thinly disguised attempt to reargue the merits of the claim” by 
invoking, despite contrary precedent, the ‘public policy’ defense to 
enforcement of the award); See generally AAA Sanctions for Frivo­
lous Arbitration—Related Actions, in LAWYERS’ ARBITRATION 
L e t t e r s  1980-1989 243 (1990).
100 See, e.g., W. Rylaarsdam, Discouraging Frivolous Claims, Cal. Bar 
J. 26 (March 1996) (discussing Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 128.7, eff. Jan. 
1, 1995).
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8.1 Introduction
As a preface to the remainder of this monograph, and 
drawing upon Chapter 7 above, this chapter collects a series of 
deficiencies associated with the FAA, especially as it serves in 
relation to international commercial disputes. A selective 
cataloging, the chapter aims to present illustrative FAA 
shortcomings under general and inevitably overlapping headings, 
to illuminate characteristics a more suitable statutory framework 
might display. The examples given are attributable primarily to 
the FAA’s non-comprehensive and minimally preemptive
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character, the resulting disintegration of governing law and 
associated influence of state law. Tables 1 and 2 supplement the 
discussion. Chapter 9 (Perspectives and Goals) in turn will shed 
further light (indirectly) upon how, in the abstract, the FAA 
departs from the ideal.
8.2 A Brief History of the FAA1
With President Calvin Coolidge’s signature, on February 1, 
1926, the United States Arbitration Act passed into law;2 it later 
came to be known as the Federal Arbitration Act and was 
codified as Title 9 of the United States Code.3 The text enacted 
in 1926 varied little from the 1923 Bill sponsored by the 
American Bar Association (ABA), thus causing Macneil to refer 
to Congress’ function as that of “rubber stamping” the ABA’s 
proffer.4 The ABA’s efforts in turn can be traced to 1920, when 
its Commerce, Trade, Commercial Law Committee began to 
explore the feasibility of replicating on a national basis statutory
1 See generally J. Cohen and K. Dayton, The New Federal 
Arbitration Act, 12 Virg. L. Rev. 265 (1926)(hereinafter Cohen & 
Dayton); L. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: the 
Federalization o f Arbitration Law, 71 Virg. L. Rev. 1305 (1985) 
(hereinafter Hirshman); Macneil (passim).
2 Pub. L. 401, 68th Congress.
3 9 USC §§ 1-14.
4 Macneil at 107-08.
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coverage of arbitration of the kind inaugurated by New York a 
few months earlier.5 By 1926, the ABA draft had evolved 
somewhat, and its sponsors could point not only to new statutes 
in New Jersey, Massachusetts and Oregon6 but to the support of 
dozens of private organizations and the Department of 
Commerce,7 offset by no serious opposition.8
The FAA’s main feature was that it reversed the rule of 
revocability which at common law sometimes allowed pre­
dispute promises to arbitrate to go unenforced. Because it treated 
also judicial appointment of arbitrators, specific enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate, arbitral subpoena power, and the 
enforcement and vacatur of awards, it was considered—as of 
1926-to be a virtually complete statute.9 It was also, however, 
well understood to be “procedural” and thus applicable only in 
federal courts;10 accordingly, based upon the FAA’s legislative 
history, subsequent Supreme Court cases11 giving it a substantive, 
preemptive character could not have been readily predicted in
1926.12 As noted in Chapters 5 and 7, additional Supreme Court
5 Macneil at 85-91.
6 Cohen and Dayton, supra, at 266.
7 Cohen and Dayton at 285.
8 Macneil at 92-97 and note 6 (Ch. 8).
9 Macneil at 102.
10 Macneil at 97-98, 111-114.
11 Notably, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
12 See Chapter 7, § 7.3.
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decisions interpreting the FAA amplified greatly subject matter 
arbitrability,13 nurtured the parties’ autonomy14 and propounded 
rules of construction for arbitration clauses which ensured (with 
one important exception)15 the broadest of arbitral submissions 
(thus promoting relatively complete docket clearing when an 
arbitration agreement was found to exist).16
In 197017 and 199018 respectively, Congress added to the FAA 
Chapters Two and Three, each designed to induct conventions 
into American law. Chapter Two implemented the New York 
Convention, Chapter Three-the Panama (Inter-American) 
Convention. Twa piecemeal amendments were made in 1988, 
one to limit the Act of State Doctrine (§ 15) and the other to allow 
appeals in actions to enforce arbitration agreements (§16).
8.3 Tell-Tale Signs O f Age
It perhaps begs a fundamental question to suggest that because 
the FAA is old, it is deficient; after all, the same can be said in 
even greater measure of the U.S. Constitution and the Ten
13 See § 7.6 and note 41 therein.
14 See§§ 5.5.2.; 7.7.
15 Concerning the Court’s Kaplan decision, see § 5.5.2, note 23.
16 See § 5.5.2.
17 84 Stat. 692.
18 104 Stat. 448.
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Commandments. Nonetheless, it seems plausible to suggest that 
choice of arbitral forum may be influenced by such cosmetic 
matters as age. Moreover, from a purely academic or 
comparative standpoint, the FAA’s age has become one of its 
defining traits, distinguishing it, for example, from the leading 
arbitral venues in Europe, the arbitral statutes of which have been 
fundamentally reworked within the last two decades.
The FAA’s pre-World War II vintage is evident from a perusal 
of its first chapter in which one encounters an exclusion for 
contracts made prior to January 1, 1926,19 a choice of law 
directive referring to federal contempt procedures existing “on 
February 12, 1925” and an insistence upon jury trial,20 a 
constitutionally unnecessary procedure21 reminiscent of an era 
when courts were relatively uncrowded. In addition, a measure 
of archaic phrasing punctuates FAA Chapter One throughout.
8.4 The FAA’s Fragmentary Character
Perhaps the predominant factor that contributes to the FAA’s
19 FAA § 14.
20 FAA § 4.
21 See J. Becker, Fixing the Federal Arbitration Act by Millennium, 8 
Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 75, 80 (1997) (relying on Chauffeurs & Teamsters 
Local No.391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 566 (1990)).
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unsuitability as a curial law is it’s failure to address many of the 
questions that arise regularly in international arbitration. That 
failing is particularly apparent when the FAA’s coverage is 
compared to that of statutes to be found in other jurisdictions or 
even to the UNCITRAL Model Law,22 which itself is far from 
exhaustive.23 In particular, one looks in vain within the FAA for 
express confirmation of various arbitrator powers24 and duties. 
The present FAA touches these questions only indirectly and 
imperfectly, by setting forth a general list of grounds upon which 
a court can vacate an award.25 It also leaves unaddressed certain 
questions about court assistance to arbitration.26
22 Table One compares the FAA’s express treatment of subjects to that 
of the Model Law. It demonstrates numerous topics and doctrines 
concerning which the FAA is silent. Many of the questions not 
addressed by the FAA, however, are considered by case law and often 
are settled by modem rules texts; the latter are important substitutes 
for a comprehensive statute and are viable as such because of the 
generous party autonomy that prevails under the FAA.
23 Table Two presents a schedule of topics considered by certain 
recently adopted statutes or texts but not by the Model Law, 
demonstrating more fully the chasm between FAA guidance and that 
given by other formulations. An introduction to the Table explains its 
purpose more fully.
24 There is one notable exception. FAA §7 gives arbitrators subpoena 
power.
25 FAA §10.
26 These include to what extent may a court render provisional relief 
in aid of international arbitration and upon what basis may a court 
consolidate related arbitrations. To its credit, the FAA does empower 
courts to make appointments of arbitrators when needed. See FAA § 5.
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The FAA’s selectivity makes it unhelpful in numerous 
contexts. Consider, for example, the plight of a non-American 
candidate for party-appointment respecting an ad hoc arbitration 
in which no agreement has been reached concerning arbitrator 
impartiality. If in advance of an interview to discuss the 
appointment the candidate consults the FAA, no positive 
statement of principle will be found; she is informed only that an 
award may be vacated “[w]here there was evident partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.”27
If the potential appointment contemplates, e.g., New York 
arbitration, the candidate—in a further effort to confirm the 
expectations of all concerned—might also consult the New York 
state arbitration statute, which again contains no direct statement 
of the controlling standard, but allows vacatur for “partiality of 
an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;”28 that, of course, begs the 
essential question. Under such circumstances, prudence will 
counsel that the interviewee structure her contact with the party 
so as to preserve neutrality, though the textual reason for doing 
so is far more murky and subtle than it ought to be given the 
importance of the question.29 In other countries, moreover, one
27 FAA § 10(b).
28 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R., art. 751 l(b)(l)(ii).
29 The attenuated chain of deductions seems to be as follows: As the 
arbitration will have a nexus with interstate commerce, the FAA will 
apply. The latter makes no distinction among arbitrators when
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can readily ascertain that independence and impartiality are 
required of all arbitrators.30 This problem was broached in § 7.11 
and is addressed again below in § 8.10[1].
Once appointed, that same arbitrator may encounter numerous 
other FAA lacunae. The FAA fails, for instance, to confirm the 
tribunal’s power to assess its own jurisdiction, to grant interim 
measures, to render partial awards, to depart from the lex forVs 
conflicts rules and rules of evidence, to appoint experts, to 
deviate from legal rates of interest, to award costs, and to make 
awards in multiple currencies. Similarly, despite what that 
arbitrator may have assumed from her familiarity with other 
jurisdictions, there may occur good faith questions about the 
limits upon the tribunal’s remedial creativity—that is, the 
tribunal’s power to act ex aequo et bono.31
A byproduct of the FAA’s present lack of ambition is a natural 
dependence upon federal and state case law and state arbitration
authorizing vacatur for evident partiality, apparently holding all 
arbitrators to the same high standard. Therefore, either because the 
FAA pre-empts the New York statute in the absence of a contrary 
party agreement or because the stricter standard is the safer one to 
follow, one should test fitness to serve and comportment in general 
against impartiality.
30 See, e.g., Arbitration Act 1996 (England & Wales) § 33(1) (a) 
(tribunal to “act fairly and impartially”) and id. § 24 (1) (a) (court may 
be petitioned to remove arbitrator where circumstances raise are 
“justifiable doubts as to his impartiality”).
31 For further discussion, see § 12.12.4.
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statutes. These supplemental sources, however, have not been 
unified, presenting, rather, a diffuse array of sometimes- 
conflicting approaches. The next section revisits this theme.
8.5 The Diffuseness of American Lex Arbitri
Given the complications engendered by state law and the 
multi-jurisdictionalism noted in Chapter 7 (§ 7.8), an attempt to 
ascertain the arbitration law that applies to a proceeding seated 
in the United States requires a sifting of federal case law (which 
differs among the circuits), a preemption analysis (because the 
issue in question may be addressed exclusively by federal law), 
and, perhaps, a study of state statutes and state case law. These 
complications were elaborated upon in Chapter 7 (§§ 7.3,7.7.4). 
If it can be said that consolidated presentation is one ingredient 
of a desirable legal framework—a suggestion made again in 
Chapter 9 (§ 9. 4.2)—it is abundantly clear that the American 
regime is missing something.
The regime’s diffuseness is evident even within basic FAA 
application, as one discovers in pursuing the essential question of 
arbitration agreement existence and enforcement. The studious 
lawyer will find that the Supreme Court has advised lower 
federal courts to apply state rules of contract formation but that 
this dictum has not prevented federal courts from composing
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differing federal rules of waiver and from episodically applying 
“federal common law of formation” to putative international 
arbitration agreements.32
Similarly, for want of a clearly controlling single text, counsel 
often must consider both state and federal law in relation not only 
to those FAA lacunae mentioned in § 8.4 but also to such matters 
as the propriety of consolidating related arbitrations,33 whether 
statute of limitation questions affecting an arbitral claim are for 
a court or the arbitrators to determine, the appropriate rate of 
compensatory and moratory interest, when attorneys’ fees can be 
allocated, and (in some jurisdictions) the question of whether the 
tribunal has manifestly disregarded the law.34 As to the 
aforementioned, state and federal approaches may differ widely.
Collateral but potentially distracting matters may also give 
participants pause. In particular, a lawyer not licensed to practice 
in the state where the arbitration takes place may legitimately
32 Cf Filanto S.P.A v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 
(S.D. N.Y. 1992). Despite a one-time invocation of the contra 
proferentem doctrine by the Court, on the question of the scope of the 
agreement to arbitrate the general rule reiterated by the Court is that 
doubts are to be resolved in favor of broad submissions (except for 
questions of jurisdiction).
33 See New England Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 
39 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying Massachusetts law in contrast to the 
prevailing view).
34 Manifest disregard is a federal common law concept but its 
application often involves an assessment of a state law alleged to have 
been disregarded.
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wonder if he is in violation of local practice limitations; so too 
may the arbitrators for that proceeding ponder if they will be 
immune from suit, should their award meet with displeasure.35
Where there is a colorable argument that the parties have 
designated state law of arbitration, the range of potential state 
law influences upon the process would be expanded, but not to 
a precisely definable extent. This notion is further developed in 
the next section.
8.6 The FAA’s Uncertain Relationship to State Law and 
State Procedure
As more fully discussed in Chapter 7 (§§ 7.3-7.4), the FAA 
and case law developed under it co-exists with one or more state 
statutory regimes covering commercial arbitration. Even for 
specialists, the identification of the governing arbitration 
provision may be challenging. FAA § 2 (which validates written 
arbitration agreements) is clearly preemptive. As to other FAA 
provisions, one is left to speculate36 or depend upon lower court
35 For a discussion of practice restrictions, see § 12.20 and concerning 
immunity see § 12.17. It will be recalled than in Volt a standard 
choice of law reference in a construction contract—viz, that the law of 
the place of the project should govern the contract—was interpreted to 
be a choice of the state arbitration law of that place, which differed 
materially from the FAA.
36Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question, it is, for 
example, difficult to imagine that FAA §10 (grounds for vacatur) is not
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decisions;37 such precedent remains disorderly concerning 
seemingly fundamental issues, such as whether the New York 
Convention must be observed in state courts.38 In addition, Volt 
(1989), though perhaps narrowed by Mastrobuono (1995), allows 
state courts to interpret standard choice of law designations to 
include state arbitration law. Under the Court’s present view, 
any preemptiveness in the FAA is subject to the parties’ will, so 
that a deemed designation of state law can expose the arbitration 
to a regime that may be somewhat less solicitous to arbitration 
than the FAA or—in those states having international arbitration 
statutes—possibly to a regime replicating the prevailing 
international standard. In either case, unpredictability reigns, in
preemptive. A state statute that made awards subject to vacatur on non- 
FAA grounds including that the agreement to arbitrate lacked certain non- 
FAA formalities could not withstand scrutiny (see Chapter 7, §§ 7.3). It is 
less clear that a state court’s every expanding of the basic FAA grounds 
would be precluded by preemption; additionally, much would depend 
upon whether the parties had indicated a willingness to allow expanded 
review or the application of state arbitration law.
37 The FAA’s jury provisions, for example, are not preemptive 
according to at least one court. Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial 
Securities Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 875 (Cal. 1996).
38 See McDermott Int’l v. Lloyds Underwirters of London, 944 F.2d 
1199 (5th Cir.), reh ’g  en banc denied, 947 F. 2d 1489 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(state courts do not necessarily have to stay litigation or compel 
arbitration under the Convention”). The better view is that expressed 
in decisions such as David L.Threlkeld & Co., Inc v. Metallgesell- 
schaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1991) (Convention and FAA 
preempt Vermont statute requiring that each party sign arbitration 
agreement).
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part because the Court has not unified the construction of choice 
of law clauses.
Given the foregoing, counsel and arbitrators alike may 
entertain serious doubts about the role of state law in the 
arbitration in which they are jointly involved. So too may the 
courts called upon to resolve the doubts raised.
8.7 The FAA’s Failure To Treat International Disputes and 
Consumer Contracts Discretely
From the standpoint of the international practitioner, much of 
the ambiguity in precedent which besets American arbitration law 
and practice results from arbitration’s wide appeal throughout 
diverse commercial sectors. Securities arbitration follows one 
pattern, construction arbitration another and labor arbitration still 
another. By contrast, arguably, less variation typifies 
international commercial arbitration. Indeed, as the 21st Century 
dawns, the available rule texts would suggest considerable 
homogeneity; these familiar international patterns are in some 
ways quite distinct from many of those evident in domestic 
commercial practice.
Among American domestic practices which depart from their 
international analogs are the presumption that arbitrators may act
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ex aequo et bono without express authorization,39 the preference 
for unreasoned awards,40 the expectation in some industries that 
party-appointed arbitrators may have ex parte contact with a 
party and may act as advocates during deliberations, the notion 
that counsel of record can issue subpoenas; the relative 
infrequency with which arbitrators must confront foreign law 
(and potential conflicts therein), foreign currencies, divergent 
legal cultures, and testimony and documents in multiple 
languages also distinguishes domestic from international 
arbitration practice.
In their specific contexts—given the uniformity of expectation 
among the participants—these diverse domestic elements 
function well. Their perceived potential for spill-over application 
in international settings, however, arguably engenders confusion 
and frustrates dispute resolution planning.
The FAA at present only treats international arbitration 
separately for purposes of applying the two convention chapters. 
In the main, those chapters merely delineate the federal courts’ 
role in enforcing awards and agreements to arbitrate covered by 
a convention. The lack of a free-standing chapter devoted to 
international arbitration prevents non-specialists and non-
39 See§ 11.4.10.
40 See§ 11.4.7.
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American lawyers from isolating the relevant doctrines 
applicable to their proceeding.41
This same universalism arguably has retarded salutary 
tinkering with the bargaining process. In particular, doctrine 
developed by the Supreme Court has not been deferential to 
consumer protection concerns related to arbitration. Rather, 
objective theory of contract and presumptions favoring 
commercial arbitration have dominated the Court’s decisions, as 
has robust support for party autonomy.42 The present FAA 
makes no distinction between an arbitration clause said to be part 
of a consumer transaction and that which binds experienced 
international traders, and the Court will not likely create one.43 
The FAA has been repeatedly interpreted to nullify state law 
attempts to impose special notice requirements and subject matter 
limitations, however well-intentioned.44 The same pro-arbitration 
policies which some would argue have eclipsed standard contract 
analysis apply equally to any contract that has a nexus with 
interstate commerce.
41 The related problem of supplemental application of FAA Chapter 
One is introduced in the next section.
42 See §§ 3.3.2, 7.6, 7.7,11.3.
43 Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) 
(forum selection in cruise ticket enforceable against consumer).
44 See Chapter 7, supra, at 185-86 nn. 18-19 and associated text.
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8.8 The Ambiguous Role of FAA Chapter One in 
Arbitrations Covered by a Convention
Chapters Two and Three of the FAA implement respectively, 
the New York and the Panama Conventions. Chapters Two and 
Three, in parallel provisions, state that Chapter One “applies to 
actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent 
that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the [relevant 
underlying convention] as ratified by the United States.”45
The provisions’ helpfulness is clear when one notices that, for 
example, nothing in Chapter Two requires a court to stay 
proceedings when brought in contravention of a properly invoked 
arbitration agreement covered by the New York Convention. In 
such a case, § 3 FAA is properly pressed into service, for a stay 
would be minimally necessary to give effect to the Convention.
Yet, because the FAA’s drafters opted for a general residual 
application clause rather than more surgical incorporation by 
reference, there is room for mischief and unnecessary debate. 
The most troubling invocations of Chapter One in convention 
proceedings have come when a party resists an award.46 Often, 
in having to traverse this maneuver the convention award holder
45 FAA §§ 208, 307.
46 Discussion of this problem is revived in § 12.2.3, where, after 
examples, it is recommended that non-specific residual application be 
avoided in the “New Act.”
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faces an added step that is of doubtful legitimacy under either 
convention.
8.9 Artificial and Unhelpful Limits Upon District Court 
Powers to Compel Arbitration
The FAA’s convention chapters, allow a party to a convention 
arbitration agreement to procure an order from a federal district 
court compelling arbitration at a place named in that agreement, 
whether that place is within or without the United States.47 If a 
convention does not apply, or the parties have not named a place 
in their clause, the powers of the courts are unclear.48 In general, 
it is supposed that a federal district court must honor the clause 
by a stay, but that it lacks the power to designate as the seat a 
natural situs outside the court’s district.49
A related problem occurs when the arbitration clause is not 
covered by a convention, but names a place outside the district in 
which the motion to compel is lodged. Because of the phrasing
47 See FAA § 206.
48 For further discussion, see Chapter 12, infra, at 327-29 nn. 18-20 
and associated text.
49 A district is the smallest federal court system unit. Typically circuits 
encompass several districts. For a table demonstrating the geographic 
ambit of circuits, see § 7.8. Often a state will encompass many 
districts, but will itself be included with other states in one circuit.
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of FAA § 4,50 despite the parties’ express agreement, the court is 
restricted to issuing stays; it has no power to compel arbitration 
outside of its district and, somewhat bizarrely, cannot compel the 
parties to arbitrate within its district because to do so would 
contravene their express agreement.51 Thus, only when the 
parties have expressly named a New York or Panama Convention 
state does the existing regime allow a court to send the parties 
beyond its own district.
At present, a party relying upon an arbitration agreement in 
defense to a lawsuit may have to invoke it twice: once in 
plaintiffs chosen litigation forum (to achieve a stay) and a 
second time, before a court in the district in which (in that party’s 
view) the arbitration ought to go forward based upon all the 
circumstances. This incapacity exacerbates the failure of the 
FAA to empower arbitrators to designate a place of arbitration, 
a default power that is now a standard feature of modem
50 It states in relevant part: “The hearing and proceedings...shall be 
within the district in which the petition for an order directing such 
arbitration is filed.” Petitions under both §§3 and 4 are often involved 
when an arbitration clause is invoked in response to litigation of a 
dispute caught by the clause; Section 3 requires the court to stay 
proceedings and § 4 authorizes it to compel the parties to carry out the 
clause. Only if the agreement falls within a convention and names as 
the situs a Party to that convention is the federal courts power 
enlarged.
51 See Couleur Int’l Ltd. v. Saint-Tropez W., 547 F. Supp. 176, 177 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); cf. § 11.3, note 20.
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arbitration statutes and many rules texts. Though rule formulae 
typically give arbitrators such a prerogative in the absence of a 
designation by the parties, there remain situations in which the 
parties have managed only a bare commitment to arbitrate, with 
no agreement as to place and no designated rules. The result may 
be that the arbitration goes forward in an irrational place.
Significantly, the FAA does not contain any authorization for 
the tribunal to meet away from the place of arbitration in 
furtherance of the proceedings. In the absence of standard rules, 
experienced American arbitrators may feel at liberty to exercise 
this power by implication; others may entertain doubts. 
Accordingly, when arbitration is relegated to an inconvenient 
place by the above-referenced “intra-district” rule, the flexibility 
and efficiency sought to be achieved in arbitration may be 
impaired.
8.10 Divergent and Contradictory Positions Have 
Filled the Void
8.10[1] In General
As intimated above, the fragmentary character of the FAA has 
left state and federal courts relative freedom to expound 
divergent rules. As the following survey suggests, some of the 
questions are substantial and bear upon the degree to which the
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United States can be categorized as an attractive venue for 
arbitration. The following items largely address matters that can 
be clarified by statute. The list presented, however, is far from 
exhaustive.
8.10 [2] Can Arbitrators Be Challenged for Partiality and, 
If So, When?
As noted in Chapter 7 (§7.13), the AAA / ABA Ethics for 
Arbitrators (1977) codify what is accepted in certain domestic 
systems for commercial arbitration—that party-appointed 
arbitrators may be non-neutral. Indeed, that text sponsors the 
presumption that in a tripartite arbitration, the party-appointed 
arbitrators should be considered “non-neutral,” unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise. An ABA resolution reverses the 
presumption,52 but the change is not widely published and 
appears nowhere in Ethics Text, which continues to be circulated. 
While there is little doubt that the third arbitrator must be 
“neutral” (to use the American domestic characterization), the
52 Resolution of November 1989 of the House of Delegates of the 
ABA Calling for Amendment to the AAA / ABA Code of Ethics of 
Arbitrators (“unless otherwise agreed, party appointed arbitrators in 
international arbitration should, to the extent practicable in the 
circumstances, serve as neutrals”).
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case law generated by alleged partiality on the part of a party- 
appointed arbitrator is “muddled.”53 As noted above (§ 7A.4), 
among the questions that arise are: 1] must a party-appointed 
arbitrator functioning under the FAA begin and remain impartial, 
and 2] if so, may a suspicious party with reason petition the 
courts to remove the arbitrator in question? As to the first 
question courts have produced holdings and reasoning in 
dramatic disagreement.54 As to the second question, the 
prevailing answer is that the challenging party must wait until the 
award is rendered and seek vacatur of it for “evident partiality,”55 
a difficult ground to establish.
8.10 [3] Is it Consistent With the Agreement to Arbitrate for 
a Court to Provide Interim Relief?
The UNCITRAL Model Law maxim that it is not inconsistent
53 Washburn v. Me Manus, 895 F. Supp. 392, 396 (D. Conn. 1994).
54 Contrast Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. v. Motor Tank Vessel, 
AKTI, 438 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.C. 1977) ( FAA makes no mention of 
non-neutral arbitrators; each presumed to be impartial) with to Sunkist 
Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d. 753, 758-60 (11th Cir. 
1990) (party-appointed arbitrator did not engaged in misconduct when 
conferring with appointing party before appointment on matters of 
substance).
55 See, e.g, Sun Ref. & Mktg. v. Stratheros Shipping, 761 F. Supp. 
293, 296 n.2 ( S.D. N. Y. 1991).
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with the agreement to arbitrate for a court to entertain and grant 
interim measures in aid of the arbitration posits a simple solution 
to hopelessly conflicted case law to be found in the United States, 
as more fully discussed in Chapter 11 (§ 11.5.1). The range of 
judicial views occupies a full spectrum, from holdings that such 
relief is available whenever necessary to preserve the status quo 
ante to—at the other extreme—an absolute prohibition when a 
convention applies. In between are cases that make availability 
depend upon whether a tribunal has been appointed or whether 
the relief is sought by a party seeking to support the arbitration as 
opposed to one thwarting it. The restrictive positions are so 
tightly held that they apparently do not give way to contrary party 
agreement.
8 .10 [4] What Choice of Law Principles Govern the 
Agreement to Arbitrate In Federal Courts?
In exerting a robust pro-arbitration tendency, American courts 
have evinced a tendency to apply American principles of contract 
formation, even to agreements to arbitrate embedded in 
international contracts.56 The lex fori bias, however, is only one 
tendency; more adventurous courts have applied foreign law,
56 See Filanto, 789 F. Supp. at 1236-38.
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though the underlying choice of law directive is often not clear.57 
Although this latter group probably can be said to have come 
closer to meeting the parties’ expectations, a lex fori rule is 
predictable and administratively efficient. In any event, the lack 
of guidance in the FAA on the applicable law (and resulting lex 
fori inference) seems conspicuously provincial when an 
international contract is under consideration.58
8.10 [5] On What Basis May a Party Mount an Interim 
Attack upon the Tribunal’s Competence and to 
What Extent Does a Tribunal Enjoy Competence to 
Determine Its Own Competence?
Traditionally, American courts have played an important role 
in assessing the existence and scope of arbitration clauses, though 
not a legally indispensable one. As noted above, the FAA is 
silent upon the tribunal’s power to determine its own jurisdiction
57 See Frydman v. Cosmair, Inc., 1995 WL 404841 (applying French 
law because the contract was allegedly formed between French 
citizens in France).
58 Perhaps the appropriate middle ground would be a statutory 
directive to apply to the agreement to arbitrate the law chosen by the 
parities in relation to the underlying contract (assuming an 
“embedded” arbitration clause), failing which designation the court 
could adopt the generic, federal rules of formation-that is, a lex fori 
default rule. See also § 4.2 at 94, note 4.
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and only indirectly indicates a court’s role in reviewing a 
tribunal’s findings concerning jurisdiction, by making excesses 
of authority a ground for vacatur. Until recently there was some 
doubt as to whether arbitral findings of jurisdiction should be 
treated with the deference with which courts approach awards in 
general (the non-deferential approach being review de novo).
Related to this, a series of questions have arisen. First, does 
the arbitral tribunal have any power to assess its own jurisdiction 
(a qualified yes after Kaplan)',59 second, if so, should it observe 
the severability principle (also not addressed in the FAA, but 
treated in rules formulae); and third, does the exercise of that 
power influence a courts’ power to review the tribunal’s 
findings—either in some form of interlocutory review (under the 
guise of considering a request for extraordinary relief)60 or 
subsequently in the context of a vacatur action?
That these are questions common to most legal systems was 
broached in Chapter 3 (§ 3.3.3). The failure of the FAA to 
anticipate these issues allows additional issues to arise in both
59 See generally §§3.3.3 and infra note 62.
60 Some courts have been willing to enjoin arbitrations where they 
determine that no agreement to arbitrate exists or that the arbitration is 
in contravention of the clause, such as by being pursued at a place 
other than that agreed upon. See, e.g., Societe Generale de 
Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Management and Systems 
Co., 643 F.2d. 863, 868 (1st Cir. 1981) (Massachusetts arbitration 
enjoined; parties had agreed to Swiss arbitration).
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state and federal courts because many of the state “international” 
statutes attempt to regulate arbitral competency to assess 
jurisdiction. Are these state provisions rendered moot by 
Supreme Court holdings, such as Kaplan (1995) and does it 
matter whether the parties have designated state arbitration law?61
8.10 [6] Are the Grounds Stated in FAA § 10 Exclusive?
The vacatur grounds set forth in FAA § 10 are not expressly 
exhaustive. Courts have differed upon the applicability of
61 Kaplan holds that the FAA allows the parties to dedicate to arbitral 
determination the questions o f existence and scope of the agreement to 
arbitrate; where the parties have done so “unmistakably,” the 
arbitrators’ determination will receive especial deference.
Nonetheless, where the intention to submit the jurisdictional question 
to the tribunal is not sufficiently unambiguous, federal courts are to 
perform de novo review when vacatur is sought. As is typical, Kaplan 
was an elaboration of doctrine under the penumbras of FAA § 2, 
there being no FAA provision dealing with Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
California, Florida and other states, by contrast, purport to grant to 
arbitrators competence to determine competence and do so with 
qualifications which are arguably more permissive than those set out 
in Kaplan. Moreover, Kaplan—a domestic case—is of uncertain 
application when the agreement in question (or the resulting award) is 
covered by a convention. Even if Kaplan applies, vagaries within the 
case itself make outcomes unpredictable. For example, where a 
putative contract clause seems clearly to give the issue o f jurisdiction 
to the tribunal, should a court petitioned to enjoin (or to compel) 
arbitration limit its consideration to the prima facie existence of the 
submission, so as to give the tribunal primacy in the determination of 
jurisdiction; or does that beg the essential question? See Apollo 
Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989).
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common law bases for vacatur under the FAA. Many have 
admitted pleas based upon theories with a substantive character, 
contrary to the FAA’s tenor.62 A related question upon which the 
courts have split is whether the parties may by agreement expand 
the level of substantive review so as to authorize vacatur for 
errors of law.63 The extent to which these issues are relevant to 
convention awards also is unclear.64
62 Among the non-statutory bases some courts have applied are public 
policy and “manifest disregard of the law.” Concerning the latter, see 
§§11.4.7, note 72; 10.5.6, note 141.
63As to expanded review by party agreement, see §12.2.2 at 342.
64 See supra § 8.8.
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ARBITRAL REFORM: 
PERSPECTIVES, ABSTRACT GOALS AND 
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
Chapter Contents
9.1 Introduction
9.2 How Urgent the Need?
9.3 Constituencies
9.4 Abstract Goals and Characteristics With Practical 
Consequences
9.5 Whether to Treat International Commercial Arbitra­
tion Separately?
9.6 Why Consider the UNC1TRAL Model Law?
9.1 Introduction
This project makes certain assumptions about vantage points 
other than the author’s own. The first portion of this chapter, 
after addressing the relative urgency (or lack thereof) associat­
ed with arbitral reform in the United States, identifies the 
constituencies with which the author is more concerned in 
assessing the need for a new statute; the roles and presumed 
perspectives of each are outlined. In part built upon these 
assumptions, concluding paragraphs introduce the abstract 
goals and characteristics that ought to guide lawmakers in the 
event reform is undertaken. The chapter concludes by enter-
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taining two preliminary questions: should international disputes 
be treated by a separate, autonomous regime and to what 
degree should the UNCITRAL Model Law attract early 
consideration by the drafters?
9.2 How Urgent the Need?
9 .2 .1  In  Gen er a l
This work does not argue that reform is desperately and 
urgently needed but, rather, that it is inevitable and worthy of 
detailed study. Several factors make the urgency argument 
particularly untenable.
9 .2 .2  Par ty  A u t o n o m y  Suppo r ted  B y  Pro-A rbitratio n  
D octrine
For those who endorse a laissez-faire approach to the privatiza­
tion of international disputes, the American law of arbitration 
might be regarded as exemplary in many respects. There is 
under the FAA’s influence wide party autonomy mirrored by 
a relative paucity in mandatory rules affecting the arbitral 
process.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the FAA exists 
primarily to exalt the parties’ right to submit their dispute to 
arbitration and to dictate the details of the arbitral process.1 
While certain traps for the unwary or ill-informed remain, in 
general parties are not required to adopt technical incantations 
to achieve enforcement of their arbitral agreement; indeed, the
1 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 478.
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presumptions adopted by most courts, especially those in the 
federal system, are designed to salvage even poorly drafted 
agreements to arbitrate.2 Similarly, it is difficult to set aside 
awards; analogous presumptions to those favoring agreements 
to arbitrate promote award enforceability.
9 .2 .3  Ju d ic ia l  Self-R estraint
Complementary to wide party autonomy is the “hands-off’ 
approach taken by the American judiciary in key respects when 
supervising arbitrations occurring within the United States. The 
FAA itself contemplates few express functions for courts to 
perform and judges have not been quick to expand their 
powers of interference. Under the FAA there is, for example, 
little basis for a party to seek interim review of an arbitral 
determination, whether substantive or procedural. Nor will 
courts readily entertain pre-award petitions that a tribunal 
member does not possess the required impartiality. The 
difficulty in setting aside awards mentioned above flows in part 
from the lack of substantive grounds for vacating an award. 
The judge-made doctrine that once arguably provided a basis 
for reviewing the arbitrators’ application of the law—“manifest 
disregard of the law—”has fallen into grave disrepute; most 
jurisdictions have narrowed it substantially or dismissed it 
outright.3
2 See Republic of Nicar. v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9th 
Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 919 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 
706 (7th Cir. 1994) (“if [the manifest disregard doctrine] is meant 
to smuggle review for clear error in the back door, it is inconsistent 
with the whole modem law of arbitration....The grounds for setting
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9 .2 .4  St a n d a r d  Ru l e  F o rm ulatio n s
The quasi-legislative function undertaken by the various institu­
tions affecting international arbitration has already been men­
tioned. The gapfilling importance of standard rule formulations 
is difficult to overstate given parties’ unquestioned power to 
adopt such texts to address the procedural details of arbitration 
and to guide the tribunal. The many formulations available 
have in common generally well-tested default procedures which 
make for relatively fool-proof arbitrations and largely unassail­
able awards. The absence of a comprehensive statute to 
provide similar default rules thus is unlikely to be a critical 
factor in the smooth functioning of arbitrations seated in the 
United States, especially with the administrative expertise 
available through organizations such as the AAA. In fact, the 
existing skeletal frame of the FAA arguably makes for relative 
predictability because it contains fewer intersections with 
prevailing rules texts; fewer conflicts and arguable conflicts 
between statutory and rules texts probably occur as a result.
9 .2 .5  U r g en c y  a n d  Inev itability  D istin g u ish ed
If as posited in the preceding paragraphs, the situation is not 
dire, why should reform be undertaken? (Or as one finds it in 
the vernacular: “if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”) The principal 
reasons include that reform would afford an opportunity to 
make the system more accessible to American and non- 
American disputants alike and would enable a consolidation of
aside arbitration awards are exhaustively stated in the statute”).
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arbitral law in a preemptive federal vehicle. Generally greater 
predictability would result by reducing the supplemental role 
played by the diverse state laws. These benefits, which are to 
be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters, do not depend on 
particular timing; nonetheless, given the potential for such a 
project to suffer an “elephantine gestation”4 it is well to not 
procrastinate.5
4 Cf. Landau at 155(The 1996 Act: “...a long and sometimes tortuous 
history—a gestation that has been often termed ‘elephantine’”).
5 Presently being revised is the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) upon 
which the majority of state arbitration laws are based. It is designed 
for individual state adoption. The latest draft of the "Revised" UAA 
(RUAA) does not distinguish international arbitration from domestic 
varieties. The broad interpretation of the FAA’s jurisdictional 
predicate (“involving commerce”) will ensure FAA dominance in 
the enforcement of commercial agreements to arbitrate. There is a 
danger, nonetheless, that the RUAA project will diminish any 
immediate incentive for federal reform. In particular, it may be 
assumed that delaying a federal initiative may allow that project to 
emulate the RUAA final draft so as to foster uniformity. In reality, 
even at the state level, uniformity is unlikely. Some states will retain 
the old UAA; others will retain their existing non-UAA-based 
regime. The result will be even greater diversity in the augmentative 
arbitration law provided by the states. Non-American lawyers will 
face even greater challenge in determining how arbitration in New 
York is likely to be different from arbitration in, e.g., Los Angeles 
or Chicago. Further, because the present RUAA does not cater to 
international practice, its utility as a model in relation to interna­
tional disputes is dubious.
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9.3 Constituencies
9 .3 .1  In  Gen er a l
The perceived merits of a given proposed reform tend to be a 
matter of perspective; in relation to international commercial 
arbitration there is not one constituency but several whose 
views bear on the project under discussion in this work. In­
deed, even within a semantically useful grouping such as “the 
international business community” there may be sub-groupings 
among which wide variation in attitude and receptiveness to 
change may be found.6 This section identifies sectors of 
practice and other groupings that will ostensibly be affected by 
reform. Speculation (or perhaps educated guesses) about the 
attitudes of each will be weaved into the discussion.
9 .3 .2  Pr iv a te  Tr a d er s—Th e  In t e r n a t io n a l  B u si­
n ess Co m m u n it y
International business has embraced alternative’s to litigation, 
arbitration being only one such avenue for circumventing 
national courts.7 In general, experienced business planners
6 Consider, for example, the different orientations one might find in 
canvassing the maritime trades, the international financial and 
securities markets and, the international technology field.
7 Arbitration though an established fixture, is under increasing 
pressure from mediation and other non-arbitral methods which 
promise greater speed and savings while offering the disputants 
control over the outcome of the process from start to finish.
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view disputes as inevitable.8 Other important considerations 
being equal,9 there is a preference for processes that save time 
and money, that bring finality to disputes, and that minimize 
loss of rapport among the disputants.
Entities involved in transnational business are generally 
thought to benefit from unification of the regimes that affect 
them. This would seem to be as true when the regime in 
question governs arbitration as when it dictates other commer­
cial rights and duties. To the extent that business planners are 
offered a range of suitable places to arbitrate, each with a 
largely similar arbitration law, ad hoc planning is reduced. 
Resort can be had more often to standard forms. Moreover, 
because each party can afford to be flexible as to the place of 
arbitration, the terms of the arbitration agreement are less 
likely to be a stumbling block to concluding the bargain; with 
juridical concerns aside, the parties can concentrate upon issues 
of situs convenience.
As to the kind of regime that ought to become the norm, it 
can be assumed that one which honors party autonomy to a 
great extent and has a minimum of mandatory rules would be 
preferred by international business. Were these among the 
chief characteristics of the common legislative pattern, 
enterprises would be able to tailor the proceedings to the 
dispute by addressing cost, speed, confidentiality, potential
8 Perhaps one tell-tale trait of an inexperienced business person is the 
rather naive reluctance to discuss disputes before they arise. Experi­
enced business persons and counsel tend to realize that once there 
is a dispute between the parties, the all-important dispute resolution 
accord may be impossible to reach.
9 That is, assuming there is not an undesirable impact upon substan­
tive outcomes.
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cross-cultural disparities, choice-of-law outcomes and disrup­
tion to the relationship.10
9 .3 .3  Th e  Leg al  Pro fessio ns
In General
Counsel in the United States and abroad play several roles in 
relation to arbitration. Lawyers are instrumental in seeing that 
their clients’ agreement anticipates disputes (the draft­
ing/planning function), in preparing to arbitrate and in appear­
ing as advocates before arbitrators. Owing to specialization and 
other factors, these roles are sometimes performed by different 
counsel, often of different firms; occasionally, they fall to the 
same lawyer, typically a member of the client’s in-house legal 
department. Given the foregoing, several segments of the 
American bar and foreign bars have a stake in arbitral reform; 
because their respective views are potentially divergent, it 
makes sense to try to distinguish among them.
Corporate Counsel
In-house counsel, at least under the American model, though 
a member of a bar, is an employee of the private company for 
whom he or she works. His or her salary represents a fixed 
cost to the corporation; it does not fluctuate with the workload 
counsel is able to accomplish and typically, an entire range of 
responsibilities is carried on by such lawyers.
10 See generally Gans and Stryker.
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Often, the company legal department is bound by an 
inflexible budget; legal department heads are accountable for 
the economic consequences of the choices they make in 
ordering the company’s legal affairs and in fighting its bat­
tles.11 There is thus pressure upon in-house counsel to contain 
not only the consequences of dispute resolution but its costs. 
A victory won at enormous processing costs may not resemble 
a victory “on the books.” Conversely, a loss (or any obligation 
arising in resolving the dispute) may seem to be a net gain if 
it “comes in under budget.”
It is often budget-consciousness, and to some extent consid­
erations of efficiency, that establish the division of labor 
between corporate counsel and retained (outside) counsel. To 
the extent that a particular drafting job, court appearance or 
other matter does not require specialist help, the in-house 
lawyer is free to undertake the task alone, or with minimal 
outside help.12 For corporate counsel facing increasing de­
mands on his or her time, it would seem to follow that a legal 
setting is to preferred which is not specialist-dependent, and 
which minimizes the consequences of inaction or less-than- 
perfect action. The arbitration regime presently in place—and 
hence the one with which a proposed reform must be com­
pared—has elements of this latter forgiveness; most imperfectly
11 Cf. P. Allen, Bottom-Line Lawyers, 37 Cal. Law. 37, 41 (1989) 
(citing Arthur Young survey of 300 corporate legal departments: 
91% required itemized bills from outside firms and approximately 
65% required detailed, per lawyer, information concerning hours 
billed).
12 Cf. id. at 38 (1988 Arthur Young study showed dramatic increase 
over preceding five years in corporations handling litigation in- 
house).
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drafted arbitration clauses are enforced. Moreover, there is 
little need to draft from scratch. Time-honored models are 
readily available and include many concise, reliable standard 
institutional clauses.13
For in-house counsel, contemplation of the active stages of 
an arbitration may undergo a similar analysis—a search for 
those aspects of it requiring specialist help. The initial ques­
tions may relate to the law’s accessibility: That is, are the 
relevant cases, statutes and rules understandable to a non­
specialist? If the answer is yes, corporate counsel is more 
likely to elect to play a significant role in the proceedings, 
whether in assisting outside counsel or in handling the matter 
using exclusively the company’s legal department. As a general 
proposition, therefore, laws which are accessible to a generalist 
because of good drafting and non-esoteric subject matter 
are—other things being equal—naturally preferred by corporate 
counsel.14
13 Standard arbitration clauses developed long ago suffice; the essential 
elements of a simple but clear clause have not changed much in 
recent decades. One advantage to the static text of the FA A is that 
only case-law developments have to be taken account of by the 
practitioner in keeping current; and, ultimately, that case-law has 
only strengthened the efficacy of even the most primitive arbitration 
clause. Moreover, such state law as would otherwise burden arbitra­
tion clauses with special requirements is preempted where the 
underlying transaction touches interstate commerce. As would be 
true in most systems, however, the consequences of inaction remain 
great: if no written arbitration agreement is reached, the courts will 
not create one in order to be rid of the case.
14 Moreover, when outside help is enlisted, an intelligible regime may 
result in a lower absolute fee because of help that in-house counsel 
and junior outside counsel will be able to provide the specialist 
leading the effort. It is also arguably true that when the arcaneness 
of practice is reduced, more lawyers are encouraged to specialize in
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Another factor influencing corporate counsel’s reaction to a 
new law (however well drafted) is the extent to which its 
substance requires a redrafting of existing contracts and 
standard forms, a disruptive exercise in the main.15
Law Firm Practice
Almost by definition, the many firms that counsel international 
business are genuinely concerned with the American regime 
governing arbitration, whether or not they are one of those that 
have carved out a prominent arbitration specialty.16 In one 
sense there is a reciprocal relationship between law firms and 
company legal departments, as suggested above. Putting aside 
the potential influence of profit motive implied in the preceding 
section, it is possible to suggest that a regime that would 
optimize the complementary relationship between the firm 
lawyer and in-house counsel should be welcomed within the 
law firm ranks.
Foreign Counsel
Whether the issue is the relative merits of naming a U.S city 
as an arbitral seat or how to prepare for the arbitration that 
eventually occurs there, the perspective of foreign counsel are 
to some extent distinguishable from their American counter­
parts, who for better or worse, may be reasonably comfortable
that practice. In theory (supply and demand) number of specialists 
should result in price competition.
15 See infra § 8.4.6.
16 E.g., Freshfields, White and Case, et al.
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with the blend of legal sources potentially affecting American 
arbitration.17 When a lawyer reasonably familiar with the 
UNCITRAL Model law surveys a statute based there upon, he 
or she immediately has a good insight into the arbitration law 
of that place; the same is true for one reading the new English 
Act, which is largely intelligible to the lay person. By contrast, 
there is nothing particularly illuminating about the American 
statutory and case law patchwork that greets the uninitiated. Its 
obscure intersections no doubt promote increased dependency 
upon American counsel and perhaps a disinclination to arbitrate 
in the United States.18 It can be assumed therefore that like 
novice American lawyers, non-American counsel would 
welcome a centralized, relatively comprehensive source to 
which to refer that is presented in accessible or familiar 
language, shorn of Americanisms and clear on issues of 
particular interest such as court intervention, the independence 
of arbitrators and the availability of punitive damages.
17 American counsel would benefit from an American arbitral regime 
that is acceptable to foreign counsel. Less bargaining power would 
be required to fix an American situs and options presented to all 
concerned would be enlarged.
18 More than once the author has encountered colleagues practicing 
abroad who confess to steering clients away from American venues 
and toward the traditional European places for arbitration; unpredict­
ability is often given as the reason. Statistics published by the ICC 
demonstrate, for whatever reason, that the United States is rarely 
designated by the Court as the apt situs. Of the 19 ICC arbitrations 
conducted in the United States in 1995, only 2 were placed there by 
the ICC. The remaining 17 were party-designated seats. Statistical 
Report, 7(1) ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 3, 7 (1996).
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9 .3 .4  The Judiciary
Litigation systems in many countries are overcrowded. Few 
judges consider themselves under-worked. In America, 
potential deterrents such as Rule 11 have not fully dissuaded 
those who would press frivolous claims. Any statutory reform, 
whatever its subject, holds the potential for increased litigation, 
because even well-drafted laws leave room to argue about 
scope and meaning. The present regime, built upon the FAA, 
for all its shortcomings gives the appearance of being relatively 
static; despite the regular emergence of new questions, most 
interpretive issues to be teased from the 1925 text have by now 
been mooted. Also in favor of the status quo is its relatively 
predictable operation: in general, arbitration agreements are 
invoked and enforced in a manner leaving little residual work 
for the court addressed; similarly, most awards brought to the 
judiciary are enforced and not vacated. Hundreds of cases 
make these generalities easy to offer. Accordingly, even the 
most enlightened new statute may prompt the assessment that 
it attempts “to fix what wasn’t broken,” an indictment recently 
leveled by an American judge at the Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods.19
The impact upon the judiciary of a new law thus will be 
multifaceted. First, caseloads may be affected, for, new forms 
of access to the courts may be explicitly authorized by the new 
law.20 In addition, there will be myriad cases that are brought
19 Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 
(S.D. N.Y. 1992).
20 The Model Law, for instance, contemplates judicial assistance for 
international arbitration not presently recognized in some federal and 
state courts.
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or prolonged because reasonable minds have differed about the 
new text. These interpretive issues will require that the context 
of the law as a whole be assessed, thus requiring the courts to 
digest yet another statute.21 Apart from the obvious point that 
clear drafting is to be preferred, it can be surmised that there 
would be value in having ample travaux available and perhaps 
an authoritative guide such as that accompanying the Arbitra­
tion Act 1996.22 Ideally, if uncharacteristically, it would serve 
the process if leading American commercial judges contributed 
to the effort long before it reached a supposed final draft, thus 
borrowing a salutary practice from the English.23
9.3.5 A rbitratio n  In stitu tio ns
The privatization of dispute resolution has occurred at least in 
part through the persistent efforts of a few organizations which 
exist to provide services of various kinds in support of arbitra­
tion. Perhaps the best known of the many institutions is the
21 There will be the usual questions about the extent to which the new 
law intends to codify existing approaches rather than to adopt new 
ones. To the extent the new regime is based upon a non-indigenous 
model, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law, additional questions 
may arise in trying to mesh new terms of art with existing legal 
phrasings.
22 See Saville Report.
23 Cf. Mustill Report.
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ICC.24 Other well established organizations include the AAA, 
the LCIA, and the SCC.25
Institutions play many roles. First, there is the quasi-legisla- 
tive function these institutions have come to serve as sponsors 
of detailed rules, designed for global use by parties represent­
ing diverse legal cultures. Some of these texts have become so 
well accepted that lawmakers have selectively borrowed from 
them in formulating statutory arbitration law.26 There is also 
the quasi-judicial role institutions play in the appointment and 
replacement of arbitrators, in the evaluation of challenges 
thereto and in the often registrar-like caretaking and supervi­
sion they exert over the proceedings.27 Leading arbitral
24 Cf. J. Paulsson, Arbitration Institutions Adapt, 6(6) Int’l Arb. Rep. 
(June 1991).
The Court of the International Chamber of Commerce has an 
unparalleled dominance. It receives over 300 cases per year, 
almost half of them involving amounts exceeding $1 million. In 
the single year 1989, these cases implicated parties of over 100 
nationalities and arbitrators of 41 nationalities.
In 1996, the ICC received its 9000th case. See 1995 Statistical 
Report 7(1) ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 3 (1996).
25 With the emerging prominence of arbitration in international trade 
have come tens of new entrants. The list, which continues to 
expand, now represents all regions of the world. See Arbitral 
Institutions Active in International Commercial Arbitration, in T h e  
In t e r n a t io n a l  A r b it r a t io n  K it  387-95 (L. Brown ed., 1993).
26 India’s recently promulgated arbitration statute, for example, is said 
to incorporate elements of the UNCITRAL Rules. See F. Nariman, 
India’s New Arbitration Law, 8(1) ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 37 
(1997).
27 The ICC’s role in scrutinizing awards, for example, is well-known. 
See ICC Rules, Art. 27. Institutional styles vary somewhat. In 
recent symposia, the ICSID and the ICC have referred to the 
arbitrations they oversee as “highly administered.” The AAA 
emphasizes its flexibility to meets the needs of the case at hand.
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institutions also endeavor to educate28 and to influence poli­
cy.29 Increasingly, arbitration statutes expressly acknowledge 
the functions performed by institutions, reflecting the reality 
that a significant percentage of arbitrations are administered30 
or contemplate the use of an appointing authority (typically but 
not invariably an institution).31 Naturally, the views of such
28 The 1996 Annual Report of the AAA refers to the organization as 
“education driven.” There are conferences sponsored on a monthly 
basis by at least one of the now dozens of organizations established 
to administer arbitration or to further its advancement.
29 See, e.g., AAA Amicus Brief in Terminix (1995).
30 The parties are not required to enlist the services of an institution. 
An award produced from an ad hoc proceeding is entitled to the 
same treatment as one carrying an institutional affiliation. The 
relative merits of ad hoc arbitration continue to be debated. See 
generally G. Aksen, Ad Hoc Versus Institutional Arbitration, 2(1) 
ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 8 (1991). Possibly, unwanted fees are the 
principal reason disputants limit institutional involvement. The 
UNCITRAL Rules were specifically designed for use with limited 
institutional support. Their introduction filled an appreciable void 
and they are now illuminated by the precedent produced by the Iran- 
U.S. Claims Tribunal, which has operated under them for well over 
a decade.
The UNCITRAL Rules notwithstanding, the arguments favoring 
institutional arbitration remain considerable. First, an institution’s 
know-how helps ensure that the arbitration can go forward without 
interruption. Most disabling contingencies have been anticipated 
either in the institution’s rules of procedure or in its internal 
policies. Second, the involvement of an institution may promote 
finality and enforcement of the award. In particular, the impression 
of institutional supervision may cloak the award with an aura of 
regularity likely to receive deference in a reviewing court. This 
remains true even though institutions generally perform no substan­
tive review of the awards they sponsor. Third, institutions often 
assist in the setting and collecting the arbitrators’ fees. For many 
arbitrators and parties, this intercession is welcomed.
31 Minimal institutional involvement occurs in arbitrations in which the 
parties have designated an institution only as an appointing authori-
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organizations should play a role in reforming and consolidating 
arbitration law; the experience many of them bring to the 
discussion is considerable based in some instances upon 
decades of international and commercial case administration.32 
Annually, these institutions, taken together, oversee hundreds 
of international cases seated in the U.S.33 At least in some 
cases, the American situs was chosen by the institution in 
question.
In general, it can be surmised that arbitral institutions favor 
pro-arbitration laws that support rather than restrict party 
autonomy. As a rule, they also favor uniformity in arbitration 
law, since the rules and model clauses they craft are designed 
to function in multiple jurisdictions.34 They no doubt also 
welcome a measure of self-restraint on the part of courts.35
ty. If needed, it appoints arbitrators, decides challenges to arbitra­
tors and replaces arbitrators. The availability of institutions to 
perform this limited role addresses the primary weakness of “pure” 
ad hoc proceedings, viz. , the possibility that lethargy or disagree­
ments in staffing the tribunal will derail the process.
32 The LCIA is over a century old; the ICC Court and the AAA are 
over six decades old.
33 In the less than two years since the AAA inaugurated its new 
International Center in New York, approximately 500 international 
cases have been filed with the AAA. Remarks of William Slate, 
Pres. AAA, Joint Colloquium, Washington D.C., November 21, 
1998. The AAA’s non-international commercial docket, in Califor­
nia and New York alone, typically approximates 5000 cases. See 
Appendix to AAA Amicus Brief in Terminix (1995) (statistics for 
1993 filings).
34 Special problems that emerge in leading arbitral venues are often 
reflected in rule revisions or adjustments in the institution’s internal 
policies. The French Dutco and the American Mastrobuono 
decisions are good examples.
35 Accord S. Jarvin, The Place of Arbitration, 7(2) ICC Int. Ct. Arb. 
Bull. 54, 56 (1996) (“where [the] courts tend to intervene unneces-
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9 .3 .6  The  College of Arbitrators
Commercial arbitrators form a diverse group whose views are 
nonetheless highly relevant to the project under discussion. 
Many (and perhaps most) in international arbitral service are 
law-trained. Though there is thus some overlap with at least 
one other category in this survey, it can be assumed that 
arbitrators qua arbitrators entertain concerns and predisposi­
tions independent of whatever other professional identities 
characterize them. Despite the diversity and subcategories one 
finds within the larger group, one is tempted to adopt the 
following speculations about the features an ideal statute might 
possess.
Guidance
The present FAA gives little instruction to arbitrators as to 
what their specific powers are, which rules, if any, are manda­
tory, which remedies are available to them, and whether the 
parties or the tribunal have the final word regarding how to 
proceed. The tribunal is relegated to depending upon the 
institutional rules chosen by the parties,36 to seeking the
sarily in the arbitration process and offer a party in bad faith an 
opportunity to obstruct the arbitration, the ICC Court is likely to go 
elsewhere when fixing the place of arbitration”).
36 The leading rules vary greatly in the amount of specificity they 
offer. The LCIA Rules offer a list of specific “additional” powers 
available to the tribunal. See LCIA Rules, Art. 22. The UNCITRAL 
Rules distribute various authorizations throughout the text (e.g. , Art. 
26: interim measures; Art. 24.3: production of documents) but give 
a default authorization (also found in the Model Law, Art. 19) that 
subject to the more specific rules therein, “the arbitral tribunal may
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assistance of the administering institution (if there is one) and 
to divining from FAA’s section on vacatur whatever guidance 
resides in its opaque terms of art.
The non-American arbitrator is particularly likely to feel 
insecure when proceeding in an American jurisdiction, not 
least because the FAA interacts with the 50 state laws of 
arbitration in seemingly mysterious ways. The arbitrator ranks 
presumably would welcome, therefore, the kinds of yardsticks 
that modern statutes offer,37 provided, of course, that the net 
result is not undue impedance of the arbitral process.
Flexibility, Restraints Upon Courts and Finality
It is difficult to see why arbitrators, whether trained in the 
U.S. or abroad, would not welcome a statute built around the 
permissive policies reflected, for example, in modem rules, the 
Model Law and certain recent enactments. Consensus among 
these texts appears to support judicial intervention limited to 
that designed to assist (rather than to impose upon) the 
process, wide tribunal discretion to advance the proceedings in
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, 
provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any 
stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of 
presenting his case.” The LCIA’s general tribunal mandate is found 
in Article 14.2 which provides that subject to a contrary agreement 
by the parties “the Tribunal shall have the widest possible discretion 
allowed under such law as may be applicable to discharge its general 
duties...”
37 One finds in the English Arbitration Act (1996), for example, a 
substantially clear indication of which rules are mandatory (via 
separate schedule) and numerous explicit grants of arbitral power 
including a list of specific procedural and evidential powers (Id. at 
§34).
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an efficient and fair manner38 and restricted bases upon which 
awards may be set aside.39
9.3.7 Th e  In t e r n a tio n a l  Leg al  C o m m u n it y  a n d  System
Somewhat more abstract than the preceding groups is a 
category, which for analytical purposes includes the shared 
interests of national legal systems in the smooth and rational 
functioning of private international dispute resolution. To this 
constituency can plausibly be attributed pro-unification ideals 
and a-national policies, a desire to minimize the importance of 
national boundaries and national irregularities. For this group, 
almost ex hypothesi, reform of the FAA offers an opportunity 
to minimize idiosyncratic national traits while bringing the 
U.S.—at least as to international disputes—in line with the 
international standard (or range of standards as the case may 
be). Unification built upon an international standard will 
engender predictability. At the same time, the natural law 
protections built into the modem paradigm (equality of the 
parties and fair opportunity to be heard) establish a minimum 
standard, especially when combined with the universal require­
ment that only a party to an arbitral agreement is bound by the 
eventual award.
38 See, e.g., AAA International Rules, Art. 16 (Tribunal shall use 
discretion in expediting resolution of the dispute); LCIA Rules, Art.
14.1 (Tribunal’s general duty to “adopt procedures suitable to the 
circumstances...so as to provide fair and efficient means...” 
[adopting the language of the Arbitration Act 1986, § 33(1 )(b)]).
39 Additionally, measures ensuring arbitral immunity would be 
applauded by most arbitrators. Some Model Law states have added 
such a provision. See Sanders at 34-35; Chapter 12 (§ 12.17) 
discusses the issue more fully.
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9.4 Abstract Goals and Characteristics With Practical 
Consequences
9 .4 .1  In  G en er a l
Arbitration legislation designed to govern, in whole or in part, 
“international” disputes ought to account for the myriad ways 
in which such disputes tend to differ from domestic commer­
cial matters.40 Whether or not the statute is singular in pur­
pose or meant to govern international arbitration as part of a 
broader enactment, certain considerations or guiding principles 
seem relevant in establishing a preferred model. The following 
sub-sections set forth a survey of sometimes-interdependent 
characteristics that attractive legislation covering international 
arbitration would, at least prima facie, possess.41
40 The author uses “tend to differ” with precision in mind. Internation­
al disputes are not always readily distinguishable from domestic 
ones, which in a given federation may contain numerous multi- 
jurisdictional facets. Thus, an arbitration between a buyer incorpo­
rated in Louisiana and a seller of Mexican descent based in Califor­
nia may bear many of the markings of an international arbitration: 
an inter-state fact-pattem, applicable law questions, the bringing 
together of different legal cultures, and the involvement of multiple 
languages and documentation rendered therein. Shared by contractu­
al arbitrations in general is also an element of voluntariness; that is, 
the parties choose it from among other possibilities and thus become 
subject to its regime as a matter of preference, not compunction.
41 As will be seen, the characteristics included on the list are not 
analytically discrete; because there is overlap, and the attributes 
promoted are mutually supportive, the categories are somewhat 
artificial. Nonetheless, they offer a way of introducing a range of 
important ideas.
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9.4.2 Centralization
Ideal legislation consolidates the governing rules in a single 
text such that with assurance the reader can refer to it, 
knowing that as to the subjects covered, one need not hunt for 
preemptive contrary rules or amendments brought into being 
but never integrated in the main text. At present, the Ameri­
can regime is a model of diffusion, not integration and 
centralization. As discussed in Chapter 7, state statutes are 
partially preempted by federal statutes, but only as a result of 
case law; nothing to be found in any of the governing statutory 
texts alerts the reader to the intricate relationship that ob­
tains.42
Especially in a common law jurisdiction, of course, perfect 
centralization is not possible. Cases remain an important 
source of the law; they are often the last word on a subject 
ostensibly treated fully in the text.
42 The United States is not alone in erecting a labyrinth. Consider 
Bermuda’s situation prior to its recent enactment of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. According to one lawyer practicing in Bermuda:
To an international user of arbitration, English Arbitration Law 
and Bermudian arbitration law is difficult to comprehend....A 
simple point of arbitration law may require looking at a section of 
the Bermudian Arbitration Act, 1986, comparing it with the 
corresponding English provision....and then studying a number of 
decisions of the English courts...
N. Hargun, International Arbitration Reform and the Bermuda Re­
sponse, paper presented at LCIA Conference, Hamilton, Bermuda, 
(26-28 June, 1996), at 3.
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9.4.3 Comprehensiveness
Related to centralization is comprehensiveness, the attribute of 
being relatively thorough in the selection of issues to be 
covered. The existing Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is truly 
fragmentary; though it covers the three pillars of court involve­
ment in the process—enforcement of arbitration agreements, 
court appointment of arbitrators, and enforcement of 
awards—the vast majority of issues typically covered in 
arbitration statutes are unaddressed. As a result, arbitrators and 
counsel are given little guidance about the proceedings them­
selves. The existence of state statutes, which tend to be more 
comprehensive than the FAA, improve the situation only to a 
degree because of uncertainty as to when they apply and their 
own deficiencies when pressed into service in the international 
setting.43
43 See Chapter 7 supra (§§ 7.3, 7.4). Disputes having a nexus with 
interstate commerce, whether those disputes have foreign facets or 
not, will be governed in federal court by all sections of FAA 
Chapter One, but in state courts, by only one or perhaps two 
sections of that chapter. If the New York Convention or Panama 
Convention applies, it must be given effect in state courts, but not 
in a fashion identical to that of the federal courts. State arbitration 
statutes fill gaps in state proceedings and to a lesser extent in federal 
proceedings. Important cases are copious and vary among state and 
federal jurisdictions. Special legislation is devoted to international 
arbitration only in a minority of states and for the non-specialist it 
may be unclear when they apply in light of the FAA’s selective 
peremption of state law.
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9.4.4 A c c e s s ib il i ty  (“U se r  F r ie n d lin e ss”)
It is all too often true of legislation, and legal drafting in 
general, that only a specialist can readily decode the intended 
meaning. Typically, prolix and complex drafting is to blame 
along with technical nomenclature employed more out of 
reverence for the time-honored than for its clarity. In legisla­
tion attempting to address an international audience, all of the 
forgoing obstacles are magnified because the reader (perhaps 
a foreign lawyer) may not be of a legal culture that provides 
any context for penetrating the text in question.44 If that is 
true of a reader with legal training, how much more difficult 
must be the task of the non-lawyer trying to take direction 
from the text.45
It is not impossible to draft “user friendly” legislation in the 
arbitration field, even if not starting with a model text. The 
English Arbitration Act of 1996, for example, combines clear 
drafting with an admirable absence of Latin phrases to offer an
44 One is reminded of Professor Lowenfeld’s exegesis of the former 
English Arbitration Act of 1979, which he qualified by explaining:
I say I think because s. 3(7), which contains the definition of 
‘domestic arbitration agreement,’ contains five consecutive 
negatives and defies confident interpretation.
Arbitrator's View at 38, n.4 (parens omitted).
45 In arbitration, the non-lawyer’s perspective is relevant because 
arbitrators and those representing parties in theory do not have to be 
persons with legal training, though typically they are. Moreover, 
arbitration is something to which one often commits in advance of 
any dispute. In the business planning stage, non-lawyers are often 
actively involved in the decision to choose arbitration and in 
deciding where such a proceeding should take place.
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intelligible text.46 American lawmakers would do well to 
emulate this and other standards.
9 .4 .5  A  D isarm in g  E ffec t
Where possible, a reform statute should take account of 
prevailing concerns and perceptions as registered in the 
literature, the views of specialists and other relevant sources. 
Many features of the American system have caused misgivings 
and apprehension among potential users abroad; the more 
apparent problem areas include the award of punitive damages 
by arbitrators in commercial cases, the perceived potential for 
party-appointed arbitrators to act with partiality, and the 
American system of discovery which some fear may find its 
way into U.S.-based arbitrations. Similarly, there are no 
provisions which clearly delineate limits upon court interven­
tion in the arbitration process.
The problem of limiting apprehension is not one of substance 
alone. Reform along lines attractive to potential users abroad 
is nullified if it is unknown, misrepresented or otherwise 
poorly understood by those potential users.47 Here again 
familiar texts have an advantage, especially when illuminated
46 Accordingly, it vastly improves upon the byzantine array of statutes 
which formed its predecessor.
47 Cf. Saville Report at para. 287:
Many...who do not have access to our case law were unaware that 
the Arbitration Act 1979 had been construed by the House of 
Lords in a way that very much limited the right of appeal, and 
which was not evident from words of the Act themselves.
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by helpful travaux, learned commentaries, and perhaps an 
official guide.48
9.4.6 M in im a lly  D isru p tiv e  (A Low R e d r a f t  F a c to r ) .
To the extent possible, new legislation should not require the 
redrafting of existing agreements en masse. The ideal is 
difficult to achieve in full, of course; new avenues of party 
autonomy may be conferred requiring potential disputants to 
opt-in or opt-out as the case may be.49 Nevertheless, such 
problems as can be anticipated should be given special 
attention lest the courts be called upon to resolve problems that 
need not have arisen.50
48 See, e.g., id.
49 If some form of exclusion agreement were to be authorized, for 
example, such as those available under the English and Swiss 
statutes, widespread redrafting would be a likely result. In general, 
any kind of “opt-out” or “opt-in” feature raises the redraft factor.
50 For instance, the enactment of the Model Law-based Indian statute 
raised doubts about existing contracts which called for two person- 
tribunals, an accepted practice under the 1940 Act but ostensibly 
impermissible under Article 10 of the Model Law (as adopted in 
India, it calls for an uneven number of arbitrators). See Indian 
Supreme Court Upholds New Act, 8(1) ICC Int’l Ct. Arb. Bull. 39 
(1997) (noting MMTC v. Sterlite Indus. (India) Ltd., Supreme 
Court judgment of Nov. 18, 1996). The Court ruled that clauses 
calling for two-person tribunals, which ordinarily implied an 
inchoate role for an umpire, fell within the meaning of “uneven.” 
Such clauses were thus permitted under the new Act; no redrafting 
would be required. Id.
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9.5 Whether to Treat International Commercial 
Arbitration Separately?
The FAA treats international disputes separately only to a 
limited degree. No special regime governs such controversies, 
which are distinguishable only to the extent either falls under 
the two treaties implemented in chapters two and three of the 
FAA. In developing a path for reform one initial question is 
whether international disputes should continue to be merely 
part of a single regime devoted to commercial arbitration, 
subject only to variations dictated by U.S. treaty obligations, 
or should international arbitration be treated separately in a 
more comprehensive way, perhaps in a separate chapter?51 
For several reasons—some pragmatic, some doctrinal—and 
despite some state practice to the contrary,52 this work as­
sumes that separate treatment for international arbitration is 
preferable to a monolithic approach.
First, discrete treatment will allow work to advance as a 
separate initiative independent of the political will and resourc­
es available or necessary to reform all of commercial arbitra­
tion, with its many manifestations and diverse constituency. 
Second, separate treatment is warranted because the law and 
practice of international arbitration is distinctive and the default
51 The alternative to a separate chapter is to weave the rules applicable 
to international disputes into the main text. Such an integration is 
not desirable because the ease of access will suffer and because and 
integrative approach would seem to assume that the entire FAA will 
be revised at the same time.
52 The English Arbitration Act of 1996, though influenced by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, does not base applicability upon interna­
tional character.
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regime treating them ought to reflect these facts.53 Third, 
separate treatment will enable potential subjects of the statute, 
at home and abroad, to more readily isolate and appreciate the 
doctrine that pertains to them; more efficient planning and 
reduced dependence upon American counsel should result.
There are, admittedly, potential detriments in separate treat­
ment. First, it may encourage divergent development in the 
law of arbitration—one body of doctrine for international cases 
and another for domestic commercial cases. Second, such 
incrementalism may also slow reform of the remaining 
(domestic) parts of the FAA, to the extent that the two projects 
cannot move forward simultaneously.
9.6 Why Consider the UNCITRAL Model Law?
The bulk of the analysis which follows relates to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. It may seem that by looking first to 
it, an essential question is being begged: why should a docu­
53 If the argument for a separate treatment had to depend only upon the 
special characteristics of international commercial disputes, it would 
be far weaker than proves to be the case. First, commercial disputes 
in their essence do not dramatically change with the introduction of 
multiple languages, cultures, currencies and legal systems. They 
remain, for die most part, arguments about rights and duties that are 
perceived to have economic implications by the disputants. The 
various international aspects of the dispute bear more on the process 
for resolving them than on the disputes themselves. The process in 
turn, whether sanctioned by a separate chapter or not, can be 
manipulated by the participants with relative ease (through, e.g. the 
adoption of appropriate standard rules and suitable arbitrators).
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ment produced by a UN Commission prima facie occupy 
center stage in a discussion about reforming American arbitra­
tion law? That is, doesn’t such an undertaking assume that the 
Model Law must be reckoned with along the way and is that 
assumption irresistible? These questions in a sense are thematic 
throughout the chapters that follows. The answers to them, 
which may not be acceptable to some American lawmakers, 
are to an extent prefigured by the answers to the question of 
separate treatment broached above.
Specifically, once it is determined that separate treatment is 
warranted, it would be foolish to overlook the Model Law, a 
free-standing, comprehensive codification crafted with expert 
American participation. It is a text which has greatly influ­
enced recent enactments in developed and aspiring arbitral 
venues alike.54 Its preeminence in the discussion therefore is 
justified because the UNCITRAL Model Law comes bearing 
an imprimatur honestly earned. Moreover, a failure to recog­
nize the Model Law as the emerging standard would conduce 
to mixed results when the ultimate draft product is examined 
by the experts. A failure to at least consider well the increas­
ingly familiar solutions and approaches to be found in the 
Model Law may ultimately lead to substantial “redrafting the
54 The list of UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdictions includes: Australia, 
Bahrain, Bermuda, Brazil (apparently), Bulgaria, Canada, (Federal 
Parliament and all Provinces), Cyprus, Egypt, Finland, Germany, 
Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Peru, Russian Federation, Scotland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden (perhaps still under study), Tunisia, Ukraine and four 
American states. Source: Status List supplied by UNCITRAL as 
updated by author.
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draft” in light of perceived ambivalence among potential 
users.55 Further, even if lawmakers ultimately adopt a differ­
ent model, there is much to learn from a study of the UNCI­
TRAL project.56
55 Cf. Saville Report at para. 2.
Although undoubtedly a highly skilful piece of work, it now 
appears that [the draft Bill circulated in February 1994] did not 
carry into effect what most users wanted [based upon reactions to 
the draft]...[Reinterpreted, what is called for is much more along 
the lines of a restatement of the law, in clear and ‘user-friendly’ 
language, following, as far as possible, the structure and spirit of 
the Model Law....(quoting interim DAC Report of April 1995).
See also A. Hermann, Bill Pulls the Wrong Punches Fin. Times, 
Feb. 15, 1994, at 12 (“a document likely to disappoint lawyers and 
businessmen”).
56 Cf. Saville Report at para. 4. Despite not adopting the Model Law 
wholesale:
at every stage in preparing a new draft Bill, very close regard was 
paid to the Model Law, and it will be seen that both the structure 
and the content of the. . .final draft, owe much to this model.
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DEBATING THE CONCEPT
Chapter Contents
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Arguments for Adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law
10.3 Potential Arguments Against Adopting the 
UNCITRAL Model Law
10.1 Introduction
It is by no means certain that after initial study the Model Law 
will become more than one influence in an eclectic mix of texts 
informing lawmakers. Even before the details of the Law’s 
substance are debated preliminary questions will arise. It no 
doubt will have strong backers as well as detractors. What 
follows are lists of arguments or propositions to be anticipated 
in relation to the Model Law. The first series support adop­
tion, the second might be offered to militate against its 
enactment. Each proposition and an elaboration of it are first 
set forth followed by a critique and further discussion. 
Chapters 10 and 11 in turn analyze the specific content of the 
Model Law in relation to existing law to determine the 
potential impact of the former upon the latter.
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10.2 The Arguments for Adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law
10.2 .1  It  Obviates  D ra fting  From  Sc ratch
The Argument: One purpose of the Model Law is to provide a 
modem statute sufficiently free of idiosyncratic provisions to 
be adopted, more or less as is, by law-makers who would 
otherwise have to begin with a blank slate. While its sponsors 
tend to discourage departures from the canonized text, nothing 
prevents a state from adapting the Model Law, augmenting and 
modifying it as necessary.1 Given that legislative resources are 
limited and that priorities may otherwise argue for delaying 
reform, the Model Law’s immediate availability is of consider­
able importance, even if the text is viewed as a first draft.
Critique and Further Discussion: The Model Law’s instant 
availability cannot be disputed. While not entirely beside the 
point, its readiness ought to be a factor only if the substance 
it offers is suitable. “Suitable” in this context ought to mean 
that it offers provisions which—after modest adjustments—are 
as good as those which would emerge from an act requiring 
much more work, whether engineered de novo or assembled 
from influences other than the Model Law.2 There is, after all,
1 Of course, one disadvantage of altering the official text is that the 
adopting state has less latitude in promoting itself as “a Model Law 
state.”
2 E.g., such as by borrowing ideas from the English Arbitration Act 
1996, the Swiss counterpart and other recent enactments not fully 
based upon the Model Law.
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no dearth of able drafters within the American legal communi­
ty.3
10.2.2 I t  Is A c c e p te d  a n d  I n c r e a s in g ly  W e ll-T e s te d
The Argument: If a goal of reform is to enhance predictability 
in the law by making its content clear, the Model Law offers 
a distinct advantage. Few recent international documents have 
been so greatly scrutinized by experts in the relevant field. The 
literature is copious. Moreover, given that several American 
states have adopted the Model law, federal adoption will have 
benefitted from, in effect, a local test period during which any 
problems in the Model will have emerged; adjustments could 
be made accordingly. The experience of the numerous adopting 
states outside the U.S can therefore be assessed in crafting 
appropriate implementation. The substantial and increasing 
number of states adhering to the Model also means that the 
approaches of courts abroad could be consulted in seeking to 
give the new Act a suitably international interpretation.
Critique and Further Discussion: All of the above ought to 
be influential. In particular, the situation has changed consider­
ably since 1990 when Messrs. Rivkin and Kellner wrote in 
opposition to the Model Law, “it has been adopted by only 
seven countries, none of which [is a] major arbitration cen­
ter!.]”4 The safety-in-numbers argument seems to assume, 
however, that the gestation period for problems is relatively
3 One need only consider the teams assembled by the CPR in 
producing its International Rules for ad hoc use (1992), by the AAA 
in improving upon its International Rules (1997) and by the LCIA 
in its 1998 revisions.
4 Rivkin and Kellner at 558.
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short such that most of them would have been evident by the 
time drafting commences. It also seems to take for granted that 
there is an efficient mechanism by which problems with the 
Model Law are reported and dissected in sufficient context to 
be helpful to other states.5 Additionally, salubrious operations 
in the many other adopting countries are only partially predica­
tive because legal systems are to some extent unique. Proba­
bly, the most reliable information will come from the common 
law adopting states (which are numerous); even as to those, 
account will have to be taken of any judicial attitudes affecting 
the Model Law’s operations.
Perhaps the sense that enough trial time may not have 
elapsed suggests that (especially since the existing system 
functions reasonable well) an especially deliberate approach to 
reform is in order. In anticipating the course that any proposed 
new chapter will follow, ample time should be allowed for 
circulation of and comment upon the proposed draft within the 
various private sectors to be affected by the New Act act; this 
canvassing would presumably include the many arbitration 
experts to be found both in practice and academia, within and 
without the U.S., with considerable analysis from the AAA 
and other institutions who by virtue of their decades of 
experience have become keenly aware of specific flaws in the
5 Context would include general information about the legal system in 
question, such as whether it is a civil law system, whether it is well 
developed or fledgling, and whether its arbitration-related caseloads 
are relatively heavy or light. Also essential would be specific details 
about the extent to which the problem (or absence of problems) 
relates to changes in the Model Law made by the state in question 
or other peculiarities not endemic to the Model Law itself.
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existing system.6 At the same time, the misgivings of certain 
quarters ought not to be talismanic.7
10 .2 .3  It  D oes N ot D r a m a tic a lly  A lter  A m e r ic a n  
La w  bu t  W o u ld  Co nfirm  a n d  C l a r ify  th e  La w
The Argument: Because of the variation caused by the federal 
system and the hybrid application of state and federal law, 
consolidation and unification is needed. The Model Law treats 
explicitly, and thus would codify, myriad rules presently not 
found in statute including some of the more arcane doctrines 
(such as severability and competence de la competence).
Critique and Further Discussion: The next two chapters 
compare in some detail the Model Law and existing American 
Law. The conclusions reached there agree with the sense that 
in the main the Model Law does not revolutionize existing law 
but would bring noticeable changes. The changes would 
nonetheless largely be in keeping with an international stan­
dard, a standard which presumably the New Act should 
emulate.
6 C f Saville Report at paras. 5-6 (referring to the positive influence of 
“the extraordinary quantity and quality of responses received [to the 
draft Bills]....[including from] a large number o f institutions...”).
7 There are anecdotal accounts suggesting that some among the 
litigation bar would instinctively press for modifications to the 
arbitration model that would give it litigation attributes, such as by 
widening discovery and allowing recourse for errors of law. The 
author holds that both tendencies should be resisted.
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1 0 .2 .4  B y C o n firm in g  a n d  C la r ify in g  It  W i l l  E n gen ­
d e r  C o n fid e n c e  A b road
The Argument: Because the domestic commercial arbitration 
system that has developed in America departs from the 
established international norm, there may remain understand­
able apprehension on the parts of business planners and 
counsel abroad contemplating arbitration in the U.S. There is, 
at present, no clear statutory dividing line between the two 
domains—no positive treatment calling attention to what in fact 
are distinguishable regimes. The outside observer trying to 
piece together a clear picture of “American” curial law also 
faces the variation to be found both among state regimes and 
federal circuits, each important sources of the lex arbitri. The 
resulting lack of complete information may lead one to form 
an erroneous impression of the American system.
For example, consulting the standard references and random 
decisions might lead one to conclude that the American arbitral 
model relevant to international disputes: 1] allows arbitrators 
to discuss the merits of a dispute with the appointing party 
prior to the appointment and to have further ex parte conduct 
with the appointing party during the proceedings;8 2] allows 
a party-appointed arbitrator to take a partisan approach—at 
least to some extent—during the deliberations among the 
arbitrators,9 and 3] leads ordinarily to an award rendered
8 See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 20 F.3d 
753 (11th Cir. 1993).
9 Cf. Coulson at 107 (“Some systems of arbitration in the [U.S.] 
assume that party-appointed arbitrators serve as advocates during 
arbitrators’ deliberations”).
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without reasons,10 which 4] may reflect the arbitrators’ sense 
of what justice and equity require rather than a remedy 
selected after a searching inquiry of the applicable law11—four 
common elements of domestic commercial arbitration.
Critique and Further Discussion: The above four characteris­
tics, which are uncharacteristic of international dispute 
processing in the United States, are nonetheless supported by 
ample authority among the commercial cases. Little in the 
FAA encourages courts to qualify their holdings by reference 
to a dispute’s domestic or international character. In practice, 
any distinctiveness that international proceedings have enjoyed 
has resulted from the rules chosen by the parties. Confusion 
and misunderstanding awaits the non-specialist called upon to 
structure or participate in arbitral proceedings; this is true to 
some extent whether or not that person was trained in Ameri­
ca.
While specialists may enjoy their rather exclusive franchise, 
the present regime falls woefully short if accessibility is a trait 
sought to be accomplished by it. Although standard rule 
formulations are clearly written, and cover, for example, the 
four issues mentioned above, there ought to be a default 
regime12 that matches the parties’ likely expectations; in
10 AAA, A G u id e  t o  A r b it r a t io n  f o r  B u sin e ss  P e o pl e  22 (1997) 
(“As a general rule, AAA commercial awards consist of a brief 
direction to the parties on a single sheet of paper”).
11 See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 36 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 581, 588 (1994) (absent choice of law designation, arbitrators 
may act ex aequo et bond).
12 The number of arbitrations that are not governed by standard rules 
chosen by the parties is probably very low. The function of a 
statutory regime, however, is not merely to provide guidance to that 
handful of proceedings. Rather, it is to circumscribe judicial
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relation to international disputes, those expectations are 
presumably best met by the international standard.
10.2.5 O n  Ba la n c e  I t  W il l  A ttr a c t  A r b itra tio n  B usi­
ness to  t h e  U n ited  States
The Argument: If it can be admitted that international arbitra­
tion has implications for invisible earnings and that promoting 
same is a legitimate goal of law-makers,13 the UNCITRAL 
Model Law (even with whatever flaws it might have) promises 
better returns than an unknown statute, however expertly 
drafted. This follows from the notion that there is comfort in 
the familiar and that which is immediately familiar enjoys an 
advantage over that which, to be accepted, must for the 
requisite period be touted, explained and, ultimately, compared 
favorably to the Model Law itself.14
Critique and Further Discussion: It is difficult to measure the 
impact that particular legislation has or will have on levels of
involvement in the process, ensure basic fairness and quality control 
and do so with sufficient transparency that the parties and their 
advisors proceed with confidence as to their procedural rights and 
duties.
13 Cf. DTI, G u id e  t o  t h e  A r b it r a t io n  B ill  (April 1996) at 2:
The Bill should help...safeguard the future of...London as a world 
centre for arbitration and so strengthen the competitiveness of our 
arbitration community. Such international arbitration business is 
highly mobile. When deciding where to arbitrate companies need 
to know quickly and easily what rights and obligations they have 
under the arbitration law of a given country.
14 The Saville Report, for example, takes care to confirm that the 
Model Law influenced the final product considerably. Id. at 5-6. 
Even the Washington Report, which in 1988 declined to recommend 
wholesale adoption, favored incorporation of certain Model Law 
ideas. See Washington Report at 312-16.
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specific private activity; the variables are many and the data 
are largely anecdotal. It is similarly questionable whether one 
can meaningfully compare the supposed results of the regime 
chosen against an alternative considered but not adopted.15 
Nonetheless, it is plausible that adoption of a known text will 
lessen apprehension on the parts of non-Americans asked to 
consider arbitrating in the United States. It is less probable that 
a non-UNCITRAL-based enactment would have the same 
effect.
Even if the Model Law forms the basis of the New Act, 
ultimately much will depend upon the changes that drafters 
make to the familiar text in implementing it; at some point it 
may become so “Americanized” that the advantages of 
familiarity will have been diminished or lost entirely.
1 0 .2 .6  C la rify in g  th e  A pplic a t io n  o f  t h e  FA A  in  
Sta te  C o u r t s .
The Argument: The present FAA’s phrasing indicates that it 
was intended for use only by federal courts. By U.S. Supreme 
Court case law the FAA has been given both a substantive 
component and preemptive character (but only as to some of 
its provisions). In doing so the Court has had to rely somewhat 
unconvincingly upon the supposed intentions of Congress. 
Some members of the Court have openly admitted that the
15 Those considering NAFTA continue to disagree about what its net 
effects have been.
Chapter 10: Debating the Concept
FAA has been pressed into service in state courts, not because 
of Congress’ intent, but in spite of it.16
Critique and Further Discussion: Many states have estab­
lished pro-arbitration regimes that are highly consistent with 
the substantive goals now identified with the FAA. Indeed, the 
FAA was intended to replicate the statute already in place in 
New York;17 that state continues to be a leading venue for 
commercial arbitration. The highest court of New York, for 
example, has recently reiterated that “it is the policy in New 
York to encourage resolution of disputes through arbitration, 
particularly conflicts arising in the context of international 
commercial transactions. ”18
State statutes devoted to arbitration generally provide for the 
enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate by acknowl­
edging their validity and providing machinery for their 
enforcement.19 The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) adopted 
in more than thirty states adopts this standard pattern,20 as 
does New York’s Civil Practice and Rules.21 As would be
16 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see infra 
notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
17 I. Macneil, A m e r ic a n  A r b it r a t io n  La w  41-42 (1992).
18 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins., 567 N.E.2d 969, 973 (N.Y. 1991) (citing
Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (N.Y.
1982)).
19 Alabama is among the few states that have resisted arbitration.
Alabama Code, § 8-1-41(3) makes written dispute arbitration
agreements invalid and unenforceable. See Terminix (1995). When 
the FAA applies, an inconsistent state statute is preempted and state 
courts must at least stay the circumscribed litigation in situations 
paralleling those giving rise to stays in federal courts, and arguably 
should do so "in a summary and speedy disposition of the motion 
or petition.” Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 29.
20 UAA Sections 1 and 2.
21 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. §§ 7501-7503 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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expected, state statutes designed to accommodate international 
dispute resolution contemplate few obstacles to enforcement of 
commercial arbitration clauses falling within their ambit.22
Although, Section 2’s preemptive power has been established
for well over a decade, the FAA nowhere contains language
preempting state law. Section 2’s viability in state courts is
purely of judicial origin. As Justice O’Connor has conceded:
I have no doubt that Congress could enact, in the first in­
stance, a federal arbitration statute that displaces most 
state arbitration laws. But I also have no doubt that, in 
1925, Congress enacted no such statute.23
Tell-tale signs in the statute itself bear this out. Sections 3, 
4 and 10, critical parts of the original chapter, refer to courts 
“of the United States,” a time-honored reference to federal 
courts. Few would dispute that the FAA’s role in state courts, 
the product of judicial elaboration, is not apparent to the 
uninitiated observer.24 It would thus be of advantage to secure 
a clearer picture through statute.25
22 California’s international title, for example, defines the requisite 
agreement broadly, and mandates that state courts, if timely 
petitioned, stay judicial proceedings covered by the agreement. Cal. 
Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1297.72-1297.82 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
23 Terminix, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
24 For example, does FAA § 10 (grounds for vacatur) apply in state 
courts? Lawyers at present must answer that it depends upon whether 
the otherwise applicable state provision unduly interferes with the 
objectives of the FAA. Thus, the answer, and in effect the FAA’s 
applicability, could vary from state to state. See supra Chapter 7 (§ 
7.3).
25 The New York Convention does not expressly mandate state court 
enforcement of arbitration agreements falling under the Convention. 
The better view, however, is that to parallel the well-established 
preemptive character of § 2, state courts also should be bound to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate under the Convention. See generally 
Washington Report. Much contract-based litigation is filed in state
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10.2.7 I t  W i l l  A cco m m o d a te  A d v a n ce s  in  T e c h n o lo g y
The Argument: Because it is flexible and broadly phrased in 
crucial respects, the Model Law will not quickly be overtaken 
by practices promoted by innovations in telecommunications.
Critique and Further Discussion: Because of the rapidity of 
advancements in computer and satellite-assisted communica­
tion, it is difficult to state with confidence that a document 
conceived in 1985 will meet the needs of the 21st century. 
Nonetheless, those few formal requirements to be found in the 
Model Law seem not to preclude alternatives made possible by 
telecommunications. For example, although the arbitration 
agreement must be in writing, that requirement is met if the 
agreement is contained in “means of telecommunication which 
provide a record of the agreement.”26 Although no similar 
definition accompanies the rule for awards, which are to be “in
courts. Even if the Convention did not apply in state courts, Chapter 
2’s removal provision would reduce the potential for state court 
emasculation of the Convention’s Article II. State courts, particularly 
those of New York, have acknowledged duties under the Convention. 
In Cooper v. Atelier de la Motobecane, 442 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y. 
1982), the highest court of that state interpreted the Convention to 
preclude pre-award attachment in state courts, relying on a line of 
federal cases to the same effect. That court has confirmed the 
applicability of the Convention on other occasions: “[w]e recognize 
strong policy concerns of international comity which enjoin us to 
enforce arbitration agreements when the Convention requires it.” 
Corcoran, 567 N.E.2d at 973 (citations omitted).
26 See also Article 3 which provides that a written communication is 
deemed received if it is “sent to the addressee’s last known...mailing 
address...by any...means which provides a record of the attempt to 
deliver it.” This presumably would include an e-mail sent to the 
addressee’s last known e-mail address.
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writing” and “signed” by the arbitrators,27 the anomaly is not 
insurmountable. Even without legislative rectification, it is 
likely that American courts will give “writing” a parallel 
meaning to that applicable to agreements to arbitrate; conse­
quently, awards dispatched by e-mail should suffice unless the 
parties have imposed a different requirement.28
Also consistent with the likelihood that commercial disputes 
will become increasingly technical are the Model Law’s 
provisions allowing the tribunal to appoint experts. This 
represents no change in comparison to the practice that has 
developed under the FAA, especially when the parties have 
selected standard rules that contain elaborate provisions 
concerning tribunal experts, such as those sponsored by the 
AAA (International Rules), WIPO,29 and UNCITRAL.30 The 
express authorization in the Model Law31 does remove any
27 Model Law, Art. 31(1).
28 It may be well to define “signature” within the New Act to include 
any commercially reasonable means of source authentication.
29 Article 55.
30 Article 27.
31 Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
(a) may appoint one or more experts to report to it on specific 
issues to be determined by the arbitral tribunal;
(b) may require a party to give the expert any relevant infor­
mation or to produce, or to provide access to, any relevant 
documents, goods or other property for his inspection.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if a party so requests or 
if the arbitral tribunal considers it necessary, the expert shall, 
after delivery of his written or oral report, participate in a hear­
ing where the parties have the opportunity to put questions to 
him and to present expert witnesses in order to testify on the 
points at issue.
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doubt that may have remained in situations in which the parties 
have not adopted rules covering tribunal experts.32
Moreover, the pliable, non-mandatory nature of the Model 
and its ability to be supplemented by the parties, would allow 
them to superimpose upon the Model’s default regime detailed 
confidentiality and secrecy procedures, such as those intro­
duced by the WIPO Rules.33
As suggested in Chapter 6, in the near future, international 
arbitrations may run their course without the parties or arbitra­
tors physically assembling, such as by using video conferences
32 The AAA Commercial Rules appear not to contain an express 
authorization regarding tribunal experts. However, given the consi­
stency with which international texts (including NAFTA, art. 1113) 
have authorized the use of tribunal experts, the reservations ex­
pressed one decade ago by the Washington Report seem provincial, 
myopic and built upon misconception. The Report at 317 questions:
Would the tribunal be able and willing to select truly qualified, 
independent experts? Would some tribunals be tempted to abuse this 
privilege by appointing experts even when they are not truly needed? 
Would the use of such experts unnecessarily prolong the hearing and 
increase the costs by increase in expert’s fees and the extra hearing 
days? Additionally, such a provision would be unlikely to win the 
support of the legal profession. United States trial lawyers are 
accustomed to selecting and working with their own experts. They 
would be wary of a tribunal’s active participation in this process 
(paragraphs merged).
These criticisms tend to reflect a generally dim, parental view of 
arbitrators and to assume that appointment of experts will be favored 
by arbitrators in a significant percentage of cases (costs notwith­
standing). In the author’s experience, arbitrators are not quick to 
appoint experts and are generally sensitive to the cost and delay 
implications of the decisions they take. Regardless, the tribunal 
expert provisions of the Model Law are subject to contrary agree­
ment of the parties {Id., Art. 26 (1), reprinted at supra note 31). 
Consequently, the potential for abuse cited in the Report appears 
exaggerated.
33 See WIPO Rules, Arts. 52, 71-73.
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and e-mail. Intriguing issues arise because the Model Law 
depends in part upon territorial delimitations. For example, 
Article 1(2) states that all but a few of the Model’s provisions 
“apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of this 
state.” Covered by this limitation are such important support­
ing functions as the appointment of arbitrators (Articles 11(3) 
and 15) and the grant of interim measures (Article 17). 
Elsewhere, in Article 20 (1), the Model provides that “the 
parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration” failing 
which, “the place of arbitration shall be determined by the 
arbitral tribunal.” That place in turn is to be mentioned in the 
award, which “shall be deemed to have been made at that 
place.”34 The Model Law places no strictures, physical or 
other, upon the parties or the tribunal in designating the place, 
except that, the tribunal shall have “regard to the circumstanc­
es of the case, including the convenience of the parties.”
The deemed place of the award is important because, under 
the Model, petitions to set aside an award allowed under 
Article 34 are to be accepted only by designated courts of the 
state in whose territory the arbitration has its place.35 The 
hypothetical arbitration set forth in Chapter 6 attempted to 
introduce some of the issues that might arise from arbitrations 
having no physical nexus to the seat designated by the parties 
or the tribunal. In anticipation of the “seats-of-convenience” 
question, lawmakers would be well to consider the physical 
nexus that shall suffice to earn the assistance and establish the
34 Model Law, Art. 31(3).
35 Id , Art. 1(2). By contrast, the Model Law does not preclude a court 
in an adopting state from entertaining requests for interim relief in 
relation to an arbitration the “place” of which is abroad. Id., Arts. 
1(2) and 9.
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award set-aside jurisdiction of the local courts. After all, one 
can read the Model Law so that “place” of arbitration is purely 
a juridical construct—a legal fiction.36
Noncentralized proceedings are also facilitated by Model
Law Article 20(2) which provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this 
article [requiring that a place be designated] the arbitral 
tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet 
at any place it considers appropriate for consultation 
among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the 
parties, or for inspection of goods, other property or 
documents.
Another Model Law provision that is consistent with the 
“on-line” future relates to applicable law. Article 28 allows the 
tribunal to employ such choice of law rules as it deems 
applicable. Accordingly, learned disagreement notwithstand­
ing,37 to the extent traditional, statist conflicts analysis seems 
inappropriate, the tribunal presumably could develop, by 
analogy to existing rules, its own approach tailored to the fact 
e.g., that the sale in question was concluded over the 
internet.38 Similarly, the Model Law’s instruction that the 
tribunal “take into account the usages of the trade applicable
36 One might expect an amendment to Article 1(2) which adds, for 
example:
For purposes of this Act ‘in the territory’ of this State includes 
circumstances in which this State has both been designated as the 
place of arbitration under Article 20 and has a reasonable relation to 
the proceedings, any party or arbitrator, or to the subject matter in 
dispute.
37 Saville Report at para. 225 (“tribunal cannot simply make up [con­
flicts] rules”).
38 This may require a reconsideration of the traditional connecting 
factors such that the place of performance and the place of formation 
will take on specialized definitions when the transaction is on-line.
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to the transaction” allows the tribunal to consider mercantile 
customs peculiar to on-line transactions. Possible amendments 
to the Model Law’s choice of law provisions are discussed in 
Chapter 12 (§ 12.12).
10.2.8 T h e M o d e l L aw  A l lo w s  F o r  N o n -A r b itr a l  
T ech n iq u es t o  F u n c tio n  a n d  D e v e lo p
The Argument: Arbitration is only one alternative to litigation 
embraced by the international business community. Mediation 
and Med-Arb are also commonly used. There is nothing in the 
Model law to preclude continued resort to collaborative 
techniques and the innovation that has characterized commer­
cial ADR.
Critique and Further Discussion: International disputes 
frequently, if not by definition, involve different business and 
legal cultures. Some of these value collaboration over confron­
tation. Such sensibilities may combine with simple economics 
to make mediation preferable to the more adversarial and 
usually more costly arbitration. There has been increasing 
recognition of the virtues of mediation and med-arb in particu­
lar, as evidenced by the plentiful model clauses to be found 
among institutionally sponsored materials.39
Rather than regard the Model Law’s silence as a strength, 
lawmakers should consider including affirmative endorsement 
of non-arbitral dispute processing. California’s implementation 
of the Model, for example, adds to the standard text a chapter 
on conciliation. To the Model’s standard provisions, moreover,
39 See, e.g., WIPO Booklet 446(E) (1995), at 74.
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is added one encouraging the tribunal to promote settlement 
and with the parties permission to use non-arbitral methods to 
that end “at any time during the arbitral proceedings.”40
10.3 Potential Arguments Against Adopting the 
UNCITRAL Model Law
10.3 .1  It  Is Too  C o m preh ensive
The Argument: One arguable virtue attributable to the FAA’s 
fragmentary character is that it leaves ample room for judicial 
law-making.41 Of necessity, courts have developed an indige­
nous (if not uniform) case law to deal with the many issues to 
which the statute does not speak. Indeed, it may be supposed 
that the FAA’s skeletal form has promoted longevity, there 
being relatively little in it to betray antiquation. Those partial 
to the common law model in its purest form may hesitate to 
depart from the FAA’s bare bones edifice, and the resulting 
case-by-case methodology.
Critique and Further Discussion: The argument assumes that 
there is some inherent advantage to incremental judge-made 
law. That position would be more compelling if judicial law 
making were centralized, rather than diffuse and unpredictable; 
Supreme Court review is exceptional and left to their own 
predilections, appellate courts have regularly diverged on 
important issues. Thus, another, perhaps more realistic, way 
to view the judiciary’s role in relation to the FAA is that by 
failing to address myriad questions, the FAA has forced the
40 Cal. Civ. Proc. §§ 1297.301.
41 Cf Rivkin and Kellner at 548-49.
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courts to enter the fray, occasioning divergent opinions which 
could have been avoided by more comprehensive legislative 
action.
10.3.2 It Is U n fa m ilia r  (F o re ig n ), A nd  W i l l  S t im u la te  
L it ig a t io n
The Argument: Change comes at an obvious cost—the learning 
curve. Even judges and lawyers operating in the utmost good 
faith will spend time assimilating the new text; initially, the 
result may be additional litigation, undertaken for the purpose 
of testing the law’s vagaries.42 Appeals will rise as well, in 
part because lower court judges will be inclined to borrow 
from the familiar, regardless of whether the Model Law in fact 
is amenable to an FAA-like approach on the particular issue in 
question. Those familiar with the Model Law will enjoy a 
natural advantage; accordingly, one elite cadre of specialists 
(Model law aficionados) in the short term will replace another 
(those presently comfortable with the present hybrid curial 
law).43
And what of the well thought-through solutions to be found 
in the FAA cases amassed since 1925? Certainly, a wholesale 
abandonment of this jurisprudence, which in the main contin­
ues to serve well, could not be the way forward. Since party 
autonomy has been well-enshrined in the FAA, the preferable 
approach may be to let the disputants fix the various details of 
the reference to arbitration by adopting one of the readily
42 See id. at 554-55.
43 Cf. id. at 554 (temporary loss of expertise would engender uncer­
tainty).
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available rules formulations drafted and regularly updated by 
experts. In fact, it might be said that the Model Law would be 
largely redundant in most international arbitrations because 
parties ordinarily incorporate such rules texts into their agree­
ment to arbitrate (either directly or indirectly by designating an 
institution the rules of which will apply).
Critique and Further Discussion: Much of the forgoing, 
which in the main argues that “it ain’t broke or at least not 
that broke,” is true. It would, however, be true of any 
enactment designed to consolidate and modernize the law 
addressing international arbitration.
Legislative inertia, fed by all of the above factors, is particu­
larly difficult to counteract when the present system seems to 
be far from the brink. Nonetheless, a few points are germane. 
First, the ability of the relevant communities to assimilate a 
Model Law-based statute ought to be relatively great because 
of the data to be found in other jurisdictions, the commentaries 
and travaux that are available and the experience of California 
and other states in functioning under the Law. Second, as more 
fully discussed in the next chapter, various solutions reached 
under the FAA may inform the courts’ construction of the 
Model. The same kinds of issues arise under both regimes. 
Moreover, in the absence of contemporary statutory phrasing, 
U.S. courts have not been slavishly attentive to the FAA’s 
text, but rather have developed many generic principles that 
will travel well into the next regime.44 Significantly, the pro­
arbitration policies characterizing American jurisprudence have
44 E.g., canons of construction for arbitration agreements which favor 
broad submissions, rules of subject matter arbitrability, and the law 
of evident partiality.
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not depended heavily upon the FAA’s text. Third, the Model 
Law would be in many respects a default regime; in the main 
it has a bearing only to the extent that the parties have not 
chosen a different approach, such as by adopting particular 
institutional rules. Fourth, the Model Law’s “foreign” charac­
ter ought not to enter into the discussion, except in pointing to 
its strengths. Why a statute dealing with international disputes 
should be distinctively “American” is perplexing; moreover, 
given the influence of Americans in its drafting, it is hardly 
hostile to American legal culture. Fifth, any prediction that 
abnormal levels litigation will greet the new statute assumes a 
poorly drafted text, a predicate which need not be fulfilled.
10 .3 .3  It  D oes N ot  Go  Fa r  E no ug h
The Argument: If a more elaborate code is to be adopted 
should it not be one that responds to existing deficiencies in the 
law? The more serious issues—those creating the jurisdictional 
splits—are not addressed by the Model Law: When can a court 
consolidate related arbitrations? When has a party waived the 
agreement to arbitrate?45 May an arbitrator award interest and 
at what rate and for how long may it be decreed by the 
tribunal to run? To what extent may an arbitrator have ex parte 
contact with the party appointing him or her, such as to further 
the possible appointment through a pre-appointment interview? 
To what extent may witnesses be interviewed (or otherwise 
prepared) before making an appearance or submitting a written
45 But see Model Law, Art. 8(1) (invocation of agreement to 
arbitrate not to occur later than requesting party’s first substantive 
statement).
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statement to the arbitrators? On what basis may an award be 
returned to tribunal on the ground of newly discovered evi­
dence? May a court enforce awards in the currencies in which 
they are denominated? To what extent may an arbitrator or a 
court order security for costs or for the satisfaction of an 
ultimate award? To what degree may the parties expand the 
bases upon which the award can be reviewed, such as by 
including an errors of law clause in their agreement? To what 
extent may parties limit judicial review of the award by 
agreement?
Critique and Further Discussion: The above-mentioned 
weaknesses are merely the result the Model Law’s silence on 
certain questions; they do not occur because of a contrary 
provision in the Law. Thus, these are matters that can be dealt 
with in the implementation of the Law, as addressed below in 
Chapters 11 and 12. Ultimately, in the interest of simplifica­
tion and to leave the courts appropriate discretion, certain 
issues may remain unaddressed by design.
10.3.4 U n if ic a t io n  is I l lu s iv e  a n d  I l lu s o r y
The Argument: The supposed virtue of adopting the internation­
al approach for the sake of familiarity abroad and uniformity 
among arbitral venues in fact has already been thwarted by the 
variations to be found within the existing national laws said to 
be based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law. Tinkering by 
domestic lawmakers has made for appreciable deviations from 
the standard text.
Critique and Further Discussion: It is true that some 
variation characterizes the arbitration laws said to be inspired
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by the Model Law. That is a natural consequence of the 
distinctive needs and legal traditions influencing law-makers in 
those states; the Model Law’s enactment in the United States 
will be no different in that sense. Even if contributing to 
unification of transnational law were a principal aim of 
lawmakers in the United States (a dubious proposition) 
certainly an enactment resembling the Model Law accomplish­
es the goal far more effectively than the present regime, or one 
crafted de novo.
10.3.5 I t  W i l l  In c r e a se  C o u r t  I n v o lv e m e n t  in  t h e  
A r b itr a t io n  P r o c e ss
The Argument: In its official form, the Model Law authorizes 
the parties to petition courts to decide challenges to arbitrators 
(Article 13(3)), to remove arbitrators for failure to act (Article 
14 (1)) and to grant interim measures of protection (Article 9), 
three entitlements which portend increased reliance on the 
courts and a consequent draining of judicial resources. Addi­
tionally, the provisions will be used by deleterious parties to 
cause delay.
Critique and Further Discussion: The roles expressly given 
to the federal courts under the FAA do not contemplate the 
three avenues of court access mentioned above. As more fully 
discussed in the next chapter, however, two of these judicial 
functions are dependent upon a failure of other mechanisms of 
first resort; these pre-conditions for court involvement should 
limit greatly the number of petitions that are properly before 
the court. The third category—interim measures—is authorized 
only by negative inference and the substantive grounds for the
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award of such remedies are not set forth in the Model. There­
fore, injunctive relief and related measures will become no 
more available than at present, except in those jurisdictions 
that currently refuse to give any injunctive relief in aid of 
arbitration, citing its inconsistency with the parties’ choice of 
arbitration; subject to legislative or Supreme Court clarifica­
tion, under the Model Law those jurisdictions will presumably 
remain entitled to impose rigorous standards for injunctive 
relief. These matters are revisited in Chapters 10 and 11.
10.3.6 U n if ic a t io n  W o u ld  C om e a t  t h e  E xpense o f  
S t a t e  I n d iv id u a lity  a n d  W a ste
The Argument: Though federal law-makers possess the power 
under the Commerce Clause to promulgate preemptive laws 
affecting international trade, they are not required to do so. To 
date, federal law has not supplanted state law in a comprehen­
sive way in the arbitration field, in effect allowing states to 
elaborate a law of arbitration consistent with their respective 
goals and policies. This species of “subsidiarity,” whether by 
default or design, is appropriate in a union in which state 
attitudes toward arbitration vary widely—indeed from highly 
solicitous to openly hostile.
Leaving aside momentarily the anti-arbitration states, 
adoption of the Model Law will work an egregious waste by 
relegating to episodic application the several statutes designed 
to attract international disputes through modernization. Given 
the recent vintage of such laws, federal adoption in the near 
term would occur just when such codifications were likely 
being assimilated, no doubt causing confusion both in the states
293
Chapter 10: Debating the Concept
that have replicated the Model Law in their own way (such as 
California) and those that have elected to depart appreciably 
from it.
As for the few states that have resisted the ascendancy of 
arbitration, the Model Law will involve the courts in those 
states, perhaps both state and federal, in a range of arbitration- 
related matters presently not invited directly by statute, such as 
the determination of challenges and petitions for interim 
measures. The reallocation of judicial resources will come at 
the cost of existing state priorities.
Critique and Further Discussion: The foregoing argument is 
not specific to the Model Law but seems directed at any 
federal attempt to treat international arbitration in a compre­
hensive way. The “distinctiveness” of the respective states’ 
arbitration laws (when combined with the splits among federal 
courts) is what makes for 51 curial laws when, constitutional­
ly, there could be one. The question is in large part a philo­
sophical one, for it is not unreasonable to suggest that arbitra­
tion, a contract-based proceeding, ought to be covered by state 
law, just as contracts generally are.
Whatever the merits of this position may be in relation to 
non-intemational commercial arbitration, the international trade 
domain is one traditionally associated with federal policies and 
initiatives; to bring unity to an important aspect of that domain 
could hardly be said to be inconsistent with tenets of American 
federalism as ordinarily understood.
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THE MODEL LAW’S IMPACT 
UPON AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
Chapter Contents
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11.3 Areas of Broad Agreement
11.4 Tribunal Powers and Duties
11.5 The Model Law’s Impact Upon Judicial Machinery
11.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a brief synopsis of the Model Law’s 
structure and content, followed by more detailed discussion of 
the Model Law in comparison to the American position, with 
emphasis upon tribunal powers and duties and the role of the 
courts. Only in passing this chapter identifies changes or 
clarifications necessary in the Model Law before its implemen­
tation within the United States (the New Act), a topic pursued 
with emphasis in Chapter 12.
11.2 The Model Law in Brief Overview
11.2 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
The Model Law comprises thirty-six articles organized in eight 
chapters. The first chapter sets forth general provisions. 
Chapters Two through Eight govern in turn: (2) the Arbitration 
Agreement, (3) Composition of the Tribunal, (4) Jurisdiction
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of the Tribunal, (5) Conduct of the Proceedings (6) Making of 
the Award and Termination of Proceedings, (7) Recourse 
Against the Award, and (8) Recognition and Enforcement of 
Awards.
By its scope it is limited to arbitrations which are both 
“international” and “commercial.” The former term is defined 
within the Model Law itself.1 The meaning of “commercial” 
by contrast is the subject of an official footnote giving a non- 
exhaustive list of transactions thought to qualify and urging 
that the term should be given a wide interpretation.2 The 
Model’s first chapter also contains a territorial delimitation 
which governs many of its provisions; most of them are
1 Under Article 1(3), an arbitration is “international” if:
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the 
conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in dif­
ferent States; or
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in 
which the parties have their places of business:
(i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, 
the arbitration agreement;
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the 
commercial relationship is to be performed or the place 
with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most 
closely connected; or
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the 
arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.
Article 1(4) provides subsidiary rules for applying Article l(3)(a).
2 A definition of “commercial” could not be agreed upon; the footnote 
is a compromise. K. Chueng, The Meaning of “Commercial” and 
“International” in the UNCITRAL Model Law: The Status in 
Ontario, [1998](3) Arb. & Disp. Resol. L.J., 224, 225-28. Califor­
nia has incorporated the official footnote, with some modifications, 
into the statutory framework, placing it on an equal footing with the 
definition of “international.” See Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1297.16. 
Presumably, the New Act would follow this sensible example.
296
Chapter 11: Model’s Impact: American Law
intended to apply only when the place of arbitration is within 
the state enacting the Model Law.
11.2 .2  Th e  M o d e l  L a w  in  Br ie f
The Arbitration Agreement
The Model Law defines arbitration agreements in a familiar 
way3 to include arbitration clauses and separate agreements; 
it requires that arbitration agreements be in writing. The 
writing requirement is satisfied by exchanges in various means 
of telecommunications that provide a record of the agreement 
or by exchanges of pleadings in which one party asserts (and 
the other fails to deny) the existence of the agreement.4 Unless
3 Article 7(1) defines “arbitration agreement” as:
an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or 
certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between 
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contrac­
tual or not.
The phrasing is similar to that found in the New York Convention 
in Article II. Omitted from the above text, however, is the Conven­
tion’s apparent qualification that the agreement to arbitrate concern 
“a subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” Yet, the 
Model Law makes lack of subject-matter arbitrability a ground for 
setting aside awards, and presumably, a court asked to give effect to 
an arbitral agreement may consider subject matter arbitrability before 
staying its proceedings under Article 8 (1), which allows courts to 
find that the agreement to arbitrate is “null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed.”
4 Model Law, Art. 7(2). The same paragraph also allows an arbitra­
tion agreement to be incorporated by reference provided both the 
incorporating and incorporated documents are in writing. Id. The 
English Arbitration Act 1996 is more liberal than the Model. Section 
5(2)(c) thereof appears broad enough to include verbal agreements 
which incorporate a written text containing an arbitration clause.
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a court finds that the arbitration agreement is “null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed” it must “refer the 
parties to arbitration,” provided the dispute is covered by the 
agreement.5
The Arbitral Tribunal
If the parties do not agree upon a different number, the 
tribunal shall comprise three members, who are to be indepen­
dent and impartial.6 The members may be of any nationality 
unless the parties agree otherwise7 and the parties may agree 
upon the procedure by which they are to be appointed.8 If 
another procedure is not agreed upon, the tribunal is constitut­
ed by each party selecting one arbitrator; the two arbitrators so 
appointed jointly designate the third.9
5 Model Law, Art. 8(1). The quoted language mirrors that found in 
the New York Convention, in Article 11(3). It is likely that Ameri­
can courts will consider the “null and void” clause broad enough to 
include situations in which the arbitration clause has been waived, 
a fact-dependent issue concerning which there is much federal case 
law. It would not be a dramatic alteration in the Model’s text to add 
an express mention of waiver in the null and void clause, for the 
sake of clarity.
6 Model Law, Art. 12.
7 Id., Art. 11(1).
8 Id., Art. 11(2).
9 Id., Art. 11(3). In contrast to the UNCITRAL Rules (Art. 7(1)) the 
Model Law does not provide that the third arbitrator “will act as 
presiding arbitrator of the tribunal.” Article 29 of the Model, 
however, assumes that there will be, among multiple arbitrators, a 
presiding arbitrator, who can be empowered by the parties or the 
tribunal to decide questions of procedure alone.
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The arbitral tribunal expressly has the power to determine its 
own jurisdiction,10 to take interim measures as it deems neces­
sary in relation to the subject-matter in dispute,11 to meet 
away from the arbitral situs as it considers appropriate,12 to 
terminate the proceedings for a claimant’s failure to file a 
claim,13 to proceed despite a respondent’s non-participa­
tion,14 to appoint experts15 and to “determine the admissi­
bility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.”16 
It may also request court assistance in taking evidence.17
Under certain conditions the tribunal may determine the 
place of arbitration,18 the language or languages of the arbi­
tration,19 whether to hold a hearing,20 and the law applicable 
to the substance of the dispute.21 In general, the tribunal may 
“conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appro­
priate,” provided that the parties are “treated with equality” 
and that “each is given a full opportunity of presenting his 
case.”22 Awards and other decisions of the tribunal may be 
made by a majority of tribunal members.23
10 Model Law, Art. 16.
11 Id., Art. 17.
12 Id., Art. 20(2).
13 Id., Art. 25(a).
14 Id., Art. 25(b).
15 Id., Art. 26.
16 Id., Art. 19(2).
17 Id., Art. 27.
18 Id., Art 20.
19 Id., Art. 22(1). The tribunal may require that documentary evidence 
be translated into the language or languages designated.
20 Id., Art. 24(1).
21 Id., Art. 28(2).
22 Id., Arts. 18, 19(2).
23 Id., Art. 29. Procedural questions can be delegated to the presiding 
arbitrator if all members of the tribunal or the parties agree.
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The Role o f the Judiciary
The Model Law attempts to strike the balance between judicial 
interference and judicial indifference; in the result, courts are 
called upon to perform several functions, but only those to be 
found in the Law.24 First, they are to enforce arbitration 
clauses indirectly by refusing to proceed with matters governed 
by an arbitration agreement.25 Second, they may entertain 
requests for interim relief.26 Third, under certain circumstanc­
es, they are to decide challenges to arbitrators27 and to arbitral 
jurisdiction.28 Fourth, under specific conditions, they must 
appoint or replace arbitrators.29 Fifth, courts are to entertain 
petitions to set aside awards on grounds enumerated in the 
Law30 and to recognize and enforce awards subject to the 
resisting party establishing one of the grounds for non-recogni­
tion set forth in the Law.31
11.3 Areas of Broad Agreement
Concordant with the general theory of arbitration observed in 
developed legal systems, American law and the Model Law 
agree that the arbitral agreement, whether reached before or
24 Id., Art. 5.
25 Id., Art. 8.
26 Id., Art. 9.
27 Id., Art. 13.
28 Id., Art. 16(3).
29 Id., Arts. 14, 15.
30 Id., Art. 34.
31 Id., Art. 35.
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after dispute arises, is the vehicle by which disputants waive 
judicial processing of the dispute and is the foundation of 
arbitral jurisdiction. Accordingly, under either regime an 
award rendered when there is no arbitral agreement or an 
award that exceeds the scope of the mandate given by the 
agreement to arbitrate is subject to nullification in a judicial 
proceeding.32 Both regimes also recognize that for the arbitra­
tion agreement to have real significance, it must be recognized 
by courts when invoked by a party to it; stays are not discre­
tionary under either scheme.
Each of the two systems gives meaning to the process in a 
further way—by limiting judicial review of the award to non­
substantive matters, thus in general giving preclusive effect to 
the findings of fact and law made by the arbitral tribunal.33 
Under either framework, the arbitration clause is autonomous 
from the commercial contract in which it is embedded34 and 
an arbitral tribunal has the competence to determine its own 
competence, i.e., to assess inter alia the existence of the 
agreement to arbitrate and its scope.35
32 Compare FAA § 10(d) with Model Law, Art. 34(2)(a)(iii).
33 Neither the FAA nor the Model Law provides for nullification of 
awards for errors of law. The grounds for attacking awards are 
related more to the integrity of the process and to the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal. Some federal jurisdictions have recognized a limited 
non-statutory basis for vacating awards—“manifest disregard of the 
law. ” Even courts that still entertain arguments on that basis have 
given it an exceedingly narrow construction.
34 See Model Law, Art. 16(1) and, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). But see § 11.4.3 infra, 
distinguishing court practice and arbitral practice in relation to 
severability.
35 See Model Law, Art. 16(1); Kaplan (1995).
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Both the Model Law and existing American law recognize 
a role for the judiciary beyond the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and awards; the appointment and replacement of 
arbitrators, for example, is expressly mentioned in the FAA36 
and in the Model Law.37 Each, however, has also adopted a 
policy of limiting judicial intervention, though not to an 
identical extent.
11.4 Tribunal Powers and Duties
11.4.1 In  General
The FAA addresses the functioning of the arbitral tribunal only 
indirectly, through vacatur provisions. The Model Law would 
thus bring an enlargement in statutory coverage. Because the 
majority of provisions to be found in the Model Law have 
been prefigured by rule formulations already operating within 
the United States, it is not correct to suppose that the Model 
would introduce a panoply of new ideas and unfamiliar 
concepts to American practice. It is more accurate to suggest 
that upon the Model Law’s adoption, the quasi-legislative 
authority of rules chosen by the parties will be supported by a 
consonant statutory framework that operates in the presumably 
rare event in which no rules have been adopted. The following 
selective survey is designed to demonstrate this notion while 
also giving a sense of the jurisprudence of international 
arbitration.
36 FAA, § 5.
37 Model Law, Art. ll(3)(a).
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11.4.2 In d e pe n d e n c e  a n d  Im pa rtia lity
Tribunal members whether presiding or party-appointed must 
remain independent of all parties and impartial throughout the 
proceedings; an arbitrator is under a continuing duty to 
disclose circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts 
about his or her independence or impartiality, which duty 
begins when a prospective arbitrator is first approached about 
a possible appointment.38 Equivalent duties are found in the 
several state laws addressing international disputes39 and in 
virtually all international rule formulations.40 Though the dual 
standard sometimes recognized in domestic American arbitra­
tion remains a source of confusion and apprehension, profes­
sionals will hardly be unaware that the expectation in interna­
tional arbitration is that arbitrators are neither agents nor 
advocates for the parties appointing them.
11.4.3 Co m p e t e n c e d e  la  Co m peten ce  a n d  S e v e r a b i l i t y
Under the Model Law, the tribunal may determine its own 
jurisdiction and for that purpose the arbitral agreement is to be 
treated as being separate from the agreement in which it may 
be embedded, such that an eventual finding that the latter was 
null and void does not imply that the tribunal acted without
38 Id., Art. 12.
39 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.124. The California statute 
curtails a prospective arbitrator’s discretion by setting forth the 
kinds of facts which must be disclosed. Id. § 1297.121.
40 See, e.g., ICC Rules, Art. 7(1)(2); AAA International Rules, Art. 
7; UNCITRAL Rules, Arts. 9 and 10.
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jurisdiction.41 That the tribunal need not refer jurisdictional 
questions to a local court before proceeding is accepted in 
American law; that also seems to be the premise adopted by 
most international rule formulations, although any such 
formulation will be subject to the mandatory procedures of the 
situs of arbitration. As discussed above in Chapter Three, in 
the United States, as in certain other systems, the preclusive 
effect of the tribunal’s jurisdictional determination (as reflected 
in the level of judicial review) will depend upon whether the 
parties unambiguously dedicated the jurisdictional issue to the 
tribunal.42
The severability principle—which establishes the clause’s 
autonomy—is recognized in many modem statutes and in 
various mle texts.43 For arbitration as an institution it solves 
an age-old problem that would otherwise unravel many an 
arbitration. In American jurisprudence, it has been an impor­
tant part of court practice under the FAA.44 Only those
41 Model Law, Art. 16(1).
42 Kaplan (1995). The Model Law by contrast does not address the 
preclusive effect of the arbitrators’ jurisdictional findings, but 
contemplates that court review of those finding can be had before 
the award is rendered, provided the tribunal chooses to decide the 
question as a preliminary matter (Art. 16(3)). Conceivably, even 
under the Model Law, the level of review employed by the court 
will depend upon whether the parties set the jurisdictional issue 
squarely before the arbitrators; thus the Kaplan doctrine, in some 
form, will likely be employed to answer the question left unan­
swered under the Model Law. The level of review issue would also 
arise when a court is asked to set aside an award under Article 
34(2)(a)(i).
43 See Chapter 3, § 3.2.2.
44 The American variant of the severability doctrine holds that for 
purposes of determining enforceability, arbitration agreements 
governed by the FAA are conceptually independent of the contract
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American statutes devoted to international disputes have made 
it a part of the tribunal’s  jurisdictional self-assessment.45
11.4 .4  Interim  M easures by  the Tribunal
Under the Model Law, a tribunal may order any interim 
measures it deems necessary “in respect of the subject matter 
of the dispute.”46 Most international rule formulations autho­
rize the arbitrators to take interim measures, in some form,
in which they are contained. Courts must look no further than the 
agreement to arbitrate when asked to grant a stay or to enforce the 
arbitration clause directly; they may not assess the validity, 
meaning, or enforceability of the contract in which the clause is 
embedded. A court’s determination is confined to whether the 
clause, when considered alone, exists, covers the dispute in question 
and is free of invalidating defects.
The severability principle was established by the Supreme Court 
in Prima Paint (1967); the Court held that under the FAA, allega­
tions of fraud in the inducement of the underlying contract were for 
the arbitrator to assess, not for the judge before whom the clause 
was invoked. The Court’s reasoning depended heavily upon the 
analytical distinctness of the arbitration agreement. 388 U.S. at 403- 
404. Federal courts have honored the severability principle in 
analogous settings not involving fraud in the inducement. A general 
rule has thus emerged: assuming a broad arbitration clause, “[a] 
federal court must not remove from the arbitrators consideration of 
a substantial challenge to a contract unless there has been an 
independent challenge to the making of the arbitration clause itself. ” 
Union Mutual Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 
F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1985).
45 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.161.
46 Model Law, Art. 17.
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and the Model Law’s text on the subject was obviously 
influenced by the corresponding UNCITRAL Rules provi­
sion.47
The UNCITRAL phrasing implies that the measures must 
relate to the subject matter in dispute; it therefore leaves some 
doubt as to provisional remedies designed to secure the award 
or a party’s costs. The Model Law’s travaux appears to 
indicate that the power granted to the tribunal was a liberal 
one.48 Yet, cautious arbitrators might be reluctant to ignore
47 Article 26(1) of those Rules in pertinent part provides:
At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may take any 
interim measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject- 
matter of the dispute, including measures for the conservation 
of the goods forming the subject-matter in dispute, such as 
ordering their deposit with a third person or the sale of perish­
able goods.
Similarly, the AAA Commercial Rules (1996) provide at Article 34: 
The Arbitrator may issue such orders for interim relief as may 
be deemed necessary to safeguard the property that is the 
subject matter of the arbitration, without prejudice to the rights 
of the parties or to the final determination of the dispute.
48 In their study, Holtzmann and Neuhaus illuminate the thinking 
behind the authorization given arbitrators under Article 17.
At various times during the legislative history the following 
such measures were mentioned as possibly within the scope of 
[the arbitrators’] power: measures to preserve goods such as by 
depositing them with a third person or selling perishable items; 
opening bank letters of credit; using or maintaining machines 
or completing phases of construction where necessary to 
prevent irreparable harm; preserving evidence until a later stage 
of the proceedings; and measures to protect trade secrets and 
proprietary information. At no time, though, was it suggested 
that this list was exclusive or even that it covered the most 
common forms of interim relief.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 531 (citations omitted).
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the apparent disputed-subject-matter requirement.49 Given the 
foregoing, the disappearance of that qualification in the AAA’s 
recently revised International Rules was no doubt quite deliber­
ate.50 The New Act should also jettison the confusing and 
unnecessary limitation that the measures be “in respect of the 
subject matter in dispute.”
In general, the American cases support the power of arbitra­
tors to order provisional measures as demonstrated by Sperry 
International Trade v. Government of Israel,51 in which the 
Second Circuit affirmed a lower court determination that 
arbitrators seated in New York had acted within their powers 
in ordering a sovereign state to pay a disputed letter of credit 
disbursement into an escrow account. The decision technically 
addresses the situation in which the tribunal has placed its 
provisional measure in an interim award, but a fortiori 
supports tribunal powers to issue the underlying order.52
49 Cf. Charles Constr. Co. v. Derderian, 586 N.E. 2d 992 (Mass. Sup. 
Jud. Ct. 1992) (construing AAA Construction Industry Rules as not 
authorizing arbitral orders to provide security for costs; arbitrators’ 
interim award vacated). The WIPO Rules do not leave the tribunal’s 
powers regarding security for costs in doubt. Article 46(b) states:
At the request of a party, the Tribunal may, if it considers it to 
be required by exceptional circumstances, order the other party 
to provide security, in a form to be determined by the Tribunal, 
for the claim or counterclaim, as well as for costs [of the 
proceeding, including legal fees].
Such an order may, under the same article take the form of an 
interim award.
50 Article 21(1) of that text provides: “At the request of a party, the 
tribunal may take whatever measures it deems necessary, including 
injunctive relief and measures for the conservation of property.”
51 532 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d , 689 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
52 Sperry was to design and build a communications system for the 
Government of Israel (GI). Sperry obtained a letter of credit for the 
GI for approximately $15 million, 532 F. Supp. at 901. It demanded
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Under several rules texts, including the UNCITRAL and the 
AAA International formulations, interim measures can take the 
form of an award,53 as occurred in Sperry above.54 The 
Model Law does not address partial or interim awards. Since 
rule formulations often give the tribunal that prerogative, the 
absence of a Model Law provision ought not to be a limitation
arbitration alleging that the GI had prevented it from performing. 
The GI intended to draw on the letter of credit for transfer to its 
own account. In an unreasoned partial award, the arbitrators ordered 
that the proceeds be paid into a joint escrow account. The district 
court confirmed the award; the GI appealed. In affirming, the 
Second Circuit reasoned that arbitral awards receive very narrow 
review under the FAA and enjoy presumptions of validity under 
New York law and that arbitrators may grant forms of relief not 
available from a court. 689 F.2d at 306 (citing Rochester City Sch. 
Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass’n, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1977)). See 
M. Hoellering, Conservatory and Provisional Measures in Interna­
tional Arbitration, in A rb it r a t io n  a n d  t h e  La w  1992-93, at 114 
(1993).
53 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 26.2; AAA International Rules, Art. 22.2. 
Rules typically also provide that the tribunal may require security 
for the costs of such measures, a standard authorization also found 
in California’s International Act. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.- 
172 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
54 Whether such an award would be enforceable would depend upon 
the nature of the measures embodied in the award. In general, 
partial or interim awards will be confirmed by American courts if 
they determine with finality a discrete issue among those within the 
tribunal’s mandate. Metalgesellschaft A.G. v. M/V Capitan 
Constante, 790 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1986); Island Creek Coal Sales 
Co. v. City of Gainesville, 729 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1984). The 
CPR International Rules encourage the arbitrators to assist the court 
petitioned for enforcement by providing that “[w]ith respect to any 
interim, interlocutory, or partial award, the Tribunal may state in its 
award whether or not it views the award as final for purposes of any 
judicial proceedings in connection therewith.” CPR International 
Rules, Rule 14.1. Similar language would be of benefit in the New 
Act.
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on a tribunal operating under the Model Law. Nonetheless, to 
include such a provision, as lawmakers in California did,55 
would codify more fully American law and remove any doubt 
created by the Model Law’s silence on the issue.
11.4.5 D is c r e t io n  t o  C o n d u c t  t h e  P r o c e e d in g s  a s  
A p p rop riate
Under the Model Law, the tribunal must give each party a 
“full opportunity” to present its case and must treat each “with 
equality,” but otherwise may conduct the proceedings as it 
deems appropriate. Both the maxim-like restraints and the 
broad grant of discretion are pillars of various procedural 
rules56 and numerous statutes. Experienced international 
arbitrators proceeding in the United States will therefore find 
the Model Law’s formula unexceptional.
There is, however, a natural tension between the full 
opportunity requirement and the discretion given to arbitrators 
to advance the proceedings. Can the full opportunity obligation 
be met only by acceding to a party’s every request to present 
argument and evidence? Recent texts give the tribunal specific 
authority with which to counter a party’s extravagant wish­
es.57 Not by accident some formulae have also recast the
55 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.316 provides that the tribunal may:
[a]t any time during the proceedings, make an interim award on any 
matter with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award. The 
interim award may be enforced as a final award.
56 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 15.1; CAMCA Rules, Art. 
17(1).
57 See, e.g., AAA International Rules, Art 16(3):
The tribunal may in its discretion direct the order of proof, bifurcate 
proceedings, exclude cumulative or irrelevant testimony or other
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familiar phrase as “fair opportunity to present....”58 That 
would be a friendly amendment to the Model Law’s official 
text, when enacted in the United States.
The liberal grant of discretion given to arbitrators under the 
Model Law is comparable to that well-recognized under 
American law. Courts have not been quick to second-guess 
tribunal decisions taken to facilitate the proceedings.59 Only 
where serious unfairness marked the process will vacatur be 
had.60
evidence, and direct the parties to focus their presentations on issues 
the decision of which could dispose of all or a part of the case.
58 See, e.g., CAMCA Rules, Art. 17(1); AAA International Rules, 
Art. 16.1.
59 See, e.g., Owen-Williams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 907 F. Supp 134, 138 (D. Md. 1995)(matters of 
“credibility of witnesses and conflicts in testimony . . .  are for the 
arbitrators to resolve, not the reviewing court”); Cearfoss Constr. 
Corp. v. Sabre Constr. Corp., 1989 WL 516375 at *4 (D.D.C. 
1989)(tribunal’s curtailment of cross-examination does not warrant 
vacatur, for “arbitrators must be expected to take actions which will 
expedite the proceedings”); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI 
Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 n.4 (5th Cir.
1995)(“arbitrators’ evidentiary decisions should be reviewed with 
unusual deference”); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1487, 
1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Only the most egregious error which 
resulted in adversely affecting the rights of a party would . . . 
require vacatur”); see also cases cited at infra note 146.
60 For example, when a party is led by the tribunal to believe that 
certain evidence, or a form of it, will not be required or has already 
been established, it is prejudicial misconduct to fault that party’s 
case for a failure to produce that evidence. Gulf Coast Indus. 
Workers Union v. Exxon Co, USA, 70 F.3d 847 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(employer’s failure to present report induced by arbitrators); cf. Iran 
Aircraft Indus, v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 
1992) (analogous decision under the New York Convention).
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The explicit tribunal power given in Model Law Article 25 
to respond to deleterious parties is to be welcomed, but merely 
serves to reinforce the power already found in the more 
recently promulgated rule texts. Such statutory backing is 
especially appropriate given that the sanctions available in that 
Article (e.g. default awards and termination of proceedings) 
are those most likely to raise due process concerns at home, 
and analogous questions abroad.
11.4 .6  Tribunal  Appointed Experts
Under the Model Law, the arbitrators may enlist the help of 
one or more experts; either party, in turn, may require the 
expert to participate in a hearing at which he or she can be 
questioned and at which the parties’ own experts can be heard. 
The FAA does not provide for tribunal experts. Numerous rule 
texts do so provide, however.
11.4.7 Aw ard  Form a n d  Formalities
Under the Model Law, awards must contain a majority of the 
arbitrators’ signatures,61 a date and a place of arbitration 
(which is deemed to be the place of the award’s rendition) and 
the reasons motivating the award.62 With the exception of the 
reasons requirement, these stipulations are probably not subject 
to contrary party agreement.63 They, nevertheless, present
61 If the award does not bear all the arbitrators’ signatures, the reason 
for any omitted signature must be stated in the award. Model Law, 
Art. 31(1).
62 Model Law, Art. 3(2).
63 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 583.
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nothing which is particularly novel in relation to existing 
American practice. Many rules and certain statutory formula­
tions have the same or similar requirements.64 If, as the 
authorities suggest, the award formality provisions of the 
Model Law are mandatory, the New Act would provide an 
invariable yardstick on these issues.65
Under the Model, the parties may agree that no reasons are 
to be given.66 In existing American practice, unreasoned 
awards are common in domestic commercial proceedings and 
are actually encouraged by the AAA in non-international 
cases.67 Thus, a tribunal’s factual findings and legal conclu­
sions often are never disclosed. An award need not even set 
forth separate components of recovery. Consequently, lump­
sum awards are enforceable68 and rather than creating suspi­
64 See, e.g., UAA § 8(a) (award to be “in writing and signed by the 
arbitrators joining the award”); cf. AAA International Rules, Art. 
27 (award to be written, reasoned, and must contain date and place 
where award was made, but no mention of signature; unlike AAA 
Commercial Rules, Art. 42 (signature of majority required)).
65 The requirements are of practical value, of course. The place 
indicated will facilitate New York Convention treatment; the 
signature requirement meets obvious authentication concerns but is 
flexible enough to prevent a discontented arbitrator from thwarting 
the process.
66 They may do so to ensure relative finality, to expedite the delibera­
tive process or to save costs.
67 See AAA A Guide to Arbitration for Business People 10 (1996):
As a general rule, AAA commercial awards consist of a brief 
direction to the parties on a single sheet of paper. Written opinions 
can generate attacks on the award because they identify targets for 
the losing party.
68 See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 
F.2d 862, 867-68 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1990) (award for nearly $1.8 
million need not separately indicate amounts attributable to overhead 
and interest, but sufficed in stating merely: “1) the claim of Federat­
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cion, are, according to one court, “presumed to be correct.”69 
The cases allowing unreasoned awards posit that requiring 
reasons would only “‘perpetuate the delay and expense’ which 
arbitration is designed to prevent.”70 Naturally, an unreasoned 
award is difficult to review substantively;71 as colorful judicial 
dictum has observed, attempting to do so amounts to a 
“judicial snipe hunt.”72
Though reversing the expectation that obtains in domestic 
commercial cases, the Model Law’s insistence upon reasons
ed is denied, 2) Federated shall pay TAB and JVD $1,789,957.89, 
and 3) Federated shall pay all administrative costs of the hearing, all 
attorney fees, and the arbitrators’ compensation and expenses”).
69 Hayne, Miller & Farni, Inc. v. Flume, 888 F. Supp. 949, 958 
(E.D. Wis. 1995).
70 Id. (quoting Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 
1254 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 2675 (1994).
71 See Federated, 894 F.2d at 871. When considering unreasoned 
awards, courts must rely upon inference and information garnered 
from other parts of the record, which itself may consist of very 
little; transcripts are not required and are often dispensed with in 
arbitration. Occasionally, in an effort to inform the parties, 
arbitrators jointly or separately provide a commentary indicating 
their impressions; however, their observations form no part of the 
award. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd., 735 
F. Supp. 1463, 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (arbitrators did not provide 
detailed findings, but supplied individual commentaries, which the 
court described as having “no authoritative or evidentiary signifi­
cance”). American judges generally have no statutory authority to 
require arbitrators to provide reasons to facilitate review. They do, 
however, sometimes remand awards for clarification; the practice, 
nonetheless, seems not to have impaired the arbitrator’s power to 
give unreasoned awards where the parties have not required 
otherwise.
72 Federated, 894 F.2d at 871 (Martin, J., concurring)(a “snipe hunt” 
characterized by “counsel for the parties arguing about contract law 
analysis that may or may not have been manifestly disregarded by 
the arbitrator”).
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for international awards is consistent with the international 
practice reflected in most rules familiar to American arbitrators 
and lawyers.73 The ability of the parties under the Model Law 
to authorize unreasoned awards makes its general rule less 
consequential. Its default rule is nonetheless salutary. Despite 
what the AAA often suggests, participants often do wish to be 
privy to the arbitrators’ reasoning; the exercise also imports a 
sobering influence among the arbitrators by obliging them to 
support their conclusions in writing.74
11.4.8 P ost-Aw a r d  T r ibu n a l  P ow ers
The Model Law provides that for a period of 30 days follow­
ing the award’s receipt, a party may request the tribunal to 
interpret, augment (by rendering an additional award) or 
clerically correct the award. The tribunal may do so if it 
considers the request justified, within 30 days of receiving the 
request (or within 60 days in the case of an additional award). 
New York’s arbitration statute and the UAA have similar 
provisions.75 The FAA contains no direct analogue, howev­
73 E.g., AAA International Rules, Art. 27.3; UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 
32.3; UNCITRAL Model Law, Art. 31(2).
74 Under American practice, separate opinions—whether concurring or 
dissenting—are generally permitted but not required. Cf. Sun Ref. 
& Mktg. Co. v. Statheros Shipping Corp. of Monrovia, Liber., 761 
F. Supp. 29. (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dissenting opinion issued in admiral­
ty dispute; fact of dissent not an issue). The Model Law, like the 
FAA, is silent on the questions of separate and dissenting opinions. 
It seems unnecessary to authorize the practice through an amend­
ment to the Model Law; the pre-New Act practices will presumably 
continue absent an express prohibition.
75 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R., § 7509; UAA, § 9.
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er.76 Enacting this provision of the Model Law would support 
the grant of post-award authority given under many rule texts 
and would be consistent with the practice of remand developed 
by courts, as more fully discussed below (§ 10.5.6).
1 1 .4 .9  A pplicable  Law
According to the Model Law, if the parties have not designated 
the law to be applied, the tribunal has broad discretion in the 
selection of conflicts methodology and ultimately, therefore, in 
the choice of substantive law.77 The structure of Article 28(2) 
and the Secretariat’s commentary suggest that the application 
of a municipal law is contemplated.78 In precluding tribunal 
selection of a-national principles, such as the lex mercatoria, 
the Model Law adopts a conservative default rule,79 one more 
restrictive than the apparent American position.
76 The FAA, § 13, does authorize a court to modify or correct an 
award as to clerical matters or to correct an excessive award, 
provided the exorbitant portion can be culled without affecting the 
merits of the decision as to other matters covered in the award.
77 Article 28(2) states:
Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall 
apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it 
considers applicable.
78 See Explanatory Note at para. 35 (in default of party choice, 
“tribunal shall apply the law, i.e., the national law, determined by 
the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable”).
79 Holtzmann & Neuhaus, at 789, observe:
Paragraph (2) reflects a more cautious approach in that it does not 
provide, as would be in line with paragraph (1), that the arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law it considers appropriate. 
Instead, it requires the arbitral tribunal to apply a conflict of laws 
rule . . .  in order to determine the law applicable . . . .
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American authority addressing a tribunal’s application of the 
lex mercatoria or similar a-national formulation is sparse. The 
FAA does not treat applicable law directly. Certainly, where 
the parties have clearly chosen the law of a particular, single, 
legal system, an application of the lex mercatoria would exceed 
arbitral authority. If, by contrast, the parties have designated 
the lex mercatoria as governing their contract, it seems equally 
clear that the arbitrators may follow their instructions. After 
all, enforcement of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate has been 
identified as the driving force behind the FAA.80
Under American law, tribunal application of the lex mercato­
ria in the absence of a choice of law provision, while not 
supportable by the party autonomy doctrine, seems likewise to 
be defensible. Although American domestic arbitration statutes 
are generally silent concerning choice of law, rules texts confer 
wide discretion. The spirit of even the more restrictive 
formulae (found e.g., in the UNCITRAL texts) would likely 
be read by an American court in light of the tradition favoring
80 Additionally, courts themselves have acknowledged the lex mercato­
ria. See, e.g., Alaska Textile Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 
982 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Letters of credit are governed 
by the lex mercatoria, and, in applying this body of law we are 
appropriately solicitous of the necessities of commerce and of 
developments in other jurisdictions”). Why should arbitrators be 
precluded from doing likewise, especially if acting under the parties’ 
express mandate? Further, the basis upon which vacatur would 
occur is not readily apparent: a party having agreed to the lex 
mercatoria as the governing law cannot successfully argue that the 
tribunal exceeded its mandate by following the parties’ choice of law 
instructions. Similarly, neither the vestigial traces of the manifest- 
disregard-of-the-law doctrine nor the narrowly drawn public policy 
exception is a likely obstacle to enforcement of an award based upon 
the international law merchant, at least generally.
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tribunal discretion to fashion remedies (discussed in § 10.4.10 
immediately following). If, as is often posited, absent a 
contractual designation, “arbitrators are not bound by rules of 
law in determining issues submitted to them,”81 a fortiori, the 
application of legal principles thought by the arbitrators to 
match the parties’ expectations better than a given national law 
would seem to be within the tribunal’s mandate.82 If in order 
to accomplish this task the tribunal has to refer (however 
disingenuously) first to some a-national conflicts rule leading 
to the lex mercatoria, an American court is unlikely to careful­
ly reverse-engineer the tribunal’s reasoning. Moreover, there 
is nothing in the methods of lex mercatoria or its supra­
national character that runs counter to American mercantile 
and legal traditions.83
81 S.A. Wenger & Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 146 N.E. 
203 (1924). See also G. Wilner, D o m k e  o n  C o m m e r c ia l  A r b i­
t r a t io n  391 (Rev. ed. 1993)(“[t]he practice of commercial 
arbitration in the United States is ... that the arbitrator has the 
freedom of determining the disputed questions according to his sense 
of the justice of the case on the basis of his fair and just apprecia­
tion”); cf. S. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum. L. 
Rev. 846, 860 (1961) (majority of arbitrators in sample preferred 
applying substantive law but would deviate from formal law if a 
more just decision could be reached thereby).
82 Given the domestic arbitral practice of rendering unreasoned 
awards, it is likely that international mercantile custom and common 
notions of good faith and fairness have often been the unspoken 
bases of decision.
83 The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the Sale of Goods 
Convention (CISG), both fixtures in American law, list supplemen­
tary sources of law bordering on, or overlapping with, the lex 
mercatoria. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (code augmented by “the principles 
of law and equity, including the law merchant . . . ” and is to be 
construed so as “to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.” Id.,
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The two-step UNCITRAL approach will be re-examined in 
Chapter 12 (§12.12) where it will be suggested that it be 
replaced with a provision posing few obstacles to the applica­
tion of general commercial principles and the like.84
11.4.10 R em ed ia l C h o ices
Under the Model Law, the tribunal may only act ex aequo et 
bono with the express approval of the parties. Even though this 
restriction has been present in the AAA International Rules 
since their inception, its impact has not been fully examined by 
the courts and commentators; it is after all, not indigenous 
jurisprudence. The limitation poses interesting questions in its
§ l-102(2)(b)); cf. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Interna­
tional Sale of Goods, art. 7 (interpretation of the Convention should 
account for its “international character” and the need to promote the 
“observance of good faith in international trade”) and art. 9 (parties, 
unless otherwise agreed, bound by widely known and regularly 
observed international trade usages applicable to their contract).
Technically, the foregoing references apply solely to the sale of 
goods context, and then only for gap-filling or establishing implied 
terms. Nonetheless, they demonstrate an established affinity for such 
sources of law. Perhaps more to the point are applicable law 
provisions in the state international arbitration statutes and in the 
Mexico City Convention (signed but yet to be ratified by the U.S.), 
which clearly condone the application of a-national substantive law. 
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.283 (West 1982 & Supp.
1996) (failing a designation of applicable law by the parties, “the 
arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law it considers to be 
appropriate given all the circumstances surrounding the dispute”) 
(emphasis added); cf. Mexico City Convention, art. 9, (law of the 
state with which contract has closest ties, consideration however to 
be given also to “general principles of international commercial law 
recognized by international organizations”).
84 See, e.g., ICC Rules, Art. 17(l)(“Tribunal shall apply the rules of 
law which it determines to be appropriate”).
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relationship to prevailing American law and practice, which 
recognizes in the arbitral tribunal rather broad remedial 
powers. Article 43 of the AAA Commercial Rules, for 
example, gives a nearly plenary mandate, providing in 
pertinent part:
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief the arbitrator 
deems just and equitable and within the scope o f the agreement 
of the parties, including, but not limited to, specific perfor­
mance o f a contract.85
The same rules have neither a party autonomy provision nor a
default directive for selecting governing law.86
American arbitrators commonly carry out in domestic cases
an amiable compositeur-like function, perhaps owing to the
vibrant role played by the law of equity within the American
legal system. This quasi-legislative role is facilitated by the
apparently well-settled maxim, noted earlier, that arbitrators
need not apply strict rules of law in reaching a result, at least
where the parties’ agreement places no applicable law strictures
on the tribunal.87 Apparently, therefore, the wide remedial
grant of the AAA Commercial Rules, quoted above, merely
codifies established tradition.88
85 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, Art. 43.
86 Though curious for rules intended to operate in an inter-state setting, 
the failure to include any direction ought not to allow tribunal 
indifference to an express choice of law provision. Absent an 
express designation, however, the arbitrators presumably may look 
to Article 43 unaffected by a governing law.
87 See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 36 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 581, 588 (1994)(power to act ex aequo et bono in absence 
of contrary parties’ agreement recognized in 1852 decision of 
California Supreme Court).
88 The sense that those rules intend not to bind the tribunal to strict 
legal prescriptions is enhanced by the absence of any choice of law 
directive such as that found in the prevailing texts for international
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The foregoing language and time-honored practice also seem 
to support arbitral gap-filling—that is, an equitable augmenta­
tion of the parties’ agreement to account for situations not 
contemplated therein or the elaboration of details necessary to 
apply the contract to the dispute at hand.89 Indeed, several 
cases have affirmed tribunal powers to equitably adjust a 
commercial relationship, unencumbered by what strict construc­
tion of the contract or traditional contract remedies would 
require. In one case, the California Supreme Court observed 
that in commercial arbitration the parties have bargained for 
“relatively free exercise” of the arbitrators’ “flexibility, 
creativity and sense of fairness.”90 Thus, in that case the 
arbitrators were within their powers when decreeing that one of 
parties was entitled to a permanent, royalty-free, non-exclusive 
license to certain intellectual property of the other party to 
address the latter’s breach in various respects of the covenant 
of good faith.91
use.
89 See W. Craig, et al. 141-42; Fox at 184-85.
90 Advanced Micro, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588.
91 Id., 586. According to the court, the remedy chosen need not 
replicate the position that the aggrieved party would enjoy from 
correct performance. Rather, it need only, under California law, be 
rationally derived from the contract and its breach. Id. at 593; see 
also Nordell International Resources, Ltd. v. Triton Indonesia, Inc., 
999 F.2d 544, 1993 WL 280169 (9th Cir. 1993){Triton I) (arbitra­
tors’ restructuring of the parties’ respective venture interests not 
subject to vacatur where parties had indicated that they could no 
longer work together and tribunal tried “to strike a compromise that 
would permit both parties to maintain an interest in the project 
without unduly hindering its further administration.” Id., *7-8); see 
also Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 
918 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1990) (vacatur not warranted 
though tribunal in gas supply dispute set price, decreed that price
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Given the foregoing, to require the parties’ approval for 
legitimate ex aequo e t bono proceedings modifies the existing 
domestic American presumption under which tribunal remedial 
powers are largely unfettered. Though the tribunal could safely 
apply principles of equity found in the governing law,92 courts 
will have to assess which departures from the contract and 
governing law fall into the realm of unauthorized remedial 
activity. Even if the Model Law is not adopted, the same 
questions will inevitably arise because the “new” restriction is 
pervasive among international rule formulations. Lamentably, 
the line-drawing to be associated with restrictions upon amiable 
compositeur activity may join with understandable confusion 
about the lex m ercatoria  to obscure matters further. If one 
assumes that the lex m ercatoria  may be applied without express 
authorization, how does a court of general jurisdiction, peti­
tioned for vacatur, distinguish between awards based upon the 
lex mercatoria  and those which are motivated ex aequo et
remain static for one year, and stipulated that any future price 
changes be supported by need demonstrated “by a preponderance of 
the evidence”).
92 See UCC § 1-103 (principles of equity augment the Code). An 
arbitrator applying the UCC could—at a minimum—adjust the 
parties’ relationship to the extent warranted under applicable 
principles of waiver, estoppel and the like. See also id. § 2-302 
(court may adjust unconscionable contracts) and §§ 1-203, 2- 
103(l)(b) (requiring merchants to observe canons of fair dealing 
recognized by their trade).
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bono?93 The problem, and some partial solutions are examined 
further in Chapter 12 (§ 12.12.4).
11.5 The M odel L aw ’s Im pact Upon Judicial M achinery
11.5.1 Co u r t-O r d er ed  In ter im  M e a su r e s
Under the Model Law, a court may grant interim remedies in 
respect o f  an on-going arbitration whether the request is made 
before or after the tribunal has been constituted, although that 
text understandably provides no details as to what types o f  
remedy ought to be available and under what conditions. In the 
United States, as in other developed legal systems, a court’s 
remedial arsenal contains various orders (cast as negative or 
affirmative injunctions) designed to preserve the status quo. 
Ordinarily, both federal and state courts may be petitioned for 
such relief. The FAA however, only expressly authorizes a 
narrow range o f  interim remedy and limits it to admiralty 
arbitration.94 A s would be expected given the lack o f  guid-
93 The Austrian courts have had to resolve this matter on appeal. See 
Rubino-Sammartano at 271 (reviewing the Norsolor award’s trek to 
the Austrian Supreme Court). See also Chapter 4, § 4.9 (quoting 
Norsolor). A studious judge attempting to distinguish the two 
doctrines will be told that both doctrines evade traditional choice of 
law analysis and by at least one distinguished commentator that: 
“[i]t is generally assumed that [amiable compositeur] authority 
implies above all to base the decision...on general principles of law 
and trade practices.” K. Berger, International Arbitral Practice and 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 46 
Amer. J. Compar. L 129, 147 (1998). Berger’s description might 
lead one to conclude that the two doctrines and associated methodol­
ogies are functionally indistinguishable.
94 FAA, § 8.
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ance, American courts have differed regarding the extent to 
which injunctive relief in aid of arbitration should be grant­
ed.95 The divergence in approach is marked and reflects funda­
mental differences of opinion as to what best serves the arbitral 
process.96
Some jurisdictions have concluded that the arbitral agreement 
reflects the parties’ intention to exclude court involvement 
beyond that necessary to enforce the clause.97 From these 
courts injunctive relief in aid of arbitration is not available. 
Courts so disinclined have been particularly steadfast in relation 
to international disputes to which the New York Convention 
applies;98 even where a state arbitration statute appears to
95 These are details that vary from state to state.
96 See generally C. Brower and W. M. Tupman, Court-Ordered 
Provisional Measures Under the New York Convention, 80 Am. J. 
Int’l Law 24 (1986); D. Reichert, Provisional Remedies in the 
Context of International Commercial Arbitration, 3 Int’l Tax & Bus. 
Law. 368 (1986).
97 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. De Caro 577 
F. Supp. 616 (W.D. Mo. 1983). In De Caro, the court concluded 
that upon staying litigation pursuant to an arbitration clause covered 
by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the court must cease further 
proceedings, lest there occur an undesirable incursion into the merits 
and delay. Id. at 624-25. The court suggested that preliminary 
injunctions may be issued by the arbitrators, if necessary. Id.; 
accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 
F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1984).
98 One leading case—now well over two decades old—is McCreary 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A. 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974). 
In McCreary, the Third Circuit vacated an attachment ordered by 
the district court. It reasoned that the relief granted violated both the 
parties’ arbitral agreement and the New York Convention’s mandate 
to recognize and enforce agreements to arbitrate. Id. at 1038; accord
I.T.A.D. Assoc, v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981). A 
second, oft-cited case is Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane S.A. 
442 N.E.2d 1239 (N.Y. 1982). In Cooper, New York’s highest
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authorize interim relief in aid of arbitration," it may not be 
available in deference to the supposed mandate of the Conven­
tion.100
court held that pre-award attachment was inconsistent with the New 
York Convention because the latter sought to encourage arbitration; 
thus, to subject the parties to the entanglement of foreign law and 
procedures would negate international arbitration’s principal virtues: 
relative certainty and the avoidance of national adjudicative methods. 
Id. at 1240. The court also noted that the benefits of construing the 
Convention to preclude attachment would accrue to U.S. businesses 
when arbitrating abroad, assuming the Convention is reciprocally 
interpreted. Id. at 414. Subsequent New York decisions have 
observed Cooper, “notwithstanding that petitioner would ordinarily 
have been entitled to an order of attachment.” Drexel Burnham 
Lambert v. Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988).
99 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7502(c):
The Supreme Court may entertain an application for an order 
of attachment or for a preliminary injunction in connection with 
an arbitrable controversy, but only upon the ground that the 
award to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered 
ineffectual without such provisional relief 
For construction, see Drexel Burham Lambert v. Ruebsamen, 531 
N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
100 See Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S. 2d 547, appeal denied, 534 N.E. 2d 
328 (N.Y. 1988). Where the parties have expressly agreed that pre­
award attachment and similar measures should be permitted, courts 
presumably have less reason to deny interim injunctive relief. 
Nonetheless, courts rigorously following McCreary Tire and Rubber 
Co. v. CEAT 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974) may still be reluctant 
to render this type of assistance. In McCreary, the Third Circuit 
declined to issue an order of attachment even though the rules 
chosen by the parties authorized them to seek interim measures from 
a court. Id. at 1038.
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Other authority, both statutory101 and decisional, holds that 
making courts available for provisional remedies in aid of 
arbitration is desirable and permissible. After all, before the 
tribunal has formed, there is usually nowhere else but to the 
courts to turn for emergency measures;102 once established, 
moreover, the tribunal has very limited influence over third 
parties.
Many American courts conceive of the power to preserve the 
status quo very broadly.103 For these, the New York Conven­
tion is no bar to provisional relief; either they find it to be 
largely irrelevant104 or its implications to be fully influenced
101 California has edified the basic Model Law text, Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code § 1297.91, by providing at § 1297.93:
Measures which the court may grant in connection with a 
pending arbitration include, but are not limited to:
(a) An order of attachment to assure that the award to 
which applicant may be entitled is not rendered ineffectual 
by the dissipation of party assets.
(b) A preliminary injunction in order to protect trade 
secrets or to conserve goods which are the subject matter 
of the arbitral dispute.
102 The WIPO emergency relief program remains under study. See 
Proposed Emergency Relief Rules (WIPO consultation document 
of 19 April 1996; on file with the author).
103 Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 47-48 (1st Cir. 
1986) (citing Roso-Lino Beverage Distrib., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola 
Botding Co. of New York, 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984); Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048 
(4th Cir. 1985); Sauer Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 
715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1070 
(1984)); see also Peabody Coalsales Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co., 36 
F.3d 46 (8th Cir. 1994) (enforcing performance-to-continue 
clause). Murray Oil Prod. Co. v. Mutsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381 
(2d Cir. 1944) (attachment to facilitate effective awards wholly 
consistent with goals of arbitration).
104 See Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (rejecting reasoning of McCreary and Cooper).
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by the facts.105 Other courts willing to grant interim relief 
adopt a middle position, viewing their role as primarily to fill 
the void until a the tribunal is constituted.106 The Model 
Law’s grant of access “before or during arbitral proceedings” 
would require these latter courts to adjust somewhat,107 and 
would in effect overrule those cases which issue a blanket 
prohibition on provisional measures in aid of arbitration. 
Nevertheless, significantly, noninterventionist courts would 
remain free to develop conservative positions under the Model 
Law, unless lawmakers or the Supreme Court harmonize the 
grounds upon which relief will be granted. That is, the Model 
Law authorizes access; it does not guarantee that relief will be 
given.
105 See Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products Co., 919 F.2d 822, 826 
(2d Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 500 U.S. 953 (1991) (FAA does not 
preclude preliminary injunction against rights-infringing conduct; 
McCreary distinguishable as requesting party not trying to thwart 
arbitration).
106 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Salvano, 999 
F.2d 211, 215 (7th Cir. 1992) (extension of TRO inappropriate 
once the tribunal has formed). Injunctive relief is sometimes 
granted to prevent misuse of the arbitral process. See also Action 
Air Freight, Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 769 F. Supp. 899, 
901 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (court may properly entertain request for 
injunctive relief pending arbitration to forestall action imperiling 
integrity of the arbitration process).
107 Another way courts support arbitration is by enforcing arbitral 
awards of interim relief. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 
1297.92 (any party may request state court to enforce an arbitral 
award of interim measures and “[ejnfor cement shall be granted 
pursuant to the law applicable to the granting of the type of 
interim relief requested”). This provision was added by California 
lawmakers when adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law.
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11.5.2 Pr e-A w a r d  Ch a l l e n g e s  to  Tr ib u n a l  
Jurisd ictio n
The Model Law also gives courts interlocutory review of 
preliminary tribunal jurisdictional findings, if the tribunal 
determines its jurisdiction as a preliminary matter and if it 
finds that it has jurisdiction.108
The merit of the Model Law provision is twofold: it honors 
the notion that a party ought not to be put through an arbitra­
tion without having agreed to be a participant; second, it serves 
an anti-waste function in those cases in which, despite the 
arbitrators’ finding of competence, the award would be vacated 
because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction.
Potentially, its negative attributes are that it offers a deleteri­
ous party an opportunity to cause delay and that such petitions 
will burden the courts. As a delay tactic, however, a jurisdic­
tional challenge need not inevitably be effective; the Model 
Law expressly allows the tribunal to proceed while the court is 
considering the matter.
As to the docket burden, the potential for added docket 
pressure seems not compelling; it will sometimes be the case 
that the tribunal chooses not to assess jurisdiction as a prelimi­
nary matter, and when it does so choose it will occasionally 
agree that it is not competent to proceed. Moreover, the net 
position may not be affected appreciably. Anti-arbitration
108 Article 16(3). Some American courts will enjoin arbitrations 
found to be unsupported by an agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., 
Societe Generate de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European 
Management and Systems Co., 643 F.2d 863, 868 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(affirming injunction against Massachusetts arbitration as inconsis­
tent with arbitration agreement’s named situs abroad).
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injunctions can already be sought in relation to arbitral jurisdic­
tion, and this prerogative is not limited to the narrow situation 
contemplated in the Model Law. Thus, depending upon how 
one interprets Article 5’s limitation on extra-statutory interven­
tion, the Model Law may result in a net reduction in docket 
activity.109
11.5.3 Pre-A w a r d  A r bitr a t o r  D isq u a lific a tio n
Under the Model Law, each arbitrator within a three-person 
tribunal may be challenged for a lack of impartiality or 
independence.110 The statutory standard of independence and 
impartiality will come before the courts in two contexts: first, 
when they are called upon to decide challenges; and, second 
when a party seeks to have an award set aside by alleging that 
one of the arbitrators was partial to a party. After raising two 
preliminary questions, this subsection considers how the courts’ 
obligation to entertain these petitions will alter existing law.
109 Given Article 5’s admonition that “no court shall intervene except 
where so provided in this Law,” may courts still consider the 
arbitral jurisdiction in other pre-award contexts? For example, if 
the tribunal decides to join the jurisdiction issue to the merits, as 
it is entitled to do under the Model Law (so that the court’s 
Article 16(3) power does not obtain), may a party still petition a 
court to enjoin the arbitration on the basis that no arbitration 
agreement exists? Presumably, it may do so when the putative 
arbitral agreement is invoked to stay litigation. In other contexts, 
the answer should remain fact-dependent.
1,0 Model Law, Art. 12(2).
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Preliminary Questions
The preliminary questions that arise relate to party autonomy 
and would be less problematic if the New Act’s mandatory 
provisions were clearly identified, perhaps in a single roster. 
The first is to what extent may the parties do away with the 
pre-award challenge procedures altogether, as part of a fast- 
track procedure designed to eliminate sources of delay. Article 
13(1) states that the parties may agree on a challenge proce­
dure, but makes that prerogative “subject to” paragraph 3 of the 
same article, which contains within it several provisions, 
including one giving court access in the event the challenge is 
unsuccessful. Is pre-award court access the mandatory portion 
of paragraph 3, or is the immutable element only that part of 
paragraph 3 that disallows appeal of the court’s assessment?
Regardless of what the Model Law drafters may have 
intended in 1985, the New Act should allow the parties to so 
configure their proceedings; challenges are time-consuming and 
disruptive and can make a misnomer of a “fast-track” proceed­
ing. Especially because the disadvantaged party will be able to 
raise arbitrator bias in a setting aside action, the benefits of 
streamlined proceedings would seem to outweigh any harm the 
moving party may suffer by having to adhere to a procedure to 
which it has agreed.
Even where no expediting agreement has been reached, 
arguably, giving immediate court access after an appointing 
authority has denied a challenge is unnecessary. Retaining in 
that situation the existing American approach, which allows the 
issue to be raised before a court for the first time in a vacatur 
proceeding, would be less disruptive than the Model Law’s
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format; to reiterate, the aggrieved party’s access to review 
would merely be delayed, not denied. By contrast, in the 
situation in which it is the tribunal that has decided the chal­
lenge, pre-award access to the courts seems more desirable and 
should be retained, but only if the parties’ arbitration agreement 
has not precluded pre-award challenges.
The second question, broached earlier, is whether the parties 
may alter the challengeability of party-appointed arbitrators by 
adopting a rule formulation which recognizes the dual stan­
dard111 known to American domestic commercial practice.112
111 Even non-neutral arbitrators are under certain duties the breach 
of which may imperil the award. In particular, they must practice 
due diligence and good faith throughout the proceedings. Metro­
politan Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. J. C. Penney Casualty 
Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 885, 892 (D. Conn. 1991); see also 
AAA-ABA Code of Ethics, Canon IV. Accordingly, a party- 
appointed arbitrator permitted to be partisan (non-neutral) by the 
governing rules could not, for example, purposely delay the 
proceedings to protect a party. Nor could he or she relinquish to 
the appointing party independence in the assessment of evidence 
and applicable law. See Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins. 
Co. v. J.C. Penny Casualty Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 885, 893 (D. 
Conn. 1991).
112 See, e.g., AAA Commercial Rules, Rule 15. As a matter of first 
principles, the Model Law standard would prevail only if that 
provision were mandatory; otherwise party autonomy would 
govern and only the presiding arbitrator would be required to be 
neutral. Holtzmann & Neuhaus seem to suggest that the parties 
may not adopt the dual standard, though the matter is not directly 
addressed. Id. at 83, 1152. This problem will not often arise for 
several reasons: first international rule formulations, which by 
their terms are likely to apply in lieu of certain domestic rules, 
clearly apply the unified standard; second, even some rules 
designed for domestic use adopt the international standard, see, 
e.g., CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business 
Disputes (1989), Rule 7.1; third, the parties are not likely to 
tinker with the standard rules they designate before dispute arises
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Again, because it would require an affirmative opting out of 
the norm by the parties, little genuine mischief seems likely to 
occur, provided that the parties’ agreement to opt for the dual 
standard is not easily inferred by courts accustomed to domes­
tic arbitration.113 Concurrently, one must admit that an out­
right preclusion of the dual standard would be simpler to 
understand and administer and would ensure an arbitral model 
more closely resembling the international standard attractive to 
potential users abroad.
Judicial Processing o f  A rbitrator Fitness Before the A w ard
The Model Law would allow a party to receive a judicial 
determination before the aw ard is rendered  as to an arbitrator’s 
competence prompted by alleged doubts as to his independence 
or impartiality. To some extent, Article 13(3) would alter the 
prevailing federal view, under which courts refrain from testing 
arbitrator impartiality before the award is rendered.114 This 
self-restraint is supported by experience, which teaches that 
alleged partiality may not be reflected in the arbitration’s 
outcome; indeed, the award may favor the once-suspicious
and may be unable agree to alter the international standard once 
dispute has materialized.
113 Even if the option were available to the parties, the author does 
not believe, however, that they should be encouraged to opt for 
the dual standard. He merely acknowledges that a broad concep­
tion of party autonomy might allow diem to do so without 
imperiling the ultimate award; to the extent the Model Law is 
unclear on the point, it should be adopted with suitable amend­
ments.
1,4 See, e.g., Sun Ref. & Mktg. v. Statheros Shipping, 761 F. Supp. 
293, 296 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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party. Moreover, once the award is rendered, courts have 
something concrete to focus upon in determining whether the 
complaining party has in fact been prejudiced.
The change proposed by the Model Law nonetheless would 
alter the existing pattern very little. Under the Model, the 
court’s function engages ordinarily only after any appointing 
authority named by the parties has acted and only if that 
authority has not sustained the challenge.115 Further, the 
matter may not necessarily advance to the appointing authority; 
the appointing party or the arbitrator himself may agree to the 
challenge.116
It might be supposed that the new role for the courts would 
require also the elaboration, from a tabula rasa, of standards 
with which to decide the challenge. In fact, the corpus of 
evident partiality law discussed in the next section offers 
existing principles upon which to draw. Naturally some 
adjustment will have to be made because at the juncture at 
which most challenges will arise, there will have been no 
arbitral award or other conduct upon which to focus; the 
analysis rather will concentrate upon inferences arising from 
disclosed interests and relationships.
Under the Model Law formula, generally the question of 
whether to apply relatively relaxed standards of impartiality to 
party-appointed arbitrators ought not to arise. Unlike the
115 If no appointing authority or similar procedure has been fixed by 
the parties, the tribunal decides the challenge. Model Law, Art. 
13(2); if the tribunal does not sustain the challenge, only then is 
the court seized.
1,6 See Model Law, Art. 12.
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FAA,117 the Model Law is express in applying an identically 
rigorous standard to all arbitrators; no legitimate confusion
117 Under the FAA, questions persist among the courts called upon 
to apply FAA § 10(b)(vacatur for “evident partiality”) to tripartite 
arbitrations in which the parties have not dictated the standard. 
Does a three-arbitrator structure impliedly sanction “non-neutrali­
ty” for party-appointed arbitrators? The FAA makes no distinc­
tion between neutral and non-neutral and refers to evident 
partiality in “either” of the arbitrators. From these facts it 
followed for one district court that equal impartiality was required 
of each tribunal member. See Standard Tankers (Bahamas) Co. 
v. MotorTank Vessel, AKTI, 438 F.Supp 153 (E.D N.C. 1977) 
(international transaction). By contrast, a more recent deci­
sion—with no international facet—acknowledged a variable 
standard. In Metropolitan Property, after noting that helpful case 
law was “scant,” the court referred to “a common acceptance of 
the fact that the party-designated arbitrators are not and cannot be 
‘neutral,’ . . .  at least in the sense that the third arbitrator or a 
judge is.” Metropolitan Property, 780 F. Supp. at 891 (quoting 
Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 182 
N.E.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962)). The court relied in part 
upon the AAA-ABA Code of Ethics which provides that party 
appointed arbitrators, “should be considered non-neutrals . . . 
unless the contract, the applicable arbitration rules, or any 
governing law requires that all three arbitrators be neutral.” Id. 
at 891-92 (quoting Canon VII).
More distant still from the international standard is Sunkist Soft 
Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 
1993). In Sunkist, a party-appointed arbitrator allegedly helped 
the nominating party prepare its case by participating in meetings 
with witnesses and party representatives. The court regarded the 
conduct as “not only unobjectionable, but commonplace.” Id. at 
759. The court stressed the conventional wisdom that party- 
appointed arbitrators may be “pre-disposed or sympathetic” 
toward the party appointing them and that no evidence suggested 
that he “discussed any information that he received during the 
pre-hearing interviews with the other arbitrators, or that any of 
the arbitrators . . . based their deliberations and award on 
anything other than the evidence of record.” Id.
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should arise, even if under the New Act parties are in principle 
allowed to adopt the dual standard by express adoption.
Vacatur O f  Awards For Bias
The Model Law’s adoption of the New York Convention’s 
non-recognition grounds for use in testing set-aside petitions 
will give American courts precedent to consult by analogy. 
Probably, as in the challenge context, courts will borrow from 
standards developed to assess “evident partiality,” as they have 
done in handling claims of bias under the New York Conven­
tion. The Convention, like the Model Law,118 refers to the 
improper composition of the tribunal as judged against the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate,119 though there is an estab­
lished tendency by advocates to raise bias under the public 
policy ground.120
Because the existing vacatur provision speaks only of evident 
partiality (and not of lack of independence) these arguably 
separate impediments to neutrality have been treated as aspects 
of “partiality,” concerning which different tests have emerged. 
Though the law of evident partiality is “muddled,”121 there is 
apparent agreement that the test is objective and to be applied 
on a case-by-case basis. Some circuits express this by positing
118 Model Law, Art. 34(2)(iv).
119 The latter will often incorporate a rules text requiring indepen­
dence and impartiality of party-appointed arbitrators.
120 See van den Berg at 377-80; Rau at 237, n.99. Bias arguably also 
bears upon whether a party was able to present its case under 
Articles 34(2)(a)(ii) and 36(l)(a)(ii).
121 Washburn, 895 F. Supp. at 396; see also Carter (noting “judicial
confusion”).
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a reasonable person formula: given the facts, would a reason­
able person “have to conclude” that the arbitrator was partial 
to a party?122 Typically, an alleged relationship between the 
arbitrator and a party or an alleged interest in the outcome is 
in question.123 Naturally, few bright lines have emerged.124
The burden upon the party seeking vacatur is generally oner­
ous,125 and speculative allegations of bias will not suffice;126 
federal courts often admonish that trivial or nebulous connec­
122 See Consolidated Coal Co. v. UMW, Local 1643, 48 F.3d 125, 
129 (4th Cir. 1995); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental 
Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993); Sun Ref. & 
Mktg. Co. v. Statheros Shipping Corp. of Monrovia, Liber., 761 
F. Supp. 293, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Morelite, 748 F.2d at 84.
123 The Fourth Circuit has cataloged the main factors bearing on evi­
dent partiality as follows:
(1) any personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, the arbitrator 
has in the proceeding;
(2) the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator and 
the party he is alleged to favor;
(3) the connection of the relationship to the arbitration; and
(4) the proximity in time between the relationship and the 
arbitration proceeding.
Consolidated Coal Co. v. UMW, Local 1643, 48 F.3d 125, 130 
(4th Cir. 1995).
124 See Washburn at 395-96 (“infinite number of possibilities of 
claims for some connective basis for disqualification”) (quoting 
United States Wrestling Fed’n v. Wrestling Div. of the AAU, 
Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 318 (7th Cir. 1979)); see also Andros 
Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 
691, 700 (2d Cir. 1978) (explaining that courts eschew “dogmatic 
rigidity” in assessing partiality).
125 Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (11th 
Cir. 1983)(only facts “powerfully suggestive” of bias).
126 See Washburn, 895 F. Supp. at 399-400; UCO Terminals, Inc. 
v. Apex Oil Co., 583 F. Supp. 1213, 1214-16 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d , 
751 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1984); cf. Sofia Shipping Co. v. Amoco 
Transp. Co., 628 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (vacatur 
requires evidence of “direct or definite partiality”).
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tions between an arbitrator and the awarded party are not 
received with sympathy.127
There is under American law a relationship between disclo­
sure and the impression of partiality, though, the relationship 
is not always clearly articulated in the cases. The Ninth Circuit, 
however, has recently developed an approach that employs two, 
discrete tests; which of the two applies depends upon whether 
the matter giving rise to the charge of partiality was disclosed 
by the arbitrator.128 That a failure to disclose certain matters 
should influence vacatur under the New Act deserves further 
study. Under the Model Law, there is arguably room to link its 
disclosure requirement more closely with its setting aside provi­
127 Morelite, 748 F.2d at 85 (unsuccessful party to arbitration not to 
be rewarded for “seeking out and finding tenuous relationships 
between the arbitrator and the successful party”); Sun Ref., 761 
F. Supp. at 304 (relying upon Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. 
Continent Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (White, J., 
concurring)).
128 Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427-28 (9th Cir. 
1996); Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994). 
“In nondisclosure cases, vacatur is appropriate where the arbitrat­
or’s failure to disclose information gives the impression of bias 
in favor of one party.” Woods, 78 F.3d at 427. The required 
impression is presumably a function of the gravity of the relation­
ship or interest that the arbitrator failed to disclose. Where the 
party seeking vacatur invokes something disclosed by the 
arbitrator, the requisite showing is heightened. “Actual bias must 
be proven;” vacatur will be allowed only where there are estab­
lished specific facts that demonstrate that the award was the result 
of the interest or relationship. Woods, 78 F.3d at 427.
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sions,129 a notion examined in Chapter 12 (§ 12.8). The cour­
ts’ role in setting aside awards is revisited below in § 11.5.6.
11.5.4 A ssist a n c e  in  Ta k in g  E vid en c e
Discovery matters often loom large in international arbitration. 
Documentary discovery normally consists of each party 
producing documents upon which it intends to rely. Depositions 
of opposing parties and witnesses may occur, but not as a 
matter of course; much depends upon the regime constructed 
by the parties with the help of the tribunal. Clashes arising 
from divergent legal cultures and conflicting expectations are 
not unusual. Because a party may disagree with a tribunal 
about the proper extent of disclosure, and because tribunals do 
not have contempt power, the courts of the situs can play an 
important role in securing desired information. Nevertheless, if 
the courts were available to consider every request to produce, 
and the corresponding views of the tribunal, undue interference 
with the arbitral process and added pressure on already 
crowded dockets would result.
Consistent with the international standard, the Model Law 
does not authorize the parties to make and enforce demands 
upon each other for documents and other information, though
129 The Model Law’s challenge procedures depend heavily upon 
arbitrator disclosure; though a challenging party may rely on facts 
garnered other than through arbitrator disclosure, as a practical 
matter these may not become known, if at all, until after the 
proceedings are closed. Thus, it is appropriate that setting aside 
grounds include dependence and partiality and that a failure to 
disclose obviously suggestive relationships or interests give rise 
to special suspicion.
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by mutual agreement comprehensive exchanges may occur. On 
the question of court assistance, the Model Law strikes a 
balance between providing no assistance and an open door 
policy; it allows courts to assist in the taking of evidence when 
requested by the tribunal or by a party with the tribunal's 
permission.™
Much existing federal law has developed around the FAA’s 
arbitral subpoena power, which allows the tribunal (but not a 
party) to summon persons to give evidence.131 If a summons 
is disregarded, a court duly petitioned may compel compli­
ance.132 Though the Model Law’s provision seems to be 
broader than the FAA’s subpoena provision—it refers to 
assistance for evidence-taking generally—some American 
courts will likely develop strictures that discourage requests for 
non-specific discovery orders, just as they have done under the 
FAA subpoena context.133
130 Model Law, Art. 27. The provision only applies to requests 
related to an arbitration within the enacting state. U.S. law 
makers might consider on what basis assistance for foreign 
arbitrators may be covered within the New Act. This might be 
accomplished by incorporating by reference 8 USC § 1782, which 
provides for court assistance in acquiring material “for use in a 
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”
131 FAA, § 7, empowers the arbitrators to:
summon in writing any person to attend before them as a 
witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them 
any book, record, document, or paper which may be 
deemed material as evidence in the case.
132 Some courts have held that the power extends to causing pre- 
hearing appearances. Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, 
Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
133 A subpoena may be quashed on the ground that it is over-broad 
or otherwise inappropriate. Some federal courts have been disin­
clined to nullify arbitral subpoenas, deferring rather to the arbitra­
tors’ sense of what materials are relevant and beneficial to the
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Though authorized under the New Act and petitioned with 
the tribunal’s blessing, in keeping with existing practice some 
courts may also be inclined to limit assistance to “extraordinary 
circumstances,” such as by insisting upon showings, e.g., that 
irreparable harm will result if discovery is not had.134
11.5.5 Re m a n d  (Re m issio n ) of A w a r d s
Under the Model Law, a court asked to set aside and award 
may instead remand it to the arbitrators “in order to give the 
arbitrators an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or 
to take such other action as in the tribunal’s opinion will 
eliminate the grounds for setting aside.” The practice of 
remission is known in American jurisprudence although no 
mention of it appears in the FAA.135 Courts have found
proceeding. See, e.g., Commercial Metals Co. v. International 
Union Marine Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(arbitrator’s subpoena duces tecum not quashed because records 
requested arguably relevant to the proceedings); Complaint of 
Koala Shipping & Trading Inc., 587 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (tribunal had authority to issue discovery order and subpoe­
na duces tecum of certain relevant documents). Others have been 
exacting; see generally Born, A r b it r a t io n  at 843-45 (some 
courts consider the “materiality” of the evidence sought).
134 See Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rossel, N.V., 125 
F.R.D. 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
135 Sometimes awards are ambiguous, vague or suffer from a similar 
imperfection. When poorly crafted arbitral work-product is 
presented to a court for enforcement, A court could vacate the 
award; but such waste seems inappropriate when an award is the 
product of a principled proceeding. Alternatively, the court could 
attribute a reasonable meaning to the award and enter judgment 
upon it accordingly; to do so, however, may depart from the 
tribunal’s intended result and involve the court in speculation and 
an undesirable study of the merits. It is the tribunal that is usually
339
Chapter 11: Model’s Impact: American Law
remand appropriate in a variety of circumstances.136 Where 
remands occurs, it prolongs or revives the mandate of the 
tribunal on a limited basis; it thus may be said to be a partial 
exception to the functus officio doctrine, though, under Ameri­
can law remand does not undermine finality; what the arbitra­
tors have already decided may not be disturbed under the guise 
of rendering the requested clarification or elaboration. Assum­
ing the same qualification is attributed to its text, the Model 
Law’s remission provision should abide comfortably in the 
United States.137
in the best position to clarify what it meant.
136 The remand of awards has occurred where the tribunal gave 
reasons that were unclear in a material respect thus making, for 
instance, the application of claim and issue preclusion principles 
difficult. See, e.g., Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied 
Workers Int’l Union, Local 182B v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 
F.3d 844, 849 (7th Cir. 1995) (reasoned award failed to anticipate 
a contingency arising after award issued); Galt v. Libbey-Owens- 
Ford Glass Co., 397 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 393 
U.S. 925 (1968) (asking arbitrators whether particular issues were 
decided); Boston Cattle Group v. ADM Investors Servs., Inc., 
1995 WL 723781, at *7 (N.D. 111. 1995) (to facilitate issue 
preclusion, award would be remanded where “[the] court cannot 
discern from the arbitrators’ [reasoned] decision whether the issue 
was resolved on its merits”); Domino Group, Inc. v. Charlie 
Parker Memorial Found., 985 F.2d 417, 418-19 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(award remanded because grant of specific performance too vague 
to be enforced).
137 See Domino Group, 985 F.2d at 420. That remission requires a 
party to request the procedure should not too greatly encumber 
courts. If the alternative is vacatur, presumably one party will be 
motivated to ask for remission. By amendment to Article 34(4), 
however, courts can be authorized to remand sua sponte, in 
keeping with existing practice.
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11.5.6 U n ified  A t t a c k s  o n  A w a rd s
A s broached above in outlining the courts’ role in policing bias 
among arbitrators, if implemented as is, the Model Law would 
apply nearly the same138 standards to vacatur (setting aside) 
petitions as it applies to determine whether an international 
award (wherever rendered) is to be enforced or recognized. 
Contrary to the existing framework, enforcement would not 
depend upon territoriality or reciprocity. This unification of 
grounds would constitute a marked departure from the main 
branch of existing American practice, which distinguishes 
Convention awards based upon where an award was made. It 
would, however, find a rough parallel in those U.S cases that 
have applied a convention to awards rended in the United 
States, based upon the presence of certain non-domestic 
elements.139
138 The setting aside grounds do not include that the award has not 
yet become binding; the absence follows apparently from the 
belief that it is illogical to set aside an award which is not yet 
final, i.e . , is not yet an award. A second difference is that, while 
both Model Law articles refer to an invalid agreement, in the 
setting aside context (Article 34), the court is directed in default 
of party choice to the lex fori, whereas the non-recognition 
provisions refer to the law of the place where the award was 
rendered (Article 35(a)(i)). Given the structure of Article 35, that 
may—or may not be—a lex fori reference; the provision applies 
to international awards, wherever rendered.
139 See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 
1983)(New York Convention); Productos Mercantiles E Industria- 
les, SA v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1994)(Inter- 
American Convention); see also New York Convention, art. I 
(applicable also to awards not considered domestic).
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The new, common standards of attack would also be familiar 
to U.S. jurisprudence, and that of approximately 120 other 
systems; they are the grounds of the New York Convention.
As a matter of substance, does the Model Law change the 
rigor (or lack thereof) with which awards are scrutinized? As 
to those awards currently regarded as “domestic,” certainly, the 
positive text addressed to “setting aside” is different from the 
grounds found in FAA § 10.140 Neither that section nor the 
convention chapters, however, encourage scrutiny of an award’s 
merits; misapplication of the law does not generally imperil an 
award in either context.141 Moreover, it is difficult to think of 
a colorable attack available under § 10 that is also not available 
under the Convention and hence under Model Law’s text.142 
Most of these have already been studied by courts under the 
conventions’ non-recognition or the FAA’s vacatur provisions. 
It is unlikely that the pro-enforcement bias of the courts will
140 The new test for vacatur would not render existing case law 
irrelevant. American courts are already familiar with the text in 
question and are already accustomed to borrowing, cross-fertiliza­
tion and unification of approach among the FAA’s three chapters.
141 In practice this is true even in jurisdictions still observing the 
manifest-disregard-of-law standard.
142 One possible difference exists in FAA § 10(d), which refers to 
imperfectly executed arbitral powers resulting in the lack of “a 
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submit­
ted.” Probably, many of cases falling under this provision could 
be brought on the basis that the “arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties” since it is at least 
implied in standard rule formulations that the tribunal is to render 
an enforceable award free of dysfunctional vagueness or equivo­
cation. Cf. Rau at 237, n.97 (differing language between FAA 
§ 10 and Convention, art. V of "minimal significance”). But see 
MacNeil et al., § 44.40.1.4 (“misleading” to posit substantial 
equivalence).
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change with the enactment of a law offering no new grounds 
for unraveling arbitral work-product, though the exclusivity of 
the Model Law grounds should be made unmistakably clear in 
the New Act, given the willingness of some courts to embrace 
extra-statutory grounds for vacatur.143
Further, it is difficult to imagine that either the Model Law’s 
public policy144 or subject matter arbitrability145 grounds
143 See generally S. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards 
for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 
731, 778 (1996)(manifest disregard doctrine).
144 See, e.g., Nordell Int’l Resources v. Triton Indonesia, 999 F.2d 
544 (9th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. 1994) 
(confirmation affirmed despite allegations that award was based 
on fraudulently prepared data); see also Northrop Corp. v. Triad 
International Marketing S.A., 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(-[t]o justify refusal to enforce . . .  the policy “must be well 
defined and dominant”) quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 
Union 749, Int’l Union of the United Paper Workers, 461 U.S. 
757, 766 (1983); Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 
526 (2d Cir. 1975) (public policy implicated only when enforce­
ment “would violate the most basic notions of morality and jus­
tice”). But see Victrix S. S. Co., S. A. v. Salem Dry Cargo A. 
B., 825 F.2d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1987)(English award based upon 
breach of a charter party could not be confirmed because of 
strong countervailing policies favoring deference to foreign 
bankruptcy proceedings).
145 In the United States, broad arbitrability has become the norm. 
One civil subject matter that may be protected by U.S. courts 
from foreign awards concerns state insurance law. At least two 
cases have ruled that the New York Convention does not require 
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate where the dispute was 
covered by a state scheme overseeing the orderly disposition of 
a troubled insurance company’s affairs. Stephens v. American 
Int’l Ins., Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); Corcoran v. Andra 
Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 696, 972 (N.Y. 1991), cert, denied, 500 
U.S. 953 (1991). As to the breadth of arbitral subject matter 
under U.S law see, Chapter 7 §§ 7.6 (and notes) and 7.7.
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will often be successfully invoked. American courts will be 
similarly reluctant to find that the resisting party was deprived 
of proper notice (or was otherwise unable to present his 
case)146 or was subjected to a procedure at odds with that 
agreed by the parties.147
By contrast, rather more scrutiny may attach to claims that 
no arbitration agreement was reached148 though once estab­
146 In approaching this ground for non-enforcement, American courts 
borrow from the law of “due process.” with an emphasis upon 
notice and the opportunity to be heard. See Biotronik Mess-und 
Thereapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Instrument Co., 415 
F. Supp. 133, 140 (D.N. J. 1976). A pro-enforcement, narrow 
construction usually prevails. See, e.g., Parsons and Whittemore, 
508 F.2d 969, 975-76 (2d Cir. 1974) (arbitrators’ refusal to delay 
proceedings to accommodate the speaking schedule of a witness 
does not prevent enforcement); Lamoinoirs-Trefileries-Cableries 
de Lens, S. A. (LTCL) v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N. 
D. Ga. 1980) (Convention award enforced despite limits placed 
upon cross examination by the arbitrators). National Dev. Co. v. 
Khashoggi, 781 F. Supp. 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(default 
award enforced; appropriate notice of the arbitration had been 
given).
147 See A1 Haddad Bros. Enterprises v. M/S Agapi, 635 F. Supp. 
205 (D. Del. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1987).
148 Under the separability doctrine, a court should examine only the 
arbitration agreement itself, not the underlying contract; the 
latter’s existence (at least under a nonrestrictive arbitration clause) 
is for the arbitrator to have evaluated. Given Kaplan (1995)(tribu- 
nal’s jurisdictional findings—absent parties’ agreement to the con­
trary-subject to de novo review), arguably courts should 
ordinarily conduct a de novo review of the clause’s existence and 
scope before confirming an award. At present, it is unclear how 
Kaplan, a domestic commercial case, affects convention awards. 
Even if Kaplan signals heightened scrutiny for international 
awards on these issues, and that doctrine remains operational 
under the New Act, de novo review should be undertaken only if 
the resisting party makes a prima facie showing that a jurisdic­
tional problem exists and that it was properly preserved. See New
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lished the agreement to arbitrate will likely be held to extend 
to the claims embodied in the award.149 In the process, choice 
of law analysis relevant to international arbitration agreements 
may evolve from its present, relatively embryonic state; 
regardless, a lex fori preference probably will retain favor.150 
From existing interpretations of the Convention it can be 
further expected that pending judicial proceedings abroad151 
will not necessarily prevent award enforcement, provided the
York Convention, art. V(l) (burden upon the attacking party to 
furnish proof); accord Model Law, Art. 36 (l)(a).
149 See, e.g., Management and Technical Consultants S.A. v. 
Parsons Jurdin International Corp., 820 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“[fjederal law has established a presumption that an 
arbitral body has acted within its powers”); see also National Oil 
Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil, 733 F. Supp. 800, 818-819 (D. Del 
1990) (tribunal’s damages award confirmed under Convention 
because not completely irrational).
150 Absent an express choice of law, the choice of law instructions 
given by the Model Law differ depending upon whether the 
action is to set aside or to enforce. In the enforcement context, 
the New York Convention formula is carried forward largely un­
changed. Thus, courts are to apply the law of the place where the 
award is made (which under the Model Law may, or may not, be 
the enacting state); in set-aside actions the reference to the place 
of arbitration is replaced by a direct lex fori rule (see Article 34
(2)(a)(l)). In both contexts the Convention’s personal law 
reference applicable to capacity issues (“the law applicable to [the 
parties]”) has been omitted. No choice of law directive has 
replaced it and American courts will likely reach different 
applicable law conclusions depending upon which choice of law 
theory they favor. Quite likely, however, a lex fori inclination 
will often be influential.
151 It is not a ground under the Model Law’s set-aside provisions that 
an award “has not yet become binding,” though that basis has 
been retained as an exception to enforcement of awards, wherever 
rendered.
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tribunal has finished with the award,152 though there is a 
counter-trend within U.S. courts to defer enforcement pending 
set-aside proceedings at the place o f  arbitration.153 That 
adjournment practice is authorized under both the N ew  York 
Convention154 and the M odel Law.155
152 See, e.g., Fertilizer Corp. v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 
(S.D. Ohio 1981).
153 See Europar Italia SpA v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., Docket No. 
97-7224, (2d Cir. Sept. 1, 1998). Cf. Hewlett-Packard v. Berg, 
61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995) (deferred pending related arbitra­
tion).
154 Convention, art. VI.
155 Art. 36(2).
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12.1 Introduction
Fashioned to be widely acceptable, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law does not attempt to address every issue that might arise 
in a given legal system. Nevertheless, its relatively streamline 
frame makes it amenable to augmentation. If the Model Law 
is to serve as the basis of a new FAA chapter devoted to 
international commercial disputes (the “New Act”), certain 
modifications may be desirable in adapting the official text to 
the American scene and to account for recent trends and 
issues. This chapter addresses a number of supplemental 
provisions that ought to be studied in formulating the New Act.
Model Law purists will not endorse the appreciable tinkering 
proposed below. Minimalism, of course, cannot be dismissed 
lightly; it is consistent with the goal of harmonization and 
would arguably engender fewer interpretive questions than an 
augmentative approach. Additionally, departures from the 
Model Law may dilute the benefits of having a ready travaux 
and the experiences of other jurisdictions to aid interpretation 
and implementation. Nonetheless, most of the changes suggest­
ed below address issues well-known to the American and 
international arbitration communities and the solutions consid­
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ered draw chiefly upon international paradigms, not indige­
nous, idiosyncratic ones.
12.2 Scope of Application
12.2.1 In G e n e r a l
Currently, the FAA’s application in state courts is clear only 
to the extent that the Supreme Court has revealed on a case-by- 
case basis how that statute (seemingly addressed to federal 
courts only) carries policies which must be vindicated in all 
American courts. The simplest approach is for New Act to 
make plain that a dispute which is both “commercial” and 
“international” within the meaning of the statute is, unless 
otherwise expressly indicated, governed by the New Act in 
both state and federal courts. Certain related issues also arise, 
however; these are treated in the following two subsections.
12.2.2 A sp ec ts  o f  P a r ty  A u to n o m y
Delineating M andatory Rules
Presently, parties to an arbitration agreement otherwise 
governed by the FAA may designate a state law of arbitration 
to govern their agreement. Presumably, this will remain so 
under the New Act; the Model Law itself is largely non­
mandatory. It may be useful, however, to borrow from the 
English example the device of listing in one place the Act’s 
mandatory provisions, to be applied irrespective of the parties’
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designation of state law or a foreign curial law.1 Although the 
Model Law’s drafters considered and rejected that technique,2 
attaching such a schedule to the Act would greatly advance 
interpretation;3 litigation over meaning would be reduced 
accordingly. The required listing would be rather brief given 
the latitude built into the Model and equally present in the 
American system.4 Prima facie, it should include: award 
formalities, such as signatures and written form requirements 
(but not the reasoned award requirement), the party equality 
doctrine, the fair-opportunity-to-present rule, and the immunity 
rules to be recommended below. Arguably, as developed in 
Chapter 11, the impartiality and independence obligation 
should also be insulated from party autonomy, though one can 
imagine that robust debate may surround this question. 
Whether or not a list is used, confusion may be lessened by
1 By definition, these would apply even when the parties had chosen 
a state or foreign arbitration law to govern the proceedings.
2 Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 1119-20.
3 Several provisions in the Model Law make reference to the distinc­
tion between mandatory and non-mandatory rules, as if the classifi­
cation of the provisions as one or the other was self-evident. See, 
e.g., Article 19(l)(Parties may by agreement set arbitral procedure 
“[s]ubject to the provisions of this law”). Some provisions are 
clearly non-mandatory; others are ambiguous. For example, may the 
parties by agreement alter the party equality principle? Or, may they 
determine that only the tribunal chair must be impartial, leaving the 
party-appointed arbitrators to act as advocates to some degree? As 
to the first, Holtzmann & Neuhaus are certain that Article 18—“the 
Magna Carta of Arbitral Procedure”—binds both the tribunal and the 
parties. See id. at 550-51. As to the partisanship of arbitrators, the 
answer seems less clear. Cf. id. at 388-91.
4 It is possible, of course, that U.S. lawmakers may allow derogation 
from provisions that the Model Law’s drafters fully intended to be 
mandatory.
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systematic use of the qualifying phrase, “unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties,” a convention used by the Model Law, 
but not with consistency.
The Gateway /  Kyocera Question
If the parties may designate state or foreign law to govern, 
may they also expand a court’s jurisdiction to review awards? 
Courts have diverged in considering arbitration clauses that 
purport to make awards reviewable for “errors of law.” In 
Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications 
Corp.,5 the Fifth Circuit held that such a clause required a 
court to conduct de novo review of an award, and that to do so 
when authorized by the parties is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedents which have emphasized party autonomy. A 
searching review followed and the award was partially nulli­
fied.6 Faced with a similar clause, a district court in Califor­
nia, fully aware of Gateway, went the opposite direction,7 
only to be reversed by the Ninth Circuit.8 The latter thus 
aligned itself with the Fifth Circuit and against the Seventh
5 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
6 Id. at 995. The lower court had confirmed the award against MCI, 
which contained actual damages, attorneys’ fees and punitive 
damages. The latter were assessed by the arbitrator to account for 
MCI’s failure to negotiate in good faith. Performing its review on 
the merits, the Fifth Circuit determined that the resisting party had 
waived its objection to the award of attorneys’ fees but that the 
award of punitive damages was incorrect under the governing state 
law, which required a basis in tort for the award of such damages.
7 Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 703 
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
8 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Circuit’s 1991 assessment that “[the parties] cannot contract 
for judicial review of [the] award; federal jurisdiction cannot 
be created by contract. ”9 
The level of review clearly matters. The result in Gateway, 
for example, would no doubt have been different under FAA 
§ 10 and under the Model Law, neither of which invites 
substantive review. The clarification invited by the decisional 
discord would best be addressed by language amplifying the 
exclusive character of the Model Law grounds for setting 
aside, perhaps in conjunction with the listing of obligatory 
provisions mentioned above. To disallow substantive review by 
contract would promote finality and speed.10 By contrast, if 
such clauses became the norm, arbitration would be merely a 
form of first instance proceeding; few losing parties would let 
the arbitrators’ award stand where the arbitration clause held 
the hope of a second chance to prevail. The costs of achieving 
a final result would naturally increase as well.11
9 Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 
935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).
10 Accord A. Lowenfeld, Can Arbitration Coexist with Judicial 
Review?, ADR Currents, Sept. 1998, at 1, 14-15.
11 Supporting this form of party autonomy is the sense of security 
promoted by an errors-of-law clause, which may make arbitration 
more acceptable to an apprehensive participant. Where one or more 
of the parties approach arbitration clauses with substantial skepti­
cism, the promise of de novo review may be the price of keeping 
disputes (at least initially) out of the courts. On balance, however 
the policies favoring alacrity, finality, economy, and the need to 
portray the United States as a situs free of judicial interference 
outweigh the above-mentioned arguments in favor of allowing 
plenary review of international awards.
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12.2.3 Chapter  Interdependence
At present, Chapters Two and Three of the FAA (the conven­
tion chapters) are supplemented by Chapter One to the extent 
that it “is not in conflict with” them or their underlying 
treaties.12 Several countries have subjected the Model Law to 
similar augmentation.13 In the United States, the “residual 
application” provisions have spawned judicial confusion, as 
skillful advocates have upon occasion pressed for application 
of Chapter One in dubious settings under the conventions. The 
issues that have arisen include whether § 9’s consent-to- 
judgment requirement,14 or the manifest-disregard-of-the-law 
standard applies to Convention awards.15 Similarly, some 
courts have applied FAA’s statutory vacatur grounds—typically 
reserved for domestic awards—to Convention awards.16
The New Act should simplify matters by declaring its 
autonomy,17 vis-a-vis FAA Chapter One. There would remain 
room for borrowing by analogy, but not under the guise of
nSee FAA, §§ 208, 307.
13 Sanders at 6 (discussing statutes in Nigeria, Peru, Tunisia and 
Georgia, (U.S.A.)).
14 Cf. G. Aksen and W. Dorman, Applications of the New York 
Convention by U.S. Courts: A Twenty-Year Review (1970-1990), 2 
Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 65, 80 (1991) (courts readily find the require­
ment, derived from FAA § 9, satisfied).
15 See, e.g., Lander Co. v. MMP Investments, Inc., 1997 W.L. 66094 
(7th Cir 111.) (leaving question open).
16 See Matter of Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1996); cf. Biotronik Mess-und 
Therapiegeraete & Co. v. Medford Med Instrument, Co., 415 F. 
Supp. 133 (1976)(applying § 10(a) FAA—award procured by 
fraud—to a Swiss Award).
17 Accord Sanders at 6-7.
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applying other chapters of the FAA directly. Because the 
Model Law as supplemented below will be relatively complete, 
excursions to other chapters ought not ordinarily to occur.
12.3 Compelling Arbitration and Limited Interlocutory 
Appeal
The Model Law adopts the New York Convention notion that 
to give effect to arbitration agreements a court seised of a 
matter covered by an arbitration agreement should stay its own 
proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration. Both in its 
implementation of the Convention and in enforcing agreements 
not governed by a treaty, the FAA allows a party to seek an 
order compelling a recalcitrant party to arbitrate. In the case 
of an agreement to which the Convention applies the federal 
courts may do so whether or not the named situs is within the 
United States.18 There is little reason to retreat from this 
important feature of American law, which could be added
18 FAA, § 206.
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without fundamentally changing the UNCITRAL text.19 In 
fact, adopting the Model Law would clarify the rule of FAA 
§ 206 in a material respect.20
Interlocutory appeals from denials of requests to compel 
arbitration were added to the FAA by amendments to the 
FAA. They allow interim appeal only from a district court’s 
decision not to recognize an arbitration agreement covered by 
the Act,21 precluding it as to orders favoring arbitration.22
19 If the New Act carries forward the FAA’s machinery for ordering 
parties to arbitrate abroad, this function might be given exclusively 
to federal district courts; uniformity of application would be 
improved and any doubts about state court powers to order opera­
tions abroad would be obviated. State courts would still of course be 
required to stay proceedings and “refer” the parties to arbitration. 
They would not be precluded from ordering the parties to arbitrate 
within the state, if the parties’ agreement so provides.
20 Strictly speaking, FAA § 206 only authorizes courts to enforce the 
parties’ choice of situs, leaving the courts no express power to 
designate an appropriate place of arbitration when the parties have 
been silent. One decision holds that a federal court may in such 
circumstances compel arbitration within its district. See Bauhinia 
Corp. v China Nat’l Mach. & Equip. Import and Export Corp., 819 
F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the Model Law, Art. 21(1), failing 
a designation by the parties, the tribunal fixes the situs “having 
regard to the circumstances of the case.” Retaining the Model Law 
formula upon adoption is consistent with existing § 206 and would 
preclude the questionable solution reached in Bauhinia. Thus, where 
the parties have designated the place, they would be ordered to 
arbitrate there; where they have not, they would be ordered to 
arbitrate, and to initiate their agreed procedure for the appointment 
of arbitrators, who, in default of intervening party choice, would 
designate the situs.
21 See generally K. W olf, Appeals from District Court Determinations 
Involving Arbitration, in C o m m e r c ia l  A r b it r a t io n  f o r  t h e  
1990’s (R. M edalie ed ., 1991) a t 105.
22 FAA, § 16(b) provides:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an 
appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order-
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Appeal, on the same asymmetrical basis, should be retained; 
the law of arbitrability has been largely formed on appeal, 
often in cases in which a lower court declined to enforce an 
agreement to arbitrate.
12.4 Jury Trial
A feature of the FAA which seems greatly out of place in an 
international arbitration statute is jury trial, even in the limited 
fashion described in Chapter 7. Because the Constitution 
guarantees a jury trial in actions at law in federal courts, an 
attempt to do away with it altogether would be subject to 
constitutional attack. Under the New Act’s jury provision, 
presumably, federal courts could continue to require the party 
alleged to be in default to demonstrate—before a jury will be 
empaneled—a colorable basis upon which a reasonable jury 
could find that no arbitral agreement exists.23
12.5 Act of State
The Act of State doctrine requires American courts to abstain 
from adjudicating the validity of the acts of a foreign state
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
23 T he constitutional requirem ent o f  a civil ju ry  does no t extend to 
state courts; the ju ry  p rovision  w ould be d rafted  accordingly .
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undertaken with respect to property and other activities in that 
state’s own territory.24
The FAA, in one o f its few m odem  amendments, limits the
doctrine’s application to arbitration:
“Enforcement o f arbitral agreements, confirmation o f arbitral 
awards, and execution upon judgments based on orders 
confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis o f the 
Act of State doctrine.”25
Prior to the above amendment, a district court declined to 
enforce a Swiss award against a Libya, citing the doctrine. 
LIAMCO26 grew out o f  Libya’s nationalization o f  its oil 
industry. The court’s reasoning remains subject to interpreta­
tion; the court’s apparent premise, however, was that because 
Libya purported to nullify the arbitration agreement, given the 
doctrine, it would not have been able in the first instance to 
enforce the agreement to arbitrate. By a questionable extension, 
it concluded that it ought not enforce the ultimate award 
either.27 Appeal on the decision was not consummated, but the 
decision was vacated.28
The above amendments effectively overrule LIAMCO , and 
should be replicated in the N ew  Act, lest confusion recur. To 
it might be added the complementary rule found in the Swiss 
International Arbitration Law, which states:
A state, or an enterprise owned by, or an organization con­
trolled by a state, which is party to an arbitration agreement, 
cannot invoke its own law in order to contest its capacity to
24 See Restatement (Third) § 433.
25 FAA, § 15.
26 Libyan Am. Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Socialist Peoples’ Arab 
Jamahira, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980).
27 Id. at 1178-79.
28 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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arbitrate or the arbitrability of a dispute covered by the 
arbitration agreement.29
While there may be overlap in the two provisions, taken
together they forestall most inappropriate sovereign defenses
to arbitration agreements.
12.6 Multiparty Disputes
12.6.1 In  General
Multiparty disputes present especial challenges to the arbitral 
mechanism. Neither the FAA nor the Model Law treats the 
various aspects of the problem to be addressed in this section. 
Yet, the addition of a provision treating multiparty issues—or 
at least some of them—ought to be contemplated because of the 
divergent American authority, the importance of the issues to 
users of arbitration and the concerns facing courts asked to 
recognize awards produced from multi-party proceedings. 
Ostensibly, two areas can be addressed by statute: judicial 
consolidation of related arbitrations and appointment of arbitra­
tors.
12.6.2 Court Consolidation—The Consent  Question
In the United States, whether unanimous party consent is 
essential to consolidation has generated two distinct approach­
es. One is typified by certain state statutes that give courts the 
power to consolidate related proceedings even though one of
29 Swiss International Arbitration Law, Article 177(2).
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the three parties resists consolidation and has not otherwise 
consented to combined proceedings. The prevailing federal 
view, by contrast, holds that the parties’ agreement to consoli­
dation must be found, in the parties’ respective contracts or 
elsewhere.30 Similarly, unanimous party assent is a prerequi­
site within consolidation provisions found in the international 
arbitration laws of California, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, Texas, and the common law provinces of Canada.31
Though at least one prominent non-American venue allows 
court consolidation of related arbitrations without complete 
consent,32 to enhance award enforceability33the New Act 
should embrace the more conservative trend.34 Consent should 
suffice, however, even if ante-dating the dispute.35
Once the consent question is settled, the remaining questions 
are important but comparatively mechanical: who may petition
30 See United Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993).
31 Sanders at 29-31.
32 See Article 1046, Netherlands Arbitration Act 1996, Code Civ. 
Proc., Bk. IV, reprinted in ICC A Handbook, Vol. III. (“The 
[named court] may wholly or partially grant or refuse the request, 
after [it] has given all parties and the arbitrators an opportunity to 
be heard”).
33 Both the Model Law and the New York Convention allow for non- 
recognition when “[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the 
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties.” New York Convention, art. V.l(d). Model Law, Art. 
34(l)(a)(iii). “Parties” presumably implies all of the parties.
34 The provision envisioned would not stricto sensu require the consent 
of the arbitrators (if any had been appointed) but the views of any 
tribunal member would be data for the court to consider in exercis­
ing its discretion.
35 See, e.g., Maxum Foundations v. Salus Corp. and United Pacific 
Insurance, 817 F.2d 1086, 1086-1087, (4th Cir. 1987).
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for consolidation,36 which factors should guide the court once 
consent is established,37 which collateral powers should the 
court be given to facilitate the consolidated proceedings and 
which procedures if any should be exhausted before the court 
may be petitioned.38 Of these, the collateral powers of the 
courts in forming a multiparty tribunal are perhaps most 
significant, as discussed in the next sub-section.
12.6.3 A pp oin tm en t o f  A r b itr a to r s —B y W hom  a n d  
H ow  M an y
Parties to a multi-party dispute, though they have consented to 
combined proceedings, may disagree as to the method by 
which the arbitral tribunal will be constituted, its composition, 
or its size. Disputants who are classed as respondents (or 
claimants as the case may be) may nonetheless have differing 
interests and priorities, leading them to entertain divergent 
conceptions of prospective appointees. Deadlock or unsettling 
compromise may thus occur if they are forced by an institution 
or a domestic court to jointly appoint one arbitrator. If, as 
would be beneficial under the New Act, courts are empowered 
to make appointments for multiparty disputes, a challenge
36 Presumably, any party to one of the arbitration agreements involved 
can so petition.
37 Among the factors which might be enumerated within the provision 
are the similarity of the factual and legal issues in dispute, the 
respective arbitration stages at which the petition to consolidate is 
made, and the views of any arbitrators that have been appointed at 
the time of the petition.
38 E.g., procedures contemplated in the parties’ agreements to arbitrate 
or entrusted to an administering institution.
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arises for lawmakers: to promote equality while avoiding 
inefficiency.39
For institutions faced with appointing arbitrators in multipar­
ty cases, navigating the Cour de Cassation decision in the 
Dutco case has been a principal concern.40 In Dutco, an 
award of the three arbitrators was nullified because the parties 
objecting to the consolidation (the defendants) were not treated 
with equality during the appointment process. They had been 
required to make a joint appointment based upon an ICC 
clause in the three-party consortium agreement calling for a 
three-person tribunal. The Court reasoned that a prospective 
waiver of equality in the appointment procedure was inconsis­
tent with French public policy.41 The claimant had been 
allowed to appoint an arbitrator; absent their post-dispute 
agreement to the contrary, each of the defendants apparently 
should have been allowed to do likewise.42
At first impression, the simple answer to the Dutco prob­
lem43 is to let each party appoint one arbitrator; no equality
39 In meeting the challenge, strategies developed by administering 
institutions deserve especial attention.
40 Siemens AG and BKMI Industriean Lagen Gmbh v. Dutco Con­
struction Co., l re Ch. Civ., Jan. 7, 1992. See generally Note from 
the ICC at 6; E. Schwartz, Multi-Party Arbitration and the ICC—In 
the Wake of Dutco, 10(3) J. Int’l Arb. 5 (1993).
41 Note from the ICC.
42 Id.
43 Whether and how elaborately to respond in the New Act to the 
Dutco issue are thought-provoking questions. Ostensibly, it is an 
idiosyncratic, French problem. Nonetheless, one cannot predict how 
influential the case will be in countries that have received the French 
system. If the authorities are correct that the case does not require 
/?atf-dispute consent to appointments by an institution or a court on 
behalf of each party, responding to Dutco seems not unduly disrup­
tive. If Dutco, nevertheless, were later construed to require post­
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problem arises in that situation. This approach—which results 
in five-person tribunals—makes nevertheless for unwieldy44 
and expensive arbitrations,45 hardly an apt statutory norm.
An alternative is to invite multiple claimants or respondents 
to make a joint appointment of one arbitrator, so as to com­
pose a traditional three-person tribunal.46 In light of Dutco, 
upon the request of any party, the court (or an institution) 
would appoint the two arbitrators that would otherwise be 
party-appointed.47 The premise is that equality of the parties
dispute consent to consolidation, U.S. lawmakers ought not to be 
fully deferential, despite the negative potential defiance may hold for 
enforcement of American awards presented in France. As a business 
planning matter, the value of parties being able to ensure combined 
proceedings by a pre-dispute agreement outweighs the marginal 
prospect of non-recognition abroad. As a general policy matter, 
sufficient protection to the parties is provided if specific, explicit 
consent to consolidation is required.
44 In the standard three arbitrator tribunal, the two parties each appoint 
an arbitrator; the third arbitrator is jointly appointed by the two 
party-appointed arbitrators. If each of three parties were allowed an 
appointment, that would complete the tribunal only if the parties are 
willing to depart from the standard of having non-party appointed 
arbitrators join the tribunal (usually as chair-person and to give an 
odd number). If they are not, two additional non-party appointed 
arbitrators would be required. The fifth is necessary to prevent 
deadlock, so that the award can be formed with a majority. The 
fourth and fifth would be appointed by the three party-appointed 
arbitrators or by an institution.
45 Nonetheless, at least one court has adopted this approach. Compania 
Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 
966 (2d Cir. 1975) (court consolidating related arbitrations required 
fourth and fifth arbitrators to be jointly and unanimously appointed 
by other three).
46 See, e.g., WIPO Rules, Art. 18.
47 Id; cf. ICC Note from the ICC (defendants in Dutco could not have 
claimed lack of equality if claimant had asked ICC to appoint an 
arbitrator on its behalf).
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is only violated if one side is allowed to appoint while the 
multiple parties on the adverse side are forced to make a joint 
appointment.48
A third possibility would be to partially override the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate in cases of consolidation by allowing a 
court to make an appointment of a single arbitrator when any 
party protests to collaboration in making an appointment. 
Because three-party tribunals have arguably become the 
international norm—reflected in the Model Law itself—party 
forfeiture of the expected format may deter parties from 
arbitrating in the United States and might jeopardize enforce­
ment abroad of the resulting award, especially when the rules 
chosen by the parties or their arbitration clauses call for 
multiple-person tribunals. Therefore, though attractive in its 
simplicity, this solution ought not to obtain unless the parties 
agreements have provided nothing in relation to the size of 
tribunal or all parties (typically numbering three) have agreed 
that their joint arbitration shall have a single arbitrator. This 
agreement could, however, be contained is the rules adopted 
by the parties.49
The desire for predictability notwithstanding, designating by 
statute a single approach seems unwise. Courts ordinarily
48 Where the parties’ agreement does not require a three-person 
tribunal, an institutional appointment of a sole arbitrator may be the 
simplest answer to the multi-party equality puzzle. If consolidation 
does not occur, but the relevant parties are subject to substantially 
similar arbitration clauses, the risks of inconsistent awards may be 
reduced by conducting parallel arbitrations served by the same 
arbitrators.
49 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 5. The default rule in other 
formulations nevertheless is that three arbitrators form the tribunal. 
See, e.g., AAA International Rules, Art. 5; ICC Rules, Art. 8(2).
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prefer flexibility to rigid statutory solutions that inhibit fact- 
sensitive judicial engineering. Moreover, the intricacies of 
multiparty disputes would seem to defy detailed statutory 
prefiguring, since they arise from a broad spectrum of troubled 
relationships, both horizontal and vertical.
In general, the apt combination of flexibility and guidance to 
all concerned may come from a statute that shifts the responsi­
bility for outcomes to the parties by assuring that where they 
have agreed upon a method for forming the tribunal, the court 
addressed will to the extent possible take instructions from the 
parties’ agreement,50 including any delegation to an institu­
tion.51 Where the parties have agreed to consolidated arbitra­
tions but have not provided any mechanism for staffing the 
tribunal, the courts discretion will be relatively wide, subject 
to certain parameters. In keeping with the Model Law, the 
provision would instruct courts to appoint only independent 
and impartial arbitrators, that an uneven number of arbitrators, 
ordinarily three, must serve52 and that sole arbitrators and 
presiding arbitrators must not be of the same nationality or 
habitual residence of any party.53 Single arbitrator appoint­
ments would be within judicial discretion, but only in the 
circumstances outlined above.
50 Cf. Model Law, Art. 11(2).
51 Cf. Id.
52 Cf. Model Law, Art. 10(2) as revised in Indian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act of 1996, reprinted in ICCA Handbook, Vol.II.
53 British Columbia’s original Model Law enactment required amend­
ment to ensure that court appointments of presiding arbitrators be of 
persons having state affiliations neutral to the parties. See Paterson 
at 162.
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12.6.4 Su m m a r y  o f  th e  R e c o m m en d ed  Pro v isio n
In general the following should be the basis upon which 
drafting proceeds. Courts may consolidate related arbitrations 
only when all the parties have clearly expressed agreement; 
consent however may be given in advance of dispute. The 
court should be empowered to make appointments to facilitate 
the consolidated arbitrations, but only in a manner that takes 
account of any requirements common to the parties’ agree­
ments and the Act itself (impartiality, etc.) and only if any 
appointing authority mechanism agreed by the parties has been 
exhausted or waived by all the parties. The consolidation 
provision adopted in California for international disputes might 
provide a suitable starting place, though not a final text.54
54 Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1297.272 provides:
Where the parties to two or more arbitration agreements have agreed, 
in their respective arbitration agreements or otherwise, to consolidate 
the arbitrations arising out of those arbitration agreements, the 
superior court may, on application by one party with the consent of 
all the other parties to those arbitration agreements, do one or more 
of the following:
(a) Order the arbitrations to be consolidated on terms the court 
considers just and necessary.
(b) Where all parties cannot agree on an arbitral tribunal for the 
consolidated arbitration, appoint an arbitral tribunal in accor­
dance with [the relevant section].
(c) Where all the parties cannot agree on any other matter neces­
sary to conduct the consolidated arbitration, make any other 
order it considers necessary.
The text (emphasis added) appears to require unanimous consent also 
after the dispute has arisen. While this is the most conservative 
position, if the parties have bargained ex ante for the advantages of 
a joint proceeding, they ought not to be able to renege even if their 
interests appear to have changed. The italicized words should not 
therefore appear in the New Act.
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12.7 Ex Parte Contact and Communications
Some arbitrations in America still proceed on the premise that 
party-appointed arbitrators need not be strictly neutral. The 
integrity of the process to be sponsored by the New Law will 
depend in part on appearances. Even though international rule 
formulations typically require that all arbitrators be indepen­
dent and impartial, not all rule formulations deal with the 
related problem of ex parte contact. Addressing the issue 
directly will assuage the apprehensive and deter the mischie­
vous better than a generic due process test,55 which leaves far 
too much latitude for infraction.56
The relative scope and strictness of the default rule under 
consideration will require study. It should address both the pre­
appointment and post-appointment settings, since inappropriate 
contact is equally troubling during both segments. In arriving 
at an appropriate draft provision, recent institutional formula­
tions—notably those of the AAA and WIPO57 may be helpful.
55 Cf. Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 
(11th Cir. 1993).
56 While parties could depart from the rule, they should be required to 
do so expressly and unambiguously.
57 Article 21 of the WIPO Arbitration Rules provides:
No party or anyone acting on its behalf shall have any ex parte 
communication with any candidate for appointment as arbitrator 
except to discuss the candidate’s qualifications, availability or 
independence in relation to the parties.
The AAA provision expressly allows the appointing party to also 
apprise the candidate of the general nature of the controversy and to 
discuss the suitability of potential third arbitrators in some circum­
stances.
WIPO Article 45 is complementary to Article 21 addressing the post­
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Though they are not identical, taken together the two formula­
tions produce relatively complete guidance.
After some adaptation, the melding produces the following 
draft provision, which seems to comport with accepted U.S. 
practice:
No party or anyone acting on its behalf shall have any ex 
parte communication relating to the case with any arbitrator, 
or with any candidate for the appointment as party-appointed 
arbitrator except to advise the candidate of the general 
nature of the controversy and of the anticipated proceedings 
and to discuss the candidates’s availability or independence 
in relation to the parties, or to discuss the suitability of 
candidates for selection as a third arbitrator where the 
parties or party designated arbitrators are to participate in 
that selection, it being understood that nothing in this 
paragraph shall prohibit ex parte communications which 
concern matters of a purely organizational nature, such 
as the physical facilities, place, date or time of the 
hearings.
No party or anyone acting on its behalf shall have ex 
parte communication relating to the case with any candidate 
for presiding arbitrator.58
appointment setting:
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules or permitted by the 
Tribunal, no party or anyone acting on its behalf may have any ex 
parte communication with any arbitrator with respect to any 
manner of substance relating to the arbitration, it being understood 
that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit ex parte communica­
tions which concern matters of a purely organizational nature, such 
as the physical facilities, place, date or time of the hearings.
58 AAA International Rules, Art. 7 (1). The underlined portion (from 
the AAA text) is not found in the WIPO counterpart. The bold text 
is taken from the WIPO Rules, Article 45. The provision does not 
address the post-arbitration setting. In important respects that context 
is treated by a provision proposed under infra § 12.18.
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12.8 Arbitrator Disclosure
12.8.1 In  General
The Model Law requires a prospective arbitrator when ap­
proached about a possible appointment to disclose “circum­
stances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence.”59 When California enacted the 
Model Law, it elaborated on the basic rule by giving a list of 
facts and relationships that must be disclosed. The goal was to 
add predictability and integrity to the process by removing 
subjectivity. The result is a non-exhaustive but relatively 
comprehensive checklist that is instructive to prospective 
arbitrators and parties alike.60 The statute omits to suggest, 
however, what consequences should flow from an arbitrator’s 
failure to disclose the kinds of facts enumerated, a failing 
common to the Model Law.
American courts have differed concerning the consequences 
of non-disclosure; most would agree, however, that non­
disclosure bears upon the question of independence and 
impartiality. Some decisions appear to treat non-disclosure of
59 Model Law, Art. 12(1).
60 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 1297.121 is elaborate—some would argue 
too elaborate. It requires that arbitrators disclose within 15 days of 
appointment any information which might cause their impartiality to 
be questioned including, but not limited to, any of the items 
(relationships and interests) set forth in the six paragraphs and sub- 
paragraphs provided.
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a material consideration as requiring vacatur;61 others regard 
a failure to divulge troubling information as lessening the 
dissatisfied party’s burden in seeking vacatur.62
Under the Model Law, lack of independence and impartiality 
is not an express basis for setting aside an award. Lawmakers 
should seize the opportunity to clarify the linkage between non­
disclosure and vacatur, perhaps by slightly amending Article 
34(2)(a)(iv). The object would be to identify independence and 
impartiality as an element in proper tribunal composition, e.g . ,  
as follows: “the composition of the arbitral tribunal, including  
b u t no t lim ited to the im partiality and  independence o f  its 
m em bers. . .was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties. . .or failing such agreement, was not in accordance 
with this Law.”63 To Article 12(l)(disclosure requirement) 
would be added: “A n  arb itra tor’s fa ilu re  to comply w ith this 
A rtic le  shall be a  fa c to r  in determ ining w hether the tribunal 
w as properly  constituted within the m eaning o f  Articles 34  and  
55.”
12.8.2 A D u ty  t o  S e a r c h  f o r  C o n f l ic t s
A related question may also be addressed by modifying the 
standard Model Law text—to what degree must arbitrators
61 Cf. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, Local 97-B v. Haddon Craftsman, 
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (M.D.Pa. 1979).
62 See, e.g., Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 924, 427-28 
(9th Cir. 1996).
63 The italicized material is new; the bracket indicates a purposefully 
omitted alternative ground better treated separately (nonconforming 
procedure). The ellipses denote material that would remain but 
which doesn’t affect the point offered here.
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search for conflicts? Like the FAA and most state arbitration 
statutes, the Model Law does not treat the question of conflict 
searches. Although the ABA-AAA Ethics for Arbitrators do 
require such a search,64 some American courts have conclud­
ed in effect that the required disclosure is only of facts actually 
known to the arbitrator; thus an award is not imperiled by 
disturbing facts which an extensive inquiry would have 
uncovered but which remained unknown to the arbitrator.65 
The position has a logic with which it is difficult to argue, viz. 
if ex hypothesi the arbitrator was unaware, e.g., that his 
former firm represented one of the parties, it could not have
64 Canon II B states:
Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators 
should make a reasonable effort to inform themselves of any 
interests or relationships described in the preceding paragraph 
[which lists various categories of interest or relationship].
65 The questions of what an arbitrator must disclose and what he or she 
is chargeable with knowing for purposes of disclosure are linked. 
Should an award be subject to vacatur for interests in the arbitrator 
or relationships to a party of which the arbitrator was unaware 
during the arbitration? If the arbitrator was subjectively unaware of 
facts that might otherwise give rise to doubts, what harm has been 
done? By hypothesis, they could not have influenced the outcome. 
The counter argument is that requiring an arbitrator to perform a 
conflicts check adds to the integrity of the process by making for 
more complete disclosure, thus reducing doubts about a system that 
allows parties to appoint their own arbitrators.
When the rules or regime chosen by the parties require a prospec­
tive arbitrator to search for possible conflicts, certainly failure to do 
so ought to be a factor—perhaps a compelling one—in looking for 
impermissible partiality. Absent an agreed search requirement, 
courts are often forgiving. See Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N. A., 85 
F.3d 680, 684 (D.C.Cir. 1996)(no vacatur though arbitrator’s 
former law firm had represented the prevailing party; arbitrator un­
aware of the former connection); accord, Betz v. Pankow, 38 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1995).
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affected his or her handling of the case. The problem with 
making the question turn on what an arbitrator actually knew 
is that an arbitrator is discouraged by such a rule from making 
a search.66 To some extent the legitimacy and longevity of 
arbitration as an institution depends upon the confidence it 
inspires in its users. Under a regime that does not require a 
reasonable search, there will always be room for the losing 
party to sense (rightly or wrongly) that certain facts later 
discovered by it could not have been unknown to the arbitra­
tor. Not requiring a search for conflicts, however, arguably 
enhances finality; a party will not be rewarded by elaborate 
post-award excursions into the arbitrators* professional and 
business life for relationships or facts that could have, and thus 
should have, been discovered and disclosed by the arbitrator. 
Rather, the effort would bear fruit only if it could be demon­
strated that the fact left undisclosed was actually known to the 
arbitrator.
Striking a statutory balance between the extremes by 
requiring a reasonable search is consistent with the prevailing 
American sense of the issue. On the one hand: “an arbitrator 
cannot be expected to provide the parties with his complete and 
unexpurgated business biography; ”67on the other, notions of
66 As to known facts, the arbitrator must make disclosure, perhaps 
precipitating a challenge; once facts are known to the arbitrator, an 
election not to disclose them adds to an impression of bias. If the 
facts are never ascertained, however, disclosure is replaced by 
blissful ignorance. Thus, with no statutory obligation requiring a 
different attitude, an arbitrator may be inclined to limit disclosure 
to those matters of which he or she is already aware, rather than to 
amplify the disclosure burden by further investigation.
67 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 
U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968) (Concurring Opinion).
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professionalism and good practice counsel that some inquiry be 
undertaken, as per the AAA-ABA Canons mentioned above. 
Accordingly, the language crafted might refer to “an inquiry 
reasonable in the circumstances and  calculated to ascertain  
any o f  the fa c ts  se t fo r th  in [the checklist referred to above] ” 
While there will still be argument about what was “reasonable 
in the circumstances,” the disclosure checklist should give 
some structure to the search; moreover, making reasonableness 
depend on the circumstances should forestall after-the-fact 
scrutiny of the arbitrators’ disclosures that unfairly raise the 
standard and discourage qualified persons from serving.
12.9 Confidentiality
12.9.1 In G e n e r a l
“Confidentiality” is often touted as one of the virtues of 
alternative dispute resolution in general and of arbitration in 
particular. The degree to which this is an accurate portrayal 
depends upon to which of a series of related problems and 
contexts one is referring. Among the questions that arise under 
this general heading are: (1) may persons not involved in the 
arbitration as a party, counsel, arbitrator, or the like (such as 
a member of the press) attend hearings, pre-hearing conferenc­
es, or other proceedings? (2) may the administering institution, 
the tribunal, or one of the parties disclose (such as to the 
press) details about the dispute, the proceedings, or the award? 
(3) are documents, testimony, and other evidence used in an
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arbitration available for use in subsequent or contemporaneous 
litigation?
The first question is sometimes referred to as the “privacy” 
issue; comparatively little controversy arises as to it.68 Nor 
are the duties of institutions and arbitrators subject to much 
doubt.69 By contrast, in the absence of contractual arrange­
ments to the contrary, are parties free to discuss with outsiders 
the details of the arbitration? As to this latter question, 
expectations vary widely, suggesting that it deserves especial
68 Standard rule texts often address the “privacy” (exclusion of the 
public at large) to be accorded the hearing. The UNCITRAL Rules 
state that “[h]earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree 
otherwise.” UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 25.4. Accord AAA Internation­
al Rules Art.20.4 (“private,” except when “the law provides to the 
contrary”).
69 Rules and canons are strict in this respect. For example, the AAA 
International Rules, Article 34, provides in pertinent part:
Confidential information disclosed during the proceedings by 
the parties or by witnesses shall not be divulged by an arbitrator 
or by the administrator. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 
or required by applicable law, the members of the tribunal and 
the administrator shall keep confidential all matters relating to 
the arbitration or the award.
The last sentence of the foregoing rule appears broad enough to 
guide an arbitrator’s conduct both during and after the proceedings. 
As to arbitrators, essentially the same rule is found in the AAA/ABA 
Code o f Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Canon VI 
(B). Similarly, the ICC’s form letter of appointment to arbitrators 
urges arbitrators to observe the “utmost respect for the confidential 
nature of the proceedings.” J. Paulsson and N. Rawding, The Trouble 
with Confidentiality, 11 Arb. Int’l 303, 319 (1995).
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attention.70 The next subsection offers related further discus­
sion.
12 .9 .2  P a r ty  D is c lo s u r e s —S t a t u t o r y  R efo rm  o r  
S t a tu s  Q uo?
Because the potential for confidentiality is often perceived to 
be an attribute of arbitration;71 the existing absence of a 
statutory or case law duty seems curious.72 Most potential 
participants in the arbitration process probably regard confiden­
tiality as something to be encouraged.73 Yet, should the New
70 Despite the ambiguous adage that “arbitration is confidential,” 
absent a confidentiality agreement, there is under American law no 
well-settled prohibition on party disclosures of information related 
to an ongoing arbitration. H. Smit, Expert Report (in Esso/BHP v. 
Plowman), reprinted in 11 Arb. Int’l 227 (1995).
71 The majority of Buhring-Uhle’s sample (64%) deemed confidentiali­
ty of procedure to be more influential than numerous other factors 
in preferring arbitration. The phrasing of the question however 
suggests that the respondents had in mind privacy of the proceedings 
(i.e., their in camera format) and not the reduced chances of 
disclosures related to the dispute. See Biiring-Uhle at 395.
72 The few relevant decisions do not establish an implied duty 
requiring the parties to hold the proceedings and information 
produced therein confidential. In United States v. Panhandle Eastern 
Corp., 118 F.R.D. 346 (D. Del. 1988), Panhandle unsuccessfully 
sought to block discovery of materials related to an ICC proceeding 
in Switzerland participated in by Panhandle’s subsidiary. It relied in 
part upon an informal confidentiality understanding alleged to exist 
with the other party (the Algerian National Oil and Gas Company). 
The court doubted that any such agreement had formed; according­
ly, Panhandle failed, under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to demonstrate that “disclosure will work a clearly 
defined and serious injury.”
12Cf. Saville Report at para. 12:
In practice there is no doubt whatever that users of commercial
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Act encumber the parties (and perhaps others) with duties 
analogous to those applicable to the tribunal and administering 
institutions under leading rule formulations?74 Some interna­
tional rule texts, such as the WIPO formulation, have already 
adopted a clear proscription. The WIPO rule states:
(a) Except to the extent necessary in connection with a court 
challenge to the arbitration or an action for enforcement of an 
award, no information concerning the existence of an arbitra­
tion may be unilaterally disclosed by a party to any third party 
unless it is required to do so by law or by a competent 
regulatory body, and then only:
(i) by disclosing no more than what is legally required, 
and
(ii) by furnishing to the Tribunal and to the other party, 
if the disclosure takes place during the arbitration, or 
to the other party alone, if the disclosure takes place 
after the termination of the arbitration, details of the 
disclosure and an explanation of the reason for it.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a party may disclose to a third 
party the names of the parties to the arbitration and the relief 
requested for the purpose of satisfying any obligation of good 
faith or candor owed to that third party.75
A less parental approach would be to retain the existing
position while encouraging the parties to plan ahead. A
provision built upon this premise would ensure that if parties
reached a written confidentiality agreement in conjunction with
arbitration in England place much importance on privacy and 
confidentiality as essential features of English arbitration...In­
deed ...it would be difficult to conceive of any greater threat to 
the success of English arbitration than the removal of the 
general principles of confidentiality and privacy [citing Sir Pat­
rick Neil’s Bernstein Lecture, 1995].
74 See, e.g., AAA International Rules, Art. 34 (tribunal members and 
the AAA “shall keep confidential all matters related to the arbitra­
tion or the award”).
75 WIPO Rules, Art. 73.
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their agreement to arbitrate, the tribunal—and the 
courts—would enforce it in such manner as the circumstances 
require, subject to any constitutional constraints that obtain.76 
The underlying position would represent little change from 
existing law except that the tribunal’s power to do so would 
become express77 and court access would become more
76 The First Amendment doctrine against “prior restraints” discourages 
courts from prohibiting speech in advance of its utterance, but is 
most clearly applicable when the expression involved is politically 
or religiously motivated; “commercial speech” (which presumably 
would include some but not all disclosures about an arbitration), by 
contrast, receives a reduced level of protection. See R. Leavell et 
al., E q u it a b l e  R e m e d ie s , Re st it u t io n  a n d  D a m a g es  36-38 
(1994). Courts themselves sometimes order litigants not to discuss 
a pending case and this practice survives attack when supported by 
compelling circumstances. Moreover, when the parties have entered 
into a confidentiality agreement, precedent supports broader 
injunctive power. A court, however, still must draw its order with 
exceeding specificity to avoid undue interference with protected 
speech. It is doubtful that First Amendment constraints apply to a 
privately composed arbitral tribunal; an express concurrent power 
can be given to the tribunal to remedy breach of confidentiality 
agreements, such as by awarding costs, a measure of damages, or 
a default award in extreme circumstances.
77 A tribunal arguably already has such power under a broadly worded 
arbitration clause and leading rules, to protect the status quo and the 
integrity of the process. After all, carefully leaked information, even 
if accurate, can undermine the proceedings in myriad ways. Consid­
er, for instance, a dispute about a company’s worth or the potential 
of its major asset. Party-induced fluctuations in the market guides 
available to the tribunal would be, at a minimum, unhelpful. 
Tribunals should be able to discourage attempts to manipulate the 
external data, provided that a party is not precluded from making 
disclosures required by law.
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predictable. The requisite agreement could, of course, be 
found in the rules chosen by the parties.78
At the other extreme would be a regime that attempted to 
regulate all aspects of the confidentiality question, extending 
obligations to witnesses, experts (party and tribunal-appointed), 
stenographers and others who at present may only be covered 
by separate confidentiality agreements.
While a blanket prohibition may be comforting to those for 
whom confidentiality is paramount, crafting a workable 
statutory rule which is intelligible to all concerned and not too 
prolix is difficult. It has to account for disclosures required by 
law, the time period during which the forbearance must be 
exercised and so on. Moreover, what matters are to be deemed 
confidential: the parties, the award, the fact of arbitration 
itself, any matters not already of public record disclosed during 
the proceedings? While rules texts provide a basis for further
78 See, e.g, CPR International Rules, Art. 17 (“The parties and the 
arbitrator shall treat the proceedings, any related disclosure and the 
decisions of the Tribunal, as confidential, except in connection with 
a judicial challenge to, or enforcement of, an award, and unless 
otherwise required by law”); LCIA Rules, Art. 30(l)(Subject to 
express contrary written agreement “the parties undertake as a 
general principle to keep all awards confidential (together with all 
other materials introduced by another party into the proceedings not 
otherwise in the public domain), save and to the extent that disclo­
sure may be required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue 
a legal right or to enforce or challenge an award in legal proceed­
ings before a state court or other judicial authority”).
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study,79 there is also ample reason to shrink from an abstract 
drafting exercise so fraught with complexity.80
12.10 Observance of Privileges
Arbitration statutes often do not address the extent to which the 
tribunal must apply attomey-client and other privileges that 
protect from disclosure certain kinds of communications and 
attorney work-product.81 The applicability of privileges in 
international arbitration has recently become controversial; 
reportedly, certain arbitrators have adopted the startling 
position that privileges do not obtain in arbitration.82 In 
regulating international proceedings, the privilege question can 
be particularly complex; given differences in legal systems and
79 See, e.g., the LCIA and CPR Rules (immediately preceding foot­
note). Cf. WIPO Rules, Arts. 73-75.
80 The Departmental Advisory Committee propounding the draft 
Arbitration Act 1996 ultimately advised against attempting “to 
codify English law on the privacy and confidentiality.” It noted that 
“grave difficulties arose over the myriad exceptions to these princi­
ples—which [exceptions] are necessarily required for such a 
statutory provision.” Saville Report at paras. 15, 17 (noting the 
absence of guidance in the UNCITRAL Model Law) Cf. In re D 
[Adoption Reports: Confidentiality] [1995] 3 WLR 483, 496D: “To 
give an accurate exposition of confidentiality at large....cannot in 
my opinion safely be attempted in the abstract”) (Lord Mustill as 
excerpted in Saville Report at para. 15).
81 The Arbitration Act 1996 addresses the matter in part, in relation to 
witnesses secured by a party to present testimony and documents 
before a tribunal. Section 43(4) extends to such witnesses the 
privileges they would enjoy in legal proceedings.
82 See J. Carter, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Arbitration, ADR 
Currents, Winter 1996/1997, at 1.
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legal cultures, the non-application of a privilege can result not 
from utter disregard of procedural safeguards, but from a 
diligent choice of law analysis.83
Though in deference to the policies behind American law 
privileges, lawmakers might be inclined to designate certain of 
them as mandatory, the better approach is to require respect 
for “applicable” privileges, the phrasing adopted by an amend­
ment to the AAA International Rules.84 Parties would remain 
free to insist upon specific privileges as part of their arbitration 
agreement, absent which the tribunal could treat the issue as a 
conflicts matter, but could not wholly disregard privilege when 
properly invoked.85
83 For example, is in-house corporate counsel an attorney for purposes 
of the above mentioned privileges? The author is informed that in 
some civil law countries the salaried corporate lawyer is generally 
not licensed to practice law; thus protections for attorney-client 
communications may not attach to intra-corporate legal advice.
84 The 1997 amendments to the AAA International Rules added at 
Article 20(6) that: “[t]he tribunal shall take into account applicable 
principles of legal privilege such as those involving the confidentiali­
ty of communications between a lawyer and client. ”
85 Indeed, it would make little sense to apply the American work- 
product doctrine in an arbitration between Mexican and Canadian 
enterprises involving no American lawyers.
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12.11 International Discovery In Aid of Arbitration and 
Subpoena Power
12.11.1 In G e n e r a l
Model Law Article 27 allows a party or a tribunal to seek 
court assistance in the taking of evidence in aid of an arbitra­
tion taking place within the adopting state. The Model Law’s 
drafters decided not to deal with the question of international 
discovery.86 The enactment of the New Act would neverthe­
less provide an opportunity to clarify in several respects the 
law governing this area. First, it should set forth the basis 
upon which a tribunal seated in the United States can seek 
court assistance in obtaining discovery abroad, either under the 
Hague Evidence Convention or through standard letters 
rogatory; Second, it should settle the questions that have arisen 
in relation to requests for assistance under 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1782, which authorizes federal courts to aid a “foreign or 
international tribunal” in the taking of evidence within the 
district where the court sits. These are treated in turn in the 
following subsections. The last subsection discusses the related 
question of arbitral subpoena power.
86 The UNCITRAL Secretariat explains:
[U]nlike earlier draft provisions [Article 27] envisages neither 
assistance to foreign arbitrations nor requests to foreign courts in 
arbitral proceedings held under the model law. This limitation is 
the result of a compromise between those in favor of international 
assistance and those opposed to any provision on court assistance. 
Seventh Secretariat Note: Analytical Commentary on Draft Text (25 
March 1985) as excerpted by Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 755 
(footnotes omitted).
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12.11.2 D isco v ery  Abroad  fo r  U .S . A rbitrations
The Hague Evidence Convention does not clearly contemplate 
that an arbitral tribunal seated, e.g., in Convention Party A 
may directly issue a letter of request to the designated Central 
Authority for Convention Party B. It is more likely to be 
consistent with the Convention to accomplish the same result 
by interposing a court in country A; the letter of request would 
issue from it.87 Because arbitration ought not to be converted 
into international litigation, the provision should require the 
request to come from the tribunal, and not directly from a 
party. To so provide would be consistent with existing Model 
Law Article 27 (Court Assistance in Taking Evidence), which 
requires the approval of the tribunal before a party requests 
discovery assistance from a court. Indeed, the clarification here 
under discussion could be accomplished by merely slightly 
amending Article 27.88 Consistent with Hague Convention 
practice, the provision should set forth the need for specificity 
and should allow the court addressed to return overly broad
87 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special Report 
on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague 
Evidence Convention, 28 I.L.M. 1556, 1566-67 (1989)(noting this 
practice in some countries and the broad language of the 
Convention’s French version); and see Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 
757 (Judge Holtzmann withdrew the United States’ request for a 
Model Law provision authorizing courts to convey tribunal requests 
for assistance in evidence gathering because there was “little 
practical need for such provisions...”).
88 Though not discussing the contrary travaux, Harris et al. suggest 
that Article 27 “also contemplates assistance in taking evidence from 
witnesses overseas by ‘Letters of Request’ addressed to a foreign 
court.” Id. at 177. At least facially, Article 27 allows that view.
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requests to the tribunal for better particulars.89 The same 
provision should also accommodate requests for letters rogato­
ry, an alternative to proceeding under the Convention.90
12.11.3 S e c t io n  1782—A p p lic a b ility  t o  A r b itr a t io n
From which entities may come requests for assistance under 
§ 1782? Until recently, commentators and courts91 have been 
in general agreement that the phrase “foreign or international 
tribunal” ought to include an arbitral tribunal seated abroad.92
89 Many Hague Convention parties have qualified their obligation to 
execute letters of request by insisting that the documents sought be 
listed with specificity. See Born, L it ig a tio n  at 898 (listing the 
U.K., Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Singapore); see also 
Newman & Zaslowsky at 144 (excerpting France’s 1986 modifica­
tion to its Article 23 reservation insisting that documents be 
“limitatively enumerated and have a direct and clear nexus with the 
subject matter of litigation”).
90 Letters rogatory may be dispatched by a federal district court under 
FRCP 28(b). Concerning letters rogatory, see Bom, L itig a t io n  at 
893-94; Newman & Zaslowsky at 147-49 (letters rogatory used 
when witness uncooperative, beyond U.S. subpoena power, or not 
resident in a Hague Convention state).
Some might suggest that the New Act should overrule the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospa­
tiale v. United States Dist. Court 482 U.S. 522 (1987)(holding that 
case-by-case analysis should determine whether to employ Hague 
Evidence Convention). Overruling Aerospatiale by statute, however, 
would more appropriately occur as part of a comprehensive study 
not limited to the arbitral setting.
91 See Quijada v. Unifrutti of America, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C. 4th 225 
(1991)(under state analogue to § 1782, Chilean arbitrator likely the 
“functional equivalent” of a foreign tribunal).
92 Accord H. Smit, International Litigation under the U.S. Code, 65 
Colum. L. Rev. 1015, 1027, n.73. The operative portion of § 1782,
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Recently, however, there has emerged a split of authority.93 
It would take little statutory space to clarify the law, but to 
what substantive effect? Perhaps the answer is to strike a 
balance among competing views while elucidating the central 
terms of art. First, the relevant section would codify the 
prerequisite of tribunal approval (thus precluding direct, 
unilateral party requests).94 Second, under the New Act, only 
requests made with specificity would be honored, a reasonable 
concession to those who question why parties who have 
selected arbitration abroad (with its generally narrow discov­
ery) should nevertheless have access to U.S. federal discovery, 
unsurpassed in its scope. Third, a definition of “foreign or 
international tribunal” should be provided; it should clearly 
encompasses a private arbitral tribunal seated abroad, whether 
ad hoc or institutionally sanctioned. With these New Act 
provisions amending § 1782, much of the debate surrounding 
its murky intent would subside.95
paragraph (a), states that “district courts of the district in which a 
person resides or is found may order him to give testimony or 
statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a 
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”
93 See D. Rivkin and B. Legum, Attempts to Use Section 1782 to 
Obtain U.S. Discovery in Aid of Arbitration, 14 Arb. Int’l 213, 218- 
26 (1998).
94 Though ostensibly the request need not come directly from the 
arbitral tribunal or with its authorization—the statute refers to ‘any 
interested person’—courts have added this requirement. See In re 
Application of Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. N.Y. 
1994).
95 The provision recommended here would not alone answer the 
concern recently raised by Judge Duffy, of the Southern District of 
New York, that § 1782 assistance extends throughout the United 
States, whereas court support for arbitral subpoenas in domestic 
arbitrations is limited, under FAA § 7, to the district in which the
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12.11.4 Subpoena Power
By adopting a standard rules text without modification, parties 
authorize the tribunal to order disclosure of them, e.g., of 
“documents, exhibits, or other evidence it deems necessary or 
appropriate.”96 As to non-parties, however, rules can confer 
upon the tribunal no authority. Accordingly, some states, 
including New York97 and California,98 like the FAA, have 
given arbitrators subpoena power. Non-parties can thus be 
compelled to appear before the tribunal to present evidence in 
various forms. As noted in Chapter 10, the FAA empowers the 
arbitrators to “summon in writing any person to attend before 
them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or 
them any book, record, document, or paper which may be 
deemed material as evidence in the case.”99 
The Model Law contains no subpoena provision. Yet, to 
omit such a provision in the New Act would create a disparity; 
arbitrators operating outside the New Act would have greater 
powers than those within its ambit, an anomalous result given 
that the need for documents and testimony of third persons are 
often essential in both settings.
arbitration is being conducted. See In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 
F. Supp. 403, 404-405 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
96 AAA International Rules, Art. 20.3. See also UNCITRAL Rules, 
Art. 24.4. (substantially similar); CPR International Rules, Art. 12.3 
(“[t]he Tribunal, in its discretion, may require the parties to produce 
evidence in addition to that initially offered”).
97 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L.& R. § 7505.
98 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1282.6, 1297.271.
99 FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 7. See generally S. Koda, Subpoena Issues in 
Arbitration, 2 ADR Currents, Spring 1997, at 20.
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There is, of course, facial appeal to the argument that a 
subpoena provision should be omitted because of the disap­
proval with which American discovery (infamous for its 
breadth) is viewed abroad. If, however, (following the FAA 
model) only a tribunal may issue subpoenas (leaving to the 
parties’ counsel only the power to recommend a subpoena),100 
litigation-style discovery will not result. The tribunal would 
stand as the check against fishing expeditions, while the courts 
would remain available to quash improvident subpoenas.101 
Additionally, a subpoena provision presumably would not 
purport to extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
United States,102 at least not without invocation of one of the
100 Thus, a New York style provision, which allows counsel of 
record to issue subpoenas, would not be adopted.
101 See, e.g. , Commercial Metals Co. v. International Union Marine 
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (arbitrator’s subpoe­
na duces tecum would not be quashed where records requested 
might be relevant to the proceedings); Complaint of Koala 
Shipping & Trading Inc., 587 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(tribunal had authority to issue discovery order and subpoena 
duces tecum of certain relevant documents); Wilkes-Barre 
Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 
559 F. Supp. 875 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (tribunal should consider 
materiality of evidence sought before issuing subpoena); but see 
Oceanic Transport Corp. v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 129 F. Supp. 
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (subpoena vacated; motion to punish for 
contempt denied).
102 FAA § 7 does not, however, expressly establish a territorial limit 
on an arbitrator’s subpoena power; only the courts’ enforcement 
thereof is geographically circumscribed. See Amgen, Inc. v. 
Kidney Center of Del. County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 881 
(N.D. 111. 1995).
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court-aided mechanisms outlined above in relation to interna­
tional discovery.103
Because an arbitral tribunal does not have contempt power 
or jurisdiction over third parties, the New Act should retain 
with variations FAA Section 7’s federal district court power to 
punish for contempt persons refusing to comply with arbitral 
subpoenas. Though such support for the tribunal would be 
helpful to the process,104 in contrast to the present wording 
of § 7, contempt findings should only follow a court order to 
comply with an arbitral subpoena.105
The power of tribunals to require non-parties to attend pre- 
hearing depositions should also be clarified; that question has
103 Though not a direct analogue, compare § 43 of the English 
Arbitration Act, which allows a party to an arbitration taking 
place in the United Kingdom, with the agreement of the other 
party or the permission of the tribunal, to use court procedures to 
“secure the attendance” of a witness situated in the United 
Kingdom. The latter can be required to give oral testimony or to 
produce documents. While not arbitral subpoena power per se 
(because of the interposing of a court), it accomplishes the same 
disclosure from third parties.
104 The assistance is limited, however, to the federal district in which 
the arbitration is seated; therefore, to be truly meaningful and to 
align judicial support for arbitral subpoena power more fully with 
the assistance to be granted tribunals seated abroad under § 1782, 
methods for relaxing the intra-district limitation should be 
explored. That would create another disparity, however. If 
international arbitrations as defined in the New Act were able to 
call on judicial support throughout the United States, domestic 
arbitration (not covered by the New Act) would remain subject to 
the existing limitation.
105 The present section states that contempt may lie for failure to 
comply with the tribunal’s subpoena, even though it is not backed 
by a court order. Courts apparently have been reluctant to so 
find.
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divided the courts.106 Additionally, the same provision should 
confirm that arbitrators conducting proceedings seated abroad 
may issues subpoenas when convened in the United States.107
12.12 Applicable Law and Remedial Authorizations108
12.12.1 In G e n e r a l
Article 28 of the Model Law (Rules Applicable to Substance 
of Dispute) contains largely unobjectionable content. Neverthe­
less, recent developments as well as American law and practice 
justify two friendly amendments to the basic text: one relates 
to the parties’ autonomy and the other to the tribunal’s ability 
to forego traditional conflicts analysis.
106 See, e.g., Meadows Indemnity Co. Ltd v. Nutmeg Ins., 157 
F.R.D. 42 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) and, by contrast, Integrity Ins. 
Co. v. American Centennial Insurance, 885 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1995)(subpoena modified by court).
107 The author is unaware of a case treating this question but has 
encountered experienced practitioners who consider the practice 
to be not controversial under the present FAA. To make subpoe­
na power available even when arbitrations are seated abroad 
would facilitate meaningful American site inspections, hearings 
and the like. Access to the courts to quash arbitral subpoenas 
which are overly broad would be retained; the seat of the 
arbitration should not be controlling where the tribunal purports 
to be pursuing activities authorized under the New Act. The same 
evidence may in a given case also be available under § 1782, as 
amended in the New Act.
108 For background, see also Chapter 4.
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12.12.2 P a r ty  A u to n o m y
In the New Act, the parties’ ability to designate a collection of 
principles not derived from a single national legal system 
should be assured. The Model Law’s drafters are likely to 
believe that they have already accomplished this by referring 
to the “rules of law designated by the parties.” Nonetheless, 
in an abundance of caution109 it may be well to remove all 
doubt by substituting for the official text phrasing such as 
“ rules o f  law, m ercantile norms or other substantive principles  
designated by the parties w hether or not contained in a  
standard text. ” That phrasing would include express references 
to the UNIDROIT Principles and more generic designations of 
the lex m ercatoria.
12.12.3 P e r m itt in g  t h e  V oie D ir e c ie
The second point relates to Article 28’s two-step default rule. 
While familiar, it seems to contemplate that the tribunal when 
faced with a conflict and no choice of law clause should first 
select the appropriate choice of law rule and then apply it to 
designate the governing law. If that is interpreted to require 
resort to an established conflicts rule (designed to select among 
national systems) it may prefigure application of municipal law 
to the exclusion of a supra-national norm structure, or the 
tronc com m un , even though either of the latter may be more
109 Karrer & Arnold at 162 suggest that in Article 187 of the Swiss 
International Arbitration Act, the phrase regies de droit (“rules of 
law”) does not clearly include “alleged rules of law such as ‘lex 
mercatoria’.”
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consistent with the parties’ expectations than national law.110 
This concern would explain the preferable phrasing of Calif­
ornia statute which substitutes for the Model Law formula the 
following:
Failing any designation of the law [by the parties] the arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law it considers to be appropri­
ate given all circumstances surrounding the dispute.110
110 The author’s premise—that the tribunal need not have the parties’ 
express agreement to apply the lex mercatoria—is not shared by 
all authorities, though arbitral practice supports it. See, e.g., O. 
Chuckwumerije, C h o ic e  o f  La w  in  In t e r n a t io n a l  C o m m e r ­
c ia l  A r b it r a t io n  131 (1994) (“discemable trend” towards 
accepting application of so called lex mercatoria absent parties’ 
designation). The author admits that such discretion may create 
an anomaly in practice since despite the analytical differences 
between the application of the lex mercatoria and amiable 
composition, one may be hard-pressed (apart from the labels 
employed) to distinguish awards purporting to reflect one process 
but not the other. That means that if an award creatively departs 
from a national rule of decision in the name of the lex mercatoria 
it will survive attack whereas if it is perceived to be the product 
of an ex aequo et bono proceeding, the parties’ authorization will 
be essential to its survival. A less liberal and problematic middle 
ground may be to limit application of a-national commercial 
principles to those “recognized by international organizations,” 
phrasing used in Article 9 of the Mexico City Convention. That 
still allows reference to the UNIDROIT Principles and to much 
of the work of UNCITRAL.
110 Apparently to clarify the range of substantive possibilities, Article 
28(1) of the recently revised AAA International Rules added the 
phrase or rules of law to the party autonomy provision and 
retained the one-step default procedure which allows the tribunal 
to apply “such law(s) as it determines to be appropriate.” The 
failure to use the “or rules of law” formula in the default 
provision, however, arguably suggests that the tribunal’s power 
to adopt, e.g., the UNIDROIT Principles or the lex mercatoria is 
limited to those situations in which the parties have designated 
either.
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12.12.4 D e fin in g  R em ed ia l P r e r o g a t iv e s
Article 28(3) of the Model Law also contains the now 
standard authorization allowing the tribunal to decide ex aequo 
et bono or as amiable compositor if (but only if) the parties 
have expressly so authorized. Here at least two considerations 
arise: should drafters eschew the Latin phrases when adopting 
this paragraph (as done in the English Arbitration Act of 1996) 
and, if so, what phrasing should replace them?
The argument for replacing the Latin terms of art is that 
neither has taken a secure place within American legal par­
lance; when presented without definition neither therefore 
provides the intended shorthand, except perhaps among those 
already familiar with these notions.111 Yet, given that the 
New Act should be attractive to disputants abroad, it is 
precisely the immediate understanding that these terms convey 
outside the United States that argues for their retention.
If the standard Model text is retained, perhaps the need for 
giving practical meaning to the traditional terms can be 
addressed in the provisions related to the award. This is the 
method adopted in the CPR International Rules, which give the 
standard formulation in addressing applicable law but in the 
provision devoted to the award explain “if the parties have 
authorized the tribunal to decide as amiable compositor or ex 
aequo et bono, [the tribunal may grant] any remedy or relief 
which the tribunal deems just and equitable.”112
1,1 Among the general American legal community, ex aequo et bono 
is probably the more familiar term.
112 CPR International Rules, Art. 14.1.
390
Chapter 12: Adapting the Model
12.13 Punitive Damages
12.13.1 In  General
Punitive damages are not unique to the American legal system, 
but the awarding of such damages by commercial arbitrators 
seems distinctively associated with arbitrations governed by 
American curial or substantive law. Policy makers and com­
mentators view the phenomenon with ambivalence, aware that 
it adds risk and unpredictability to private dispute resolution, 
while being out of step with certain other legal systems. For 
several reasons it can be argued that punitive damages ought 
not be an ordinary part of a tribunal’s remedial repertoire 
when the dispute arises out of an international relationship, at 
least where the parties’ agreement does not expressly contem­
plate such a remedy. First, giving to commercial arbitrators the 
power to administer quasi-criminal relief is hardly a main­
stream international approach. Second, the uncertainty this 
prerogative causes may dissuade non-Americans from choosing 
the United States as the arbitral situs.113 Third, awards of 
punitive damages will not predictably receive a warm reception 
when presented abroad for enforcement.114 The New York 
Convention’s public policy ground would allow the state
113 To the author’s knowledge only anecdotal support can be found 
for this concern, however.
1,4 But see H. Smit, Punitive Damages in Arbitration—An Encore, 6 
Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 313, 316 (“At the most, recognition might 
be denied if the amount of punitive damages was so excessive as 
to offend internationally accepted notions of fairness”).
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addressed to decline enforcement in whole or in part.115 The 
same would be true under the Model Law, which mirrors the 
Convention’s non-recognition grounds.
12 .13 .2  T he P r e se n t  S itu a t io n
Under American law, a penalty measure of damages may 
result either from a statutory multiplier provision or from a 
tort-based theory of recovery addressing outrageous conduct. 
The Supreme Court in Mastrobuono116 held that arbitrators 
may award punitive damages in arbitrations governed by the 
FAA, unless the parties have clearly excluded that possibility 
in their agreement to arbitrate.117 It was not dispositive that 
the law governing the commercial agreement prohibited 
arbitrators from rendering punitive damage awards; rather, 
strong federal policies favoring arbitrator competency were to
115 See generally H. Bungert, Enforcing U.S. Excessive and Punitive 
Damages Awards in Germany, 27 Int’l Law 1075 (1993). But see, 
V. Veeder, The New York Convention in Common Law Countries, 
in ASA, The New York Convention of 1958 117, 126 (1996) (“To 
my knowledge, no English court has ever refused to enforce or 
recognize a foreign award on the ground of public policy”).
116 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
117 The Court held in an eight to one decision that an arbitral award 
granting, in addition to certain compensatory damages, $400,000 
in punitive damages should not have been vacated even though 
the contract expressly stipulated New York law as governing, 115 
S. Ct. at 1217-18. The Court reasoned that as a matter of contract 
interpretation, given an unrestrictive arbitration clause, the choice 
of New York law could not be said to unambiguously convey the 
parties’ agreement to prohibit the award of punitive damages. Id. 
at 1218. In the absence of a clear contractual prohibition of that 
remedy, the FAA’s policy favoring wide arbitrability controlled.
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prevail unless supplanted by the parties’ agreement.118 The 
Court, however, provided no detailed rules governing the 
exercise of arbitral discretion in relation to punitive damages. 
Post-Mastrobuono cases confirm that a number of factors 
remain relevant.119
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd.,120 is the type 
of case that gives non-Americans pause. It arose from a 
contract that called for Todd to repair and refit Cunard’s ship. 
The governing arbitration clause was broadly worded.121 
After a AAA arbitration held in California which lasted over 
two years, the tribunal awarded Todd $11.4 million, which 
included punitive damages. The measure was tort-based and 
not required by statute. Todd had alleged bad faith on the part 
of Cunard; the tribunal apparently agreed. Though largely 
unreasoned, the award cited Cunard’s deceptive practices
1,8 Said the Court, its own precedent made “clear that if the contract­
ing parties agree to include claims for punitive damages within 
the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement 
will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law 
would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration.” 115 S. 
Ct. at 1216-17.
119 For a case applying Mastrobuono, see, e.g., Kelley v. Michaels, 
59 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 1995). After Mastrobuono, 
whether an award of punitive damages will be vulnerable to attack 
will, as before the decision, be influenced by the scope and 
content of the parties’ arbitration agreement, the rules they have 
chosen, and the content of any state arbitration law they have 
unambiguously designated. Some courts will continue to look for 
a basis in the applicable substantive law as well.
120 943 F.2d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
121 The clause provided: “Any and every dispute, difference or 
question between the parties hereto which shall at any time arise 
after the execution of this Agreement. . . relating to this Agree­
ment, shall be referred to arbitration.” Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d 
at 1060. New York law governed the contract. Id.
393
Chapter 12: Adapting the Model
during performance and its withholding of monies due.122 
Because the arbitrators provided no detailed rationale, the 
appellate court’s review was based upon “findings implicit in 
the arbitration award.”123 It found no reason to vacate the 
award, for, “[t]he arbitration panel obviously was convinced 
Cunard was guilty of willful and wanton fraud.” Accordingly, 
the tribunal had not exceeded its powers.124
12.13.3 Reform  Options
At present, when an arbitration is governed by the FAA, 
parties wishing to preclude punitive damages must unambigu­
ously opt-out of the remedy. Under Mastrobuono, it is not 
sufficient to designate as the governing law of the underlying 
contract one which limits arbitrators to compensatory damages. 
As the New Act begins to take shape, several possibilities 
might be discussed. One is to retain existing law by not 
addressing punitive damages; another is to invert the Mastro­
buono presumption. These are taken in turn.
Do Nothing
Leaving the law unchanged is consistent with the prevailing 
sense, especially under American doctrine, that arbitrators 
should have wide discretion in formulating remedies. There is,
122 Id. at 1061.
123 Id. at 1058.
124 The implied finding of fraud sufficed, therefore, against allega­
tions that the arbitrators had “manifestly disregarded the law.” Id.
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moreover, little indication that this discretion has been widely 
abused.125
Furthermore, because the parties have the power to prevent 
awards of such damages, only the ill-informed will be at risk 
from unintended results. Domestic business counsel and the 
various administering institutions are well equipped to instruct 
the parties how to eliminate exposure to punitive damages. 
Institutions may do so in the same way that they educate about 
other elements of arbitration clause drafting.126
Not attempting to address punitive damages by statute also 
leaves institutions with flexibility in developing their own 
policies. When revised in 1997, for example, the AAA 
International Rules included a provision on point. Unless the 
parties grant a broader remedial mandate, the provision limits 
punitive damages to those required by a statute, such as RICO 
or the Sherman Act.127 The provision128 does not contem­
125 Cf National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, Revision of Uniform Arbitration Act, Discussion Draft of 
Oct. 31, 1997, (hereinafter UAA Discussion Draft), at 79 
(discussing securities arbitration).
126 Arbitral seat, applicable law, and number of arbitrators are all 
subjects of standard reminders in the rules booklets distributed by 
various institutions.
127 Article 28(5) of the AAA International Rules provides:
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly 
waive and forego any right to punitive, exemplary or 
similar damages unless a statute requires that compensa­
tory damages be increased in a specified manner. This 
provision shall not apply to any award of arbitration costs 
to a party to compensate for dilatory or bad faith conduct 
in the arbitration.
128 The revision arose in response to Mastrobuono and the fact that:
[f]oreign parties often fear the award of punitive damages by 
American tribunals...[and from] the nature of commercial dis­
putes that are most commonly subject to arbitration under these
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plate a complete ban, but, unless the parties disturb the 
presumption, it precludes punitive awards in cases such as 
Todd Shipyards, noted above.129
Reverse the Mastrobuono Presumption by Statute
Congress could of course reverse Mastrobuono, in whole or in 
part, at least as to arbitrations deemed to be international. This 
would meet the primary objection, that the remedy is not 
within the reasonable expectation of foreign disputants. This is 
the reform urged, for example, by the New York State Bar’s 
International Practice Section.130 The same distinction is 
reflected in the AAA rule revisions noted above, which only
[international] rules. [The revisions are designed to] provide 
comfort to both U.S. and foreign parties about arbitrating under 
these rules.
Task Force to Enhance AAA International Arbitration Rules, 
Commentary on the Proposed Revisions to the International 
Arbitration Rules, reprinted in, ADR Currents, Winter 1996/97, 
at 6.
129 The October 1997 Discussion Draft of Uniform Arbitration Act 
(UAA) revisions would leave unbridled the arbitrators’ power to 
award punitive damages in circumstances in which a court could 
do so. It would insist, however, that the tribunal’s reasoning in 
awarding punitive damages is contained in a retrievable record, 
unlike what occurred in Todd Shipyards. The record is apparently 
designed to facilitate court assessment of whether the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, a ground for vacatur under both the FAA 
and the UAA. See UAA Discussion Draft, at 72, 75-79. If it is 
also intended to promote review for errors of law, it is inconsis­
tent with the appreciable trend away from substantive review of 
arbitral awards.
130 See Report on Punitive Damages in International Commercial 
Arbitration, New York State Bar Association, Section of Interna­
tional Law & Practice (Jan. 1992), reprinted in 5 New York Int’l 
L. Rev. 103 (1992).
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affect the International Rules, leaving the very broad remedial 
grant in the AAA Commercial Rules undisturbed.131
If Mastrobuono is to be altered, it seems preferable to 
merely reverse the presumption established in that case, rather 
than to prohibit punitive damages irrebuttable. To allow the 
parties to expressly allow for such a recovery would be 
consistent with the FAA’s emphasis upon party autonomy. If 
the parties are to be rebuttably presumed to desire no punitive 
damage exposure, another question arises: should that pre­
sumption extend to statutorily enhanced measures? That more 
inclusive premise arguably subverts the policies of deterrence 
driving statutory damage multipliers and offers arbitration as 
a hiding place for conduct that might otherwise carry greater 
sanction.132 One can thus see the crafting in the above-men­
tioned AAA revisions,133 which on balance seem worthy of 
imitation in the New Act.
12.14 Tribunal Powers to Facilitate Settlement
Increasingly, arbitration is being coupled in practice with non- 
arbitral ADR, often but not invariably as a precursor proce­
131 See Article 43 thereof (“any remedy or relief that the arbitrator 
deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement”).
132 Troubling implications notwithstanding, it remains unclear under 
the negative inference of Mastrobuono, whether the parties could 
preclude the award of statutorily multiplied punitive damages by 
expressly so providing; certainly they could not evade completely 
the application of RICO, the Sherman Act and other public laws. 
An award not taking account of such laws would be subject, in a 
U.S. court, to vacatur or non-recognition based upon public 
policy. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637, n.19.
133 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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dure.134 These procedures often lead to outcomes that are 
cheaper and more beneficial to the underlying relationship than 
the more court-like arbitration. Even if a separate chapter or 
section within the New Act is not devoted to international 
mediation (conciliation), a provision urging the tribunal to 
accommodate non-arbitral techniques would be useful:135 it 
would remind all concerned of the possibility and would make 
clear that a tribunal has not exceeded its powers if recommend­
ing alternative procedures to the parties at any time during the 
arbitral process or if pursuing such methods upon the parties’ 
request.
The prevailing standard is clear that a tribunal may not act 
as both mediator and arbitrator unless the parties agree and this 
rule could be codified in the statute without controversy.136
134 See generally Peter, Med-Arb.
135 California’s International title is expressly pro-conciliation, 
positing that state policy prefers conciliation over arbitration when 
either is available, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.341. It also 
suggests that the tribunal, with the parties’ permission, may use 
mediation and other procedures “at any time during the arbitral 
proceedings to encourage settlement,” id. § 1297.301 and that the 
tribunal may select a conciliator for the parties upon request. Id. 
§ 1297.341.
136 Experts differ as to whether it is desirable for the tribunal to play 
both roles even if the parties have so authorized. The IB A Ethics 
text (Rule 8) counsels against ex parte meetings with the parties 
in pursuit of settlement, though such caucusing is, in mediation 
simpliciter, an important technique. Provided the parties authorize 
the specific use of that procedure, the prohibition against ex parte 
receipt of evidence should be deemed waived. In practice, med- 
arbitrators will inform the parties of the nature of the procedure 
envisaged and confirm their approval before beginning. In 
addition, many arbitrators will be inclined to limit their non- 
arbitral activities to proposals of settlement terms formulated 
without caucusing. It seems unnecessary, however, to limit them
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More debatable is whether the New Act should adopt the 
California innovation, which likens a conciliated agreement to 
an award if certain formalities are observed.137 Such a provi­
sion raises interesting questions under the New York Conven­
tion concerning which experts will likely disagree,138 but ulti­
mately does little harm to international standards.139
12.15 Awards of Interest
The Model Law does not the treat the significant matter of 
interest, although members of the Secretariat believe the 
question to be so important as to warrant a priority on UNCIT-
to this latter role by statute.
137 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.401 states that a written conciliation 
agreement signed by the conciliator(s) and the parties “shall be 
treated as an arbitral award rendered by an arbitral tribunal duly 
constituted in and pursuant to the laws of this state, and shall 
have the same force and effect as a final award in arbitration.”
138 See, e.g., A. Redfem, Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards and Settlement Agreements, Arbitration, May 1988, at 
124, 126-28(conciliated agreement not an arbitral award properly 
understood).
139 It seems to be merely a variant of the award on agreed terms 
concept widely acknowledged in rules and statutes, including the 
Model Law (Art. 30). Regardless, there may be some doubts 
expressed abroad when the “award” is presented for enforcement 
under the New York Convention. The court addressed may 
wonder if it is less of an award because it has not been produced 
through an adversarial proceeding. Probably most courts would 
not find international public policy engaged but some may as an 
interpretive matter find that the Convention simply does not apply 
since the instrument presented is not an award classically under­
stood. In principle, if default awards and awards on agreed terms 
are enforceable, conciliated agreements ought to be too, in the 
majority of circumstances.
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RAL’s agenda.140 Under this heading, several related issue 
have arisen in American law. As to arbitral powers, there 
seems to be agreement that unless otherwise restricted by the 
parties’ agreement a tribunal may award interest reflecting the 
period of lost use between the time the cause of action arose 
and the award, i.e. “pre-award interest. ” Less agreement exists 
among courts and arbitrators as to post-award interest.141 A 
provision to be welcomed is one that confirms the tribunal’s 
power as to both segments and also clarifies the extent to 
which an arbitral grant of post award interest affects courts 
called upon to confirm the award.142 An express recognition 
of arbitral discretion in setting the rate of interest would also 
be beneficial. Arbitrators ought not to be confined to legal 
rates of interest in addressing the aggrieved party’s loss of use.143
140 See G. Hermann, The Implementing Legislation, in ASA, T h e  
N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n  o f  1958 135-35 (1996).
141 See, e.g., Sun Ship Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 
62-63 (3d Cir. 1986)(arbitrator lacked authority to dictate interest 
to be borne by the award); but see Carte Blanche (Sing.) v. Carte 
Blanche (IntT), 888 F.2d 260, 264-70 (2d Cir. 1989)(post-award, 
but not post-judgment interest could be fixed by arbitrators at 
near-market rate).
142 A principal question is to what extent should the court converting 
the award to judgment adopt (for the period from confirmation 
onward) the interest rate stipulated by the arbitrators, as opposed 
to that designated by the federal statute for court judgments. The 
prevailing view is that confirmation transforms the award to a 
judgment so that the statutory rate should apply from confirmation 
hence. Carte Blanche, 888 F. 2d at 264-70. This approach offers 
a bright line demarcation and seems to do little damage to arbitral 
discretion, which would govern the period up to confirmation.
143 Certain international formulations authorize the arbitrators to 
award compound interest at market rates, rather than being tied 
to the prevailing federal rate for judgments. See, e.g., LCIA 
Rules, Art. 26.6 (“...Tribunal may order that simple or com­
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12.16 The Currency of the Award
12.16.1 Tribunal  Powers
Many arbitral venues allow a tribunal to designate the currency 
in which the award is to be paid, a prerogative made express 
in the LCLA and WIPO Rules.144 The lack of specific treat­
ment in, e.g., the ICC and AAA Rules has not prevented 
arbitrators from choosing a currency appropriate to the parties 
and their obligations. It was thus an uncontroversial AAA 
award rendered in New York that ordered the respondents to 
pay certain sums in Japanese yen, and the parties to pay the 
arbitrators’ fees and costs in American dollars.145 Requiring 
payment in yen was entirely logical for as the confirming court 
noted: “[t]he parties . . . conducted all their transactions in 
yen.”146 An arbitrator’s ability to render the award in an 
appropriate currency is merely one aspect of the wide remedial 
discretion he or she ought to enjoy under a broadly cast 
arbitration clause.
pound interest ...at such rates as the Tribunal determines to be 
appropriate... in respect of any period which the Arbitral Tribunal 
determines to be appropriate...”); see also AAA International 
Rules, Art. 28.5 (“tribunal may award such pre-award and post­
award interest, simple or compound, as it considers appropriate, 
taking into consideration the contract and applicable law”). The 
italicized portion gives the tribunal flexible guidance and mitigates 
any sense of arbitrariness—a good starting place in crafting 
legislative language.
144 See LCIA Rules, Art. 26.5; WIPO Rules, Art. 60 (1994).
145 Mitsui & Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp., 906 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995); see U.S. Court Confirms Award in Japanese Yen, 10 No. 
12 Int’l Arb. Rep. 3 (1995).
146 Mitsui, 906 F. Supp. at 204.
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12.16.2 Conversion to Judgm ent
There is emerging authority for the proposition that awards in 
foreign currencies may be confirmed in U.S. courts without 
conversion to U.S. dollars. The traditional position147 re­
quires that awards in foreign currency be converted to U.S. 
dollars when judgment upon the award is entered. Thus, in Sae 
Sadelmi S.P.A. v. Papua New Guinea Electricity Commis­
sion,148 the federal court serving the southern district of New 
York confirmed an ICC award of English Pounds and PNG 
Kina, but directed the clerk of the court to enter the judgment 
in the equivalent number of U.S. dollars. The court observed, 
“[a]n American court. . . can only enter a money judgment in 
U.S. dollars.”149 
The Second and Seventh Circuits have helped precipitate an 
incremental move in the other direction. Both, when faced with 
judgments in foreign currencies, had questioned the traditional 
rule in light of the 1982 repeal of the Coinage Act of 1792, an 
enactment upon which the “dollar-judgment” rule was in part 
based. In 1995, the southern district for New York, when 
presented an award denominated in Japanese yen, departed 
from the established approach. In Mitsui & Co. Ltd., v. 
Oceantrawl Corp.,150 the court was influenced by the doubts 
expressed by Second and Seventh Circuits and concluded 
“were the Second Circuit faced with the question today, it 
would hold that American courts may enter judgments in
147 See generally Newman & Zaslowsky at 175-180.
148 1994 WL 669543 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
149 Id. at 2 (citing Fils et Cables D’Achier de Lens v. Midland 
Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
150 906 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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foreign currency.”151 It found further support for its holding 
in the Restatement (Third)152 and a New York statute requir­
ing courts to render judgments in a currency other than U.S. 
dollars whenever the “action is based upon an obligation 
denominated in [that] currency.”153 
An express provision allowing courts to recognize and 
enforce non-dollar awards would not contradict Model Law 
Article 36, which does not treat the issue. It would be consis­
tent with a provision allowing arbitrators to make such awards 
and is apt supplementation in light of the nature of modem 
international commerce and the disputes generated thereby.
12.17 Immunity of Arbitrators and Others
12.16.1 E x ist in g  L aw  a n d  T e x ts
Under existing American law, arbitrators are recognized as 
serving a quasi-judicial function and thus enjoy certain forms 
of immunity in connection with the arbitrations they con­
151 Id. at 204.
152 Section 823(1) thereof, in pertinent part, states:
Courts in the United States ordinarily give judgment on 
causes of action . . . denominated in a foreign currency, in 
United States dollars, but they are not precluded from giving 
judgment in the currency in which the obligation is denomi­
nated or the loss was incurred.
153 N.Y. Jud. Law § 27(b) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995); see J. 
Freeman, Judgments in Foreign Currency—A Little Known 
Change in New York Law, 23 Int’l Law. 737 (1989).
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duct.154 The principle is over a century old in American 
jurisprudence,155 and has been endorsed by the United States 
Supreme Court.156 While there is diversity within the case 
law, in general, immunity extends to all alleged acts or 
omissions occurring during the arbitral process.157 The shield 
from claims applies regardless of whether the arbitrators are 
party-appointed or whether they are compensated.158 Nor 
does immunity subside because an arbitrator’s jurisdiction is in 
doubt;159 it obtains even where it is argued that the party 
bringing the claim never agreed to arbitrate. 160To maintain 
immunity, no threshold level of formality or judicial likeness 
need be observed.161 In addition, alleged bias does not lessen 
an arbitrator’s immunity.162
Generally, the immunity conferred is said to be “absolute” 
in the sense that it extends to alleged willful or grossly 
negligent acts,163 though aberrant decisions exist.164
154 See generally Branson and Wallace at 85-96; M. Hoellering,
Immunity from Liability, in A r b it r a t io n  a n d  t h e  La w  1991-92 
41 (M. Hoellering et al., eds., 1992).
155 See Jones v. Brown, 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880).
156 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (explaining that federal
agency officials are entitled to immunity for their decisions).
157 Branson and Wallace at 88.
158 Id.
159 See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 1977).
160 See Raitport v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
161 Branson and Wallace at 89.
162 See Yates v. Yellow Freight Syst., 501 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Ohio
1980); cf. Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1973) (concluding that an alleged conflict of interest did 
not alter arbitrator’s immunity).
163 See Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th 
Cir. 1987).
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Florida’s International Arbitration Act, for example, provides
the following succinct rule:
No person may sue in the courts of this state or assert a cause 
of action under the law of this state against any arbitrator when 
such suit or action arises from the performance of such 
arbitrator’s duties.165
The AAA Commercial166 and the ICC Rules167 contain a
similarly unqualified version of the doctrine. Certain formulae,
however, have embraced narrower positions that extend
immunity only to the extent that the claim is not the product of
“conscious and deliberate wrongdoing.” Institutional texts
adopting this approach include the AAA International
Rules,168 the CPR International Rules,169 the WIPO
Rules,170 and the LCIA Rules.171 The English Arbitration
Act also adopts qualified immunity, exempting from immunity
acts or omissions “shown to have been in bad faith.”172
Certain Model Law-based statutes have also chosen qualified
164 See Branson and Wallace at 93 n.49. While “absolute,” arbitral 
immunity only extends to acts or omissions performed within a 
quasi-judicial capacity. Hence, “an arbitrator would not be 
immune from suit over a car accident that occurs on the way to 
an arbitration.” Id. at 94.
165 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 684.35 (West 1990); see also Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2712.68 (Anderson 1992) (providing immunity to arbitra­
tors acting in official capacity); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1280.1 
(West Supp. 1996) (same).
166 Rule 47(d).
167 Article 34.
168 Article 35.
169 Rule 19.
170 Article 77.
171 Article 31.1.
172 English Arbitration Act, § 29(1).
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immunity173 and the IBA Ethics Text also concedes a quali­
fied rule.174
12.17.2 Suggested Provision
Like the FAA, the Model Law175 does not address immunity 
of arbitrators and institutions.176 Since both are largely 
uncontroversial under American law, to treat both in the same 
provision seems efficient. The immunity of tribunal-appointed 
experts may be addressed in that provision as well.177
173 See, e.g., Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 
§34.
174 See Introductory Note thereto.
175 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 1119.
176 Arbitral institutions such as the AAA have been given immunity 
for reasons paralleling those driving arbitrator immunity. In Cort 
v. American Arbitration Association, 795 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992), for example, the plaintiff sued the AAA for alleged 
mishandling of certain documents produced during his arbitration. 
Relying on Austern v. Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 898 
F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990), the court concluded that the AAA’s 
management of evidence was a type of quasi-judicial activity 
warranting immunity. Cort, 795 F. Supp. at 972-73; see also 
Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cir. 
1982) (extending immunity to “boards which sponsor arbitra­
tion”).
177 Some thought should be given to whether to cover experts in 
general. The immunity of expert witnesses has been established 
in California, the highest court there reasoning that the privilege 
promotes candor in experts by removing the risk of liability. 
Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204, 209 (Cal. 1994) (medical 
expert); see also Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (court-appointed mediator entitled to absolute immuni­
ty when acting in official capacity), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 1314 
(1995).
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Whether to adopt a qualified or unqualified rule is debatable. 
On balance, the “conscious and deliberate” exception seems 
sufficiently narrow and the policy it contains sufficiently 
compelling to counsel its adoption in the New Act; harmful 
conduct that is truly intentional ought not to find a sanctuary 
there. Though such a provision will invite more lawsuits than 
an absolute formulation, it can require courts to insist upon 
demonstrable proof of deliberate wrong-doing. Authorized 
grants of attorneys’ fees will assure that an arbitrator won’t 
remain unreimbursed in cases in which the suit embodies 
merely a personal vendetta or speculative accusations.178 
Moreover, the stricter default rule within the New Act can be 
made subject to the parties’ agreement to confer a broader 
immunity.179
12.18 Participation in Subsequent Proceedings
Sometimes a dissatisfied party attempts to discover matters 
related to the deliberative process in an attempt to support a 
vacatur proceeding. In general, courts have not been receptive 
to attempts to examine arbitrators, whether majority or dissent­
ing, or to efforts to discover documents related to the tribun­
al’s decision-making process.180 As one California court put 
the proposition, “[t]he deliberations of the arbitrators are
178 It may be that this deterrent should be made express in the 
provision itself.
179 Nonetheless, there will likely be robust debate as to whether 
qualified immunity should be among the Act’s mandatory rules.
180 See Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 
A.G., 579 F.2d 691, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1978); Arco Alaska, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 214 Cal. Rptr. 51, 57 (Ct. App. 1985).
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sacrosanct.”181 Decisions allowing dissenting and majority 
arbitrators to be deposed concerning specific acts of miscon­
duct affecting the award182 are exceptional and narrowly 
reasoned; there must be a reasonable basis for believing that 
misconduct has occurred, 183and the inquiry may not delve 
into the “mental process of the arbitrators.”184 
While one must acknowledge the possibility for injustice 
occasionally to result, on balance the integrity and finality of 
the arbitral process would be best preserved by adoption of a 
provision roughly assimilating that found in the LCIA Rules. 
Adapting LCIA Article 31.2 for that purpose might yield the 
following:
After the award has been made and the possibilities o f correc­
tion and additional awards referred to in [Model Law Article 
33] have elapsed or been exhausted, neither [an administering 
institution as defined in this Act] nor any arbitrator or expert 
to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be under any obligation to make 
any statement to any person about any matter concerning the 
arbitration, nor shall any party seek to make any of these 
persons a witness in any legal or other proceedings arising out 
of the arbitration.
181 Arco Alaska, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 58. The court explained further:
Absent an agreement so to do, the parties to an arbitration may 
not join in the deliberations of the arbitrators as they sit around 
the arbitration table or through discovery of documents reflect­
ing those deliberations.
Id.
182 See Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 230 
S.E.2d 380 (N.C. 1976); Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for
Women, 289 P.2d 476, 478 (Cal. 1955).
183 Gunter, 230 S.E.2d at 387-88.
184 See id. at 387. The mental-process limitation is born of the
domestic arbitration system in which awards are not reasoned. 
Equally strong policies would seem to argue against a disgruntled 
party’s ability to secure, e.g., intra-tribunal memoranda leading 
to a reasoned award.
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A provision of the preceding type, in conjunction with the 
immunity provision suggested above, would reassure prospec­
tive arbitrators who might otherwise be dissuaded from 
authoring a dissenting opinion, fearful of prolonged duties as 
a witness in a foreign land. It also adds to an institution’s 
ability to perform its important tasks. As to both entities, the 
phrasing of the LCIA provision seems to allow for the 
privilege to be waived, potentially raising ethical concerns.185
12.19 Costs
12.19.1 By  A rbitrators
The Model Law does not treat the question of fees and costs. 
It can be argued that this deliberate omission186 is insignifi­
cant given that standard rules formulations contain costs provi­
185 There are subtle differences between the available canon texts. 
The ABA/AAA Ethics Code, Canon VI.C states in pertinent part: 
“After an arbitration award has been made, it is not proper for an 
arbitrator to assist in post-arbitral proceedings, except as required 
by law.” The IBA Rules, Rule 9, adopts the same general 
position, excepting situations in which the arbitrator “considers 
it his duty to disclose any material misconduct or fraud on the 
part of his fellow arbitrators.” To restate the rule common to 
these texts as part of the LCIA-based provision set forth above 
seems prudent. The AAA/ABA exception (“as required by law”) 
would not be greatly expanded by adding the IBA’s fraud 
exception, though modified to require “manifest and palpable 
fraud”—or similar phrasing designed to discourage volunteerism 
based merely upon alleged intellectual dishonesty or interpretive 
differences among arbitrators.
186 See Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 1118-19 (neither the Working 
Group nor the Secretariat were in favor of a comprehensive 
provision on costs).
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sions.187 There are, nonetheless, at least two reasons for 
adding a provision which provides some guidance upon the 
issue.
First, as noted in Chapter 7, the American rule under which 
each party pays its own costs is not a fixture of international 
practice but merely one possibility among several typically 
available to the arbitral tribunal.188 A statutory provision 
would thus confirm that under the New Act an American seat 
does not entail, necessarily, the American rule on costs.
Second, such a provision would remove doubt about the 
permitted elements of costs.189 Study of the many modem 
treatments of the question in rules and statutes should facilitate 
composition of a provision which establishes appropriately 
broad arbitral discretion and confirms that legal as well as 
other costs may be awarded in whole or in part to any par­
ty.190
187 Accordingly, certain adopting states have added provisions on 
costs. See, e.g., N. Kaplan and P. Caldwell, Hong Kong Arbitra­
tion Thrives, 7(2) News & Notes Inst. Transnaf 1 Arb. 1 (1992) 
(provisions on costs and interest added by Hong Kong).
188 See, e.g., Act on the Reform of the Law Relating to Arbitral 
Proceedings of 22 December 1997, § 1057 Bundesgesetzblatt part 
I, p. 3224 ( \997)(unofficial trans. reprinted in J. Gotanda, 
Su pp l e m e n t a l  D a m a g e s , Ch. 5)(arbitrators to allocate costs 
within the award, considering outcome of the proceedings).
189 There may be, for instance, some doubt in the minds of the 
arbitrators regarding costs components corresponding to execu­
tive time spent in preparing for and participating in the arbitra­
tion.
190 California lawmakers in adopting the Model Law added a non- 
exhaustive enumeration of permissible cost elements. Cal. Civ. 
Proc. Code § 1297.318.
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12.19.2 In V acatur  Proceedings
A survey of vacatur cases indicates that the vast majority of 
such proceedings resulted in the award being upheld. They 
nonetheless occupied the courts and delayed the day of 
reckoning. The interest carried by the award in those cases was 
a poor substitute for reimbursement of costs. Moreover, with 
the refinements made to Rule 11 in 1993, only palpably ill- 
founded attacks on an award will lead to sanctions, which in 
turn do not invariably include costs.191 There is good reason 
therefore to consider the relative merits of erecting a statutory 
presumption which favors reimbursement of expenses when 
vacatur proves unsuccessful.
An analogue for such a fee-shifting presumption can be 
found in recent U.S. legislation, 192which strengthened Rule 
11 in relation to certain securities lawsuits by requiring federal 
courts to affirmatively apply the Rule’s requirements that 
actions have evidentiary and non-frivolous legal support. 
Where a violation is found, attorneys’ fees are presumed to be 
the proper sanction from among those otherwise available to 
the court.193 In the interest of conserving judicial resources
191 Sanctions other than the award of costs—such as non-monetary 
directives and fines paid into court—can be deployed under the 
Rule. To escape penalty, the unsuccessful party need only demon­
strate that the argument for vacatur was made after an inquiry 
into applicable law and relevant facts which was “reasonable 
under the circumstances,” phrasing designed to soften the Rule’s 
original content. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. § ll(b)(c) (1993).
192 See R. Phillips and G. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards 
for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. 
Law. 1009, 1046-47 (1996).
193 Id.
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and to promote the finality of awards rendered in the United 
States, a similar provision ought to be included in the New 
Act.
12.20 Accommodating Legal Representation
The importance to international arbitration of the current trend 
toward relaxing obstacles to foreign lawyers was noted in 
Chapter 5. (§ 5.8.2). In California, non-California lawyers 
involved in international arbitrations have the comfort of a 
provision sanctioning their activities. A recent case in that 
state, however, sounds a cautionary note and underscores the 
need for an express provision in the New Act.
The California Supreme Court in Birbrower, Montalbano, 
Condon & Frank v. Superior Court194 declined to acknowl­
edge an arbitration exception to the unauthorized practice of 
law; the New York firm there involved could thus not enforce 
its fee arrangement with a client for which it had performed 
services in relation to an arbitration. The court noted that state 
lawmakers had enacted an exception in relation to international 
disputes; accordingly, they could be entrusted to do so for 
domestic arbitrations if such an exemption were thought 
warranted.
One can readily appreciate the deterrent effect that Birbrower 
might have on foreign counsel and disputants contemplating an 
American arbitration. Its influence upon other jurisdictions is 
difficult to predict.
194 949 P.2d 1 (1998).
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Despite the traditional role of states in regulating the practice 
of law, federal power to relax the practice rules in relation to 
arbitrations covered by the New Act seems clear. Because the 
scope of any exception created may otherwise come into 
question, the New Act should add to a general authoriza­
tion195 an illustrative list of activities that will not be deemed 
to violate local practice limits.196
195 The California analogue merely provides:
The parties may....be represented by any person of their 
choice. A person assisting or representing a party need not 
be a member of the legal profession or licensed to practice 
law in California.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.351. Interestingly, the provision is 
found in the Chapter devoted to conciliation thus creating doubt 
about its application in arbitration.
196 Prima facie the non-exhaustive list should include: the filing of 
arbitration demands and arbitral briefs, oral advocacy and other 
appearances before a tribunal, participation in inspections and in 
non-arbitral forms of ADR such as negotiation and mediation. 
Court appearances by contrast would be subject to local rules, 
unaffected by the New Act. The same provision should make 
express that serving as an arbitrator or other neutral does not 
violate local practice restrictions.
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Introduction
The world has changed dramatically since 1925 when the 
FAA was first enacted. The surprise is that the law has 
lasted as long as it has, not that it is in need of reform 
today.
Thus observed Judge Daniel Kolkey—then a practitioner 
specializing in international arbitration—in his 1990 study of 
the FAA’s viability. Though offered once above to
foreshadow this study,1 Kolkey’s words seem worth intoning 
again, this time in conclusion; for, as of mid-1999, the FAA 
remains unchanged, increasingly stark in its contrast to the 
many modem regimes abroad and to the rapidly changing 
milieu in which it must continue to function.
1 See Author’s Foreword, note 2 (citing Kolkey, 1 Amer. Rev. Int’l 
Arb. at 534).
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The Present Array
Among the notions sponsored in preceding chapters are that 
statutes designed to regulate international commercial 
arbitration should be comprehensive, should offer centralized 
content, should be presented in an accessible way, should be 
modem and forward-looking, and should embody recognized, 
internationally-accepted solutions and approaches to 
prevailing issues. When examined in light of these ideals, the 
FAA falls woefully short; its coverage is episodic and the law 
developed under it is diffuse, conflicting and well understood 
only by specialists.2 In a federation in which federal law­
makers enjoy virtually plenary power to address matters 
affecting interstate and international commerce, the retention 
(fundamentally unchanged) of a fragmentary 1925 statute is 
nearly inexplicable, especially given the preeminence assumed 
by commercial arbitration since the statute’s inception.
Though helpful to arbitration, the progressive case law 
propounded by the U.S. Supreme Court is not an apt substitute 
for codification and consolidation, for as Macneil’s historical 
account of the FAA has concluded, “major fault lines” mn 
through the case law bedrock upon which modem federal
2 See generally Chapter 7A.
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arbitration law is built.3 In a manner reminiscent of the 
Emperor’s clothes, the FAA (originally conceived of as a 
procedural text for federal courts) has been selectively imbued 
with substantive character and imposed upon state courts; the 
resulting unhappy fit derives from the FAA’s failure to 
contemplate such duty and from its modest scope. Not 
surprisingly, persistent questions remain about the 
augmentative role of state law in arbitrations governed by the 
FAA.
The Way Forward
Consistent with what thoughtful observers have offered, this 
work has argued not that the FAA is in dire need of 
emergency care, effectuated through precipitous abandon, but 
rather that studied reform is inevitable and desirable. At least 
as to the regulation of international disputes, however, it has 
proposed a reformatting of regime more comprehensive than 
that suggested within the literature at large. It thus may be 
seen to be more ambitious than for example, Professor Park’s 
characteristically sensible counsel4—that reform should be
3 1. M acN eil, A m erica n  A r b itr a tio n  L a w  175 (1992).
4 W . Park, The Interaction of the Courts and Arbitrators in England: 
The 1996 Act as a Model for the United States, 1(2) In t’l A rb. L. Rev. 
54, 6 7 (1 9 9 8 ).
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narrow and of a high quality.5 While Park and other 
considered voices cannot be dismissed lightly (they evince 
obvious practical and political insight), the difference in the 
view here expressed is merely one of degree, not principle. 
Indeed, given the manner in which the self restraint of others 
is sometimes couched, one is entitled to suspect that 
proponents of incrementalism are partly influenced by an 
unduly pessimistic sense of what is practically achievable, 
rather than by what would be ideal.6 Moreover, much of the
5 Professor Park’s recent reaction to the Arbitration Act 1996 in 
relation to its American counterpart concludes with the following 
observations:
Whether the new English Act commends itself for 
transport across the Atlantic remains uncertain, 
however. One need not be a Luddite to resist 
wholesale replacement of an established arbitration 
statute, even by one of superior vintage, until there has 
been considerable study devoted to the consequences.
Modification of American arbitration law should 
proceed through focus on the specific aspects of the 
current legal framework that have performed poorly....
Shooting before all the ducks are in a row has 
sometimes been part of the American genius. At this 
time, however, the path of prudence lies in holding fire 
on broad scale reform, in order better to attend to those 
precise and identifiable defects in federal arbitration 
law that clearly need fixing.
6 One need not look far for cautionary notes boding ill for reformist 
zeal. Macneil, for example, ventured the following general prognosis 
based upon the inertia he detected in 1992 among the better placed 
agents of modernization:
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literature assumes that reform will be FAA-wide, i.e., 
addressed to commercial arbitration in general, a premise from 
which arguably should follow more modest, deliberate 
initiatives.7
[I]t seems quite unlikely that anything like the old 
reform movement will come forth to give American 
arbitration law a good old-fashioned comprehensive 
going over. That movement itself has accomplished 
most of its aims and its organization, the American 
Arbitration Association, has settled into establish- 
mentarian institutional maturity. And in spite of the 
great interest in arbitration of various groups, the legal 
situation is unlikely to be so desperate that enough of 
them will come together to give arbitration law a 
comprehensive shake-up, comparable, for example, to 
that given commercial law by the UCC. No one can, 
however, tell for sure....
7The notion that only modest change is required or achievable cannot 
be taken as full agreement upon what changes should be made; some 
vital improvements are well agreed upon, others are not. Nor, when 
viewed as a whole, are the recommended changes found in the 
literature minimal; when combined, they form the beginnings of a 
relatively substantial restructuring. Professor Park, for example, has 
suggested:
At present the most pressing need is for piecemeal 
change addressed to consolidation, pre-award 
attachment, federal pre-emption, informed consent, 
contractual expansion of judicial review of awards, and 
the allocation of functions between courts and 
arbitrators with respect to arbitral preconditions.
At a later stage, the United States might consider 
replacing the existing grounds for judicial vacatur of 
awards with at least the analogous provisions in the 
English law [substantive excess and serious procedural
418
J J  Coe (LSE)
Epilogue
M any o f  the practical and political advantages o f  the 
piecem eal approach can be realized by  treating international 
arbitration separately and firstly.8 I f  reform o f  the regim e
irregularity]....
Park, supra note 4, at 67. He also notes that probably awards should 
be reviewable for errors of law, at the option of the parties, referring to 
the 1996 Act, § 69 (though it is unclear whether he advocates an opt-in 
or an opt-out format).
Other potential improvements are contained within the joint findings 
of the several committees on arbitral reform and within commentaries 
taking up the same mandate. The Washington Foreign Law Society, 
for example, though ultimately not endorsing adoption of the Model 
Law by the U.S., recommended that the U.S. enact provisions 
allowing: the challenge of arbitrators along Model Law lines 
Washington Report, 3 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 303, 314-15 (1988), 
arbitral tribunals to designate the place of arbitration (Model Law, Art. 
20), Washington Report at 315-16, and (as widely endorsed) courts to 
grant interim measures in aid of arbitration (see Model Law, Art. 9), 
Washington Report at 313-14. Accord Rivkin and Kellner, 1 Am. Rev. 
Int’l Arb. at 551; New York State Bar Ass’n, Report on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration by 
the International Litigation Committee 35 (1990). Other studies 
would add the Model Law’s applicable law provision (Article 28), see 
New York State Bar Report, supra, at 35-36, and a provision designed 
to prevent the application of state arbitration law in all but the clearest 
cases of intentional opting out by the parties. Id. at 28-30.
8 Both as a matter of federal politics (state individuality and traditional 
dominion over contract law) and inertia (a preference for the familiar), 
international arbitration will be viewed to be the more legitimate focus 
of federal lawmaking. By contrast, a proposal to expand and unify 
federal law in a manner affecting all commercial arbitration touching 
interstate commerce will likely meet with multi-faceted opposition. 
Because a comprehensive consolidation will supplant state law, some 
will argue that the effort is tardy, wasteful, and unnecessary given the 
newly revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) (see infra note 18 and 
accompanying text). Second, consumer advocates will likely oppose 
any arbitration law that does not effect a net enhancement in consumer
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affecting international arbitration is addressed first, the 
arguably more com plicated task o f  m odernizing the FA A  
generally can be discharged more sim ply and surgically than 
w ould  be the case i f  lawmakers were faced with generating a 
s i n g l e  t e x t  s e r v ic e a b le  in  a l l  c o m m e r c ia l  
contexts— international and dom estic. Further, the feasibility  
o f  starting with international disputes is greatly enhanced by  
the existence o f  the M odel Law. At least as it relates to 
international arbitration, it represents the em erging standard; 
m oreover, it is not greatly at odds with existing Am erican  
practice in the field .9 Its foibles are largely faults o f  
om ission— curable by augmentation; and in application, it has 
apparently functioned w ell abroad.
M oreover, M odel Law adoption by the U nited States w ould  
further unify the arbitral regim es o f  the existing N A FT A  
countries10 and w ould improve the general accessibility o f  
Am erican arbitration law  to foreign counsel and disputants.
protection in relation to arbitration clauses in certain kinds of form 
contracts; to strike the correct balance may require prolonged study. 
Third, important arbitration states, such as New York, may consider 
their state arbitration laws to be superior to anything that may emerge 
at the federal level. While an effort to reform international arbitration 
may encounter the same sentiment, if the parties’ ability to choose 
state arbitration law remains undisturbed, established arbitration states 
may have little to fear from federal law limited to international 
disputes.
9 See Chapter 11.
10 All provinces of Canada have adopted the Model Law and Mexico’s 
recently enacted statute replicates many of the Model’s features.
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Im p ro v in g  U pon T h e  M odel L aw — A  S um m ing  U p
Though finding considerable merit the U N C ITR A L M odel 
Law  as a foundational text, this work has suggested  
supplem entation designed to account both for desirable 
aspects o f  the prevailing regim e and for the often-purposeful 
lapses in M odel Law coverage. In general, these 
augmentations w ill clarify the N ew  A ct’s interpretation and 
coverage,11 w ill improve judicial powers in appropriate 
w a y s,12 w ill enhance express tribunal pow ers,13 w ill promote
11 These changes include: statutorily adopting UNCITRAL’s 
definition of “commercial” (see §§ 11.2.1, 12.2 ) exhaustively listing 
the New Act’s mandatory provisions (see § 12.2.2) and perhaps 
providing an official commentary not unlike that supporting the 
Uniform Arbitration Act. See also infra note 23 and accompanying 
text. Consideration should also be given to designation of judicial 
powers exercisable when no place of arbitration has been set or has 
been fixed outside the United States (cf. §11.5.1, n.101; and see 
English Arbitration Act 1996, § 2 (3)(4)).
12 Such as by authorizing orders compelling arbitration (see § 12.3), by 
adding a non-exhaustive catalog of measures within a court’s power 
under the Model Law (cf § 11.5.1, n.101), by authorizing 
consolidation of related arbitrations and tribunal appointments to 
facilitate multiparty arbitration (see § 12.6), by removing potential 
impediments to arbitration based upon the sovereign character of a 
party (see § 12.5), and by enabling courts to facilitate discovery in 
favor of arbitration, irrespective of the seat of arbitration (see § 12.11).
13 These recommendations included removing restrictive language 
governing tribunal grants of interim measures (see § 11.4.4), adding 
subpoena powers (see § 12.11), and confirming tribunal power: to 
award interest and costs (see §§ 12.15, 12.19), to designate the 
currency in which the award should be paid (see § 12.16) and to 
facilitate settlement (§ 12.14). Also proposed are a clarification of the
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the integrity o f  the process14 and finality o f  the result, and w ill 
lim it artificial impediments to selection o f  the U nited States as 
a situs for arbitration.15 M ore amplification m ay result, o f  
course, as the process unfolds.16
Though this study has proposed a bolder undertaking than 
that endorsed elsewhere (at least as to international disputes), 
it is not one that is out o f  step with the developm ents in other 
countries. In fact, m ost states adopting the M odel Law have 
added to its 36 articles; so too are arbitration statutes in non- 
M odel Law jurisdictions far more code-like than the FAA. 
Thus, i f  resisting the temptation to sim ply apply m ore 
bandages to the FAA, U .S . lawmakers w ill have an 
opportunity to match the considered efforts o f  their 
counterparts in other leading international arbitration venues.
ex aequo et bono mandates (see §12.12.4), broadened discretion in 
tribunal choice of law (§12.12.3), and an opt-in condition for tribunal 
awards of non-statutory exemplary damages (§ 12.13).
14 Specific recommendations under this heading include that 
arbitrators must conduct a reasonable, pre-appointment, search for 
conflicts (see §12.8), that a failure to disclose matters raising doubts 
about impartiality should bear upon actions to set aside an award (see 
§ 12.8.1), that ex parte contact with a party should, with narrow 
exception, be prohibited {see §12.7), that costs attach to parties 
resisting an award without good cause {see § 12.19.2 ) that arbitrators 
should observe applicable privileges {see § 12.10) and that arbitrators 
should be immune from suit {see § 12.17).
15 Such as by eliminating practice restrictions for enumerated 
arbitration-related activities {see § 12.20).
16 It may prove desirable, for example, to include a provision enabling 
a case initially filed in a state court and covered by the New Act to be 
removed to a federal court. Cf. FAA § 205.
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W ithin the period during which this study w as finalized, the 
efforts to revise the Uniform  Arbitration A ct (U A A ) 
m entioned in Chapter 8 17 have advanced apace.18 M any state 
arbitration statutes are based upon that docum ent. During the 
same period UNCITRAL announced an intention to embark 
upon a project designed to consider, and perhaps to draft, 
supplem ental M odel Law provisions, to be available for 
consideration by adopting states.19 There is thus at present 
m om entum  and assem bled expertise that m ay be harnessed  
(both as to inspiration and personnel) in an effort to privately  
produce a draft international chapter w hich takes account o f  
the likely developm ents com ing out o f  UNCITR A L20 and, to
17 At page 217, note 5.
18 Since Chapter 8 was written, the RUAA has undergone several 
drafts. The final text is to be discussed, and perhaps approved, at a 
convention to be held in Denver from July 23-30, 1999. While the 
text includes certain provision that should be excluded in a statute for 
international arbitration, if  the FAA’s later-crafted domestic chapter 
were to assimilate the style and content of the RUAA, harmonization 
would result, limiting thereby the potential for conflicts among 
regimes devoted to non-international disputes. If, as recommended in 
this work, the FAA’s international arbitration chapter were free­
standing, the drafters of its domestic chapter would be at liberty to 
borrow from the RUAA in material respects without concern for the 
international standard influencing the international chapter.
19 Speech by Dr. Gerhold Herrmann, Secretary of UNCITRAL, before 
Institute of Transnational Arbitration, Dallas, June 17,1999.
20 In the interests o f avoiding delay in what may prove to be a 
prolonged project, the FAA international chapter should not await the
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the extent consistent with the aims noted herein, the m odem  
treatment o f  certain issues to be found in the R U A A .21 This 
could be accom plished best by staffing a private drafting 
com m ittee w ith persons involved in all three projects.22
The New Act in Operation-Nurturing the Promise
One risk faced by reform is that it w ill go  unnoticed. 
Courts, arbitrators and counsel m ay allow  their com fort with
outcome of UNCITRAL’s further work; cross-fertilization between the 
two projects may be desirable however.
21 The Prefatory Note accompanying the RUAA of June-July 1999 
states that while the drafters “did not directly address international 
arbitration” they did utilize “provisions of UNCITRAL, the New York 
Convention, and the 1996 English Arbitration Act as sources of 
statutory language....” Id. at 5.
22 The author assumes that the most efficient and substantively 
satisfying approach would involve producing a draft through a private 
initiative and to gain support for it among international arbitration 
authorities and relevant constituencies before seeking sponsorship 
within Congress. For example, the Drafting Committee’s members 
might include one member of the ABA’s International Arbitration 
Committee, the General Council of the AAA, the two academic 
lawyers who consulted Uniform Law Commissioners in producing the 
RUAA, perhaps one or two other publicists (practitioner or academic) 
respected in the field, a further member nominated by the Center for 
Public Resources, at least one jurist with background in international 
arbitration under the FAA and, ex officio, the Secretary of 
UNCITRAL.
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familiar w ays to obscure the obvious. Som e questions w ill 
arise in good  faith, others from w ishful thinking; both types 
w ill in turn cause dismay am ong observers abroad, for w hom  
the statute w as supposed to be attractive and illuminating. 
A ccordingly, lawmakers should: 1] strive in the statutory 
language to avoid technical, specialized language, Latin 
incantations, and convoluted structure; 2] provide sufficient 
supporting information to provide genuine guidance, a 
beneficial practice that ought to be inspired by European 
exam ples;23 3] g ive broad principles o f  construction within the 
A ct itse lf and an exhaustive schedule o f  mandatory 
provisions, and 4] refer courts and other users, to the extent a 
matter is not covered in the accom panying report, to the 
travaux preparatoires  surrounding the M odel Law.24
The Supreme Court for its part should edify the N ew  A ct’s 
rules o f  construction by elaborating others designed to 
preclude the unpredictability injected into the process by state 
law  and state rules o f  contract construction. To appreciate the 
need for top-dow n interpretive discipline, one need only recall 
the California courts’ insistence in Volt, acquiesced in by the
23 See, e.g., MustiU and Saville Reports, the respective reports by 
Jenard and Schlosser on the Brussels Convention and Protocol thereto 
at [1979] O.J. C59 at, 1, 66, 71 and the Guiliano and Lagarde Report 
on the Rome Convention at [1980] O.J. C282 at 4.
24 This is the approach followed in, e.g., the Bermuda International Act 
which in § 24 authorizes the use of various UNICITRAL documents 
such as those prepared by the Secretariat.
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majority o f  the Court, that “the law  o f  the place where the 
project is located” (contained in a form contract) included by  
im plication a reference to C alifornia’s arbitration law — a law  
probably not contemplated by the parties w hich nonetheless  
side-tracked an arbitration otherwise governed by  the F A A .25
The specific question in Volt can be addressed w ithin the 
N ew  A ct itself, by requiring the parties to be unam biguous 
in opting for a state arbitration regime; the general tendency  
for state law  to create unpredictability, how ever, w ill 
require sustained supervision lest the allure o f  the N ew  A ct 
be quickly lost.
25 Volt, 489 U.S. at 472. The dissent’s analysis of the that clause, 489 
U.S. at 479 et seq., was far more consistent with contemporary 
construction in private international law. It was emulated somewhat in 
Mastrobuono, which itself has nonetheless been evaded by lower court 
use of state rules of construction. See L. Marinuzzi, Punitive Damages 
in Arbitration—The Debate Continues, 52 Disp. Resol. J. 67, 72 
(1997) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds v. Trimble, No. 119930/94 1995 
N.Y. Misc. Lexus 401, at *7 (Sup. Ct. June 13 1995)).
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Table 1
Express Statutory Treatment o f Specific 
Topics (FAA and Model Law Compared)*
TRIBUNAL IN GENERAL
FAA ML
1. Arbitrator Independence 
& Impartiality
§10
(by implication?)
A12
2. Tribunal Composition NO A A 10,12
3. Number of Arbitrators § 5 (apparently) A10
TRIBUNAL POWERS
FAA ML
Select Applicable Law NO A28
Assess Own Jurisdiction NO A16
Interim Measures NO A l l
Assess/Manage Evidence NO A19(2)
Determine Language NO A22(default)
Determine Place NO A20(default)
Order Translations NO A22
Subpoena § 7 NO
Appoint Experts NO A26
Request Court Assistance NO A l l
(discovery) [but see § 7]
*“NO” indicates not covered, but does not preclude case law or rule coverage of the issue
listed.
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JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE/INTERVENTION
FAA ML
Whether Waiver NO A9
Limits Upon NO A5
Appointment o f Arbitrators §5 A15
Deciding Challenges to 
Arbitrators
NO A13
Arbitrator’s Failure to Act, 
Removal
NO A14
Replacement o f §5 A15
In Taking Evidence § 7 A l l
Remand of Awards NO A34(4)
Setting aside o f awards §10 A34
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
FAA ML
Pleadings (order, content) NO A23
Language/Place NO A l l
Hearings NO A24
Default o f a Party NO A25
Experts NO AA24, 26
Applicable Law NO A28
Termination of NO A32
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TH E AWARD & RELATED M ATTERS
FAA ML
Arbitral Decision-Making NO A29
Form and Content (reasons) NO A31
On Agreed Terms NO A30
Post-Award Adjustment 
(by Court)
FAA § 11 NO
Post-Award Adjustment 
(by Tribunal)
NO A33
Remission/Remand o f NO A34(4)
Recognition/Enforcement of 
Domestic Awards
§9 A3 5
Setting Aside (Vacation) YES
§10
A34
Recognition/Enforcement 
(Foreign Awards)
§§ 207, 302, 304 A3 5
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TA B L E  2
SCHEDULE OF SELECTED TOPICS AND ISSUES
NOT ADDRESSED BY THE MODEL LAW OR THE FAA 
BUT FOUND IN OTHER ARBITRATION STATUTES AND
TEXTS
Scope Note and Abbreviations: This table provides a checklist 
of the issues not treated in the FAA or the Model Law that 
arbitration rule and statute drafters have nonetheless addressed in 
certain other texts. The examples given are illustrative, not 
exhaustive. The purpose is to raise these matters for potential 
inclusion by lawmakers contemplating an international chapter 
within the FAA, whether or not that chapter is based upon the 
Model Law. The following abbreviations have been used: AAA 
Int’l -  American Arbitration Association Rules for International 
Arbitration (1997); BC-British Columbia International Commercial 
Arbitration Act (1996); Berm.-Bermuda International Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act (1993); Cal.-Califomia Title 9.3, Arbitration 
and Conciliation o f International Commercial Disputes, Cal. Code 
Civ. Proc.§§ 1297.11 et seq; CPR Int’l-Center for Public Resource 
Rules for Non-Administered International Arbitration (1992); Eng. 
Arbitration Act 1996; Fla.-Florida International Arbitration Act o f  
1996, Fla. Statutes Ann. §§ 684 et seq.; Germ-German Act on the 
Reform of the Law Related to Arbitral Proceedings (Tenth Book 
Civ. Proc. §§ 1025-1066); HK-Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance 
(Cap 341 as amended by Ordinance No. 75 o f 1996); ICC- 
Intemational Chamber of Commerce Rules for Arbitration (1998); 
ICSID Convention-Convention on the Settlement o f Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals o f Other States (1965); 
ICSID Rules-Intemational Centre for the Settlement o f Investment 
Disputes Rules o f Procedure for Arbitration; LCIA-London Court 
o f International Arbitration Rules (1998); ML-UNCITRAL Model 
Law 1985; NL-Netherlands Arbitration Act (1986) (Code o f Civil 
Proc., Book IV); RUAA-Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (July 
1999 draft); Scot.- Law Reform Scotland Act 1990 (§ 66 and 
Schedule 7 incorporating the ML); Sing.-Singapore International 
Arbitration Act (1994); Switz-Swiss Private International Act 
(1987), Ch. 12, WIPO-World Intellectual Property Organization 
Arbitration Rules (1994).
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I. Act Coverage and Interpretation
A. A statutory definition o f “commercial. ”
1. Examples: BC § 1(6); Cal. §1297.16. Scot., art. 2g.
2. Comment: those encountered have based the statutory 
definition o f “commercial” on the official footnote to the 
ML. Some ML countries, e.g., Germany and Hong Kong, 
have not limited ML application to “commercial” 
arbitrations
B. Powers exercisable by a court before the place o f  
arbitration has been designated or when seat is abroad.
1. Example: Eng. § 2(2)(3); NL art. 1074(2).
2. Comment: recall ML dependence upon place o f  
arbitration being within the state.
C. Power o f  the parties to select another curial law.
1. Example: Eng. § 4.
2. Comment: See Saville Report, para. 23.
D. Canons o f  construction for courts and arbitrators; 
relevance o f  any travaux.
1. Example: BC § 6; Berm. § 24, Eng. § 1.
2. Comment: One approach is to designate specific UN  
documents as citable or persuasive.
E. Mandatory rules listed in one location or otherwise clearly 
indicated.
1. Example: Eng. § 4(1), Sched. 1.
2. Comment: See Saville Report, paras. 28-30.
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II. Court Powers To:
A. Grant specific interim measures: an illustrative catalog 
o f  the permitted types.
1. Example: Cal. § 1297.93; Fla. § 684.23(b)(3).
2. Comment: The listing in these provisions is not 
intended to be exhaustive.
B. Consolidate related arbitrations and staff the tribunal 
for multiparty disputes.
1. Example: BC § 27(2); Cal. § 1297.271 et seq.; HK § 
6B; NL art. 1046.
2. Comment: Australia’s ML (international disputes) 
approach is to authorize requests to the tribunals 
involved to consider consolidation jointly; no reference 
to a court is contemplated. Apparently, Hong Kong’s 
provision has been little used (Morgan, [1998] ADRLJ 
287 at 301). NL’s provision is not dependent upon the 
parties’ consent.
C. Dismiss stale arbitration claims.
1. Example: HK § 29A.
2. Comment: By way of related historical note, see 1979 
Act (England and Wales) § 5 and § 13 A o f Courts and 
Legal Services Act 1990 (empowering tribunal to 
pursue designated measures).
III. Tribunal Powers
A. To act a mediator, appoint mediators, or otherwise 
promote settlement.
1. Example: Berm. §§3-21; Cal. § 1297.341; Canada (all 
provinces); Fla. § 684.10; HK §§ 2A, 2B.
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2. Comment: Some ML States have enacted separate 
chapters or detailed provisions on conciliation. These 
include: Berm., Cal., HK, Nigeria, Ohio, Oregon, and 
Texas. Bermuda and Nigeria attach the UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules (1980) as a schedule.
B. To award interest
1. Example: BC § 31(7); Cal. § 1297.317; Eng. § 49; HK § 
2GH(1).
2. Comment: Certain rules texts grant this power as well; 
see, e.g., LCIA art. 26.6; AAA Int’l art. 28(4).
C. To allocate costs,
1. Example: Cal. § 1297.318; Eng. § 61; HK §§ 2GJ (1), 
2GL (as amended 1996).
2. Comment: The ML states that have added provisions on 
interest have generally also treated costs.
D. To designate currency o f the award,
1. Example: Eng. § 48(4); Fla. § 684.46 (be inference).
2. Comment: Certain rules texts grant this power: see LCIA 
art. 26.6; AAA Int’l art. 28(4).
E. To proceed when “truncated. ”
1. Example: Germ. § 1025(2)(3).
2. Comment: See also LCIA arts.. 12 ,26(2)(4); ICC Rules 
art. 12.
F. To implement specific case management measures.
1. Example: Eng. § 34; AAA Int’l arts. 16(2)(3), 20(4).
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2. Comment: The above-referenced English provision 
allows (but does not require) a tribunal to proceed in 
inquisitorial (civil law) fashion, thus enabling an active role 
in fact finding and in determining order and manner of  
proofs.
G. To provide/attach separate opinions,
1. Example: ICSID Convention art. 48(4).
2. Comment: The ICSID Rules counterpart is art. 47(3).
H. To decide specified categories o f  subject matter 
(arbitrability),
1. Example: NL art. 1020(3); Germ. § 1030; Switz. art. 177.
2, Comment: The Dutch provision asserts the truism that 
the matter must be one o f which the parties can freely 
dispose. The Swiss provision grants arbitrability to “any 
dispute involving financial interests.” The German 
counterpart (“claims involving an economic interest”) adds 
that parties may arbitrate non-commercial disputes which 
the law allows them to settle by agreement, a grant which 
corresponds to the statute’s intentional coverage of non­
commercial matters. Concerning the German statute, see 
Delaume, 37 I.L.M. 790 (1998).
I. To require security for costs,
1. Examples: Eng. § 38(3).
2. Comment: The English provision contemplates that 
claimant is the party to whom the order will issue but would 
include counter-claimants also. Distinguish tribunal power 
from the now-eliminated power o f English courts in this 
regard, reversing Ken-Ren Chemicals, [1995] 1 AC 38.
J. To secure the ultimate award.
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1. Examples: Eng. §§ 38(4)(a), 39(2).
2. Comment: See also LCIA art. 25.
K. To render partial/interim awards,
1. Examples: Berm. § 36; Cal. § 1297.316; Eng. § 39(2); 
Switz. art. 188.
2. Comment: The Swiss statute, art. 190(3), limites the 
grounds upon which partial awards can be attacked.
IV. Tribunal Duties
A. To observe privileges,
1. Example: AAA Int’l art. 20(6); CPR Int’l, Rule 17; cf. 
Eng. § 43(4).
2. Comment: For the American case law position, see 
Carter at 2(1) ADR Currents, Winter 1996/1997, at 1,15.
B. To observe confidentiality,
1, Example: AAA Int’l art. 34; CPR Int’l rule 17; LCIA art. 
30 (partial); ICSID Rule 48(4) (refers expressly only to 
Centre); WIPO art. 76.
2. Comment: A statutory provision could draw upon the 
above referenced rule texts. Disclosures required by law or 
fiduciary obligation may be exempted.
C. To avoid unnecessary delay or expense,
1. Examples: Eng. § 33 (l)(b), (2); HK § 2GA(l)(a).
2, Comment: A similar duty is set forth in certain rules 
texts; see, e.g., AAA Int’l art. 16(2); LCIA art. 14(2).
V. Party Autonomy To:
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A. Expand substantive review o f the award.
1. Examples: RUAA § 20, Alternatives I and II.
2. Comment: On existing American case law, see 
Lowenfeld, 3(3) ADR Currents (Sept. 1998) at 1,12.
B. Limit review o f the award,
1. Examples: Eng. § 45; Switz. art. 192.
2. Comment: In England, review for serious procedural 
irregularity apparently cannot be eliminated by an exclusion 
agreement, but can be waived by a failure to complain in 
time. See Arbitration Act 1996, §§ 68, 73.
VI. Miscellaneous
A. The immunity o f  arbitrators from suit
1. Example: Berm. § 34; Cal. § 1297.119; Eng. § 29, Fla. § 
684.35.
2. Comment: Most rules texts grant immunity, either 
qualified or absolute, to arbitrators; see, e.g., AAA Int’l art. 
35; ICC art. 34; LCIA art. 31; WIPO art. 77.
B. The immunity o f arbitral institutions,
1. Example: Eng. § 74.
2. Comment: In the United States, immunity has been 
conferred by case law; see Cort v. American Arbitration 
Association, 795 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Various 
rule formulations also immunize the institution in question; 
see, e.g., LCIA art. 31; ICC art. 34.
C. Whether arbitrators privileged to not testify in subsequent 
proceedings related to the award.
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1. Examples: C f ICSID Convention 21(a).
2. Comment: C f  LCIA art. 30(2) (tribunal deliberations 
confidential).
D. The confidentiality o f  arbitral proceedings within the 
courts.
1. Example: Berm. § 45.
2. Comment: The Bermudian provision provides: “subject 
to the Constitution, proceedings in any court under this Act 
shall on the application o f any party to the proceedings be 
heard otherwise than in open court.”
E. Exemptions from local practice restrictions for arbitrators 
and representatives o f  a party.
1. Examples: Berm. § 37(2); Eng. § 36; HK § 2F (1989).
2. Comment: See also Cal. § 1297.351 (found in the 
Conciliation chapter but phrased in a general manner).
F. Clarification o f continuing relevance o f  convention 
reservations.
1. Examples: HK (by omission o f arts. 35 and 36).
2. Comment: Unlike the NYC as implemented by many 
states, the ML has no reciprocity requirement.
G. Liability ofparties to tribunal for fees and expenses.
1. Examples: Eng. § 28 (joint and severable).
2. Comment: to the same effect is LCIA art. 28.5
H. Intervention o f a third party.
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1. Example: NL art. 1045; LCIA art 22(h).
2. Comment: See also art. 26 o f ML as adopted in Iran, 
discussed by Seife, 5(2) J. IntT Arb. 5,27 (1998). Cf NAFTA 
art. 1128 (State party to NAFTA may make submissions to 
Tribunal on matters o f interpretation).
I. Linking the equal treatment and opportunity-to-be-heard 
rules directly to set aside (vacatur) provision.
1. Example: Switz. art. 190(2)(d).
2. Comment: The Swiss provision, in the English and 
French texts, requires that the parties be heard in an 
“adversarial procedure.”
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U.S. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT*
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section
1. ‘‘Maritime transactions” and “ commerce” defined; exceptions to operation of title
2. Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
3. Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration
4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to United States court having jurisdic­
tion for order to compel arbitration; notice and service thereof; hearing and determi­
nation
5. Appointment of arbitrators or umpire
6. Application heard as motion
7. Witnesses before arbitrators; fees; compelling attendance
8. Proceedings begun by libel in admiralty and seizure of vessel or property
9. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; procedure
10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order
12. Notice of motions to vacate or modify; service; stay of proceedings
13. Papers filed with order on motions; judgment; docketing; force and effect; enforce­
ment
* Title 9, U.S. Code sections 1-14, first enacted February 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 
Stat. 669), and amended September 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1233). Chapter 2 added July 31, 1970 (84 Stat. 692). Section 15 
added November 16, 1988 (102 Stat. 3969); Section 16 added on November 19, 1988 (102 Stat. 4671) [renumbered 
as § 16 December 1, 1990 (Stat. 5120)]. Chapter 3 added August 15, 1990 (104 Stat. 448).
14. Contracts not affected
15. Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine
16. Appeals
CHAPTER 2. CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
201. Enforcement of Convention
202. Agreement or award falling under the Convention
203. Jurisdiction; amount in controversy
204. Venue
205. Removal of cases from State courts
206. Order to compel arbitration; appointment of arbitrators
207. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; proceeding
208. Chapter 1; residual application
CHAPTER 3. INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
301. Enforcement of Convention
302. Incorporation by reference
303. Order to compel arbitration; appointment of arbitrators; locale
304. Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral decisions and awards; reciprocity
305. Relationship between the Inter-American Convention and the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10,1958
306. Applicable rules of Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission
307. Chapter 1; residual application
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. “ Maritime Transactions” and “ Commerce” Defined; Exceptions to Operation of 
Title
“ Maritime transactions,” as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of water 
carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies, furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, 
collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would 
be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; “commerce,” as herein defined, means commerce 
among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in 
the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such 
Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State 
or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ­
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.
2. Validity, Irrevocability, and Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract 
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, 
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
3. Stay of Proceedings Where Issue Therein Referable to Arbitration
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any 
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in 
which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding 
is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties 
stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with 
such arbitration.
4. Failure to Arbitrate Under Agreement; Petition to United States Court Having Juris­
diction for Order to Compel Arbitration; Notice and Service Thereof; Hearing and 
Determination
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under 
a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save 
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of 
the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order 
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days’ 
notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof 
shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall 
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing 
and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an 
order directing such arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, 
neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the
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trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter 
in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where 
such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on 
or before the return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and 
upon such demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the 
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that 
purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that there is 
no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an 
agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereun­
der, the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration 
in accordance with the terms thereof.
5. Appointment of Arbitrators or Umpire
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator 
or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided 
therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such 
method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or 
arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the 
controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the 
case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect, as if 
he or they had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement 
the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
6. Application Heard as Motion
Any application to the court hereunder shall be made and heard in the manner provided 
by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided.
7. Witnesses Before Arbitrators; Fees; Compelling Attendance
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise, or a majority of 
them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness 
and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which 
may be deemed material as evidence in the case. The fees for such attendance shall be the 
same as the fees of witnesses before masters of the United States courts. Said summons shall 
issue in the name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be signed by 
the arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be directed to the said person and shall be 
served in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the court; if any person 
or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition 
the United States court in and for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, 
are sitting may compel the attendance of such person or persons before said arbitrator or 
arbitrators, or punish said person or persons for contempt in the same manner provided on 
February 12, 1925, for securing the attendance of witnesses or their punishment for neglect or 
refusal to attend in the courts of the United States.
8. Proceedings Begun by Libel in Admiralty and Seizure of Vessel or Property
If the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise justiciable in admiralty, then, 
notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary the party claiming to be aggrieved may begin 
his proceeding hereunder by libel and seizure of the vessel or other property of the other party 
according to the usual course of admiralty proceedings, and the court shall then have jurisdiction
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to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its 
decree upon the award.
9. Award of Arbitrators; Confirmation; Jurisdiction; Procedure
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered 
upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time 
within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so 
specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order 
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this 
title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made 
to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made. Notice of 
the application shall be served upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have 
jurisdiction of such party as though he had appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse 
party is a resident of the district within which the award was made, such service shall be made 
upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in 
an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be a non-resident, then the notice of the 
application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse party may 
be found in like manner as other process of the court.
10. Same; Vacation; Grounds; Rehearing
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the 
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration—
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, 
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material 
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the 
award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing 
by the arbitrators.
11. Same; Modification or Correction; Grounds; Order
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the 
award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application 
of any party to the arbitration—
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material 
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it 
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the 
controversy.
443
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote 
justice between the parties.
12. Notice of Motions to Vacate or Modify; Service; Stay of Proceedings
Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse 
party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered. If the adverse 
party is a resident of the district within which the award was made, such service shall be made 
upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in 
an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident then the notice of the 
application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse party may 
be found in like manner as other process of the court. For the purposes of the motion any judge 
who might make an order to stay the proceedings in an action brought in the same court may 
make an order, to be served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of the adverse 
party to enforce the award.
13. Papers Filed with Order on Motions; Judgment; Docketing; Force and Effect; En­
forcement
The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award shall, at the 
time such order is filed with the clerk for the entry of judgment thereon, also file the following 
papers with the clerk:
(a) The agreement; the selection or appointment, if any, of an additional arbitrator or 
umpire; and each written extension of the time, if any, within which to make the 
award.
(b) The award.
(c) Each notice, affidavit, or other paper used upon an application to confirm, modify, 
or correct the award, and a copy of each order of the court upon such an application.
The judgment shall be docketed as if it was rendered in an action.
The judgment so entered shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be 
subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced 
as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.
14. Contracts Not Affected
This title shall not apply to contracts made prior to January 1, 1926.
15. Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine
Enforcement of arbitral agreements, confirmation of arbitral awards, and execution upon 
judgments based on orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act 
of State Doctrine.
16. Appeals
(a) An appeal may be taken from—
(1) an order—
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
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(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an 
arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be taken 
from an interlocutory order—
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
CHAPTER 2. CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
201. Enforcement of Convention
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 
10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.
202. Agreement or Award Falling Under the Convention
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract, or 
agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention. An agreement or 
award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States 
shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property 
located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable 
relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a 
citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the 
United States.
203. Jurisdiction; Amount in Controversy
An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the 
laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United States (including the 
courts enumerated in section 460 of title 28) shall have original jurisdiction over such an action 
or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy.
204. Venue
An action or proceeding over which the district courts have jurisdiction pursuant to section 
203 of this title may be brought in any such court in which save for the arbitration agreement 
an action or proceeding with respect to the controversy between the parties could be brought,
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or in such court for the district and division which embraces the place designated in the 
agreement as the place of arbitration if such place is within the United States.
205. Removal of Cases from State Courts
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an 
arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention, the defendant or the defendants 
may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action or proceeding to the district court 
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the action or 
proceeding is pending. The procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law shall 
apply, except that the ground for removal provided in this section need not appear on the face 
of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for removal. For the purposes of Chapter 1 
of this title any action or proceeding removed under this section shall be deemed to have been 
brought in the district court to which it is removed.
206. Order to Compel Arbitration; Appointment of Arbitrators
A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accor­
dance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that place is within or 
without the United States. Such court may also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the 
provisions of the agreement.
207. Award of Arbitrators; Confirmation; Jurisdiction; Proceeding
Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made, any party 
to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter for an order 
confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration. The court shall confirm the 
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement 
of the award specified in the said Convention.
208. Chapter 1; Residual Application <
Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that 
chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States.
CHAPTER 3. INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
301. Enforcement of Convention
The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of January 30, 
1975, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.
302. Incorporation by Reference
Sections 202,203, 204,205, and 207 of this title shall apply to this chapter as if specifically 
set forth herein, except that for the purposes of this chapter “ the Convention” shall mean the 
Inter-American Convention.
303. Order to Compel Arbitration; Appointment of Arbitrators; Locale
(a) A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accor­
dance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that place is within
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or without the United States. The court may also appoint arbitrators in accordance with 
the provisions of the agreement.
(b) In the event the agreement does not make provision for the place of arbitration or the 
appointment of arbitrators, the court shall direct that the arbitration shall be held and the 
arbitrators be appointed in accordance with Article 3 of the Inter-American Convention.
304. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Decisions and Awards; Reciprocity
Arbitral decisions or awards made in the territory of a foreign State shall, on the basis of 
reciprocity, be recognized and enforced under this chapter only if that State has ratified or 
acceded to the Inter-American Convention.
305. Relationship between Inter-American Convention and the Convention on the Recog­
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10,1958
When the requirements for application of both the Inter-American Convention and the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, 
are met, determination as to which Convention applies shall, unless otherwise expressly agreed, 
be made as follows:
(1) If a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of a State or 
States that have ratified or acceded to the Inter-American Convention and are member 
States of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention 
shall apply.
(2) In all other cases the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall apply.
306. Applicable rules of Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission
(a) For the purposes of this chapter the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commercial 
Arbitration Commission referred to in Article 3 of the Inter-American Convention shall, 
subject to subsection (b) of this section, be those rules as promulgated by the Commission 
on July 1, 1988.
(b) In the event of the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission are modified or amended in accordance with the procedures for amendment 
of the rules of that Commission, the Secretary of State, by regulation in accordance with 
section 553 of title 5, consistent with the aims and purposes of this Convention, may 
prescribe that such modifications or amendments shall be effective for purposes of this 
chapter.
307. Chapter 1; Residual Application
Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent 
chapter 1 is not in conflict with this chapter or the Inter-American Convention as ratified by 
the United States.
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A p p en d ix
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION*
CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1—Scope of Application
(1) This Law applies to international commercial arbitration, subject to any agreement in force 
between this State and any other State or States.
(2) The provisions of this Law, except articles 8, 9, 35 and 36, apply only if the place of 
arbitration is in the territory of this State.
(3) An arbitration is international if:
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that 
agreement, their places of business in different States; or
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have 
their places of business:
(i) the place: of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration 
agreement;
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relation­
ship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter of the dispute 
is most closely connected; or
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement 
relates to more than one country.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3) of this article:
(a) if a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that which
has the closest relationship to the arbitration agreement;
(b) if a party does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to his habitual resi­
dence.
(5) This Law shall not affect any other law of this State by virtue of which certain disputes
may not be submitted to arbitration or may be submitted to arbitration only according to
provisions other than those of this Law.
* Adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985.
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Article 2—Definitions and Rules of Interpretation
For the purposes of this Law:
(a) “arbitration” means any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent 
arbitral institution;
(b) “arbitral tribunal” means a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators;
(c) “court” means a body or organ of the judicial system of a State;
(d) where a provision of this Law, except article 28, leaves the parties free to determine 
a certain issue, such freedom includes the right of the parties to authorize a third 
party, including an institution, to make that determination;
(e) where a provision of this Law refers to the fact that the parties have agreed or that 
they may agree or in any other way refers to an agreement of the parties, such 
agreement includes any arbitration rules referred to in that agreement;
(f) where a provision of this Law, other than in articles 25(a) and 32(2)(a), refers to a 
claim, it also applies to a counter-claim, and where it refers to a defence, it also 
applies to a defence to such counter-claim.
Article 3—Receipt of Written Communications
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties:
(a) any written communication is deemed to have been received if it is delivered to the
addressee personally or if it is delivered at his place of business, habitual residence
or mailing address; if none of these can be found after making a reasonable inquiry, 
a written communication is deemed to have been received if it is sent to the addres­
see’s last-known place of business, habitual residence or mailing address by registered 
letter or any other means which provides a record of the attempt to deliver it;
(b) the communication is deemed to have been received on the day it is so delivered.
(2) The provisions of this article do not apply to communications in court proceedings.
Article 4—Waiver of Right to Object
A party who knows that any provision of this Law from which the parties may derogate 
or any requirement under the arbitration agreement has not been complied with and yet proceeds 
with the arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay 
or, if a time-limit is provided therefor, within such period of time, shall be deemed to have 
waived his right to object.
Article 5—Extent of Court Intervention
In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in 
this Law.
Article 6—Court or Other Authority for Certain Functions of Arbitration Assistance and 
Supervision
The functions referred to in articles 11(3), 11(4), 13(3), 14, 16(3) and 34(2) shall be 
performed by . . .  [Each State enacting this model law specifies the court, courts or, where 
referred to therein, other authority competent to perform these functions.]
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CHAPTER II. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Article 7—Definition and Form of Arbitration Agreement
(1) “Arbitration agreement” is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or 
certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined 
legal relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form 
of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
(2) The arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An agreement is in writing if it is contained 
in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other 
means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement, or in an exchange 
of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of an agreement is alleged by 
one party and not denied by another. The reference in a contract to a document containing 
an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in 
writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract.
Article 8—Arbitration Agreement and Substantive Claim Before Court
(1) A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration 
agreement shall, if a party so requests not later than when submitting his first statement 
on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
(2) Where an action referred to in paragraph (1) of this article has been brought, arbitral 
proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be made, 
while the issue is pending before the court.
Article 9—Arbitration Agreement and Interim Measures by Court
It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or during
arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for a court to grant
such measure.
CHAPTER HI. COMPOSITION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
Article 10—Number of Arbitrators
(1) The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators.
(2) Failing such determination, the number of arbitrators shall be three.
Article 11—Appointment of Arbitrators
(1) No person shall be precluded by reason of his nationality from acting as an arbitrator, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
(2) The parties are free to agree on a procedure of appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators, 
subject to the provisions of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this article.
(3) Failing such agreement,
(a) in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and 
the two arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator; if a party fails to
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appoint the arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a request to do so from the 
other party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within thirty 
days of their appointment, the appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, 
by the court or other authority specified in article 6 ;
(b) in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties are unable to agree on the
arbitrator, he shall be appointed, upon request of a party, by the court or other 
authority specified in article 6 .
(4) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,
(a) a party fails to act as required under such procedure, or
(b) the parties, or two arbitrators, are unable to reach an agreement expected of them 
under such procedure, or
(c) a third party, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to it 
under such procedure,
any party may request the court or other authority specified in article 6  to take the necessary 
measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for 
securing the appointment.
(5) A decision on a matter entrusted by paragraph (3) or (4) of this article to the court or other 
authority specified in article 6  shall be subject to no appeal. The court or other authority, 
in appointing an arbitrator, shall have due regard to any qualifications required of the 
arbitrator by the agreement of the parties and to such considerations as are likely to secure 
the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator and, in the case of sole or third 
arbitrator, shall take into account as well the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a 
nationality other than those of the parties.
Article 12—Grounds for Challenge
(1) When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, 
he shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and through­
out the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose any such circumstances to the 
parties unless they have already been informed of them by him.
(2) An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to his impartiality or independence, or if he does not possess qualifications 
agreed to by the parties. A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in 
whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which he becomes aware after 
the appointment has been made.
Article 13— Challenge Procedure
(1) The parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging an arbitrator, subject to the 
provisions of paragraph (3) of this article.
(2) Failing such agreement, a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen 
days after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming 
aware of any circumstance referred to in article 1 2 (2 ), send a written statement of the 
reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. Unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws 
from his office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide 
on the challenge.
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(3) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by the parties or under the procedure of 
paragraph (2 ) of this article is not successful, the challenging party may request, within 
thirty days after having received notice of the decision rejecting the challenge, the court 
or other authority specified in article 6  to decide on the challenge, which decision shall 
be subject to no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal, including 
the challenged arbitrator, may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.
Article 14—Failure or Impossibility to Act
(1) If an arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other 
reasons fails to act without undue delay, his mandate terminates if he withdraws from his 
office or if the parties agree on the termination. Otherwise, if a controversy remains 
concerning any of these grounds, any party may request the court or other authority 
specified in article 6  to decide on the termination of the mandate, which decision shall be 
subject to no appeal.
(2) If, under this article or article 13(2), an arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party 
agrees to the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, this does not imply acceptance 
of the validity of any ground referred to in this article or article 1 2 (2 ).
Article 15—Appointment of Substitute Arbitrator
Where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates under article 13 or 14 or because of his 
withdrawal from office for any other reason or because of the revocation of his mandate by 
agreement of the parties or in any other case of termination of his mandate, a substitute arbitrator 
shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator 
being replaced.
CHAPTER IV. JURISDICTION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
Article 16—Competence of Arbitral Tribunal to Rule on Its Jurisdiction
(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect 
to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration 
clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the 
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and 
void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.
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(2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the 
submission of the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea 
by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A 
plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon 
as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral 
proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the 
delay justified.
(3) The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either 
as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a 
preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after 
having received notice o f that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, 
which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral 
tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award. 452
Article 17—Power of A rbitral Tribunal to O rder Interim  M easures
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, 
order any party to take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider 
necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any 
party to provide appropriate security in connection with such measure.
CHAPTER V. CONDUCT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
Article 18—Equal Treatment of Parties
The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity 
of presenting his case.
Article 19—Determination of Rules of Procedure
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be 
followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings.
(2) Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, 
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The power conferred 
upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, 
materiality and weight of any evidence.
Article 20—Place of Arbitration
(1) The parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Failing such agreement, the place 
of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances 
of the case, including the convenience of the parties.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this article, the arbitral tribunal may, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for 
consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for 
inspection of goods, other property or documents.
Article 21—Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal proceedings in respect of a 
particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to 
arbitration is received by the respondent.
Article 22—Language
(1) The parties are free to agree on the language or languages to be used in the arbitral 
proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the language or 
languages to be used in the proceedings. This agreement or determination, unless otherwise 
specified therein, shall apply to any written statement by a party, any hearing and any 
award, decision or other communication by the arbitral tribunal.
(2) The arbitral tribunal may order that any documentary evidence shall be accompanied by 
a translation into the language or languages agreed upon by the parties or determined by 
the arbitral tribunal.
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Article 23— Statements of Claim and Defence
( 1 ) Within the period of time agreed by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal, the 
claimant shall state the facts supporting his claim, the points at issue and the relief or 
remedy sought, and the respondent shall state his defence in respect of these particulars, 
unless the parties have otherwise agreed as to the required elements of such statements. . 
The parties may submit with their statements all documents they consider to be relevant 
or may add a reference to the documents or other evidence they will submit.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, either party may amend or supplement his claim or 
defence during the course of the arbitral proceedings, unless the arbitral tribunal considers it 
inappropriate to allow such amendments having regard to the delay in making it.
Article 24—Hearings and Written Proceedings
(1) Subject to any contrary agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether 
to hold oral hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or whether the 
proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents and other materials. However, 
unless the parties have agreed that no hearings shall be held, the arbitral tribunal shall 
hold such hearings at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, if so requested by a party.
(2) The parties shall be given sufficient advance notice of any hearing and of any meeting of 
the arbitral tribunal for the purposes of inspection of goods, other property or documents.
(3) All statements, documents or other information supplied to the arbitration tribunal by one 
party shall be communicated to the other party. Also any expert report or evidentiary 
document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in making its decision shall be communi­
cated to the parties.
Article 25—Default of a Party
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if, without showing sufficient cause,
(a) the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim in accordance with article 
23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings;
(b) the respondent fails to communicate his statement of defence in accordance with 
article 23(1), the arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings without treating such 
failure in itself as an admission of the claimant’s allegations;
(c) any party fails to appear at a hearing or to produce documentary evidence, the arbitral 
tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the award on the evidence before it.
Article 26—Expert Appointed by Arbitral Tribunal
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
(a) may appoint one or more experts to report to it on specific issues to be determined 
by the arbitral tribunal;
(b) may require a party to give the expert any relevant information or to produce, or to 
provide access to, any relevant documents, goods or other property for his inspection.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if a party so requests or if the arbitral tribunal 
considers it necessary, the expert shall, after delivery of his written or oral report, partici­
pate in a hearing where the parties have the opportunity to put questions to him and to 
present expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue. 4 5 4
Article 27—Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
The arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request from 
a competent court of this State assistance in taking evidence. The court may execute the request 
within its competence and according to its rules on taking evidence.
CHAPTER VL MAKING OF AWARD AND TERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
Article 28—Rules Applicable to Substance of Dispute
(1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are 
chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Any designation of the 
law or legal system of a given State shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as 
directly referring to the substantive law of that State and not to its conflict of laws rules.
(2) Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined 
by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the 
parties have expressly authorized it to do so.
(4) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract 
and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.
Article 29—Decision-Making by Panel of Arbitrators
In arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, any decision of the arbitral tribunal 
shall be made, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, by a majority of all its members. However, 
questions of procedure may be decided by a presiding arbitrator, if so authorized by the parties 
or all members of the arbitral tribunal.
Article 30—Settlement
(1) If, during arbitral proceedings, the parties settle the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall 
terminate the proceedings and, if requested by the parties and not objected to by the arbitral 
tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms.
(2) An award on agreed terms shall be made in accordance with the provisions of article 31 
and shall state that it is an award. Such an award has the same status and effect as any 
other award on the merits of the case.
Article 31—Form and Contents of Award
(1) The award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the arbitrator or arbitrators. In 
arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all 
members of the arbitral tribunal shall suffice, provided that the reason for any omitted 
signature is stated.
(2) The award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the parties have agreed 
that no reasons are to be given or the award is an award on agreed terms under article 30.
(3) The award shall state its date and the place of arbitration as determined in accordance 
with article 20(1). The award shall be deemed to have been made at that place.
(4) After the award is made, a copy signed by the arbitrators in accordance with paragraph
( 1 ) of this article shall be delivered to each party.
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Article 32— Term ination of Proceedings
(1) The arbitral proceedings are terminated by the final award or by an order of the arbitral 
tribunal in accordance with paragraph (2 ) of this article.
(2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings 
when:
(a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent objects thereto and the 
arbitral tribunal recognizes a legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final settle­
ment of the dispute;
(b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings;
(c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other 
reason become unnecessary or impossible.
(3) The mandate of the arbitral tribunal terminates with the termination of the arbitral proceed­
ings, subject to the provisions of articles 33 and 34(4).
Article 33—Correction and Interpretation of Award; Additional Award
(1) Within thirty days of receipt of the award, unless another period of time has been agreed 
upon by the parties:
(a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct in 
the award any errors in computation, any clerical or typographical errors or any errors 
of similar nature;
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the 
arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award.
If the arbitral tribunal considers the request to be justified, it shall make the correction or 
give the interpretation within thirty days of receipt of the request. The interpretation shall 
form part of the award.
(2) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type referred to in paragraph (l)(a) of 
this article on its own initiative within thirty days of the date of the award.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request, 
within thirty days of receipt of the award, the arbitral tribunal to make an additional award 
as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award. If the arbitral 
tribunal considers the request to be justified, it shall make the additional award within 
sixty days.
(4) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it shall 
make a correction, interpretation or an additional award under paragraph (1) or (3) of 
this article.
(5) The provisions of article 31 shall apply to a correction or interpretation of the award or 
to an additional award.
CHAPTER VH. RECOURSE AGAINST AWARD
Article 34—Application for Setting Aside as Exclusive Recourse Against Arbitral Award
(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for 
setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article.
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 only if:
(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some 
incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the 
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of 
this State; or
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment 
of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present 
his case; or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond 
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on 
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, 
only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted 
to arbitration may be set aside; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in 
conflict with a provision of this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, 
or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Law; or
(b) the court finds that:
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of this State; or
(ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State.
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from 
the date on which the party making that application had received the award or, if a request 
had been made under article 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed 
of by the arbitral tribunal.
(4) The court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where appropriate and so requested by 
a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period of time determined by it in 
order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to 
take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will eliminate the grounds for 
setting aside.
CHAPTER VIII. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS
Article 35—Recognition and Enforcement
(1) An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be recognized 
as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court, shall be enforced 
subject to the provisions of this article and of article 36.
(2) The party relying on an award or applying for its enforcement shall supply the duly 
authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof, and the original arbitration 
agreement referred to in article 7 or a duly certified copy thereof. If the award or agreement 
is not made in an official language of this State, the party shall supply a duly certified 
translation thereof into such language.
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Article 36—Grounds for Refusing Recognition or Enforcement
(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it 
was made, may be refused only:
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to the
competent court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof that:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some 
incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties 
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made; or
(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of 
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters be­
yond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions 
on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submit­
ted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not 
in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or 
suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that 
award was made; or
(b) if the court finds that:
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of this State; or
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of this State.
(2) If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to a court 
referred to in paragraph (l)(a)(v) of this article, the court where recognition or enforcement 
is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application 
of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the other party to 
provide appropriate security.
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A p p e n d ix
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS*
Article I
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made 
in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of 
such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical 
or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the 
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.
2. The term “ arbitral awards” shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed 
for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties 
have submitted.
3. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article 
X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention 
to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Con­
tracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences 
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as 
commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.
Article II
1. Each Contracting State shall recognise an agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may 
arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term “ agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an 
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or tele­
grams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which 
the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article shall, at the request 
of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement 
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
* June 10, 1958. Sometimes also referred to as: the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce­
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards. For a list of signatories and parties, see Appendix 47.
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Article HI
Each Contracting State shall recognise arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in 
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under 
the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially 
more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral 
awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement 
of domestic arbitral awards.
Article IV
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, the party 
applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which 
the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award 
shall produce a translation of these documents into such language. The translation shall 
be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where 
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable 
to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law 
of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope 
of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award 
which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognised and 
enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accor­
dance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
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(a) The subject-matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under 
the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of that country.
Article VI
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a 
competent authority referred to in article V(l)(e), the authority before which the award is sought 
to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the 
award and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order 
the other party to give suitable security.
Article VII
1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or 
bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered 
into by the Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have 
to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law 
or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.
2. The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the 
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 shall cease to have effect between Con­
tracting States on their becoming bound and to the extent that they become bound, by 
this Convention.
Article VUI
1. This Convention shall be open until December 31, 1958 for signature on behalf of any 
Member of the United Nations and also on behalf of any other State which is or hereafter 
becomes a member of any specialised agency of the United Nations, or which is or hereafter 
becomes a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, or any other State to 
which an invitation has been addressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
2. This Convention shall be ratified and the instrument of ratification shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article IX
1. This Convention shall be open for accession to all States referred to in article VIII.
2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Conven­
tion shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations of which it 
is responsible. Such a declaration shall take effect when the Convention enters into force 
for the State concerned.
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take effect as from the ninetieth day
after the day of receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this notification,
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or as from the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned, whichever 
is the later.. . .
Article XI
In the case of a federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative 
jurisdiction of the federal authority, the obligations of the federal Government shall 
to this extent be the same as those of Contracting States which are not federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the legislative 
jurisdiction of constituent states or provinces which are not, under the constitutional 
system of the federation, bound to take legislative action, the federal Government 
shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the 
appropriate authorities of constituent states or provinces at the earliest possible 
moment.
(c) A federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other Contracting 
State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supply a 
statement of the law and practice of the federation and its constituent units in regard 
to any particular provision of this Convention, showing the extent to which effect 
has been given to that provision by legislative or other action.
Article X n
1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit 
of the third instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to this Convention after the deposit of the third 
instrument of ratification or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the nineti­
eth day after deposit of such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article XIU
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by a written notification to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the 
date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General___
2. This Convention shall continue to be applicable to arbitral awards in respect of which 
recognition or enforcement proceedings have been instituted before the denunciation 
takes effect.
Article XTV
A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention against
other Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the Convention.
Article XV
The Secretary-General of this United Nations shall notify the States contemplated in article
VHI of [various State activities affecting adherence to this Convention].. . .
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Article XVI
1. This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts shall 
be equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit a certified copy of this Conven­
tion to the States contemplated in article VIIL
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